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Forholdet mellom scenisk representasjon og metateater hos Shakespeare har 
tradisjonelt blitt oppfattet antagonistisk: publikum ses enten som fanget inn av 
scenens skinn av virkelighet, eller som fremmedgjort og skeptisk distansert fra 
den. Min forskning viser imidlertid at Shakespeares drama kun realiseres 
gjennom forfalskende effekter og posisjoner, men at det likevel ikke er noe 
motsetningsforhold mellom representasjon og metateater. Tvert imot 
suspenderes virkningen av hver enkelt modalitet; begge forblir i spill, og 
dramatikeren kan utnytte det generative potensialet som ligger i hver av dem. 
Kort sagt, representasjon og metateater flettes sammen som et overordnet 
kunstgrep. Dette er en risikabel estetisk strategi som på hvert trinn lett kan feile. 
Jeg analyserer hvordan Shakespeare lar motsetning, simulering og parodi virke 
sammen, og hevder at han med dette bidrar til å gi renessanseteatret en unik 
form for estetisk representasjon.
vii 
 
Note on Publication 
The first two articles presented in this dissertation have already appeared in 
academic journals.  “Holy Words and Low Folly in A Midsummer Night’s Dream” 
was published in Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen und Literaturen, 
vol. 254, no. 1, 2017, pp. 48-66, and “Political Shakespeare and the Blessing of 
Art” appeared in EMCO, vol. 4, no.1, 2018, pp. 1-6. Minor corrections have been 
made to these two articles. A number of pieces that I have otherwise published 
have also found their way into the dissertation in one form or another, and these 
are noted below. 
The Introduction makes use of my article, “How to Paint the Plays”, 
published in EMCO, vol. 6, no. 1, 2015, pp. 31-40, and “Shakespeare, Art and 
Artifice: An Interview with Stuart Sillars”, published in EMCO, vol. 4, no. 2, 2019, 
pp. 1-31. It also references my “Titania and Bottom and a Vitruvian Fairy: A new 
reference to the work of Leonardo da Vinci in Henry Fuseli’s Titania and Bottom”, 
published in American Notes and Queries, December 2019, as well as my review 
of Shakespeare’s Pictures: Visual Objects in the Drama by Keir Elam, published 
in the Review of English Studies, vol. 70, no. 293, 2019, pp. 171-174. 
“Holy Words and Low Folly in A Midsummer Night’s Dream” references 
my “Transgendering Thisne”, published in American Notes and Queries, vol. 29, 
no. 3, 2016. 
“Green Plots, Hawthorn Brakes and an Ass’s Nole: Imaginative Translation 
in A Midsummer Night’s Dream” references my review of A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream; Third Series (The Arden Shakespeare) by William Shakespeare, edited by 
Sukanta Chaudhuri, published in Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen 
und Literaturen, vol. 255, no. 1, 2018.  
“‘Mocked with art’: Contradiction and Affect in The Winter’s Tale’s 
‘Statue’ Scene’”  makes use of my “‘Quit presently the chapel’; A note on setting 
in the final scene of The Winter’s Tale”, published in Notes and Queries, vol. 67, 
issue 2, June 2020. 
 “‘Exit [Chuckling]’: Exposition, Role and Dissimulation in The Winter’s 
Tale” makes use of my “‘This seeming lady and her brother’: Further remarks on 
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1. Metatheatrical representation 
 
 
1.1 Preliminary definitions 
If this discussion of Shakespeare’s drama is to concentrate on what I have termed 
‘metatheatrical representation’ it is perhaps best to begin with a preliminary definition of 
how each of those two words is here utilized. Preliminary, because as this introduction 
develops these terms will be progressively fleshed out, lent nuance and made more 
complex. In the case of ‘metatheatre’ the typical definition supplied to it is mostly 
sufficient: this refers to the ways in which a work of drama foregrounds its status as a work 
of drama, that is, to the fact that it is a constructed art object. Metatheatre’s inevitable result 
is that the spectators’ attention is refocused; they are pointed back – and the manner and 
degree of this ‘pointing back’ is of course dependent on the skill and intention of the 
playwright and performers – to the relationship they have taken up towards the play. Yet 
the remarking that a play has a literal as well as a figurative dimension should not be 
thought a revelation of earth-shattering proportions. Any engagement with an art object 
clearly requires an awareness of its duality. I perceive the artwork that hangs on the wall 
opposite me as I write this as a yellowed side of beef hanging in an abattoir and, 
simultaneously, as a framed canvas with oil paint on it. The baby who visited me at the 
weekend and contentedly sucked on the corner of another one of my paintings exhibited a 
clear failure to remark art’s duality, and we cannot consider him an aesthete. Recognizing 
that, unlike our infant philistine, the theatre audience never loses sight of art’s double-
nature allows me to supply our definition of metatheatre a couple of addenda.  
Firstly, it means that we must think of meta-reference as pointing its audience’s 
attention back to something it is already aware of – a point almost banal in its obviousness, 
but not, as we will see later on, of little importance. Secondly, it suggests we need not 
confine ‘metatheatre’ to explicit allusions to the play’s artifice, but instead see the essential 
duality of drama as something that is in play throughout the performance and which may 
– as will be demonstrated in a few pages’ time – draw attention to its own nature through 
a variety of far more subtle indicators. And of course, in the early modern public theatres 
where Shakespeare’s plays were originally put on – in which performances took place in 
the open-air, on bare or almost bare promontory stages, and unfolded according to dramatic 
traditions that had yet to find place for realism and its fourth wall, wherein the performance 
of persona bore no imprint of Stanislavsky’s method – the sense of drama’s duality was 
much more prominent.1 
                                                          
1 The research of modern scholars has provided us with a strong sense of how action on Shakespeare’s stage unfolded, 
as well as with a good idea of the relationship that audiences formed to the plays. See for example, the invaluable 
historical reconstructions of Andrew Gurr (especially The Shakespearean Stage 1574-1642 (Cambridge University 
Press, 1992); The Shakespearean Playing Companies (Clarendon Press, 1996); Shakespeare’s Workplace (Cambridge 
University Press, 2017)) and Anthony B. Dawson (especially The Culture of Playgoing in Shakespeare’s England: A 




Like ‘metatheatre’, the definition given to ‘representation’ is also broadly construed, 
although, since I use ‘representation’ in somewhat perverse fashion, its unpacking will be 
less straightforward. Reflecting the dissertation’s focus on the self-reflexive concerns of 
drama, when ‘representation’ appears in these pages it most often refers to the presentation 
afforded by an art object (and ‘an art object’ need not be material; the verbal instantiation 
of rhetorical performance, for example, can certainly count as an artistic presentation). This 
somewhat clunky phrase is designed to remark not only the artwork’s depiction, but also 
an abiding sense of the media and processes by which that depiction is brought about. As 
would be expected in a dissertation that concerns itself with the contemporary theatrical 
conditions that Shakespeare’s plays were subject to, the ‘representations’ discussed in this 
introduction are for the most part the depictions of the stage. But as the reader will see, this 
particular discussion extends to take in a range of different artworks, and these extend from 
the classical to the postmodern, going from the grapes of Zeuxis to Warhol’s Brillo Boxes. 
And the inclusion in the discussion of pieces like the latter signals the need to put some 
distance between the term ‘representation’ and the concept of resemblance. 
The equation of artistic depiction and the copying of appearance is a central plank 
of western logocentrism, and is commonly traced to Book X of Republic where Plato states 
that a painting of an object is a mimesis – that is to say, imitation or representation – of its 
shape and colour.2 The etymology of ‘represent’ marks the term’s mimetic provenance; not 
only do the word’s linguistic origins presume a congruence between sign and signified, but 
they too underline the implicit hierarchy and ideality that inheres within the sign’s desire 
to transcend itself, that is, to re-realise itself as full presence. To represent is ‘to bring to 
mind by description’, also ‘to symbolize, to be the embodiment of’. Derived from the Latin 
repraesentare, the original term can be literally translated as ‘to place before’.3  
Poetic theory most often follows Aristotle in understanding this process of 
representation as composed of three elements: ‘the object’ (that which is being depicted), 
‘the manner’ (the way the depiction is realised), ‘the means’ (the material, or media, by 
which this depiction is brought about).4 The form of theatre, though, and particularly its 
early modern variety, does not fit neatly with the poetics of mimesis. In fact, without getting 
too far ahead of myself, it is a central contention of this dissertation that the conventions 
and material conditions at play in the early modern theatre compel its drama to realise its 
                                                          
research into the uses of the stage space (“‘This Wide and Universal Theatre’: The Theatre as Prop in Shakespeare’s 
Metadrama” (Shakespeare’s Theatres and the Effects of Performance, edited by Farah Karim-Cooper and Tiffany 
Stern, The Arden Shakespeare, 2014, pp. 11-32)) and (here writing with Simon Palfrey) the performance of part 
(Shakespeare in Parts. Oxford University Press, 2007), and also the lucid overview provided by C. W. R. D. Moseley’s 
English Renaissance Drama: A Very Brief Introduction to Theatre and Theatres in Shakespeare’s Time (Humanities-
Ebooks, 2008). These perspectives can be broadened by the illuminating research of Lynn Enterline and Leonard 
Barkan into the education and reading habits of the period (in, respectively, Shakespeare’s Schoolroom (University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2016) and in “What Did Shakespeare Read?” (Cambridge Companion to Shakespeare, edited 
by Margreta de Grazia and Stanley Wells (Cambridge University Press, 2001)), pp. 31-48), which serve to provide us 
with a sense of the cultural touchstones that playwright and educated audience member would have shared.   
2 Platonis Opera, edited by John Burnet (E typographed Clarendoniano, 2000). 
3 Oxford English Dictionary, third edition, edited by Angus Stevenson, first edition edited by Judy Pearsall and Patrick 
Hanks (Oxford University Press, 2010).  
4 From Book 3 of Poetics, translated by Anthony Kenny (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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depictions in a way that is at odds with the mimetic prescriptions of classical poetics. For 
in dramatic performance, a body depicts, through bodily gestures, a body – a 
representational economy that seems to elide the discrete identities that Aristotle supplies 
‘means’, ‘manner’ and ‘object’. At the same time, when it comes to drama’s rendering of 
locale – this is accomplished through subjecting the almost bare stage of the early modern 
theatre to what is often a colourless and cursory exposition. Here, ‘means’ so overwhelm 
the imagined signified that it is questionable whether such a depiction can even be 
considered a representation; it seems little more than a nomination, and to function in a 
manner that more closely resembles simple reference. 
As the articles demonstrate, Shakespeare’s plays often give presentation to a model 
of mimesis (or an aligned signifying practice) in order to ironically remark the theatre’s 
incompatibility with such a poetics, and, through an exploration of this discrepancy, to 
better examine the different economy of representation that drama’s form makes available. 
And so that my own discussion might match this movement of (mis)appropriation and 
subversion, rather than opting to use in this dissertation’s title the more neutral ‘depiction’ 
I instead choose to couple ‘metatheatrical’ with ‘representation’. 
With that being said, let us briefly make clear by way of illustration the small 
adjustment that my use of ‘representation’ asks of the reader. When applied to drama, 
‘representation’ in its conventional use would indicate the fictional depiction of play-world 
events and persons and would ask that the audience understands these as operating in the 
terms of reference, resemblance and relation laid down by the poetics of mimesis. When I 
use ‘representation’ in this dissertation it should be thought of – to go back to the somewhat 
graceless definition offered earlier – as ‘the presentation afforded by the art object’, and 
understood as referring not only to the fictional depictions of the play-world but also to the 
manner and means through which these depictions are actualized. The first approach takes 
it that the audience, in say the case of A Midsummer Night’s Dream, understands the play 
as offering a depiction of runaway lovers, crisscrossed male and female pairs, lost in a 
forest at night – that is ‘representation’ as encompassed by the play-world, and as 
exclusively imaginary. My approach takes it that the audience understands the play as 
offering a depiction of runaway lovers, crisscrossed male and female pairs (performed 
though, as was always the case in Shakespeare’s theatre, exclusively by male actors), lost 
in a forest at night (all of which, nonetheless, occurs of an afternoon on the almost bare 
open air stage in the rounded theater). The parenthetical marking works serendipitously 
here to underline something that the articles argue for: that in the early modern spectators’ 
experience of this simultaneous duality, the figurative dimension of the play-world enjoys 
prominence over the literal dimension – except, that is, where metatheatre would have it 
otherwise. 
This should not of course be thought a radical or innovative revision of 
‘representation’. It follows a pattern established by the three philosophers who we can 
argue made the most important contributions to aesthetic theory in the last century. Martin 
Heidegger, Theodor Adorno and Jacques Derrida each chose to adopt the term mimesis as 
a descriptor of the aesthetic process at the same time as they shifted its signification away 
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from its classical roots in resemblance.5 And if we look at some of those present-day 
Shakespeare scholars who accord self-reflexivity a place of importance in their research, 
then we see that to deploy ‘representation’ in the manner I have suggested is not that 
unusual (though providing it the sort of extended definition given here perhaps is). Yet 
despite that fact, Shakespeare’s metatheatrically inflected representation has not been given 
a full and proper account. For even the present-day scholars that explore the exchange 
between metatheatre and representation do not, for the most part, offer analysis which 
discloses the full extent of the effects this relationship affords. The current dissertation 
attempts to redress this. Its aim is to demonstrate the power, variety, complexity and 
pervasiveness that inheres to the plays’ metatheatrical representation, and to map the 




1.2 Metatheatre’s relationship to representation 
Having glossed the separate terms, we should go on to remark that the yoking of 
‘metatheatrical’ and ‘representation’ has not been a common critical manoeuvre. In most 
theorizations, the effects of metatheatre are presumed as coming at the expense of stage 
illusion. This perspective is reflected in each of the critical models that have dominated 
investigations into the use made of metatheatre in the drama of the early modern period, 
and in the drama of William Shakespeare in particular. The first approach can be 
understood as an extension on the theatrum mundi trope, a favourite metaphor in the early 
modern period, given what is probably its most famous instantiation by Jacques in As You 
Like It: ‘All the world’s a stage’.6 It is a critical formulation that understands metatheatre 
as unfolding through the play’s references to actors and impersonation, theatres and 
staging. This critical topos developed out of Anne Righter’s seminal study, Shakespeare 
and the Idea of the Play,7 and despite it being over half a century since the work’s first 
                                                          
5 See, for example, Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art”, in Poetry, Language, Thought, translated by Albeit 
Hofstadter (Harper and Row, 1971); Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, edited by Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, 
translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor (University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Derrida’s “The Double Session” in 
Dissemination, translated by Barbara Johnson (University of Chicago Press, 1981, pp. 173-286). While the reader will 
note the extent to which 20 and 21st century critical thought has shaped my approach, these developments are not 
provided extended focus in this dissertation. Patricia Parker, introducing her work, Shakespeare from the Margins 
(University of Chicago Press, 1996), marks out a position which comes close to my own: ‘the argument here is that 
the plays themselves provide a language with which to approach [critical] questions, a historically more concrete and 
grounded language, finally, than importations from contemporary literary or cultural theory, however helpful the latter 
might be heuristically at different times’ (p. 4). I will return to Parker (in a section which, despite what I have just 
remarked, develops the relationship that one aspect of her research forms with Derrida’s work) later in 2.5. 
6 2.7.139. All quotations from the works of William Shakespeare are, except where stated otherwise, taken from the 
third edition of The Norton Shakespeare, edited by Stephen Greenblatt, Walter Cohen, Suzanne Gossett, Katharine 
Eisaman Maus, Gordon McMullan (W. W. Norton, 2016). 
7 First published Chatto and Windus, 1962. The book does not use the phrase ‘metatheatre’; the term was not coined 




publication, explorations of Shakespeare’s use of the theatrum mundi motif remain heavily 
indebted to Righter’s conceptualization. Almost invariably this model results in a reading 
that is compelled to remark the illusory nature of artistic representation, and which in doing 
so diagnoses the activity of drama as characterized by an essential fraudulence. Such a 
perspective is often assumed as reflecting the disdain with which Shakespeare regarded his 
medium. From this initial position a second is sometimes developed, and the inherent 
artifice of depiction is read as pointing back to the duplicities that mark the world of human 
experience and to the treachery that all representations admit.8 
The alternate model of metatheatre derives from an even older critical source, 
arising out of the theory and practice of epic theatre developed by Bertolt Brecht in the first 
half of the twentieth century.9 For Brecht, the effects of self-reflexive drama function to 
realise a theatre of estrangement. In parallel with the critical fate enjoyed by Righter’s 
work, scholarly discussions which understand metatheatre as effecting to distance the 
audience almost invariably revert to Brecht’s theories of drama, and consequently the 
central premises of the German playwright’s model together with its broader conceptual 
framework remain very much in place in various present-day applications of metatheatre. 
This development demands and will later be given an extended study, but for now it is 
sufficient to sketch it broadly. According to this approach, metatheatre marks the processes 
and conditions by which the play-world illusion is brought about, and this functions to strip 
representation of its power to enchant. The spectators, divorced from any imaginative 
engagement with the stage fictions, are cast back upon reality, and, in good Marxist 
fashion, the immediate and actual conditions to which they are subject are impressed upon 
them.  
It hardly needs underlining that both models see the exchange between metatheatre 
and representation as one in which representation is impacted negatively.10 And this seems 
problematic. For while we might recognize each approach as elucidating certain aspects of 
the relationship that an audience must perhaps necessarily take towards incidents of 
metatheatre, these models inevitably seek to circumscribe the affective power of play-
world representations in a way that would seem to contradict our experience of drama. And 
                                                          
8 This last phrase sounds dramatic but should not be thought as an overstating of this critical position. As I realized on 
re-reading the paragraph, my wording here echoes a phrase from Keir Elam’s Shakespeare’s Pictures: Visual Objects 
in the Drama (Bloomsbury), a 2017 study which, while it elaborates for the plays a sophisticated metatheatrical 
structuring, will often nonetheless revert to this earlier notion of representation. On page 98, discussing the opening 
of Timon, Elam writes ‘the scene acts out the treachery of all representations’. In my review of Elam’s book (Review 
of English Studies, vol. 70, no. 294, 2019, pp. 171-174), I attempt to offer this perspective a certain qualification.  
9 These ideas are laid out in Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic, edited and translated by John Willett 
(Hill and Wang, 1966). Later in his career, Brecht preferred other designations to ‘epic theatre’: ‘dialectical theatre’ 
when he chose to emphasize his drama’s instructional merits, and ‘non-Aristotelian theatre’ when he wished to mark 
up the contrast his stage representations took to the mimetic model. ‘Epic theatre’ remains, however, the most familiar 
and is what I will continue to use here. 
10 Tiffany Stern’s “‘This Wide and Universal Theatre’: The Theatre as Prop in Shakespeare’s Metadrama” offers a 
similar assessment: ‘Both approaches to Shakespeare’s metatheatre share … a sense that theatrical reference is 
negative. The first imagines that Shakespeare is conflicted about his art … The other imagines that Shakespeare, like 




that ‘our’ of the last sentence should not be thought of as a presentist affectation. 
Documentary evidence from Shakespeare’s day attests time and again to the investment 
that audiences are prepared to give to play-world fictions. Thomas Nashe, for example, 
writes of the figure of Talbot from Henry VI Part 1 in the following terms:  
How would it have joyed brave Talbot, the terror of the French, to think that after 
he had lain two hundred years in his tomb, he should triumph again on the stage, 
and have his bones new embalmed with the tears of ten thousand spectators at least 
(at several times) who in the tragedian that represents his person imagine they 
behold him fresh bleeding.11 
An excerpt from Henry Jackson’s letter to “G.P.” September 1610 also provides 
effective illustration. Translated to English (it was composed in Latin) it reads: ‘Moreover 
that famous Desdemona killed before us by her husband, although she always acted her 
whole part supremely well, yet when she was killed she was even more moving, for when 
she fell back upon the bed she implored the pity of the spectators by her very face’.12 These 
examples would seem to suggest the incomplete understanding supplied to representation 
in the models of metatheatre introduced above. For while both indicate that for the early 
modern spectator the artifice of the play is never quite forfeited, this awareness clearly does 
not engender the spectators’ emotional disassociation – as in the Brechtian model – nor is 
the stage representation understood as marking the relationship dramatic illusions take to 
the actual world of experience – as in the theatrum mundi model. Unquestionably here, it 
is representation’s presented fiction that makes the greater and more immediate impact. 
Another thing that these two models of metatheatre share is that both are structured 
in a way that offers their analysis prescription. As much of the research conducted 
according to what we might term the theatrical-reference model of metatheatre 
demonstrates, it is an approach that – when not realised with the verve and ingenuity of a 
scholar like Righter – appears constrained by the terms of its own formulation, almost 
invariably concluding its investigations in a rehearsal of the relationship that artistic 
representation takes to actuality through the theatrum mundi motif. And while it could be 
suggested that there are varieties of estrangement, something that has been demonstrated 
in the imaginative uses made of the proto-Brechtian model by, for example, a number of 
new historicists and cultural materialists, the second model of metatheatre is nonetheless 
limited to an interpretation that must at some point divest the stage fictions of their power 
to engage the audience, and which needs see whatever significances the work might have 
readied as coming to rest in the ideological structures of the world. 
It is the aim of this dissertation to provide a more thorough understanding of the 
relationship that metatheatre takes to representation in Shakespeare’s plays. Building on 
                                                          
11 Pierce Penniless, His Supplication to the Devil, quoted in The Works of Thomas Nashe, vol. 1, edited by R. B. 
McKerrow, (Basil Blackwell, 1966), p. 212. 
12 Sep. 1610, Fulman Papers, Corpus Christi College, MS 304, fol. 83v-84r; translation from Eyewitnesses of 
Shakespeare, edited by Gamini Salgado (Sussex University Press, 1975), p. 30. The original text reads: ‘At vero 
Desdimona illa apud nos a marito occisa, quanquam optime semper causam egit, interfecta tamen magis mevebat, 
cum in lecto discumbens spectantium misericordiam ipso vultu imploraret’.  
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the work of a number of recent commentators, the articles that follow will articulate an 
understanding of metatheatre which contrasts with, what even today, remains a highly 
influential critical understanding. Rather than seeing the effects of metatheatre as 
attenuating or even invalidating representation’s power, the articles demonstrate how 
metatheatre often operates to lend to play-world depiction an even more dynamic presence. 
And it is shown that this presence does not come about through an attempt at disguising or 
abjuring the artifice of representation, but rather through marking this aspect. This 
arrangement enables the plays to explore the nature of artistic depiction itself, and through 
this, the manner in which Shakespeare’s art challenges traditions of renaissance poetics 
and contemporary practices of signification. It will be argued that in the early modern 
period theatre enjoyed a unique set of aesthetic possibilities, and that the drama of 
Shakespeare remarks and realises these extensively and profoundly through what I have 
termed metatheatrical representation.  
 
 
1.3 Metatheatrical representation: a reading 
So that the reader might get an idea of how my own critical perspective functions to explore 
the relationship between metatheatre and representation, and also so that I might instance 
the methodological approach I will adopt in this study, it seems valuable to begin with an 
example. Here is the passage from Troilus and Cressida where Cressida has just discovered 
that the Trojans have arranged to give her to their Greek opponents in exchange for 
Antenor. The lines represent her anguish at the impending separation from her lover, 
Troilus:  
CRESSIDA I'll go in and weep –  
PANDARUS Do, do. 
CRESSIDA Tear my bright hair and scratch my praisèd cheeks, 
Crack my clear voice with sobs, and break my heart 
With sounding “Troilus”. (4.2b.31-35) 
Electing to illustrate my argument through this snatch of dialogue may appear an 
odd choice. These are not lines that most scholars would readily label metatheatrical, 
neither does it seem has the brief exchange generated any significant critical commentary.13 
Both of these points, however, are useful for my present purposes. Demonstrating the 
metatheatrical realisation of such a passage will bring with it the implication that rather 
than metatheatre being considered a technique constrained to a set of particular 
arrangements (the play-within-the-play, explicit references to dramatic performance, for 
example) it can be understood as enjoying a ubiquitous presence in the plays, and that as 
such it represents an aesthetic strategy which audiences and critics are obliged to attend to 
throughout. At the same time, the value and pertinence of the interpretive approach that I 
                                                          




have adopted will be made apparent if it proves capable of demonstrating a complex and 
radical play on notions of artistic representation in a passage that has previously been 
subject to something of a critical oversight. The analysis will also serve to direct the 
reader’s attention to a number of elements that are key to my analysis: the nature of 
performance and its relation to dissimulation; the discipline of rhetoric, and in particular 
the figures of copia and ekphrasis; the discourse of renaissance poetics and the ideal of 
mimesis. Introduced here, these elements will later be given the fuller treatment they 
warrant. And I forewarn the reader, perhaps used to essays of this type which open with an 
illustration that is rather brief, in order that I might make clear the extent and complexity 
of the episode’s use of metatheatrical representation, it is necessary that this example is 
somewhat lengthy. 
Before proceeding to any analysis of the lines it is required that we establish the 
broader context in which they are given to operate. For in the case of the original audience 
members that were familiar with the medieval story of Troilus and Cressida, any 
interpretation given to Cressida’s words would necessarily have been filtered through the 
anticipation of her exposure as inconstant. Since the twelfth century, the story of the two 
lovers had been reworked in the literature of continental Europe, and the figure of Cressida 
had developed into the archetype of female perfidiousness.14 This conceptualization, 
however, would have lost some of its unilateral force for those members of the audience 
that had come across Geoffrey Chaucer’s version of the tale with its more generous 
depiction of the Cressida-figure. Composed around 1380, Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde 
highlights the precariousness of Criseyde’s situation, and she is presented as an essentially 
sincere figure that is led astray by the treachery of Pandarus.15 
This historical-literary inheritance lends itself to one of the most common devices 
of the English Renaissance, and one that we are compelled to think of as among 
Shakespeare’s favourites. Renaissance copia can be understood as the contemporary 
imitation of earlier – most often classical – models. Compressing multiple layers of 
experience and artistic statement and foregrounding its own intertextual nature, the 
transposition makes signification into something compound and contradictory rather than 
singular and perfect.16 And Shakespeare makes the most of the referential ambivalence that 
                                                          
14 While the figure of Troilus of course bears a classical provenance, what later became the story of Troilus and 
Cresside is taken from Benoît de Sainte-Maure’s 12th century Roman de Troie. There though, the female character is 
called Briseida, and it is only with Boccaccio’s Il Filostrato (from around 1335) that Troilus’s inconstant lover takes 
on the more familiar ‘Criseida’. 
15 Chaucer of course enjoyed a considerable reputation in early modern England, where he was lauded as ‘our English 
Homer’, and Troilus and Criseyde was his most popular work. See, for example, Jane Kingsley-Smith’s entry for 
“Chaucer” in The Oxford Companion to Shakespeare, edited by Michael Dobson and Stanley Wells, revised by Will 
Sharpe and Erin Sullivan (Oxford University Press, 2015). The impact that Chaucer’s work had on Shakespeare has 
been well explored; see, for example, E. Talbot Donaldson’s excellent The Swan at the Well: Shakespeare Reading 
Chaucer (Yale University Press, 1985), and chapter five in Helen Cooper’s equally impressive Shakespeare and the 
Medieval World (Arden, 2010). 
16 Renaissance copia’s complex of representation is most fully treated by Thomas M. Greene’s The Light in Troy: 




this particular instance of copia affords. His Cressida is an elusive and flickering presence, 
at all times equivocal. This is made apparent only a few lines into the lovers’ first meeting. 
Cressida produces a beautiful and apparently wrenching avowal of her passion for Troilus, 
and then, seeming to catch herself, ingenuously confesses her ingenuousness: ‘Where is 
my wit? I know not what I speak’ (3.2.137-138). But is this, after all, what happens? For a 
line later, Cressida changes tack, suggesting that she may have been dissimulating all 
along: ‘Perchance, my lord, I show more craft than love; / And fell so roundly to a large 
confession, / To angle for your thoughts’ (3.2.140-142). The audience though cannot be 
sure if this new position represents disclosure or double bluff. The play-world fictions offer 
no certainty as to which of these representations represents Cressida herself – if, that is, 
one of them even does. And neither, as the play unfolds, is any such revelation forthcoming. 
As Stuart Sillars observes, ‘the uncertainty is developed to such an extent that it becomes 
a certainty, a constant inconstancy’.17  
Certainly, Cressida’s briskly shifting series of emotional self-portraits has its appeal, 
insinuating as it does an obscured yet sophisticated agency. Yet at the same time, it may 
be thought to indicate something like a voiding of agency. Philip Edwards makes a 
comment on the play that is equally pertinent when re-applied to its eponymous female; 
Cressida, it might be argued, ‘seems to circle about the Object, exchanging one valuation 
for another, and demonstrating their invalidity’.18 The Cressida which the audience watches 
may be considered as nothing more than a matrix of presentational stratagems, the shifting 
superficies of a performed identity.19 Indeed, in actuality, the ‘superficies of a performed 
identity’ is exactly what the play’s simulated ‘Cressida’ is. ‘Cressida’ is a dramatic part 
fulfilled by a Jacobean actor, a circumstance which these dissimulating displays cannot 
help but draw the audience’s attention to. The realisation given to Cressida is one which 
throughout emphasizes the role’s fictionality; it remarks the part’s figuration through 
literary model and highlights the theatrical nature of the current acted instantiation. Yet, as 
is apparent, this marking up of the illusory nature of literary and theatrical representation 
does not automatically neutralize its power to beguile. In fact, the figure’s charismatic 
appeal is it seems in large part predicated on this arrangement. The play’s spectators, like 
Troilus at the lovers’ initial meeting, are ‘seduced by performative rhetoric and the sheer 
duality of performance’.20 
The elements of theatrical impersonation and literary re-configuration that 
determine the role of Cressida are underlined, in rather emphatic fashion, in the episode 
                                                          
Problems of Writing in the French Renaissance (Clarendon Press, 1979) and Stuart Sillars in various works, but 
especially in Shakespeare and the Visual Imagination (Cambridge University Press, 2015). Copia is discussed at 
appropriate length later in section 2.5. 
17 “‘You lie, you are not he’: Identity, Rhetoric and Convention in Shakespeare’s Art of Lying” Shakespeare and the 
Art of Lying, edited by Shormishtha Panja (Orient BlackSwan, 2013), p. 29. 
18 Shakespeare and the Confines of Art (Taylor and Francis, 2013), p. 101. 
19 And we would, I think, be somewhat remiss were we not to remark that the instantiation of Cressida that the narrative 
presents could very well be thought of as being a strategized projection by which the fragile security of a young 
widower’s war-time existence might be negotiated.  
20 Stuart Sillars, “‘You lie, you are not he’: Identity, Rhetoric and Convention in Shakespeare’s Art of Lying”, p. 29. 
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that I have chosen to discuss. The quoted passage is framed on either side by markers 
pointing to the literary fate which enfolds the figure. The last half-line from the passage 
quoted is completed by ‘I will not go from Troy’, a resolution in plain statement that will, 
plainly, be overturned. And two sentences prior to Cressida’s promise to ‘go in and weep’, 
she vows ‘Make Cressid's name the very crown of falsehood,/ If ever she leave Troilus!’ 
(4.2b. 26-27), an even more heavily marked piece of dramatic irony, so heavy, in fact, that 
one is compelled to wonder if the line was not meant to be delivered in somewhat arch 
fashion.  
Another form of copia also marks the quoted passage, taking the form of an 
ironically redeployed textual appropriation. As Stephen Connor points out Cressida’s 
‘Crack my clear voice with sobs’ re-figures a line from Ovid’s Remedia Amoris.21 
Describing Phyllis as she laments her separation from ‘“perfide Demephoon”’, Ovid tells 
us that ‘ruptaque singultu verba loquentis erant’ – ‘her words were broken by sobs’ (597-
598).22 The narrative developments given to each figure extend the intertextual 
juxtaposition that Connor remarks: where Phyllis, in despair, goes on to hang herself, 
Cressida will, in the very next act, promise her bed to Diomedes. And the irony can take a 
further layer still if we remember that in Ovid’s Heroides Phyllis labels herself ‘ingeniosa’ 
(2.22) and ‘mendax’ (2.11), descriptors that correspond rather precisely to the talent for 
creative dissimulation enjoyed by Cressida.23 
This flagrant self-reflexivity interweaves the dissimulations associated with the 
figure of Cressida with the dissimulations by which theatrical representation is itself 
realised.24 This is an observation of some importance, for it allows us to recognize that the 
emotional reaction that Cressida’s lines frame is presented as occurring at a number of 
representational removes. For rather than the exchange revealing Cressida as being 
consumed by sorrow, she is instead given a description that rehearses a potential 
performance of sorrow (the italicized phrase should, if it is to capture the full extent of the 
serial recession of the representational gambit, take four beats). Cressida instantiates a 
projection of herself as tableau; she offers a depiction of the performed representation of 
her sorrow. Or, given the immediately emblematic terms of the ekphrasis Cressida supplies 
(and, throughout, the role exhibits an inclination for, in Kenneth Palmer’s phrase, the 
‘emblematic pose’25), it seems fair to think of the description as referring not to the specific 
incident of her anguish, but instead indicating a stylized representation of the general 
                                                          
21 Stephen Connor, Beyond Words: Sobs, Hums, Stutters and Other Vocalizations (Reaktion Books, 2014), p. 55; 
Ovid, Remedia Amoris; or, The Remedy of Love: Literally Translated into English Prose, with Copious Notes, 
translated by Henry T. Riley (Good Press, 2019). Ovid, of course, exercises a profound influence on Shakespeare. See 
for example, Jonathan Bate’s excellent Shakespeare and Ovid (Clarendon Press, 1994).  
22 Connor’s translation. 
23 Ovid, Heroides and Amores, 2nd edition, translated by G. P. Gould and Grant Showerman (Harvard University Press, 
1914). 
24 Some of the points in this and the next paragraph have been made previously in my article “How to Paint the Plays” 
(EMCO, vol. 6, no. 1, 2015, pp. 31-40, p. 36). 




condition of ‘Sorrow’. Theatrical representation resorts to verbal representation which 
renders a picture that seems more like an artistic representation than a depiction of actual 
experience. This sense of a self-reflexive and dissimulating representational transposition 
is implicated, deliberately or otherwise, in Jean-Pierre Maquerlot’s response to the passage: 
‘the emotion is instantaneously translated into sound and vision. Cressida shares a highly 
developed sense of pose with the painted or sculpted figures in Mannerist art’.26 The 
comment also marks up the gestural short-hand that painting and theatre share, and through 
the implications brought by ‘pose’ underlines again the artifice of such signs. 
Presented with Cressida’s projected spectacle, Pandarus is made over into an 
audience – and, it seems important to remark, not an audience that reacts with a sentimental 
identification towards the representation of Cressida’s grief, but an audience that, in his 
repeated ‘Do, do’, shows an enthusiastic appreciation for the translation of emotion into 
its own word-painting. Locating Cressida’s anguished performance off-stage (‘I’ll go in 
and …’) adds a further dimension to the layering of representational pretense and erasure. 
The arrangement ensures that within the play-world, Cressida’s performance of anguish 
remains forever unwitnessed. At the level of ‘character’, the equivocal nature of Cressida’s 
portrait means that the audience cannot know if she fulfills this apparent intention. And, of 
course, in terms of stage action, Cressida’s performed sorrow never occurs (a point 
underlined, one imagines, by Cressida’s ‘I’ll go in’ being accompanied by a dietic indicator 
of the actors’ tiring house door in the back-wall of the stage through which her stage exit 
will be accomplished 3 lines later).  
I think we have to assume that this sense of a self-reflexive complex of 
representation wherein the theatrical, visual, literary and rhetorical arts converge is 
something that would have struck the educated members of the original audience rather 
forcefully. That Cressida’s brief speech operates in the mode of ekphrasis is not something 
likely to have escaped the attentions of the grammar school-educated new humanist. 
Ekphrasis was, as Catherine Belsey notes, ‘a favourite device of the period’,27 and the 
rhetorical training that the educated audience members had undergone would have ensured 
that at the same time as they recognized Cressida’s speech as such, this recognition would 
have inevitably located itself within the conceptual structure of poetics that defined early 
modern thinking on artistic representation: the mimetic doctrine of ut pictura poesis. 
Horace’s dictum, often understood to mean ‘as a painting, so a poem’,28 and indicating, at 
least for renaissance scholars, that artistic representation’s ideal can be imagined in terms 
of an intermedial exchange, is complemented and completed by another honoured classical 
formulation, Simonides’ ‘Painting is mute poetry, poetry a speaking picture’.29 The 
operation of ekphrasis, whereby verbal representation is infused with such vividness that 
                                                          
26 Shakespeare and the Mannerist Tradition (Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 137-138. 
27 Catherine Belsey, “The Rape of Lucrece”, The Cambridge Companion to Shakespeare’s Poetry (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), pp. 90-107, p. 100. 
28 The Collected works of Horace, translated by Lord Dunsany and Michael Oakley (J. M. Dent, 1961), p. 361. 




it forms pictures in the imagination of its auditors (or readers) which rival the experience 
of actually seeing, would seem to perfectly manifest the determining presumption of 
renaissance poetics.30 This quality of vividness was termed enargeia, and Erasmus 
provides it illustration: ‘We shall enrich speech by description of a thing when we do not 
relate what is done, or has been done, summarily or sketchily, but place it before the eyes 
painted with all the colors of rhetoric, so that at length it draws the hearer or reader outside 
himself as in the theatre’.31 
In his comparing the internal visiones that ekphrasis conjures to the immediate 
experience enjoyed by the theatrical spectator, Erasmus makes use of one of the favourite 
similes by which rhetoricians time and again exemplified ekphrastic enargeia. Yet this 
formulation begs the question that the Cressida passage enacts: what happens when 
ekphrasis actually occurs on stage – when the auditors or readers are already, in fact, 
spectators? The rhetorical reification that Cressida’s ekphrasis pursues is marked as 
occurring within another representation, and a representation that enjoys the actual 
presence that enargeia can only attempt: the speaking picture of the theatrically embodied 
Cressida herself. There is a strong sense that ekphrasis is presented on the stage so that the 
poetics which the form epitomizes might be critiqued and ironized, a sense that is 
sharpened when we remember that despite the differing formulations that the plethora of 
renaissance treatises on the arts gave to ut pictura poesis these theses were, more often than 
not, content to view theatre as a lesser art which did not warrant inclusion in their aesthetic 
systems. That the audience hears Cressida paint a picture of her enacted grief rather than, 
as the theatre uniquely allows, witnessing the instantiated spectacle itself, could be 
understood as the episode’s ironic adoption of the limitations that poetry and painting are 
subject to. The passage seems to mark that theatre makes available just such 
representational possibilities – but then, having marked these possibilities, Shakespeare’s 
play withholds them. The implication of reification that Erasmus’s description carries is 
checked, and Edward’s ‘Object’ is again skirted, for as Cressida makes clear, the acting 
out of these gestures is reserved for when she will ‘go in’ – with all the suggestions of 
omission and theatrical duplicity that the announced exit through the tiring house door 
arouses. 
Having plotted the relationship that this short scene forms between performer, 
performance and representation, a rather intriguing staging possibility presents itself, one 
that would lend to the episode a further layer of irony and abstraction. For surely rather 
                                                          
30 This is the understanding of ekphrasis that the various treatises and exercise books devoted to rhetoric in the period 
gave out, and which all educated grammar students would have recognized. For modern readers, a more familiar 
definition of ekphrasis is that of a vivid description of a visual work of art. The way these different understandings 
can be thought of as coming together in the period will be discussed later. And in my opinion, Cressida’s brief 
description calls both definitions into play. 
31 ‘Rei descriptione locupletabimus orationem, quum id quod fit aut factum est non summatim aut tenuiter exponemus, 
sed omnibus fucatum coloribus ob oculos ponemus, ut auditorem sive lectorem, iam extra se positum, velut in theatrum 
avocet.’ Desiderii Erasmi Roterdami Opera Omnia, vol. I, (North-Holland, 1988), p. 202. English translation by 
Donald B. King and H. David Rix, On Copia of Words and Ideas (Marquette University Press, 1963), p. 47. As with 
copia, the extended discussion that ekphrasis merits will come later – in section 2.4. 
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than simply provide a description of Cressida’s off-stage gestures, the lines invite the actor 
playing the part to simultaneously demonstrate the gestures that would accompany 
Cressida’s off-stage grief. That is, the stage-Cressida plays these gestures out as performed. 
Where the mimetic ideal of renaissance poetics imagines representation as enjoying a 
congruent relationship to the represented, the representations of Troilus and Cressida 
underline, variously, their own multifarious treacheries. The grief that Cressida’s speech 
claims is authentic, claims is the thing itself, is not only deliberately absented, but a feigned 
reproduction comes to stand in its place. And, we need to underline, this feigned 
reproduction has no original.  
The surmise that the player acts out the speech’s description at the same time as he 
declaims it should not be thought wholly speculative either; the speech itself is constructed 
in such a manner that it works to commentate on the processes of its own performed 
instantiation. Let us go back to Cressida’s lines once more (with Pandarus’ interjection 
removed): ‘I'll go in and weep – […] Tear my bright hair and scratch my praiséd cheeks,/ 
Crack my clear voice with sobs and break my heart/ With sounding “Troilus”’. The passage 
is realised through a kind of grammatical sleight of hand, whereby active structures take 
the place of what would usually be passive. The – normally – involuntary gestures of 
hysterical grief are presented as the effect of a willed agency, and this movement becomes 
progressively explicit, culminating in Cressida announcing her intention to break her own 
heart. The sense that this speech acts as commentary for the performance of a skilled actor 
is most pronounced in the phrase, ‘Crack my clear voice with sobs’, seeming to declare as 
it does (and ask for the simultaneous performance of) how the actor brings off the 
impersonation of anguish. 
 
 
1.4 Methodology and analysis 
Let us then briefly note the method by which my critical analysis of this passage proceeds, 
a method which for the most part characterizes the approach taken in the articles that 
follow. We see that the analysis is focused on a short section but that it makes effort to 
locate the object of its study contextually. It takes in the broader framework of the play 
narrative as well as the immediate circumstances of the surrounding scene. And this is an 
approach that, as the last article presented in this dissertation demonstrates, can be extended 
further – there the initial focus on a single passage is shown as functioning to elucidate the 
play in something closer to overall terms. 
This method also attempts to locate the discussed passage, as best as it is able, 
according to its original performance realisation. It marks up the theatrical traditions, 
conditions and conventions that determined the play’s original stagings; it emphasizes the 
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physical nature of the playing space, the ‘Action’32 of the actors, and as such what can be 
said of the original theatre-goers’ experience of the play. This is in turn circumscribed by 
another context still, as the reading discovers in the self-reflexive play of the episode a 
concern with renaissance poetics, and by implication, the humanist worldview these poetics 
embody and seek to enact. 
The imaginative investment in the play as an early modern performance is crucial 
to the success of the approach. A consequence of this is that the readings will, at points, 
offer imaginative reconstructions as to possible stage action. Such re-imaginings are most 
often, as is the case with the above reading, supported by arguments that are derived from 
the text, or that emerge from what we know about early modern theatrical practice. At other 
times, as the reader of the articles will observe, arguments for picturing an episode as 
possibly realised through a particular performative arrangement will draw their support 
from broader social and historical conditions and practices. Certainly, when making use of 
imaginative reconstruction of this type one must tread warily. It is a process that, as David 
Scott Kastan has adroitly observed, ‘yields too easily to our desire’.33 Yet it strikes me as 
a responsibility that the critic must sometimes embrace, or otherwise risk closing off a vital 
investigative route. If imaginatively reconstructed models of this kind can be used in a 
manner that is inventive yet mindful, and if these propositions are located within the larger 
analysis with the necessary circumspection, then this is an approach that is likely to yield 
more than it stands to forfeit. For it is in the dimension of the performed, and only in the 
performed, that metatheatrical representation takes place.34  
Certain points emerge out of the approach outlined above, and, in turn, feed back 
into it. Unlike in the estrangement model of metatheatre where the literal and figurative are 
taken to be opposed elements, constrained to pursue an on-off binary, these aspects are not 
here conceived of as distinct. They are understood as of a piece, and as encompassed within 
the broader conceptualization of a representational economy that is simultaneous and 
                                                          
32 The early modern theory of Action underlined that the outward gestures of the actor (and orator) must relate directly 
to the passion being expressed. Andrew Gurr’s article “Elizabethan Action” (Studies in Philology, vol. 63, no. 2, April 
1966, pp. 144-156) provides the subject insight and illumination. 
33 Shakespeare and the Book (Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 7. In order to ensure that such an impulse is 
properly constrained I have taken to submitting examples of my work which incorporate aspects of an informed yet 
imaginative reconstruction to Notes and Queries as well as its transatlantic cousin, American Notes and Queries – 
journals which represent an approach to research which emphasizes, as the inner sleeve of all modern issues of Notes 
and Queries underlines, ‘the factual rather than the speculative’. That these pieces have been accepted encourages me 
in the belief that I am capable of approaching my material with sufficient circumspection. (See for example, my 
“Titania and Bottom and a Vitruvian Fairy: A new reference to the work of Leonardo da Vinci in Henry Fuseli’s 
Titania and Bottom” (American Notes and Queries (December 2019)); “References to the doubling of Autolycus and 
the bear in Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale” (Notes and Queries, vol. 66, no. 3, September 2019, pp. 454-457); “‘Quit 
presently the chapel’: A note on setting in the final scene of The Winter’s Tale” and “‘This Seeming Lady and Her 
Brother’: Further remarks on the doubling of Perdita with Mamillius in The Winter’s Tale” (both Notes and Queries, 
vol. 67, no. 2, June 2020)). I remain of course obliged to keep Kastan’s words of warning uppermost in mind. 
34 Emphasizing that metatheatre is dependent on the literal dimension of the performance is not as uncontroversial a 
statement as it may sound; see, for example, Harry Newman’s “Reading Metatheatre” (Metatheatre and Early Modern 




multiplicitous. As the Troilus and Cressida passage demonstrates, and as the articles will 
explore more extensively, such representation is often realised through the figures of copia 
and ekphrasis (together with enargeia), and lent a further layer of signification through 
drawing on the renaissance discourses of rhetoric and poetics that these figures afford. Yet 
as we have seen, when transposed into Shakespeare’s dramatic art, these figures function 
to suspend and interrogate the humanist ideology that they are otherwise assumed to enact. 
Instead of representation in the plays operating in the archetypal terms that contemporary 
poetics and the new humanism often prescribe – as a copula connecting the depicted, the 
actual and the ideal – Shakespeare’s dramatic art points up the inherent dissimulation of its 
own representations, and so positions itself in distinction to such discourses. Remarking 
this dissimulation does not, however, divorce the audience from its engagement in the 
play’s fiction. The spectators’ imaginative translation, by which one impulse is recast in 
terms of the other, remains self-aware; illusion and the awareness of illusion are 
experienced simultaneously and both are recognized as occurring through – and never 
beyond – the confines of drama’s artistic construct.35 Representation is multiplicitous, and, 
rightly directed, the self-reflective remarking of the work’s artifice can in fact intensify the 
stage action’s appeal. For even as the figure of Cressida is marked up as a counterfeited 
construction it nonetheless remains capable of seducing the audience’s attentions. 
Moreover, as we have seen, this beguiling attraction must in large part be thought of as 
predicated on a pattern of dissimulation that operates at both the levels of play-world and 
metatheatre. 
This is a view of Shakespeare’s dramatic art that emphasizes its concern with its 
own artifice, while at the same time insisting on the appeal of the play’s fictional world; it 
views metatheatre as a ubiquitous presence, capable of a range of effects, not the least of 
which is to lend an intensity and a complex urgency to stage fictions; and it understands 
dramatic representations as compound, multiple, and as acting to interrogate the 
relationship they take to that which they represent. The approach and the analysis it obtains 
are indebted to at the same time as they develop the work of a variety of present-day 
scholars, and this critical framework will be explored in the next chapter. 
                                                          
35 I discuss ‘imaginative translation’ at some length in the dissertation’s third article, “Green Plots, Hawthorn Brakes 




2. A critical framework 
 
2.1 An economy of duality 
Of central importance to the critical reformulation of metatheatre that I attempt is the 
understanding of drama’s duality. To repeat what is already an obvious point, all our 
experiences of physically realised artworks occur according to a simultaneous sense of the 
object’s duality. Hamlet is at one and the same time a prince in the court of Denmark, and 
a professional actor on a wooden stage; Michelangelo’s Bacchus is at once a tipsy and 
flexuous god and a frozen piece of marble.1 But this duality must be considered as enjoying 
a particularly prominent foregrounding in the theatre of the early modern period. It is this 
prominence which leads the estrangement model to view the literal and figurative as 
discrete elements, and to assume that the aesthetic unity which the play presents and which 
its audience agrees to observe does not survive metatheatre’s self-reflexive indication. This 
remains, as has been noted, an influential view of metatheatre, and the historicist and 
materialist enquiries that often form its critical corollary still hold a central position in early 
modern studies. Yet in the last two decades a certain counter tendency has arisen, as critics 
have exhibited a readiness to re-invest in the aesthetic aspects of the literary object and to 
understand their operation in terms that are at least in part independent of historical-
materialist discourse.2 This development has encouraged a number of writers to view anew 
Shakespeare’s metatheatre, and, in doing so, reconfigure how we conceive of the 
relationship formed by the literal and figurative.  
This is not to suggest, however, that metatheatre’s operation forms the key critical 
concern among these Shakespeare scholars. Most often with these writers, metatheatre is 
explored through the role it plays in a larger critical apparatus. When exclusive attention is 
devoted to the subject this often takes the form of shorter accounts, usually meaning that 
there is only space for the exploration of a single aspect of metatheatre, or where broader 
theorisations are advanced, that these can only be supplied a preliminary sketch. Yet if we 
lack an extended critical focus on metatheatre, in that these studies share a number of 
similarly framed concepts, taken together, they can be thought of as offering the outlines 
of a critical matrix.  
Common to these approaches, whether or not it is given explicit statement, is a 
revised sense of how theatrical duality operates and is perceived. The notion is anticipated 
                                                          
1 Even works of art as radical as say Marcel Duchamp’s ready-mades are still dependent (in fact, here I think we would 
be justified in saying, absolutely and exclusively dependent) on the fact of their duality, on the fact that at the same 
time as they are a shovel or a bicycle wheel they are a shovel or a bicycle wheel seen as a work of art. 
2 I am reluctant to label this tendency ‘new formalism’ or ‘new aestheticism’ or even ‘new theatricality’. Such 
designations suggest a movement marked by a degree of critical consensus and a shared impetus. As Majorie Levinson 
underlines in her lucid account of new formalism, the development is not bound together by a common theoretical 





by William E. Gruber who, back in 1985, provided it a neatly emphatic formulation. He 
proposes that in contrast to their present-day equivalents, Tudor and Stuart theatregoers 
would ‘not only tolerate visible contradictions’ between the actual conditions of the theatre 
and the fictions there being played out, but that they clearly ‘consider[ed] them to be the 
affective basis of spectating’.3 
The sense that Shakespearian metatheatre affords a presentation that interweaves 
the dimensions of the fictional and actual forms an important strand in Stephen Purcell’s 
research on performance studies and audience reception, and his 2018 article “Are 
Shakespeare’s Plays Always Metatheatrical?”4 gives metatheatre exclusive attention. Like 
a number of present-day scholars that would understand metatheatre in expanded term, 
Purcell questions the critical ‘eagerness to reach for the word “Brechtian” and its related 
concepts of alienation and critical distance whenever we see self-conscious theatricality in 
early modern drama’.5 He remarks that the notion that metatheatre’s ‘revelation of the 
theatrical situation destroys the scenic illusion’ requires that the literal and figurative 
aspects of the performance function as opposed binaries, and for Purcell, this is an 
arrangement which is wholly at odds with the structures of the early modern theatre space.6 
The conditions in effect on the open-air apron-stage compel in audience and performers an 
acknowledgement of their actual and immediate circumstances. In such a theatre, the 
audience never forgets that “the play is just a play” – so no real disruption is brought about 
by metatheatre’s remarking it.7 Metatheatre instead ‘functions as a kind of imaginative 
game’, 8 its moments of self-reflexivity more likely to lead to delight than to disjuncture.9 
To explain the operation of this imaginative game, Purcell makes recourse to Arthur 
Koestler’s concept of bisociation, arguing for metatheatre as operating through ‘universes 
                                                          
3 “The Actor in the Script: Affective Strategies in Shakespeare's Antony and Cleopatra” (Comparative Drama, vol. 
19, 1985, pp. 30-48), p. 34. Gruber is discussing specifically the contradictions between actor and role, but his 
observation must be thought to take in the broader terms of the literal and figurative. 
4 Metatheatre and Early Modern Drama, a special issue of Shakespeare Bulletin, vol. 36, no.1, Spring 2018, edited 
by Sarah Dustagheer and Harry Newman, pp. 19-35. 
5 “Are Shakespeare’s Plays Always Metatheatrical?”, p. 21. 
6 Purcell is here contesting the concept of metatheatre outlined in Polish theatre scholar Slawomir Świontek’s Dialog–
Dramat–Metateatr: Z problemów teorii tekstu dramatycznego (Oficyna Wydawnicza Errata, 1999), and elaborated by 
Jenn Stephenson in “Meta-enunciative Properties of Dramatic Dialogue: A New View of Metatheatre and the Work 
of Sławomir Świontek” (The Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism, vol. 21, no. 1, Fall 2006, pp. 115-128). 
Świontek makes the argument for the intrinsic duality of dramatic dialogue, which Stephenson adapts and extends so 
as to make the case for the essential duplexity of all theatrical elements. Their perspectives premised on a duality 
whose aspects are conceptualized as mutually exclusive, these researchers inevitably view metatheatre as disruptive 
of stage illusion. The quoted remark is Świontek’s, as translated by Stephenson in her “Excerpts from Le Dialogue 
Dramatique et le Metathéâtre by Sławomir Świontek” (Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism, vol. 21, no. 1, 
2006, pp. 129–144), it occurs on p. 25 of Purcell’s article. Świontek and Stephenson’s research will be discussed in 
section 3.5. 
7 “Are Shakespeare’s Plays Always Metatheatrical?”, p. 26.  
8 “Are Shakespeare’s Plays Always Metatheatrical?”, p. 19. 




of discourse colliding, frames getting entangled, or contexts getting confused”.10 This leads 
Purcell to conceive of metatheatre as an occurrence which takes place when the “Now and 
Here” of the actual and the “Then and There” of the play-world ‘become entangled, a line 
or theatrical moment resonating on both levels at once’.11 And while ‘[o]ften in 
Shakespeare’s plays, bisociative collisions are sustained over whole scenes’,12 in Purcell’s 
model ‘metatheatricality cannot be a constant state: it is always the result of a shift in the 
ways in which the two planes relate to each other’.13 Nor does metatheatricality ever fully 
undo the claims of the fictional: ‘the point at which the planes of fiction and reality become 
so entangled that the stage action ceases to be legible as the representation of a fictional 
world at all’ is a point that metatheatre might approach but which, if it is to sustain its own 
operation, can never be realised.14 
This last point is especially valuable. And it is imbricated in Purcell’s conception of 
a metatheatre which rather than acting to ‘destroy scenic illusion’ effects an aesthetic 
awareness that is likely to delight. This corresponds to my own understanding that 
metatheatre remains, as the Troilus and Cressida reading makes clear, an aspect of 
representation – meaning that representation is art’s overall condition, one that metatheatre 
can only play at escaping. Yet to my thinking, this makes of metatheatre, at least 
potentially, a permanent presence. As I hope the extended analysis of self-reflexive 
operations in the Troilus and Cressida reading bears out, the case can be made that at the 
same time as the plays never wholly forfeit their fictional world, they are always 
metatheatrical. Purcell’s analysis is it seems still informed by the kind of phenomenological 
duplexity that he would elsewhere contest. For Purcell, Shakespeare’s metatheatre is a 
momentary or limited operation, which engenders a shift between the “Now and Here” and 
the “Then and There” – and results in an entanglement. My analysis, by contrast, indicates 
that Shakespeare’s metatheatre enjoys a ubiquitous presence, produces a representation 
that is multiple and simultaneous, and results not in confusion but in complexity. 
Tiffany Stern is another critic whose critical investment in the geography of the 
early modern theatre leads her to reconceptualize how representation and metatheatre 
functioned. Her work belongs to a field that has emerged from the groundbreaking research 
undertaken by Andrew Gurr and his peers in the last century into uncovering the original 
stage conditions and playgoing practices of the early modern era. In the 2000s scholars 
have often given to these investigations a more specific focus – exploring, for example, the 
uses stage curtains and cosmetics were put to, or the impact that aspects such as touch or 
smell had on the original audience’s theatrical experience of play-texts.15 And where the 
                                                          
10 “Are Shakespeare’s Plays Always Metatheatrical?”, p. 29 (Koestler’s words are taken from his The Act of Creation 
(Danube, 1976), p. 40). 
11 “Are Shakespeare’s Plays Always Metatheatrical?”, p. 26. 
12 “Are Shakespeare’s Plays Always Metatheatrical?”, p. 29. 
13 “Are Shakespeare’s Plays Always Metatheatrical?”, p. 33. 
14 “Are Shakespeare’s Plays Always Metatheatrical?”, p. 34, n 6. 
15 I am thinking here of Frederick Kiefer, “Curtains on the Shakespearean Stage” (Medieval and Renaissance Drama 




investigations of this earlier generation of critics contributed significantly to an 
understanding that the plays’ representations were confined to an anti-illusionist mode, and 
their effects limited to estrangement,16 more recent research in this field has thrown up 
various fresh readings which oftentimes demonstrate not only how the play’s fictional 
world sustains itself in the face of reference to the actual performance conditions, but also 
how such reference can function to lend the play-world extension, complexity and 
intensification.17 
Of these researchers, it is Stern who most prominently pursues the relationship that 
metatheatre takes to the theatre space. Her research offers a conceptualization of 
metatheatre that is liberated from the oppositional arrangement according to which it has 
so often been theorized, and which even Purcell’s work bears the imprint of. Writing with 
Farah Karim-Cooper, Stern states that for Shakespeare and his contemporaries ‘there was 
no binary between the materiality of theatre and the emotional, metaphoric and poetic 
registers of the plays themselves’.18 It is a notion that Stern explores at some length in 
“‘This Wide and Universal Theatre’: The Theatre as Prop in Shakespeare’s Metadrama” 
(2013). Stern makes the case that in Shakespeare’s drama the theatrical space and its 
staging potentialities were celebrated; the theatre itself was made over into a dramatic 
device, and the early modern playwright enthusiastically explored the complexities that the 
arrangement derived. This perspective means that rather than seeing theatrical reference as 
being constrained to the undermining of play-world representation, metatheatre is thought 
of as capable of a range of possibilities. By underlining the way in which the physical 
reality of the stage meets the fictions played out upon it, Stern is able to demonstrate that 
‘[t]here was not … one form of metatheatre that Shakespeare used with one effect’.19 Self-
reflexive reference to the actuality of the playhouse was used ‘sometimes, as a way of 
querying or undercutting’ the stage fictions, and sometimes ‘as a way of interpreting and 
heightening’ them.20 We might further pursue Stern’s argument that in early modern 
dramatic representation there exists ‘no binary’ between the material conditions of the 
playing space and its poetic and play-world registers, and suggest that these different 
aspects need not be thought to manifest themselves in an exclusive and discrete manner. 
As we saw in the reading I presented earlier, Cressida’s indication of the tiring house doors 
acts to query the scene’s action at the same time as it heightens it. The audience experiences 
the episode according to what I referred to as imaginative translation, whereby the aspects 
                                                          
(Edinburgh University Press, 2006), and The Hand on the Shakespearean Stage: Gesture, Touch and the Spectacle of 
Dismemberment (Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2016); Jonathan Gil Harris, “The Smell of ‘Macbeth’” 
(Shakespeare Quarterly, vol. 58, no. 4, Winter 2007, pp. 465-486). 
16 And it is a position that Gurr sometimes still commits to. See, for example, his “Metatheatre and the Fear of Playing” 
in the 2017 collection, Shakespeare’s Workplace: Essays on Shakespearean Theatre, pp. 145-166. 
17 Scholars that have made important contributions to this field include, for example, Bridget Escolme, Evelyn Tribble, 
Nathalie de Carles, Katharine Eisaman Maus, Lucy Munro, Paul Menzer and Angela Stevens. 
18 From the Introduction to Shakespeare’s Theatres and the Effects of Performance, edited by Farah Karim-Cooper 
and Tiffany Stern, The Arden Shakespeare, 2014, pp. 1-8, p. 3. 
19 “‘This Wide and Universal Theatre’: The Theatre as Prop in Shakespeare’s Metadrama”, p. 31. 
20 “‘This Wide and Universal Theatre’: The Theatre as Prop in Shakespeare’s Metadrama”, p. 32. 
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of the literal and figurative are recognized as simultaneous and multiple, and the effects of 
both enlisted. 
This is an arrangement which makes the most of what Gruber terms early modern 
drama’s ‘visible contradictions’: representation marks itself up as false and also – in the 
performance of this falsity – playfully absurd. Yet these are the very elements which, when 
wielded by a sufficiently dexterous dramatist, engender the ‘affective basis of spectating’. 
The part played by falsity and absurdity in Shakespeare’s representational economy is 
something that recent criticism has taken up, and the remaining sections of this chapter will 
provide this perspective elaboration. But before moving on to this twenty-first century 
research, it is worthwhile examining an article from 1986 which rather neatly anticipates 
some of the main strands of this interpretive line. As its title indicates, W. B. Worthen’s 
“The Weight of Antony: Staging ‘Character’ in Antony and Cleopatra”21 addresses the task 
of hoisting up the dying Antony to Cleopatra’s monument in the last scene of act 4. It is an 
episode which must be considered as pointedly courting a sense of its own ridiculousness: 
the difficulties the arrangement presents, both physical and dramatic, must be thought of 
as risking the richness of the play’s concluding mood.  
Worthen approaches the passage via the notion that Shakespeare’s drama compels 
its audience to take up ‘a double perspective’.22 Not dissimilar to what I called imaginative 
translation, Worthen sees this ‘double perspective’ as brought about through the way 
Shakespeare ‘forces our attention to the means of theatre … as part of our attention to the 
drama itself’.23 This allows Worthen to recognize that the difficulties which threaten the 
integrity of the scene are the very aspects which underpin its dramatic success. As Worthen 
advances, in a formulation that foregrounds the paradoxical nature of Shakespeare’s 
representational economy, ‘what seems in part to prevent the final scene from becoming 
“ludicrous” is the “ludic” aspect of its theatrical playing, the precise physical and histrionic 
challenges that the performers engage in so as to present the tragic scene on the stage’.24 
This juxtaposition is repeated in the discussion of Cleopatra’s speech in which she laments 
how the story of her and Antony will become the stuff of stage comedians, and that her 
own greatness will be reproduced by some squeaking boy (5.2.215-220). Worthen writes: 
It's a daring moment in Shakespeare's theater, one that invites us to attend to the 
means of theatrical “character” – the boy actor's performance – in order to deny it, 
to affirm that “Cleopatra” somehow transcends those means. Cleopatra's 
“grotesquely sceptical” self-portrait asks us to “behold and see” the boy actor only 
to insist that we overlook him, and enter Cleopatra's imaginative perspective, if we 
are to “see” the play through to its finale.25  
                                                          
21 “The Weight of Antony: Staging ‘Character’ in Antony and Cleopatra” (Elizabethan and Jacobean Drama, a special 
issue of Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900, vol. 26, no. 2, Spring 1986, pp. 295-308). 
22 “The Weight of Antony: Staging ‘Character’ in Antony and Cleopatra”, p. 298. 
23 “The Weight of Antony: Staging ‘Character’ in Antony and Cleopatra”, p. 296. 
24 “The Weight of Antony: Staging ‘Character’ in Antony and Cleopatra”, p. 302. 
25 “The Weight of Antony: Staging ‘Character’ in Antony and Cleopatra”, p. 303. 
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The scene’s power derives itself from the dissimulated nature of dramatic 
representation and the essential absurdity which this obtains, and the spectators, in that they 
must overlook the boy actor that their attention is being drawn to, and ‘enter Cleopatra’s 
imaginative perspective’ repeat these performances of dissimulation and absurdity. In fact, 
in the process of exerting metatheatrical pressure on stage fictions to the point where they 
risk their dissolution in a ludicrous actuality, it seems that they somehow exceed the absurd 
arrangement of such a realisation, and that they manifest themselves all the more richly.  
The next section will develop further our understanding of the use that 
Shakespeare’s metatheatrical representation makes of dissimulation, and the gambits of 
aesthetic absurdity that dissimulation affords. The critical framework will be expanded, 
and the application that the plays make of rhetoric, ekphrasis and copia properly 
introduced. This discussion will bring about a shift in critical and historical focus. Where 
the voices in this section can be considered as responding to, and to a great extent rejecting, 
20th and 21st century instantiations of the estrangement model of metatheatre, the 
investigations will more firmly locate themselves in the critical discourses of the early 
modern era, and demonstrate the manner in which the plays challenge and, at the same 
time, exploit the reigning poetic model of the day: mimesis.  
 
 
2.2 Dissimulation and mimesis: rhetoric, ekphrasis, copia 
If, in the early modern period, the concept of mimesis coordinated the relationship between 
representation, reality and the ideal, and in this way underwrote the structures and impetus 
that would later be referred to collectively as logocentricism, it was through the discipline 
of rhetoric that these claims were announced and, to a large extent, understood as 
embodied. As we have seen though, Shakespeare’s art counters the poetics of mimesis 
through its emphasis on the artifice of dramatic form, an emphasis which by implication 
remarks the dissimulation of all artistic representation. Yet, and this may be the favourite 
irony of an art that is rarely, if ever, without irony, this process is itself carried out – as in 
the early modern theatre it must be – through rhetorical performance. Perhaps though it 
would be more precise to write ‘the staging of a rhetorical performance’. For at each turn 
Shakespeare’s drama announces its layered artifice, and in this way, rhetoric in the plays, 
rather than – as in its classical formulation – acting as the promise and instantiation of the 
connection between representation and the real, between language and the ideal, becomes 
instead the means by which this artistic dissimulation is itself carried out and remarked. 
And while as we have seen this shift does not rob rhetoric of the powerful effects it can 
realise, it does mean that these effects are dislocated from their structuring in the ideal, and, 
following from this, that this structuring is itself presented for interrogation.  
In exploring the plays’ staging of rhetoric, the articles of this dissertation have been 
compelled to give attention to a pair of devices which enjoyed great prominence in the 
scholary and artistic practice of early modern England, and which we have already come 
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across in the earlier reading from Troilus and Cressida: ekphrasis and renaissance copia. 
These figures lend animation and intensity to rhetoric’s ideology of representation, and as 
such have urgent application to the poetical discussions of the day. Ekphrasis, in promising 
the self-identification of the verbal and visual, can be considered as the exemplar of the 
mimetic desire for full presence, and copia – as it is understood here – too seems a device 
of mimetic excellence, predicated as it is on the imitation of classical paragon. As the work 
of Stuart Sillars and Richard Meek26 has underlined, Shakespeare’s drama, to an extent that 
is exceptional even for the period, exhibits a fascination for these rhetorical figures. Their 
utilization is manifold, and they are often configured in a way that structures the 
overarching sense of Shakespeare’s drama. And, I would argue that in similar fashion to 
the way in which rhetoric is made to perform its own staging, these figures are given an 
ironic and self-reflexive presentation which operates to underline not only their own 
dissimulation, but of that of the work of drama itself. Sillars and Meek often understand 
the figures’ function in similar fashion and the prominence enjoyed by both scholars in the 
following pages as well as in the articles themselves reflects the influence that their 
research has had in forming my notions of Shakespeare’s dramatic dissimulation.27 
                                                          
26 Most especially Narrating the Visual in Shakespeare (Routledge, 2016). 
27 A word needs to be said about my use of the term ‘dissimulation’ in light of the manner in which these two scholars 
discuss Shakespeare’s remarking of artistic pretence. When exploring this artistic strategy Meek does not, as far as I 
am aware, use ‘dissimulation’, but the sense the term suggests is not far removed from that of his favoured descriptors. 
Meek most often uses ‘duplicity’ and ‘deception’ when describing this aspect of Shakespeare’s art, a choice of 
vocabulary which reflects his concern with demonstrating the plays’ consciousness of their own contrivance. And 
while Sillars will sometimes resort to using ‘dissimulation’ he most often labels this aesthetic phenomenon through a 
lexis drawn from the vocabulary of the plays and their contemporary discussion. Where ‘dissimulation’, like Meek’s 
‘duplicity’ and ‘deception’, necessarily frames itself negatively, Sillars mostly opts for terms like ‘artificial’ and 
‘counterfeit’ – adjectives which could in Shakespeare’s time still indicate a perfectly valid representation (and even 
when Sillars marks out more explicitly Shakespeare’s playing off of notions of ideal and aesthetic truths, as in his 
article, “‘You lie, you are not he’: Identity, Rhetoric and Convention in Shakespeare’s Art of Lying”, his lexis is still 
taken from the plays themselves and the poetical discussion occurring around them). The different descriptors that 
Meek and Sillars elect to use reflects the difference in their respective critical takes, something that Sillars has 
commented on in “Shakespeare, Art and Artifice: An Interview with Stuart Sillars” (conducted by Perry McPartland, 
EMCO, vol. 4, no. 2, 2019, pp. 1-31). His remarks on the The Rape of Lucrece are worth repeating in this context. 
Discussing Lucrece’s response to the techniques of painterly representation, Sillars remarks ‘That Lucrece takes this 
as deceit undermines the whole poem, and of course the whole poetic and visual tradition of the rape of Lucrece itself. 
This makes it far more real to the reader because her objection to artistic deceit makes her claim to being a “real 
person” all the more powerful. Also, it's not just a description of that painting, whatever “that painting” may be. It is 
an account of Lucrece’s reading of that painting – something which doesn’t take away the idea of deceit but puts it on 
a completely different level … to me the point is that it isn’t a deceit, it's artifice – and that's the only way that artifice 
is going to work’ (pp. 12-13).  
My own preference for ‘dissimulation’ derives from the fact that the metatheatric episodes that the articles have 
focused on often foreground the plays’ self-conscious games of aesthetic pretence (the articles on A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream, for example, give attention to how the play’s spectators must conceive of a rather quotidian prop as 
instancing marvellous transformation, or the way in which they are asked to see Theseus as both subject to, and as 
reversing, the tragic fate that classical myth attributes him), but also because these articles often discuss episodes 
which concern some kind of dissimulation within the narrative itself (whether this is Edgar’s description in King Lear 
of the non-existent view from a non-existent precipice, or the various deceptions that the parts in The Winter’s Tale 
perform on each other – the exaggerated performances of the courtiers in the play’s first act, or Autolycus’s con-
trickery, or, most fantastically, Hermione’s impersonation of her own sculpted likeness). Another reason for my 





The first reason that Aristotle provides for the usefulness of the discipline in the Rhetoric 
is that discourse is inevitably bound up with truth (1355a 21-24). For Aristotle, it is not that 
rhetoric supplies the means by which truth might be best disseminated but, as William M. 
A. Grimaldi explains, simply ‘that rhetoric qua rhetoric reaches out to truth’.28 So 
conceived, rhetoric is, as Bradford Vivian terms it, ‘doubly representative’. It allows 
mankind to represent and unfold the absolute, and it provides the means by which truths 
and laws might be expressed. As such rhetoric represents ‘the definitively human capacity 
of human beings, the activity in which humans personify the truth of their being’.29 A 
system of this kind must be considered dependent on and must be thought of as enacting a 
conjunction of mimetic ideality. The claims of truth, presence and speech are 
fundamentally aligned, and the rhetorical display of ethos remarks nothing less than an 
embodiment, providing testament to the fact that rhetoric’s outward display corresponds to 
an analogous inner state. 
Though cast in the terminology of the present, this is, broadly speaking, the 
understanding that the Elizabethan and Jacobean humanists would have derived from their 
extensive training in classical rhetoric. Yet the very educative methods which ensured that 
the practice of rhetoric, together with the metaphysics that sustained it, had such a profound 
impact on the period must also be thought of as sowing the seeds for a more equivocal 
understanding of the discipline – and, it must be added, an understanding that the theatre 
was uniquely placed to exploit. Despite the claims that the Aristotelian emphasis on ethos 
served to underwrite, the rhetorical training that schools provided was conducted in a 
manner which meant that the expression it made available was neither immediate nor 
unmediated. The lessons of rhetoric were embodied in Latin and could only be absorbed 
into English through a process of translation and transposition. This was made more 
involved due to the fact that Latin was distinguished from the vernacular in how it was 
construed as well as through a teaching process that approached it structurally (that is to 
say, focusing on grammar and syntax rather than lexis). This produced, in Leonard 
Barkan’s words, ‘a consciousness of language as a thing in itself, and not just a frictionless 
instrument’.30 This consciousness would have been intensified by the means through which 
rhetoric was both studied and realised – this being, essentially, performative. In the early 
                                                          
throughout the project. In the first stages of my research it seemed my arguments were best made if I employed terms 
like ‘dissimulation’, together with ‘duplicity’ and ‘deception’. Some of these early efforts were soon after accepted 
for publication, and as the official guidelines for the dissertation ask that any such articles are presented in their 
published form, rewriting them with a different critical lexis was not an option. So while my later research has made 
clear to me that in a number of critical instances the vocabulary of Shakespeare’s time (especially with the positive 
representational value that terms like ‘artificial’ and ‘counterfeit’ denote) is often at least as adequate to convey my 
intended meaning, in order to facilitate the dialogue that the different articles take to one another, I have elected for 
the most part to continue with the critical lexis employed in my first efforts. 
28 “Rhetoric and Truth: A Note on Aristotle. “Rhetoric” 1355a 21-24” (Philosophy and Rhetoric, vol. 11, no. 3, 
Summer 1978, pp. 173-177), p. 173. 
29 Being Made Strange: Rhetoric Beyond Representation (SUNY, 2004), Preface, p. x. 




stages of instruction master and pupil conducted question and answer conversations in 
Latin, and this progressed through to the delivery of epistles and verse, and the training 
culminated in the production of full-blown orations. Workbooks like the Progymnasmata 
would supply the classroom with examples of classical texts, derived from sources such as 
Quintilian and Cicero, and the students would be directed to create their own Latin 
compositions in which they placed themselves in some hypothetical historical or 
mythological situation. The resulting exercises were, as Barkan remarks, ‘inevitably full of 
tropes self-conscious about their status as discourse, and – most importantly of all – they 
amounted to dramatic impersonation’.31 
Such an educational process inevitably disturbs the sense that rhetoric unfolds 
according to the metaphysical model that Aristotle affirmed. For if, as a modern critical 
survey remarks, ‘[t]he ability to perform outstandingly in declamatio shows that the student 
has absorbed his moral as well as his intellectual lessons’,32 then, as Sillars points out, the 
first four words of the sentence reveal rhetoric as an essentially performative device, and 
remark ‘the deception that is implicit within the whole tradition of rhetorical phrase-
making’.33 Jay Fliegelman underlines this sense that the mastery of rhetoric depended on 
and could only be had through deliberate simulation: 
For all the insistence that eloquence was an art of magnifying feelings actually 
experienced not of deceptively fabricating feelings, to teach the code of voice and 
gesture – to elide the distinction between the production of natural sounds and the 
reproduction of them made possible through a deceptive taxonomy in the service of 
a mechanical science – was to equip all men to deceive, to act a role … Distinctions 
between ‘sincere’ and ‘artful’ to the contrary, ‘the art of speaking’ was always artful, 
the show of naturalness was still a show.34  
Inevitably, it was the early modern theatre – and Shakespeare’s theatre in particular 
– which made the most of these ambivalences. In Shakespeare’s plays, the dissimulations 
of dramatic performance underline the dissimulations of rhetoric and these in turn function, 
as Sillars writes, ‘to destabilise a series of assumptions earlier held in common between 
the world of play, the audience and the world beyond’. According to Sillars, it is the 
simulated nature of rhetoric which makes possible in Shakespeare’s drama the weaving 
together of ‘a richly variegated textual fabric within which a whole series of pretences, 
imitations, limitations, affectations and personations function together’. In this way, the 
plays profit from the effects made available by rhetoric’s performative dimension, while at 
the same time offering these effects interrogation. What emerges is a ‘quality of compound, 
                                                          
31 “What Did Shakespeare Read?”, p. 36. 
32 Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, From Humanism to the Humanities (Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 131. 
33 “‘You lie, you are not he’: Identity, Rhetoric and Convention in Shakespeare’s Art of Lying”, p. 24. Sillars discusses 
this aspect at some length in “Shakespeare, Art and Artifice: An Interview with Stuart Sillars”, at one point declaring 
that the key element of rhetoric is its artifice (pp. 3-4).  
34 Declaring Independence: Jefferson, Natural Language and the Culture of Performance (Stanford University Press, 




generative ambivalence’, that itself rests on ‘the dissimulation of theatre’, and which 
enables a ‘rich, inventive playfulness that exploits to the full the elements that it ostensibly 
rejects’. Rhetoric then functions at all points in the plays as a particularized form of 
metatheatrical irony, and one which we are constrained to recognize as, Sillars argues, 
‘fundamental to Shakespeare’s playmaking’. 35  
2.4 Ekphrasis 
The early modern humanist would have been introduced to ekphrasis through his (for it 
was nearly always a he) scholastic training in rhetoric, most probably through what we 
have noted was the preferred instructional manual of the day, the Progymnasmata. The 
Progymnasmata provided a series of preliminary rhetorical exercises begun in ancient 
Greece that were used to train students in basic compositional skills, of which the writing 
of an ekphrasis is one of the more advanced. In contrast to the understanding the modern 
reader is likely to attach to the term, that of a poetic account of an artwork,36 Shakespeare 
and his contemporaries would have been taught that ekphrasis referred to a description 
which was applicable to a catholic range of subject material. The recommended topic list 
that the various versions of the Progymnasmata takes in, for example, battles and 
battlements, storms and plagues, seashores and meadows, extending even to crocodiles and 
hippopotami.37 Artworks are accorded no particular distinction in any of these indexes, 
most often in fact, they make no appearance whatsoever.38 What distinguishes the 
particular quality of classical ekphrasis is not the specific nature of the represented object, 
but rather the manner of its representation: as the instructional manuals repeatedly insist, 
ekphrasis is compelled to manifest enargeia. In the versions of the Progymnasmata 
credited to Theon, ‘Hermogenes’, Apthonius and Nikolaos – despite their being separated 
by up to almost four centuries – the definition given to ekphrasis remains identical: 'a 
speech which leads one around, bringing the subject matter vividly before the eyes.’39 
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Understood in these terms, the device of ekphrasis would seem, as Murray Krieger notes, 
to give itself out as having ‘been created expressly for mimetic purposes’.40 
However, outside of the classroom the contemporary practice and discussion of 
ekphrasis would have inevitably meant that the cultured Elizabethan or Jacobean would 
have a sense of ekphrasis that coincided rather closely with the understanding reflected in 
modern definitions of the term. Throughout the early modern period the most exalted 
exemplifications of ekphrasis drawn from the classical world remained descriptions of 
artistic representations. In the early Renaissance Homer’s elaborate account of the imagery 
of the shield of Achilles was held up as the genre’s paradigm, and by the late Renaissance 
Virgil’s description of Aeneas’ shield was lauded in similar terms.41 And antiquity, of 
course, offers a range of instances beyond the celebrated examples of the descriptions of 
Homer and Virgil where ekphrasis takes the artwork as its subject. We encounter it as early 
as the 6th century BCE, in the renowned Hesiodic fragment, ‘Shield of Herakles’, and the 
pattern is still in place almost a thousand years later, in 4th century CE works such as Paul 
the Silentiary's Ekphrases of the church of St. Sophia, and Christodurus’ Ekphrasis of the 
statues in the public gymnasium called Zeuxippos.42 
This instantiation of ekphrasis, as the poeticized description of a visual artwork, 
would have had a special pertinence for the early modern humanist. The transposition of 
enargeia from the visual arts into the verbal arts would seem to animate the central and 
foundational precept of early modern poetics: the doctrine of ut pictura poesis. At the same 
time, the arrangement seems to offer the paragone between painting and poetry – what Joel 
Elias Spingarn calls ‘almost the keynote of renaissance criticism’43 – the perfect means by 
which to unfold itself. And early modern writers were not slow to recognize the form’s 
attractions. There was, as Meek remarks, ‘something of a rediscovery of the delights of 
ekphrasis in the Renaissance’,44 and Belsey, as we saw earlier, describes ekphrasis as ‘a 
favourite device of the period’.45 And the fact that both of these critics are content to refer 
to the poetic presentation of a visual artwork at this point in history as ekphrasis only speaks 
further to the centrality that such descriptions enjoyed at the time. Yet this early modern 
fascination often realised itself in literary performances that were quite removed from the 
precepts that classical poetics laid down. The lively and not un-sceptical sensibility of the 
early modern artist would sometimes lead him – especially when that ‘him’ was 
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Shakespeare – to uncover in the poeticized account of an art object the means by which a 
self-reflexive critique of mimesis might be effected. Such an artistic development was not, 
however, without a classical precedent. The structures of aesthetic paradox that ekphrasis 
makes available were something that the sophists recognized and, in their playfully self-
reflexive manner, seized upon. 
The finest example of this is probably Philostratus’ Imagines (third century CE), 
which presents itself as a description of 65 paintings that the writer saw in Naples. The 
work prompted a second series of Imagines by Philostratus the Younger, and inspired in 
turn Callistratus’ Ekphraseis, an imitation of Philostratus’ work which describes fourteen 
sculpted pieces as performed by various eminent artists. Diana Shaffer’s article, “Ekphrasis 
and the Rhetoric of Viewing in Philostratus’s Imaginary Museum”,46 provides an insightful 
reading of Imagines, and happily for our present purposes, her observations often chime 
with my own analysis of Shakespeare’s representational economy. Her comments on 
Imagines serves to highlight the use made of ekphrastic accounts of artworks in the plays 
and underline their sophistic deployment. Ekphrasis, writes Schaffer, 
functions not only as an elegant literary topos, but also as a sophistic critique of the 
epistemological stability of viewing – a critique intended to unmask both the 
deceptions of mimetic illusionism and the assumed correspondence between 
representation and reality … Whereas Homer’s ekphrasis firmly grounds the 
tradition of the sister arts (poetry and painting) in the mimesis of human actions, 
Philostratus’s Imagines explores the hermeneutic, persuasive, and prescriptive force 
of this ancient Trope [sic].47 
This exploration draws the readers back to art’s duality and entangles them in its 
projections. Shaffer concludes by underlining the challenge that such representational 
poetics bear for the mimetic model:  
Undermining the concept of verisimilitude itself, Philostratus’s ekphraseis reveal 
the tensions between description and interpretation and word and image 
characteristic of this ancient trope. Moreover, his ekphraseis dramatize both the 
futility and the fascination of the attempt to display the world in visual and verbal 
language. Contrary to Homer, who praises the supplementary relationship of word 
and image in the representation of the world perceived by the human eye and mind, 
Philostratus challenges the veracity of mimetic illusionism, pointing to the 
paradoxes of both visual and literary representation.48  
Belsey makes a similar point in her discussion of Shakespeare’s own use of ekphrasis: 
‘There is by definition no immediate representation. Even while it comes so close to truth, 
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Shakespeare’s ekphrasis has the effect of confirming the difference between life and its 
likeness’.49  
While the inherent self-referentiality that a poetic meditation on an art object makes 
ekphrasis’ reflexive qualities all the more pronounced, this quality – though signalled with 
less urgency – also inheres to ekphrasis even when conceived according to the broader 
impulses classicism’s definition supplies it. Ekphrasis, of either type, at the same time as 
it desires to make its reader or auditor ‘see’ can also be highlighted as a set piece, as a self-
conscious display of artfulness that points back to its own writtenness.50 When the device 
(in both its narrow and broad forms) is transferred to the theatre of Shakespeare’s age these 
tensions are amplified. As Joel Altman remarks, ‘Ekphrasis could be used not only to waft 
an audience out of its own theatre to one in a distant land but could also function as a mirror 
in which the audience was invited to observe itself looking and listening; in this way, 
ekphrasis became a vehicle for concentrating an audience's theatrical self-awareness’.51 For 
Altman, ‘ekphrasis instantiates early modern theatricality’.52 It manifests itself as a doubled 
effect, enlivening the imaginative investment in illusion while also pointing up 
representation’s artifice. Altman expounds ekphrasis’ theatrical operation in the following 
passage:  
If we think of theatricality as a quality attending any performance—whether in a 
theatre, court, innyard, street, or river barge—that solicits the kind of attention not 
usually accorded the ordinary behaviour encountered in daily life, then ekphrasis is 
a distinctively verbal form of theatricality. In its very nature as a stop-action device 
– and in its relation to epideictic rhetoric – it calls attention to itself … If, on the 
other hand, we think of theatricality as a term that emphasizes the mimetic activity 
that occurs in any ‘framed’ setting – theatre, court, innyard, street, barge, etc. – with 
whatever degree of verisimilitude, soliciting a commensurate suspension of 
disbelief in accordance with current convention, performance style, mode of 
representation, audience disposition and experience, then ekphrasis augments 
mimesis through its own unique power to inform the imagination … Ekphrasis, 
then, might be said to be quintessentially theatrical, since it can invite critical 
attention to itself as performance yet also bracket that performance to infiltrate, 
captivate, and illustrate with images the mind of the listener, effecting through the 
skilful mimetic expression of its content both intellectual and emotional 
conviction.53 
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To better realise the significant place that ekphrasis takes in Shakespeare’s drama 
we can return once more to the work of Stuart Sillars and Richard Meek. Sillars’ 
Shakespeare and the Visual Imagination approaches the plays according to an 
understanding ‘that accepts the elision of verbal, visual and performative genres as at the 
least a possibility and at the most a constant presence’.54 He argues that our appreciation 
of the canon is enriched if we recognise that there was a ready artistic exchange between 
word and image in Shakespeare’s period, and that playwright and audience both were 
familiar with not only the major visual forms of the age, but also with the ideas on which 
they rested.55 In this way, Sillars’ work reveals ‘the absorption of visual elements into 
dramatic or poetic forms, through their reinvention within verbal or theatric structures, their 
contribution to the themes and ideas of a play or poem, and larger reflection on the 
workings of poetry or theatre to the sensible universe’.56 What emerges from this coming 
together is ‘an analytical address between forms that interrogate, undermine, parody and 
extend each other, word and image held in balance as mirrors that depend on and intensify 
each other’s compound identity. The self-reflexive processes of metatheatric or metapoetic 
examination, rarely absent in the canon, are thus further enhanced’.57 In such a complex 
exchange between visual and verbal, ekphrasis will oftentimes function not merely as a 
bracketed rhetorical instance, but something more like one of the work’s configuring 
principles; the device and the allusions it activates folding back into ‘the action that drives 
the play and the issues that it debates’.58  
Richard Meek’s 2009 monograph, Narrating the Visual in Shakespeare, also 
approaches Shakespeare’s use of ekphrasis, and his response overlaps with some of the 
notions Sillars elaborates. For Meek, ekphrasis (in both its classical and modern 
applications) is the principal device by which Shakespeare explores and coordinates, as the 
title of his study indicates, the relationship between the visual and the narrated. While 
recognizing the prevalence of ekphrasis in the literature of the era, Meek argues it enjoys 
a particularly prominent place in Shakespeare’s artistic repertoire, suggesting that the 
‘continual fascination with ekphrasis’ that Shakespeare demonstrates ‘is perhaps unique 
among early modern authors’.59 Revisiting the lesson of the sophists, Meek remarks that 
while ekphrasis gives itself out as an exemplification of enargeia, as offering a natural and 
unmediated representation, it must also be thought of as a purposeful rhetorical 
contrivance, and in this way ekphrasis realises an arrangement by which the nature of 
representation is itself tabled: ‘ekphrasis highlights and crystallises something of the 
paradoxical nature, even duplicity, of literary description more generally. Perhaps, then, 
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the fascination of ekphrasis derives from the fact that it is an extreme – or at any rate more 
explicit – example of what all representation tries to achieve’.60 
Yet as with Sillars, Meek is far from viewing Shakespeare’s intensification of the 
paradoxes of ekphrasis as undermining representation’s effect. Instead, he sees it as 
offering a literary and self-reflexive transposition that acts to contrast and make available 
different modes of representation – or, perhaps it would be more in keeping with Meek’s 
analysis to say, different modes of literary re-presentation.61 Approached in this way, 
‘ekphrasis represents a particularly suggestive example of – or even a metaphor for – the 
seductive effects’ of Shakespeare’s art.62 And for Meek, the key to this metaphorical 
relationship is that this seduction is produced through the self-aware play of aesthetic 
deception. He suggests that some of the most powerful moments of Shakespeare’s dramatic 
art can, ‘like ekphrasis itself, […] be read as a sophisticated confidence trick’.63 Moreover, 
a cataloguing of Shakespeare’s rogues and tricksters allows Meek to demonstrate the 
‘particular Shakespearean interest in the relationship between ekphrasis and con-trickery’ 
and to assert how the ‘ekphrastic moments in Shakespeare’s work invite us to compare his 
aesthetic strategies with those of the various con-men he depicts’.64 Yet the plays’ pointing 
back to the duplicity of their art does not of course undo their effects; it becomes, in fact, 
a further means of dramatic seduction.  
Before moving on, a few more words need to be said about early modern ekphrasis 
and how the device lends itself to the layering effect of ‘literary re-presentation’. For as 
well as furthering our understanding of the utilization that Shakespeare’s art makes of 
ekphrasis, these points will serve to introduce another, related device central to 
Shakespeare’s metatheatrical representation, that of renaissance copia. As Meek notes, 
‘any consideration of ekphrasis in the period demands that we consider the relationship 
between literary texts’,65 an observation that chimes with Grant Scott’s assertion that the 
device is ‘necessarily intertextual’,66 and which is underlined once more by W. J. T. 
Mitchell’s pun that ekphrasis is as much about citing artworks as it is sighting them.67 Time 
and again, Shakespeare will have his ekphrastic accounts unfold within copia’s re-
presentations. Even Shakespeare’s descriptions of art tend to be, as Meek notes, ‘based on 
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other works of ekphrastic literature rather than actual paintings’.68 E. H. Gombrich 
suggests, for example, that the painting which Shakespeare describes in The Rape of 
Lucrece has its source in Philostratus’ Imagines,69 an observation which, rather happily for 
the current discussion, would suggest the playwright self-consciously locating himself in 
relationship to the sophistic tradition, while also demonstrating how ekphrasis and copia 
will often operate in tandem.  
 
 
2.5 Copia  
The notion of renaissance copia that this dissertation makes use of is indebted to the 
research of Sillars, Thomas M. Greene, Terence Cave, and the just mentioned, Ernst 
Gombrich.70 Overlapping with the concepts of translatio, imitatio and aemulatio, copia is 
understood as a complex of presentation realised through a revitalized imitation of earlier 
originals, an aesthetic strategy common to the visual, verbal and literary arts of the period.71 
‘Revitalized’ is key, for these works are, in both concept and execution, far more than 
reproductions of their artistic predecessors. Sources are appropriated, recontextualized, 
modified and enlarged in a process that Sillars glosses as ‘enriched imitation’.72 Describing 
these artistic developments, Sillars writes:  
Following the renaissance notions of copia, they modify their earlier originals with 
directly contemporary references, adding immediacy and enrichment by yoking 
together the two areas of experience and artistic statement. Imitation of an earlier 
form, with its narrative or political meanings, is thus not simple reproduction: as 
David Lowenthal remarks, the word copy at this time ‘denoted eloquent abundance’, 
reflecting through a macaronic pun the concept of copia to reflect fullness caused 
by such doubly enriched significance.73 
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Copia offers to the work an aesthetic architecture, in terms both practical and 
conceptual: ‘it allows an earlier form to provide both structural basis and intellectual 
immediacy’.74 And while in the plays it is most often ‘an earlier form’ that is given 
redeployment, as Sillars’ work itself demonstrates, sources from Shakespeare’s own day 
are often treated to the same artistic transposition.75 Such imitation, rather naturally, takes 
up a relationship to the orderings and orthodoxies of the classical and contemporary world 
that has about it something of the parodic. But parody in its early modern instantiation 
should not be thought of as limited to an instrument of comic deflation. Most often, as the 
articles in this dissertation make clear, Shakespeare employs parody in serioludic fashion, 
the serious and comically absurd aspects overlapping and acting to invigorate each other. 
Occasionally even, the serious will outgo the comic; some of the most gruesome scenes in 
the entire canon are realised in a modality that is best described as parodic copia.76 
A second strand of copia must be placed beside this. Where the ‘elaborated 
imitation’ Sillars discusses makes for an application of copia that is usually configured in 
broad and discursive terms, and which looks at the plays’ representations as deriving from 
and unfolding against the rich and variegated textual tapestry that the accumulated 
layerings of culture lend to its tropes, figures and discourses, this second aspect takes 
narrower terms and is closer to a reproduction than an imitation. Given insightful outline 
in Patricia Parker’s Shakespeare from the Margins,77 this dimension of copia most often 
operates through the play-dialogue’s reproduction of other texts. 
The relationship of reproduction to copia had contemporary pertinence. As Cave 
observes, the classical understanding of copia as indicating copiousness, had by the 
medieval era, owing to a productive accident of usage, extended to embrace ‘copy’.78 This 
is an understanding implied in Parker’s discussion of All’s Well That Ends Well, where she 
notes how in the early modern era, ‘[c]opia itself, in the sense of abundance or fertility, 
also had its double in the simulacra-like copies’ that the plays’ stage figures realise.79 At 
the same time as this ‘double’ then draws from traditional notions of copia, it also unsettles 
them, juxtaposing classicism’s copious and fruitful varying with an iteration that as Parker 
argues is conceptualized in terms that are heavily indebted to the early modern advances 
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in mechanical reproduction.80 In practice these reproductions often unfold themselves 
through, to phrase it in a way that recalls the points that Scot and Mitchell made about 
ekphrasis, what today would be referred to as intertextual citation.  
Iteration is Parker’s preferred term for these reproductions. Her use of the word must 
be considered as coloured by Derrida’s concept of the same name, and aspects of 
deconstruction are evident in Parker’s analysis of the effects of Shakespeare’s dramatic 
iteration.81 Whether these textual echoes draw on classical sources or refer to the new 
orders of humanist discipline, Parker argues that the process of their repetition shifts them 
away from a signification that is secure and univocal. Iteration realises instead a discourse 
that is inversionary and powerfully multi-faceted: ‘what often appears in the plays as a 
rehearsal or replaying of … closural procedures is frequently closer to the contemporary 
sense of parodia as an iterative reproduction, a repetition that simultaneously dislocates or 
displaces what is being shown, without necessarily enabling a particular deciphering’.82 
One key aspect of this effect Parker labels the ‘preposterous’, drawing on Elizabethan 
definitions which remark the term’s carnivalesque character. Contemporary dictionaries 
gloss ‘preposterous’ as ‘“contrary to all good order” … disruptive of a “natural” or 
“proper” sequence’;83 descriptions which themselves demonstrate how language in the 
period was ‘intimately linked to the production and reproduction of social order or 
precedence’.84 For Parker, the plays’ use of iteration works to call into question ‘the very 
priority of the “original”’, and in this way undermine ideological strata..85 Discussing 
Hamlet, for example, she argues how ‘[t]he very proliferation of simulacra, forgeries, and 
likenesses in this play … undoes its own language of first and second, original and 
sequel’.86  
Central to Parker’s reading of the preposterous function of intertextual reference is 
the transposition that occurs in moving from the written, and, most usually, printed 
‘original’ to the performed ‘iteration’. That is from a medium which unfolds lineally and 
sequentially, and which, more powerfully, brings with it the connotation of deriving 
directly from, and reproducing exactly, an original, to a medium which self-reflexively 
marks its freedom from such constraints.87 In providing classical or contemporary 
orthodoxies – together with the notions of priority, order and rule that inhere to these 
discourses – re-presentation in a theatrical performance that marks itself as simulated, 
secondary and unreal, the claims these discourses would otherwise advance and institute 
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become themselves vacated and open to interrogation. When Parker writes how duplicates 
and doubles in Shakespeare connote ‘duplicity and treachery’ this is not an observation 
that is limited to theme and narrative,88 but instead indicates an approach to theatrical 
representation that aligns itself with the notions of dissimulation and artifice that we have 
already seen rehearsed in the writings of Sillars and Meek. 
These two notions of copia, that of an ‘elaborated imitation’, and that of an iterated 
citation, are of course complementary. and often they operate together. We can, for 
purposes of example, turn to the readings of A Midsummer Night’s Dream offered by 
Parker in Shakespeare from the Margins and by Sillars in “‘However strange and 
admirable’: A Midsummer Night’s Dream as via stultitae”.89 Both treatments draw 
attention to the classical provenance attached to Theseus, and remark the dislocative effects 
that are made available by Shakespeare’s decision to give this particular figure central 
position in what is a marriage comedy. As the educated members of Shakespeare’s 
audience would have been aware, myth paints Theseus as a notorious philanderer and 
reports that his marriage to Hippolyta – the marriage that Shakespeare’s play celebrates – 
ends in a bloody debauch. And both Parker and Sillars’ studies place this ‘elaborated 
imitation’ in the context of an investigation into textual reference. Parker’s essay reveals 
the play’s preposterous subversion of the vows of the Marriage Ceremony from The Book 
of Common Prayer and illuminates the more profound dimensions of Bottom’s account of 
his ‘dream’ by exploring the passage’s echoes of Corinthians 2 in the Geneva Bible. Sillars 
analyses the same speech, uncovering and exploring it allusions to Erasmus’ In Praise of 
Folly, and – as the article’s title emphasizes – the spiritual traditions of the via stultitae. 
The re-utilisation of folk proverb in Puck’s speech of impending reconciliation from act 3 
scene 2 together with the passage’s disruption of sequence and rhetorical order further 
underline the drama’s inversionary play of high and low, and the spiritual accord of the 
play’s resolution is underlined in what Sillars argues is a textual echo of Julian of 
Norwich’s most famous motto. 
 
 
2.6. A critical convergence 
While then no overarching theory of Shakespeare’s use of metatheatre has established itself 
in recent times, in the work of the scholars discussed in this chapter a patterned series of 
related ideas emerges suggesting the possibility of a critical convergence. Underpinning 
these different strands of research is the investment in the plays’ early modern staging 
together with the manner of their performing. Developed from this, is a more precise sense 
of the operation of the early modern theatre’s artistic duality that contests, often pointedly, 
the binary structure by which the estrangement model posits the literal and figurative. The 
formulation it offers is at once simple and radical: the audience never takes the play-world 
                                                          
88 Shakespeare from the Margins, p. 133. 
89 Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen und Literaturen, vol. 244, 2007, pp. 27-39. 
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as ‘real’, and this means that metatheatre’s self-reflexive remarking of its unreality never 
proves fatal to the play’s presented fictions. The artwork’s paradoxes are the very thing 
that the audience has agreed to observe and, in their spectating, sustain. A perspective is 
obtained that sees representation as compound and multiple; poetic and material registers 
are intertwined, and a variety of depictional modalities and their associated effects can 
unfold simultaneously.  
Formulated in this way, the plays’ self-reflexivity does not so much point back to 
the material and actual conditions of the play’s construction as it does mark up their own 
aesthetic nature and processes. It is an attention which highlights the form’s artifice, and 
which underlines the dissimulations and absurdities which this artifice obtains. The re-
presented nature of drama’s representations is emphasized, and the representation is made 
to explore the gap that it takes to its original. Such an economy contrasts sharply with the 
poetic operation that the contemporary model of mimesis describes, and the plays make 
the most of this contrast in their appropriation of the discourse. The familiar poetic model 
is undermined and parodied at the same time as it is extended; its effects are re-realised 
and redeployed at the same time as the significances it would secure are interrogated. What 




3. Metatheatrical representation and the model of estrangement: a 
survey of metatheatrical criticism 
 
If this dissertation proposes that Shakespeare’s dramatic art unfolds in distinction to the 
poetical models of estrangement and mimesis, it is then necessary to give these 
theorisations a fuller assessment than space has so far allowed. This will be taken up over 
the next two chapters. The shift in focus does not, however, mean that we are abandoning 
our previous discussion; the consideration of these different aesthetic models will demand 
a response, and this response will serve to clarify and extend our understanding of 
Shakespeare’s metatheatrical representation. The current chapter considers the model of 




3.1 The theatrical reference model 
While any historical survey of the criticism of Shakespearean metatheatre is bound to 
remark the prominence of the estrangement model, it is too obliged to make space for a 
second theoretical framework: the theatrical reference model. Developed in the 1960s, the 
approach offered a conceptual frame which determined in large part the responses to 
Shakespearean metatheatre throughout the next two decades. It is an interpretation of 
metatheatre which, as noted earlier, must be thought as emerging out of Anne Righter’s 
seminal Shakespeare and the Idea of the Play from 1962. Righter’s research into the earlier 
English dramatic traditions of the mystery and miracle plays together with the later 
morality plays leads her to argue that the central transition of early modern drama is toward 
a more self-contained play-world, one more heavily marked by stage illusion. Theatrical 
representation remains hybrid however, and this hybridity is secured by the use to which 
Shakespeare’s puts the theatrum mundi metaphor. Righter’s study interprets this 
commonplace metaphor in amplified and extended terms, seeing it as taking in tropes of 
acting, subterfuge, disguise, and as being further explored through the relationship that the 
audience is made to take to actor and stage. The metaphor functions self-reflexively, 
remarking how reality is represented in the plays, as well as highlighting the conventions 
and conditions which themselves determine the performance. Righter reads this 
arrangement as serving to reveal Shakespeare’s shifting attitude to the theatre, arguing that 
his initial sense of the powerful possibilities of the medium yields later to a sardonic 
disillusionment.  
As subsequent critics have taken this model up, its central focus has become 
dramatic form itself, with the theatrum mundi motif acting to provide such investigations 
their sustaining metaphor. Most often, theatrical dissimulation is read as pointing back to 
the falsity of all appearances. So even though Righter’s original study argues for the 
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hybridity of representation, and remarks the innovative power of stage illusion, this 
becomes a far less central concern in later realisations of the theatrical-reference model. 
The critical interest in stage illusion is less concentrated on aspects of its play-world 
operations, and more focused on how such a presentation remarks its fictionality together 
with how it relates this dissimulation back to the world beyond the stage. Approached in 
this manner theatrical performance is most often taken as indicating the deceptive nature 
of all representation.  
 
 
3.2 Brecht’s model of estrangement 
Brecht’s model of dramatic estrangement derives from and feeds back into his development 
of epic theatre in the first half of the twentieth century. This new form arose as a response 
to the naturalistic drama of the day, an entertainment that Brecht dismisses as ‘culinary’1 
and which he sees as perpetrating an aesthetic and ideological fraudulence. Theatre of this 
kind is dependent on the audience’s empathic identification with the illusions it presents; 
an engagement which facilitates an emotional circuit whereby the audience’s desires are 
reproduced in order that they might be represented as fulfilled. These though are merely 
‘psuedo-satisfactions’, they operate on the spectators in the manner of a ‘palliative’, 
enabling them to bear the ‘agonies, disappointments and impossible tasks’ that a mercenary 
reality imposes on them.2 What Brecht calls ‘the general drug traffic conducted by 
bourgeois show business’ works to stupefy its audience and in this way render it 
acquiescent in its own exploitation.3 
In Brecht’s drama the ‘audience’s tendency to plunge into illusions has to be 
checked by specific means’.4 As such, epic theatre takes no pains to divert attention from 
its own constructedness, but rather, as Walter Benjamin observes in a remark that 
highlights the form’s metatheatricality, ‘incessantly derives a lively and productive 
consciousness from the fact that it is theatre’.5 As Brecht determines it, in epic theatre form 
and content do not correspond, but must be realised as separate elements. This dissonance 
serves to disrupt the spectators’ uncritical submission to stage illusion and instead 
engenders in them the Verfremdungseffekt – the best translation of which is probably ‘the 
estrangement effect’. Estrangement need not of course be thought of as producing an 
attitude of cool indifference, and in epic drama, and as Benjamin’s description implied, it 
can even make for an invigoration – as a bracing return to the real. Brecht writes: 
                                                          
1 Brecht on Theatre, p. 35. 
2 Brecht on Theatre, p. 41. 
3 Brecht on Theatre, p. 88. 
4 Brecht on Theatre, p. 136. 




The V-effect consists in turning the object of which one is to be made aware, to one 
which one’s attention is to be drawn, from something ordinary, familiar, 
immediately accessible, into something peculiar, striking and unexpected. What is 
obvious is in a certain sense made incomprehensible, but this is only in order that it 
may then be made all the easier to comprehend. Before familiarity can turn into 
awareness the familiar must be stripped of its inconspicuousness.6 
Brecht held that in this alienated and distanced state, the audience is better placed to reflect 
intellectually and objectively on the line of argument that the play presents. And, according 
to the Marxist and dialectical configuration by which epic theatre was framed, this process 
of estrangement would in turn force the audience members into a confrontation with the 
‘real’ conditions of their own ideological conscription. 
Brecht himself sees epic theatre’s Verfremdungseffekt as anticipated in the 
metatheatrical techniques of Elizabethan drama, and he claims Shakespeare as the 
outstanding example of this tendency, even going so far as to credit Shakespeare with 
achieving ‘a theatre full of alienation effects’.7 As W. E. Yuill observes, Brecht found in 
Shakespeare ‘a model for the revolutionary style to which he aspired’: that is, ‘a stage with 
minimal technical resources, incapable of creating illusion or mesmeric “atmosphere”, 
depending for its effects on word and gesture’.8 The sense that Shakespeare’s theatre 
conforms to the dramatic model advanced by Brecht is a perspective that criticism on 
Shakespearean metatheatre has time and again returned to, and when in 1985, the essay 
collection that brought cultural materialism to Shakespeare studies, Political Shakespeare, 
was published, space was made to explore the relationship between the two playwrights. 
In “How Brecht Read Shakespeare” Margot Heinemann revisits Yuill’s line of argument, 
asserting that ‘because of the particular nature of his theatre’ Shakespeare’s plays would 
have inevitably realised themselves within epic drama’s model of estrangement: 
it was an informal theatre with a very mixed public, popular and educated, close to 
both ‘beer-gardens and colleges’ and using the language of both. Since illusion was 
impossible anyway, with daylight performances, boys playing girls and so on, it was 
easy to include direct address to the audience, narrative and commentary, and the 
action could move freely from one place or country to another on the unlocalised 
stage, so that remote as well as immediate causes could be represented and distant 
opponents brought into confrontation.9  
In the context of my overall thesis it is worth underlining that both commentators imagine 
Shakespeare’s stage representations as subject to the same categorical restrictions: the 
                                                          
6 Brecht on Theatre, pp. 143-144. 
7 The quotation occurs in “How Brecht Read Shakespeare” (Political Shakespeare: New Essays in Cultural 
Materialism, edited by Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield, Manchester University Press, 1985, pp. 202-230), p. 
208, and is derived from the pages of the Messingkauf Dialogues found on pp. 57-64 in Brecht on Theatre. 
8 The Art of Vandalism: Bertolt Brecht and the English drama: an inaugural lecture (Bedford College, 1977), p. 8. 
9 “How Brecht Read Shakespeare”, p. 208. Heinemann’s quotation draws on Brecht’s Messingkauf Dialogues, 
translated by John Willett (Methuen, 1977), p. 32. 
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creation of illusion, or even a ‘mesmeric “atmosphere”’ is considered ‘impossible’ on 
Shakespeare’s stage. Moreover, this assumption appears to be consolidated as a critical 
given to the extent that in the quotations from both Yuill and Heinemann its statement 
requires nothing more than a breezy sub-clausal iteration. 
We are obliged to note here that Brecht himself may not have always considered 
stage illusion in such totalizing terms. His pronouncements, reflecting as they do decades 
of practical and theoretical investigation, do not always follow a single consistent line. So 
while in Brecht’s writings there are a number of passages which demand that aspects such 
as illusion, identification and empathy (and the last two are plainly dimensions of the 
former) be extirpated from drama, and although Shakespeare’s plays are often valorized 
for their apparent realisation of just such an arrangement, there are here and there glimpses 
of a more rounded view of the earlier dramatist’s aesthetic operation. For example, Brecht’s 
discussion of the role of empathy in Shakespeare’s plays in “A Little Private Tuition for 
my Friend Max Gorelik” cedes to it an occasional though not inefficacious operation: 
‘What a contradictory, complicated and intermittent operation it was in Shakespeare’s 
theatre’ (emphasis added).10 Brecht’s adjectives here suggesting not so much a minor 
element as they do an intricate and potentially impactful effect that the playwright has taken 
pains to direct. And I would argue that the German playwright’s own drama is often 
prepared to take advantage of the effects that varied representational modality allows, 
something which Brecht himself sometimes remarks. For example, in “On Experimental 
Theatre” he writes: 
It must never be forgotten that non-Aristotelian theatre [realised, that is, according 
to Brecht’s estrangement model] is only one form of theatre; it furthers specific 
social aims and has no claims to monopoly as far as the theatre in general is 
concerned. I myself can use both Aristotelian [which is to say, conventionally 
mimetic] and non-Aristotelian theatre in certain productions.11  
However, as we have seen in the commentary of Yuill and Heinemann, and as we 
will observe time and again throughout this survey, critical approaches that consider 
Shakespeare’s metatheatre through the estrangement model most often take Brecht’s 
pronouncements regarding stage representation rather categorically. In these 
interpretations, stage illusion is understood as evacuated of its enchantment, and the 
spectators’ attention is ineluctably redirected to the actual and immediate conditions of 
their own existence. Even in the more nuanced versions of the model the notion of 
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3.3 The impact of estrangement in the theatrical reference model 
If Righter’s 1962 book framed the theatrical reference model with ingenuity and insight, 
Lionel Abel’s Metatheatre: A New View of Dramatic Form12 from the following year, lent 
this impetus a lexis and brought with it the strong suggestion that the development 
warranted a structured theoretical complement. A number of scholars were encouraged to 
explore this version of ‘metatheatre’, with the result being that for the next two decades the 
theatrical reference model dominated investigations into Shakespeare’s self-reflexive 
practices. While this focus meant that the model underwent certain innovations – most 
especially in the work of James L. Calderwood – as we will see, the extent to which these 
developments remain impacted by a conceptual structuring owing to Brecht is marked. 
It is in the books Shakespearean Metadrama (1971), Metadrama in Shakespeare’s 
Henriad (1979), and To Be and Not to Be: Negation and Metadrama in Hamlet (1983),13 
that James L. Calderwood gives the theatrical reference model of the 1960s what must be 
considered its most significant extension and elaboration. Calderwood observes that while 
the metaphor of life-as-drama is a frequent resource of the early modern dramatist, it is 
Shakespeare who transforms the trope into an epistemology of theatrical poetics, making 
it possible to read back into it a ‘complex and coherent mode of dramatic meaning’.14 
Introducing his thesis, Calderwood remarks how ‘dramatic art itself – its materials, its 
media of language and theatre, its generic forms and conventions, its relationship to truth 
and the social order – is a dominant Shakespearean theme, perhaps his most abiding 
subject’.15 The theatrical form inclines itself to such an emphasis: its dual nature is 
foregrounded to a unusual degree and this means that all dramatic representation is marked 
by ‘curious ambiguity’, which Calderwood terms ‘duplexity’. 16 
As the term indicates, Calderwood’s model realises the literal and figurative in 
binary terms; the illusory depiction of the play-world is juxtaposed to the drama’s 
metatheatrical remarking of its processes and construction, and this makes for a pair of 
more or less distinct representational modalities. Calderwood invokes one of the favourite 
concepts of natural realism, ‘the willing suspension of disbelief’, to argue for the 
audience’s faith in the play-world: ‘Shakespeare’s audience probably suspended disbelief 
as willingly as any other, transforming … a stage full of costumed actors playing soldier 
into the battle of Shrewsbury Field, and Shakespearean blank verse into the speech of living 
and dying men’.17 ‘The play’, Calderwood claims, ‘will not work otherwise’, adding, ‘We 
cannot be simultaneously conscious of actor and character, of theatre and depicted life, of 
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13 Published by University of Minnesota Press, University of California Press, Columbia University Press, 
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14 Shakespearean Metadrama, p. 5. 
15 Shakespearean Metadrama, p. 5. 
16 Shakespearean Metadrama, p. 12. 




art and nature. We cannot be imaginatively involved in the immediate experience of the 
play and, at the same time, be intellectually detached from it’.18 And spectators who engage 
with illusion according to the structures of experience that Calderwood ascribes to them, 
must it seems inevitably experience the disruptions of metatheatre in the manner of the 
Verfremdungseffekt Hamlet’s numerous ‘instances of theatricalization’, for example ‘serve 
as Brechtian alienation devices to shatter our illusion of Danish reality and cut the cord of 
our imaginative life there’.19  
The influence of the Brechtian model is apparent; the aspects of the literal and 
figurative are still conceived in oppositional terms, and metatheatre’s operation acts to 
effect estrangement. And this influence persists in the work of scholars who take up the 
theatrical reference model in the wake of Calderwood’s research. Richard Hornby’s 
Drama, Metadrama, and Perception (1986),20 for example, offers a survey of metatheatre 
that goes from Sophocles to Harold Pinter, yet the broad sweep does nothing to dissuade 
the author from viewing metatheatre as producing in its audience an ‘unease’ which will 
often explicate itself in ‘the most exquisite of aesthetic insights, which theorists have 
spoken of as “estrangement” or “alienation”’.21 And five years later, in Judd D. Hubert’s 
Metadrama: The Example of Shakespeare,22 we see that metatheatre is still conceived as a 
device that illuminates the essential incompatibility that abides at the heart of the artwork’s 
duality: devices of metatheatre ‘transfer or transport elements involving content to 
performative schemes ascribable to the medium”,23 and it follows that ‘a constant 
performative thrust informs and subverts the various significta of the script’.24 
 
                                                          
18 Metadrama in Shakespeare’s Henriad, p. 79. The sentence in full reads ‘We cannot be imaginatively involved in 
the immediate experience of the play and, at the same time, be intellectually detached from it, playgoer and critic at 
once, any more than we can register Hamlet’s feeling while deliberating on Gielgud’s competence in the role, or take 
in the meaning of a soliloquy while parsing the lines’. I repeat it here, firstly, because Calderwood’s words demonstrate 
rather precisely the shared assumptions that inform the conceptualization of representational economy in, for all their 
apparent differences, models of both mimetic illusion and of metatheatrical disenchantment: the notion that the 
depiction of a fictional world is only capable of gratifying its spectators for as long as they delude themselves as to its 
actual nature. And secondly, because this contrasts almost diametrically with my own sense of artistic engagement, 
whereby the playgoer never forfeits her critical awareness. The familiarity of Calderwood’s position, inspired as it is 
by a conventionalized reformulation of Coleridge’s concept of ‘a willing suspension of disbelief’, can distract us from 
recognizing just how untenable a perspective it is. To imagine that we engage with art’s fictions without a simultaneous 
critical consciousness of the nature of our engagement is a conceptualization that quickly falls apart. Our critical 
evaluation is coeval and abiding; however invested in art’s depictions we might be, our awareness of our own 
engagement with the art object is never wholly forfeited. We always have a sense of how successful the work is, or 
more naively, the degree to which we are enjoying it. It is the quality that allows one – resorting here to personal 
experience but keeping to the subject of our discussion – to walk out of Shakespeare in Love after five minutes, or to 
discard Interred with Their Bones before the second chapter.  
19 To Be and Not to Be: Negation and Metadrama in Hamlet, p. 167. 
20 Associated University Presse.  
21 Drama, Metadrama, and Perception, p. 32. 
22 University of Nebraska Press, 1991. 
23 Metatheater: The Example of Shakespeare, p. 1. 





3.4 Metatheatre’s critical consolidation 
The research of the seventies and eighties served to establish metatheatre’s critical 
relevance, and today it is one of the given analytical tools by which scholars approach 
Shakespeare’s drama. ‘Metatheatre’ as Sarah Dustagheer and Harry Newman underline in 
the introduction they provide to the 2018 issue of the Shakespeare Bulletin devoted to the 
subject, ‘has become an absent-present concept in a field where early modern theater is 
seen as intrinsically self-reflexive, always concerned in some way with “the idea of the 
play”’.25 Critical investigations of this type most often interpret metatheatre through the 
theatrical-reference model,26 and unfold its signification through the simple transposition 
that the theatrum mundi affords. And as the language of the last two sentences implies, 
metatheatre’s critical consolidation has come at a certain cost. Dustagheer and Newman 
point out that the semantic ambiguity and flexibility that attaches itself to the concept 
means that ‘once-fresh terms such as “metatheatre,” “metadrama,” “reflexivity,” “self-
referentiality,” and “the play-within-a-play” … are too often used with a lack of self-
consciousness’.27 In these applications of the theatrical reference model, metatheatre is 
made into a conventional and rather modest critical tool; the breadth of its incorporation 
less a testament to its utility than to the fact that it will behave. It yields no radical dividends 
that might otherwise compel these differently situated readings to reposition themselves 
but lends itself instead to an application that is localized and facilitating. And this, for the 
most part, seems the theatrical reference model’s critical fate. Only a handful of studies 
given over to metatheatre have since the 1980s made use of it, and in present-day critical 
discussions that are focused on metatheatre it is rarely allocated much, if any, space.28 
The estrangement model of metatheatre has, as remarked, fared better. While in 
recent times critical engagement with this model also most often occurs when it functions 
as an element in a more broadly framed research area, it is rarely subsumed in the way that 
the theatrical-reference model of metatheatre is. In many of these studies the estrangement 
model acts to determine, or at least to significantly impact, the theoretical framework by 
which these investigations are conducted. In turn, the model itself often undergoes 
extension and refinement. What must be thought of as the most significant of these 
developments has come from fields that locate early modern metatheatre within the 
historical and material conditions of its original performance: in research designed to 
illuminate the immediate conditions and contexts that informed early modern 
performances, as well as in the work of new historicism and cultural materialism. In these 
approaches to metatheatre, the traces of Brecht’s original formulation of what we have 
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termed the estrangement model are more heavily marked than previous, and oftentimes the 
critics that make use of the model will pursue the broader ideological effects that Brecht 
argued derived from the audience’s estrangement. 
 
 
3.5 Shakespeare’s ‘theatre of estrangement’  
As we saw earlier reflected in the comments of Yuill and Heinemann, there is a critical 
perspective that understands the conditions of Shakespeare’s theatre as precluding any 
successful realisation of illusion, and which, following from this, conceives of performance 
as unfolding according to the estrangement model. It is a view often propounded – and 
usually in terms just as unilateral as the earlier quotations from Yuill and Heinemann would 
indicate – by scholars committed to recovering aspects of early modern theatre practice. 
Andrew Gurr, a pioneer in this field, is often happy to conceive of Shakespeare’s work as 
unfolding in a ‘theatre of estrangement’, and his essay “Metatheatre and the Fear of 
Playing”, collected in his Shakespeare’s Workplace from 2017, offers a rather categorical 
inflexion of the idea.29 The essay sees metatheatricality as operating to direct attention back 
to the duplicities of stage representation itself, and in this way producing a disengaged 
audience. Gurr argues that Shakespeare’s use of metatheatre is more extensive and urgent 
than criticism most usually allows, and that it is only through an appreciation of 
metatheatre’s impact that Shakespeare’s plays can be properly experienced. He writes that 
‘[w]e need to heighten our consciousness about the places where the early players’ sharp 
use of metatheatricality impacted on their performances, and how deeply they might have 
affected the original staging practices and therefore our reading of the plays’.30 Understood 
according to Gurr’s approach, metatheatre becomes a determining and all pervasive 
structure in Shakespeare’s drama, something underlined in his comments on Hamlet, where 
he asserts ‘the play’s insistence that the whole performance was anti-realist, metatheatre, a 
play within a play’.31  
In fact, as early modern drama is configured by Gurr, its representations cannot 
function otherwise. For Gurr, as for Yuill and Heinemann, the playing conditions and 
conventions in place in the early modern theatre compel an ‘openly unrealistic’ staging.32 
Gurr argues that features such as natural light and the almost bare apron-stage, together 
with soliloquys, asides, and the speaking of verse cannot help but function so as to 
undermine the production of artistic illusion.33 Furthermore, the early-moderns that Gurr 
posits have been socially conditioned so that any representational counterfeiting engenders 
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in them a powerful apprehension – and in the instance of theatrical representation this 
consciousness is further intensified. As Gurr puts it, ‘[t]he association of playing and 
deception with evil is basic to Elizabethan thinking’.34 In such a context metatheatre 
operates to defuse the dangerous allurements that theatrical illusion might otherwise realise 
– and to make his point, Gurr returns to the familiar model: ‘Like the alienation of audience 
from the emotions of the actors in Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt, the obviousness of the 
pretence could save the participants from the fear of being really deceived’.35  
The influence of the estrangement model is even more pronounced when it comes 
to the research of new historicism. Most models of metatheatrical criticism which make 
use of Brecht’s notion of epic theatre, in their borrowing of the concept of estrangement 
tend to extract it from, or at least shift its focus away from, the ideological structures within 
which Brecht’s original model configured it. By contrast, new historicism’s approach to 
early modern drama operates at all times to locate performance within the anatomy of state 
power. This concern is reflected in new historicism’s version of metatheatre, which 
replaces the focus on artistic form that was often the primary concern of Calderwood and 
the critical line that can be thought as emerging from his work with what became called 
‘theatricality’. The concept of ‘theatricality’ derives from critical theory’s uncovering of 
the role that performance played in constituting what had previously been considered 
unambiguously real. In Laura Levine’s words, ‘as New Historicism has broadened its 
scope’ it has ‘in the process, extended the number of things … existing only in the 
performance of themselves’.36 Drama’s particular theatricality, in that it represents a self-
conscious marking of such performance, becomes at once the instantiation and exploration 
of ‘performance’. 
This produces a shift in status accorded to metatheatricality, and this is outlined by 
Louis Montrose in The Purpose of Playing (1996),37 a work which re-examines Elizabethan 
politics of representation in A Midsummer Night’s Dream:  
That the play foregrounds the dramatic medium and the poetic process does not 
necessarily imply a claim for the self-referentiality of the literary object or the 
aesthetic act. I suggest, instead, that it manifests a dialectic between Shakespeare’s 
profession and his society, a dialectic between the theatre and the world … The 
much noted metatheatricality of A Midsummer Night’s Dream is no more apparent 
and striking than in [the] process by which the play assimilates its own dramatic 
effects. When I suggest that the play simultaneously subsumes and projects the 
conditions of its own possibility … I am attempting to locate it more precisely in 
the ideological matrix of its original production. 38 
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37 University of Chicago Press. 
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Earlier in the same book Montrose describes how theatricality might be conceived: 
the source of this theatre’s power was its very theatricality, and in the implications 
of theatricality for the construction and manipulation of social rules and 
interpersonal relations – implications touching fundamental epistemological and 
sociopolitical issues of causality and legitimacy, identity and agency. … The 
theatrical power that I am seeking to describe did not lie in the explicit advocacy of 
specific political positions but rather in the implicit but pervasive suggestion – 
inhering in the basic modalities of theatrical representation and dramatic conflict – 
that all such positions are relationally located and circumstantially shaped and that 
they are motivated by the passions and interests of their advocates.39 
In this way Montrose argues that the relationship between the Elizabethan state and 
its theatre was ‘complex and equivocal’, that it ‘was not constant but was subject to 
numerous shifts’40 and that theatre’s ‘ideological positioning’ was itself ‘ambiguous, 
diverse and contradictory’.41 It is an emphasis that complicates the more familiar new 
historicist account of an early modern theatre obliged to unfold according to the 
subversion-containment concept. Most closely associated with the work of Stephen 
Greenblatt, and particularly with the rather apodictic form of the model set out in the 
earliest versions of his “Invisible Bullets” essay,42 the subversion-containment theory 
refers to the ‘capacity of the dominant order to generate subversion so as to use it to its 
own ends’43. Montrose, however, makes explicit that the impact that he attaches to 
theatricality would not necessarily be subject to such confines: ‘I wish to resist arguments 
that bind the practices of the professional Elizabethan theatre to the practices of the 
Elizabethan state and that bind Shakespearean theatricality to political absolutism’.44  
As implied above, Greenblatt’s work does not always take such an absolute line, 
and one of the most significant contributions to the new historicist understanding of 
theatricality can be found in his essay “Shakespeare and the Exorcists”.45 The piece looks 
at King Lear’s borrowings from Samuel Harsnett’s A Declaration of Egregious Popish 
Impostures so as to explore the larger cultural text generated by the intertextual exchange 
and to make apparent the interests which the borrowing serves. While the reading remains 
ordered within the subversion-containment model, the essay presents a more qualified 
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version of the concept than that proposed in “Invisible Bullets”. Theatricality is still 
characterized as servicing power, but at the same time it can be read as lending to the 
performance space a qualified autonomy – and even granting it a certain liberty. 
Harsnett’s text attempts to demystify the charismatic appeal enjoyed by the Catholic 
ritual of exorcism by remarking ‘exorcism’s cunning concealment of its own theatricality’ 
and demonstrating how its practices echo the ‘falsity, tawdriness, and rhetorical 
manipulation’ of early modern drama.46 The theatre, as Greenblatt characterizes it, is 
‘marked off openly from all other forms and ceremonies of public life precisely by virtue 
of its freely acknowledged fictionality’;47 the play-world it presents is ‘clearly designated 
as a fiction’ and the performance itself is ‘bounded by the institutional signs of 
fictionality’.48 In that drama offers its dissimulations theatrical foregrounding, it becomes 
for Harsnett the perfect means by which he can remark the fraudulence and essential 
untruth of Catholic exorcism. Greenblatt gives an account of the negotiation that arises: 
‘The official church dismantles and cedes to the players the powerful mechanisms of an 
unwanted and dangerous charisma; in return, the players confirm the charge that those 
mechanisms are theatrical and hence illusory’.49  
Yet while theatricality underwrites power, it can also be understood as 
deconstructing it. The re-presentations that theatricality affords effects a series of 
‘institutional exchanges’; when the extra-artistic world is made over into performed fiction 
its ‘signs’ are ‘renegotiated and shifted’.50 The results that Greenblatt remarks as derived 
from this process demonstrate the continued influence of the estrangement model:  
Harsnett’s arguments are alienated from themselves when they make their 
appearance on the Shakespearean stage. This alienation may be set in the context of 
a more general observation: the closer Shakespeare seems to a source, the more 
faithfully he reproduces it on stage, the more devastating and decisive his 
transformation of it …What happens, as we have already begun to see, is that the 
official position is emptied out, even as it is loyally confirmed. 
And this ‘emptying out’, as Greenblatt underlines, ‘bears a certain resemblance to Brecht’s 
“alienation effect”’. 51 
Greenblatt’s description of the theatre makes clear the complex relationship that he 
sees between the ideological matrix in which Shakespeare’s plays are given to operate and 
their theatricalized re-presentation of that matrix: 
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the theater, a fraudulent institution that never pretends to be anything but fraudulent, 
an institution that calls forth what is not, that signifies absence, that transforms the 
literal into the metaphorical, that evacuates everything it represents. By doing so the 
theater makes for itself the hollow round space within which it survives … 
Shakespeare’s theater has outlived the institutions to which it paid homage, has lived 
to pay homage to other, competing institutions which in turn it seems to represent 
and empty out.52 
And for Greenblatt, it is the theatre’s particular location within this ideological matrix 
rather than any self-aware aesthetic strategies which grants it this discrete operation: ‘This 
complex, limited institutional independence, this marginal and impure autonomy, arises 
not out of an inherent, formal self-reflexiveness but out of the ideological matrix in which 
Shakespeare’s theater is created and recreated’.53 
The ideological dimensions of the estrangement model of metatheatre also concerns 
several critics associated with new historicism’s transatlantic cousin, cultural materialism. 
According to the Marxist analysis which underpins cultural materialism, the artwork, being 
as it is a cultural-historical product, cannot help but reify the ideological dissonance of the 
society from which it emerges. Consequently, many cultural materialists find metatheatre’s 
foregrounding of the disjunctures of form and content fertile territory, and they often 
conduct their explorations into early modern drama according to the model that Brecht 
originated.54 Cultural materialism’s demand for a politically invested criticism finds natural 
correspondence in the ideological agenda by which the theory of epic theatre is configured, 
and of all the critical lines that make use of the estrangement model, it is cultural 
materialism which can be said to adhere most fully to Brecht’s original Marxist dialectic. 
This is an attitude that one of the founding talents of cultural materialism, Jonathan 
Dollimore, makes explicit in his 1984 Radical Tragedy,55 where he writes of the need to 
approach early modern drama via a ‘critical perspective deriving from Brecht’.56 Dollimore 
reminds us that Brecht advocates a drama reflecting a reality – that is, a society – ‘full of 
conflict, contradiction and ideological misrepresentation’.57 And when Brecht turns to 
early modern drama he sees that this element of conflict functions as a central structural 
element; it is realised in a way that is ‘complex, shifting, largely impersonal, never 
soluble’.58 Representation in early modern drama is fractured, and it is in the 
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disconnectedness of Shakespeare’s plays that ‘one recognizes the disconnectedness of 
human fate’,59 and from which, quite naturally, estrangement follows.  
Dollimore demonstrates the extent that the representations of the early modern stage 
are rendered discordant and dislocated through an analysis of the markedly metatheatrical 
drama of John Webster. In his reading of The White Devil 2.2 Dollimore remarks how 
various aspects of the action are rendered in a way that is ‘bizarre’, ‘gratuitous and indeed 
incongruous’, and he underlines the scene’s ‘unnaturalness’ as well as its ’sudden alteration 
and deliberate contrast of mood’. The depiction of the court is described as ‘lacking in 
emotional coherence, unity of purpose or predictability – in a word discontinuous’.60 
Similar effects are remarked when Dollimore turns to Bosola’s mistaken killing of Antonio 
in Webster’s Duchess of Malfi, and the estrangement that derives from such a mannered 
presentation is made clear: ‘Indeed from a Brechtian perspective what is most relevant is 
the incongruity … One effect of that incongruity is to check the expected climax … 
Checked expectation, not enthrallment or empathy, is the result and we are thereby 
provoked to dwell critically’. Metatheatre’s self-reflexive marking is seen, in line with 
Brecht’s original formulation of the estrangement model, as producing a critical 
consciousness: ‘The artifice of the scene …is central. The drawing attention to the play as 
play … is a kind of estrangement effect, an invitation to engage critically with an issue 
rather than accept a transparent truth’.61 Dollimore claims that the incessant attention that 
metatheatre gives to its own dramatic structures effects an estrangement whereby ‘the 
“obvious” is made in a certain sense incomprehensible but only in order that it be made the 
easier to comprehend – that is, it is properly understood for the first time’. And, as 
Dollimore underlines, ‘to defamiliarize the “obvious”’ is ‘a crucial step towards ideological 
demystification’.62 
The imaginative and effective arguments that derived from the estrangement model 
of metatheatre made by critics working within the fields of cultural materialism and new 
historicism as well as by researchers like Gurr, working to elucidate the original 
performance conditions, have proved impactful. Even later and more formalist-inclined 
work on Shakespearean metatheatre still tends to view dramatic representation according 
to the terms established by the estrangement model, as in, for example, the research of Jenn 
Stephenson. Stephenson is one of the few scholars from the 2000s to give extended and 
concentrated study to metatheatre, with Shakespearean metatheatre figuring prominently 
in her writing. Her work draws on Polish theatre scholar Slawomir Świontek’s research 
into the intrinsic duality of dramatic dialogue.63 Świontek sees dialogue as unfolding along 
either the stage-stage axis, whereby characters interact with each other, or the stage-house 
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axis, whereby characters address the audience. In “Singular Impressions: Meta-theatre on 
Renaissance Celebrities and Corpses” (2007),64 Stephenson proposes a concept of 
metatheatre that extends Świontek’s theory so that it is conceived as marking up the 
ontological ‘duplexity’ (Stephenson borrows the term from Calderwood) not merely of 
speech, but also of set, props, costumes, lighting, bodies and gestures. This makes for a 
theoretical model which prioritizes the geography of the theatre and its materiality, together 
with the temporal nature of the performance and the perceptual processes of spectatorship, 
and which at the same time understands all of these elements as innately self-reflexive:. As 
Stephenson writes in “Meta-enunciative Properties of Dramatic Dialogue: A New View of 
Metatheatre and the Work of Sławomir Świontek” (2006),65 drama is marked by a 
‘particular fluid characteristic of identity in the spatial matrix between the actual “here” of 
reception and the fictional “not-here” of execution’.66 Instances of metatheatre are thought 
of as activating a ‘phenomenological shift in perceiving consciousness’, with the ‘shift’ 
being understood as ‘a change of flow, rather than an act of violence shattering the 
theatrical illusion’.67  
Describing the movement between fictional and actual planes in terms of fluidity 
and flow might seem to suggest that the effects of metatheatre do not negate the presence 
enjoyed by the fictional play-world representations, that dramatic representation need not 
be restricted to either the disjunctures that cultural materialism sees metatheatre as 
producing, or confined to the kind of anti-illusionistic effect that must inevitably derive 
from other instantiations of the Brechtian model. Yet Stephenson’s conceptualization of 
metatheatrical representation as characterized by ‘fluidity’ and ‘flow’ remains 
encompassed within the binary structuring that informs Świontek’s dialogical model, and 
which purposes a physical and spatial separation between the stage’s fictional ‘not here’ 
and the audience’s actual ‘here’. This framework leads Stephenson to understand the 
impact that performance conditions have on illusion in terms remarkably similar to those 
proposed by Heinemann and Gurr. Stephenson argues that ‘daylight performances, the bare 
minimally adorned stage and boy-players in female parts, demanded significant 
interpretive work on the part of the audience to manage the relationship between the actual 
… and the fictional’, and the result is that ‘the perceptual gap between the fictional and the 
actual is wide and inescapable’.68 We see once more that we return to a conception of 
metatheatre which estranges the audience from the drama’s depiction of its play-world.  
This survey makes apparent that what must be considered the most extended and 
influential theorisations of metatheatre – and regardless of whether they make use of the 
theatrical reference model of metatheatre of the estrangement model – are united by the 
belief that the relationship between metatheatre and representation is an antagonistic one, 
with the various theories differing really only in the particular cast they supply to this 
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antagonism. Most often this relationship is viewed in rather unilateral fashion; metatheatre 
reveals stage illusion as false, and in doing so, evacuates it of all enchantment. At their 
most categorical these theories assert the impossibility of the audience’s investment in a 
play-world illusion that is metatheatrically marked, yet even in more nuanced versions, 
metatheatre still acts to radically attenuate the audience’s engagement in the fictional play-
world.  
The most powerfully theorized versions of the estrangement model offer 
formulations which assert that the performance conditions and conventions prevent the 
realisation of a successful representational illusion (as in, for example, Gurr), or which 
demonstrate that dramatic success hinges not on illusion but on illusion’s puncturing (as 
Dollimore’s reading makes apparent), or else they remark how metatheatre’s highlighting 
of the performative uncovers, at the same time as it enacts, the mechanics of the spectacle 
– an operation which, once more, acts to engender illusion’s dismissal, or which limits 
artistic representation merely to displays of power (as is the case with the research of new 
historicists like Greenblatt and Montrose). And while the theatrical reference model is 
formulated in such a way that it is obliged to attend to dramatic form and to invest in art’s 
duality, an arrangement that would in itself seem to offer alternative to the unilateralism 
by which the estrangement model necessarily configures metatheatre’s effects, as we have 
seen, this attention often fails to extend beyond the mere re-rehearsal of art’s double-nature. 
When drama’s representational duality is further pursued, as in, for example, the work of 
Calderwood and Stephenson, this duality is often configured as a binary and oppositional 
relationship. In such a formulation, metatheatre works in one direction only, its remarking 
of drama’s artifice operating inevitably to undo the play-world’s integrity and to sever the 
audience’s connection to it.  
 
 
3.6 In response to the estrangement model 
If I am to make a case that Shakespeare’s stage fictions enjoy a power and impact that is 
not wholly undermined by the audience’s awareness of their constructedness then spme of 
what are the key premises of the estrangement model must be contested. Let us begin with 
the critical assertion, rehearsed in the arguments of Heinemann, Yuill, and Gurr, and 
informing and underwriting the notion of duplexity in the work of Calderwood and 
Stephenson, that the conditions of Shakespeare’s theatre, with ‘daylight performances, 
boys playing girls and so on’, meant that ‘illusion was impossible’.69 This is a position 
which seems not only to assume that for a representation to engage it must realise itself as 
mimetic reproduction (something implied in Gurr anachronistically labelling the style of 
                                                          




early modern theatre ‘anti-realism’70) but which makes of illusion a vitreous and brittle 
thing, fated to shatter in the revelation of the actual.  
It is also a position which seems to underestimate what Catherine Belsey terms the 
early modern audience’s ‘eagerness to be beguiled’.71 Nearly any art form, broken down 
to its component means and conventions, would seem to evince an incongruous 
relationship to anything like a convincing reproduction of reality. Film, a medium almost 
exclusively given over to depictions of high realism, cedes to the viewer multiple and often 
impossible viewpoints, and in doing has its screen figures enlarge and shrink. Edits and 
cuts serve to thrust audiences across impossible gaps of time and space – a narrative device 
so ‘unreal’, that when it is made use of in Act 4 of The Winter’s Tale, Shakespeare elects 
to play it as farce. But these features do not function as an obstacle to the audience’s 
engagement with filmic representation – most usually in fact they intensify it. Imagination, 
once it has made itself familiar with the particular configuration by which a medium is 
realised, seems happy to collude with any of the unrealities presented it. 
Certainly, it is true that in the early modern theatre the actual conditions by which 
representation is realised lie close to illusion’s surface. And this means that the playwright 
can, in opting to frame the actual and illusory as binary and oppositional, foreground the 
former so as to disrupt the latter. But this need not be the only effect derived, nor the only 
way by which the actual and fictional are made to relate. As I have argued earlier, it is 
equally possible that the proximal relationship that the two modalities enjoy could be 
thought as making possible a mutual interaction, coordinated through complicity and 
adulteration. Let us, for example, re-examine the ‘impossible illusion’ of ‘boys playing 
girls’ in light of the already quoted letter of Henry Jackson concerning how the Jacobean 
actor, to revert here to the revealing ambiguities of Nashe’s formulation, ‘represents the 
person’ of Desdemona: ‘although she always acted her whole part supremely well, yet 
when she was killed she was even more moving, for when she fell back upon the bed she 
implored the pity of the spectators by her very face’. We can observe that the attention to 
the actual and performed nature of the part does not invalidate, or even work in opposition 
to, its dramatic appeal. Rather, the stage figure is experienced as a fluid configuration, 
conceptually compound to the extent that the experience of the stage action serves to 
mingle not only the actor with his part, but also actual gender with its performed opposite 
(‘Note too,’ writes Anthony B. Dawson, ‘that the actor’s vitality is invoked even though 
the represented character is dead’, a remark which suggests that such a theatre makes no 
final and unadulterated representational positions available72). Jackson’s words warn us 
against an understanding that sees stage fictions as vaporised when their occurrence in the 
actual is remarked, and argues instead for an appreciation of early modern drama in which 
play-world illusion is not so easily overthrown – in fact, one in which the representations 
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of the stage are just as likely to subvert the plays’ self-referential remarking of the actual 
as the other way around. 
A similar failure to properly account for the centrality and power of play-world 
illusion can be found in the theories of metatheatre that follow more closely the ideological 
impetus of the estrangement model as originally formed. This critical line is perhaps best 
epitomized in the early work of Dollimore, and to better examine it we will return to his 
discussion of Webster. As noted earlier, the Dollimore of Radical Tragedy understands 
metatheatre as a force of dislocation and disjuncture, acting to bring about dissonance and 
disengagement. Play-references which highlight the constructed nature of the stage 
representation realise ‘a kind of estrangement effect, an invitation to engage critically with 
an issue rather than accept a transparent truth; in Raymond Williams’ characterization of 
the process, a “falsely involving, uncritical reception’ is checked and replaced with ‘an 
involved, critical inspection”’.73 As we have seen, Dollimore illustrates his critical 
perspective through a reading of Bosola’s mistaken killing of Antonio in The Duchess of 
Malfi. He begins by observing that  
the episode is not intrinsically implausible: the play makes it clear that it is night 
and that Antonio and Bosola are in darkness (the servant exits at line 42 to fetch a 
lanthorn) – and so on. In this connection John Russel Brown and Lois Porter have 
suggested that Webster may have been exploiting the partially darkened stage made 
possible by the enclosed Blackfriars theatre.  
But he goes on to remark that,  
from a Brechtian perspective, what is most relevant is the incongruity between 
Bosola’s measured meditation and the sudden disruption of the moment – one 
sharpened by the actual or implied transition from darkness to light (the servant 
returns with the lanthorn- 5.4.48). One effect of that incongruity is to check the 
expected climax: in fact, the episode is a kind of anti-climax: both revenge and 
poetic justice are anticipated but suddenly denied through the disclosure that it is 
Antonio not Ferdinand who lies dying. Checked expectations, not enthrallment or 
empathy, is the result.74 
While Dollimore argues that the scene estranges the play’s spectators, we might 
point out the extent that his own analysis reveals this affect is made possible and is 
predicated on the preliminary and ongoing operations of illusion. For the effects of – and 
here I revert to a handful of terms by which this line of criticism constructs its position – 
dislocation, discontinuity, and demystification can only be brought about by an initial 
relationship with the work that is, to some extent or other, located, continuous, and even 
mystified – that is to say, through an experience of the play which is only had through an 
imaginative investment in its illusions. As Dollimore remarks, the episode of Antonio’s 
                                                          
73 Radical Tragedy, pp. 66-67. The quotation from Raymond Williams comes from The Long Revolution (Fontana, 
1976), p. 385. 
74 Radical Tragedy, p. 66. 
56 
 
stabbing, outrageous though it is, is nonetheless lent a fictional plausibility – and 
plausibility must rightly be considered a species of illusion-making. Furthermore, the affect 
that the outcome of Bosola’s scheme delivers can only be felt as an ‘incongruity’ when a 
preceding illusion (or at the least, an expectation) of congruity has been established, and 
such an affect can only be ‘sharpened’ when the audience has invested itself in play-world 
events. In the same vein again, in order that an anti-climax is brought about, the movement 
by which ‘revenge and poetic justice are anticipated’ must have its momentum. And finally, 
when Dollimore argues that the scene produces ‘Checked expectations, not enthrallment 
or empathy’, it must be observed that expectations can only be checked if the audience is 
already sufficiently engaged (– and if instead of ‘engaged’ I had made recourse to Belsey’s 
‘beguiled’ that would, I feel, be fair description to what some portion of the spectators must 
be feeling, or, to go further, a fair description of what each spectator must be feeling in 
some portion). 
While the demystifications of new historicism’s theatricality do not operate 
according to such a pronounced binary, theatricality still understands the plays’ self-
reflexive indication as limiting the extent of the play-worlds’ imaginative appeal. The 
theatre remarks the fictional and fraudulent status it enjoys, and in doing so, dramatic 
representation engenders a dislocation between the theatrical signifier and the real-world 
signified. This allows theatricality to demonstrate the performed nature of discourses which 
would otherwise present themselves as authentic and absolute – yet at the same time, it 
allows the theatre to re-realise the performance of these discourses and to reify their power. 
This is a conception of self-reflexive dramatic representation which has impacted a number 
of subsequent approaches to Shakespeare, including, of course, my own. Yet there is a key 
difference. I do, somewhat similarly, see the plays’ representational economy as acting 
simultaneously to assert and interrogate itself, yet I would argue that while the interrogation 
underlines that the representation as false and acts to empty it out, the effects that such a 
representation might bring about remain to be had. The spectators know very well the play-
world is a false and empty thing, only, having come to the theatre, they have agreed to 
allow these fictions to make their claims on them. Where my analysis is prepared to 
understand the redeployment of these borrowed effects as not only affording but 
amplifying the range and appeal of play-world fictions, for new historicism, such a 
representational economy remains determined by the ideological matrix from which it is 
presumed to emerge, and the claims of the fictional world are confined to elaborating the 
power structures within which they unfold. 
It is a limitation already remarked in one of the earliest critical responses to new 
historicism. Anthony B. Dawson, in his 1988 article, “Measure for Measure, New 
Historicism, and Theatrical Power” makes the point that ‘just because power defines itself 
theatrically doesn’t necessarily mean that every theatrical act is a part of power’.75 And he 
                                                          
75 “Measure for Measure, New Historicism, and Theatrical Power” (Shakespeare Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 3, Autumn, 




points to moments in new historicist analysis where ‘a “nostalgia” for the subject and 
his/her freedom, however inconsistently, breaks through’, arguing that these ‘reveal a 
hidden desire or lack in the theory itself, one that should … be given some theoretical 
weight (especially since one way of appeasing such desire would be to go the theatre)’.76  
This is a criticism elaborated by Harry S. Turner in his “Towards a New 
Theatricality?”.77 Turner argues that the theatricality of new historicism, as well as cultural 
materialism, is marked by a failure to ‘consider the formal aspects of theatre in a sustained 
way’. Terms like “playing” or “spectacle” are made over into ‘generalized metaphors for 
royal power and display, useful for analyzing gender relations but rarely grounded in a 
detailed analysis of precisely how the stages operated’. An analysis of the stage’s operation 
demands that we recognize that while the theatre is a material and historical phenomenon 
it is also ‘intellectual, mental, fictional, verbal, signified, abstract’ and these aspects are not 
always and absolutely subject to ideological determination.78  
In responding to these different instantiations of the estrangement model, then, it 
seems that a comprehensive understanding of metatheatre can only be had by a 
reincorporation of that which the estrangement model in its different versions either lacks, 
ignores or refutes. Central to this understanding is the acknowledgement that play-world 
illusion, even as it is self-reflectively remarked as such, still powerfully engages its 
audience’s imaginations. Certainly, metatheatre can be utilized for purposes of dislocation 
and estrangement, but when it does so, we observe that this is a contingent rather than 
absolute effect. It does not exceed the art object that is the play but is itself one of the play’s 
processes. For while metatheatre might often produce a distancing, this effect does not ever 
completely outdistance the claims that stage fiction makes on the spectator’s imagination. 
The estrangement which the audience experiences is relational, coordinated by and 
sustained through the play’s ongoing processes of representation. When metatheatre 
functions to estrange, this does not then represent a final position, neither can it be thought 
of as severing itself from the art-object. And, coordinated in this way, it becomes clear that 
metatheatre is not, as it is even in the rather subtle realisation given to aesthetic self-
reflexivity in new historicism’s theatricality, confined to effects of dramatic estrangement. 
Metatheatre is understood as an aspect of drama’s unfolding, an unfolding that makes use 
of the possibilities of both the figurative and literal, but which avoids coming to rest in 
either. Which is to say, an adulterated process where illusion and a sense of illusion’s falsity 
are mingled and in which neither impulse is allowed to make itself wholly distinct from 
the other, an unfolding in which dramatic art is acknowledged as both fraudulent and 
enchanting.
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4. The poetics of mimesis and the early modern theatre 
 
 
4.1 Mimesis in the early modern era 
The remarks by which the previous section concludes are not intended as a dismissal of the 
discontinuities that metatheatre allows but are an attempt to qualify this impulse and place 
its operation in a broader representational context. Neither is this to contest the 
understanding that metatheatre serves to reject the poetics of mimesis – an idea as old as 
the critical concept of metatheatre itself1 – but rather to remark that this rejection does not 
preclude the redeployment of mimetic effects. This idea may strike the reader as a critical 
having my cake and eating it, but I ask her to bear with me. As the following paragraphs 
will make clear, my approach to metatheatre does not attempt to minimize what we might 
think of as the essential incompatibility of the poetics of estrangement and those of 
mimesis; in fact, it depends on understanding each aesthetic position in its most extreme 
incarnation. 
The version of mimesis that determines renaissance poetic theory is of course 
heavily indebted to its classical predecessor. It remains marked by a Platonic idealism and 
must be thought of as embedded in the correspondence theory of truth. As such, this model 
of mimesis asserts a congruous – and generally available – relationship between 
representation and object, between figuration and meaning. Offering a harmonizing 
language of unity, it locates itself within, and operates to underwrite, an ordered universe. 
All of which is to say, it represents a system of metaphysics – and one, we should add that 
the estrangement model would appear at each turn to contest. And, as would be expected, 
it follows that the artistic processes that each model describes (and would institute) are 
diametrically opposed. Where the estrangement model seeks to undo the sign, remarking 
its constructedness, mimesis by contrast would naturalize the sign; its representations are 
to be infused with enargeia – that is, rendered with such vividness that they rival the objects 
of the actual.  
Mimesis can be thought to embody what aesthetic philosopher Arthur C. Danto in 
his book The Transfiguration of the Commonplace describes as ‘the aspiration … of 
redeeming art for reality’.2 As Danto’s phrase implies, it seems somewhat inevitable that 
this aspiration would seek ultimately for representations so wondrously vivid that they 
might be mistaken for life itself. And in the early modern era where Horace’s dictum ut 
pictura poesis (‘as is painting, so is poetry’) represented ‘the universal presumption of all 
writers on poetry and poetics’,3 it was the visual arts, and particularly the legendary 
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vol. 3, edited by Glyn P. Norton, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 168-175), p. 168. 
60 
 
artworks of antique description, which most often served as paradigmatic exemplar of how 
representation might render immediate presence. We can turn, for example, to Marsilio 
Ficino’s Theologia Platonica for a colourful roll-call of the classical world’s most famous 
mimetic paragons: Zeuxis’ painted grapes at which birds pecked, Apelles’ depictions of 
horses and hounds that confused their real-world counters, and the marble Aphrodite by 
Praxiteles which excited the salacious gazes of men.4  
Yet the imitation that mimesis offers should not be thought of as limited to a direct 
empirical reproduction of nature, for its representations may also be constructed through 
selection and idealization. While the tale of Zeuxis’ painted grapes was endlessly 
rehearsed, so too was the somewhat different story concerning the same painter’s portrait 
of Helen. Tasked with realising the Image and Type of female beauty, Zeuxis chose the 
most beautiful women he could find, and composed his Helen through a selection of the 
best features from each of his models. This second story broadens our understanding of 
mimesis. Its imitation is no slavish reproduction, instead it borrows from the real to achieve 
what remains its principal aspiration: the rendering of a representation that would enact its 
presence with the same immediacy and fullness as the objects of reality themselves. And 
the effect of such a representation should not be confused with the quotidian, for in 
‘redeeming art for reality’ the imitation acts to affirm the connection between the actual 
and ideal – a notion reflected in Zeuxis’ name, with its meanings of ‘bridging’ or ‘method 
of yoking’.  
So rather than associate mimesis first and foremost with the powerful instancing of 
verisimilitude, it is more precise to see it, principally, as a strain of idealism. What mimesis 
seeks is nothing less than the creation of ‘an overwhelming sense of direct physical 
presence carrying both the matter and inner meaning of the actions it portrays into the 
spectator’s very soul’.5 Neoplatonist thought ensured that of all the arts it was painting 
which was taken as manifesting enargeia’s presence in most immediate terms. For, as 
Christopher Braider elucidates, where poets have to make use of ‘conventional verbal signs 
standing for, but thereby also displacing, the things they represent, painters deploy the 
“natural signs” constituted by the images of things themselves’.6 As such, when 
renaissance poetic treatises, already structured as they are according to the notion of 
intermedial analogy, expound on the verbal or literary utilization of enargeia they will 
oftentimes resort to the criterion of the painting. Erasmus, for example, writes: ‘We use 
[enargeia] whenever … we do not explain a thing simply, but display it to be looked at as 
if it were expressed in colour in a picture, so that it may seem that we have painted, not 
narrated, and that the reader has seen, not read’.7 But as we saw earlier, also in a quotation 
from Erasmus, there is another art which renaissance poetics invoked almost as often as it 
                                                          
4 Theologia Platonica de immortalitate animorum (Olms: Nachdr. d. Ausg. Paris, 1559), xiii.3. 
5 Christopher Braider, “The Paradoxical Sisterhood: ‘Ut Pictura Poesis’”, p. 169. 
6 “The Paradoxical Sisterhood: ‘Ut Pictura Poesis’”, p. 169. 
7 De Copia, in Omnia Opera, 9 vols (Basil: Froben, 1540), vol. 1, p. 66. The translation is Terence Cave’s and is taken 
from his “Enargeia: Erasmus and the Rhetoric of Presence in the Sixteenth Century” (L’esprit Créateur, vol. 16, 1976, 
pp. 5-19, p. 7). 
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did painting when instancing the kind of presence that enargeia must manifest: ‘We shall 
enrich speech by description of a thing when we do not relate what is done, or has been 
done, summarily or sketchily, but place it before the eyes painted with all the colors of 
rhetoric, so that at length it draws the hearer or reader outside himself as in the theatre.’ 
By placing the stories of antique artworks of legendary verisimilitude beside the two 
explications of enargeia provided by Erasmus, it is possible to see these instances as 
revealing another aspect which operates to coordinate the structures by which mimetic 
representation is realized. These instances remark, implicitly, how the medium is itself 
expected to function within the mimetic model, a point which, it is perhaps worth 
remarking, contemporary poetics give little overt attention. As both the glosses of Erasmus 
and the described artworks of antiquity serve to intimate, the medium is expected to 
conduct itself rather conscientiously: at the same time as it fulfills its representational 
function, it must it seems efface its own presence. In the first quotation from Erasmus 
enargeia transposes narration into something ‘not narrated’, and makes text into something 
‘not read’, while in the second, enargeia’s successful transportation of the reader or hearer 
into the imagined-actual acts to expunge its own literary or verbal description. The 
artworks of Zeuxis, Apelles and Praxiteles that were earlier introduced fare likewise; paint 
and surface do not survive their transposition into image, and marble is made over into 
something more limber. This sense that successful depiction, that mimetic realization of 
representational immediacy, is dependent on the absenting of the medium’s actuality is a 
notion that time and again informs renaissance accounts of the painting process. Leon 
Battista Alberti’s famous description rehearses the idea: ‘First of all, on the surface on 
which I am going to paint, I draw a rectangle of whatever size I want, which I regard as an 
open window through which the subject to be painted is seen’.8 And Leonardo da Vinci 
provides an equally well-known rendition of the same principle: ‘Perspective is nothing 
else than the seeing of an object behind a sheet of glass’.9  
Having elucidated the parts played by enargeia, idealism and the medium of 
representation in the Renaissance’s conceptualization of mimesis we might now return to 
the second quotation from Erasmus and to the question it prompted in the earlier discussion 
of Troilus and Cressida. In urging rhetorical and literary representation to replicate the 
qualities of immediacy and (it must be thought) intensity that inhere to theatrical 
performance Erasmus’s words beg the question: what happens when the representation is 
not directed to a ‘hearer or reader’ but to a spectator, one who is already ‘in the theatre’? 
While in the early modern period the arts of painting, sculpture, poetry, and rhetoric sustain 
an analogous relationship that happily incorporates and works to further explicate the 
mimetic model, the art of the theatre seems, circumstantially, to exist outside the 
parameters that determine the sister arts; for the representations of the theatre are already 
the stuff of actuality. As Leonard Barkan observes, ‘What renders the theater special among 
                                                          
8 Leon Battista Alberti, On Painting and On Sculpture: The Latin Texts of De Pictura and De Statua, edited and 
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these debates is the ever-present possibility that it will make poetics literally visible, that it 
will take the ut out of “ut pictura poesis”, that it will realize the promises implicit in all 
those definitions of poetry that want to give it presence and materiality’.10  
We must add to Barkan’s comment, however, that at the same time as theatre 
appears to offer to mimetic representation its manifest realization, it would also seem to 
realize its dissolution. As the paragraph before the last argued, mimetic success demands 
that the medium is assimilated to the point where it disappears. But in the case of the early 
modern theatre the ‘presence and materiality’ of the successful representation is 
simultaneously the ‘presence and materiality’ of the medium. ‘Desdemona’ is at once the 
representation of Desdemona and the actual actor. Yet, early modern theatre is, at the same 
time, happy to make use of representations that fail the most minimal tests of mimesis – 
and this too is due to the ‘presence and materiality’ of the medium. As briefly touched on 
in this text’s opening pages, the early modern play was, with next to no help from props or 
scenic indicators, constrained to establish the location of the scene (when, that is, it chose 
to do so) through announcing it. And this oftentimes merely nominative reference would 
not have been anywhere near sufficient to re-realize as convincing mimetic illusion the 
wooden promontory stage, nor to produce a sense of fictional locale that overwhelmed the 
spectator’s experience of the theatre structure that rounded the stage and of the other 
audience members that filled the venue.11 As this arrangement demonstrates, and in 
contrast to the imaginative relationship present-day audiences most often take to dramatic 
representation, on the early modern stage, actor precedes setting, with the latter being 
derived from the former.12 This means that almost every scene begins, up until the point 
where the actors establish setting, in a locale which takes no representative value, and as 
such must be thought to throw the audience’s imaginations back again onto the actual 
conditions of the stage. And of course, setting in the plays is only indicated where it is 
pertinent; a large portion of the action in early modern drama takes place in a ‘location’ 
that is wholly undefined, and, if it is imagined at all, can only be given the vaguest and 
most circumspect envisioning. It is, in short, a representative arrangement almost wholly 
at odds with the mimetic dictates of enargeia.13  
Early modern theatre then seems to present two contrasting difficulties for mimesis. 
On the one hand, it threatens to realize the dream of enargeia, rendering to the 
representations of Talbot or Desdemona actual presence. Only it does so in a way that 
makes explicit the medium in which these representations are constructed, something 
which must be thought to complicate the sense of their mimetic realization, pointing back 
as it does to the dissimulation of this actualized representation. On the other hand, when it 
                                                          
10 Mute Poetry, Speaking Pictures (Princeton University Press, 2012), p. 107. 
11 Even when Shakespeare lends to setting an extended and beautiful poetry, as, for example, in the description of the 
exterior of Inverness (Macbeth 1.6.1-10), it is difficult to imagine that this would have served to wholly displace the 
theatre’s material presence. 
12 A point discussed by Helen Cooper in Shakespeare and the Medieval World, pp. 96-97. 
13 Particularly with the idea that enargeia’s quality of verisimilitude needs be based on circumstantiae, that is, 
precision of detail. As Dionysius of Halicarnassus for one observes, enargeia’s power ‘arises out of [this] grasp of 
circumstantial detail’ (Quoted in Leonard Barkan’s Mute Poetry, Speaking Pictures, p. 7). 
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comes to other aspects of the theatre’s representational poetics – as is the case with setting 
– the material conditions of the space are allowed to manifest themselves with what seems 
like a cavalier disregard for the coherence and potency of play-world illusion. In fact, at 
times it seems that the physical facts of promontory and scene are so devoid of rendering 
that they can barely be considered to function as representation.  
The strains of incorporating the form of theatre into the mimetic model were 
certainly remarked by the theorists of the early modern era. Most often this resulted in a 
view of drama that denied the form inclusion in the sister arts, and consequently relegated 
it from full aesthetic consideration. This perspective probably found its most forthright 
formulation in what was the most important English language work on poetics in the 
Renaissance, Sir Philip Sidney’s An Apology for Poetry (written around 1580, published 
1595)14. Sidney’s work addresses itself to the difficulties which I have shown that the 
representational practices of early modern theatre present for the poetics of mimesis, and 
in doing so offers a rather delighted denunciation of the form taken by contemporary 
dramatic art. 
Before getting to that however, it has to be underlined that the date of writing places 
An Apology for Poetry prior to not only Shakespeare’s work, but what must be considered, 
the blossoming of English theatre. And it too needs to be remarked that in introducing 
Sidney’s critique of the form of early modern drama I am not suggesting that the self-aware 
and myriad representational economy that I argue Shakespeare’s drama takes is something 
wholly contrasting with Sidney’s own art, or even for that matter, Sidney’s poetic 
testimony. Sidney’s poetry and fiction are themselves marked by an ambiguity and a deep 
dramatic irony which plays elaborate games with speaker and style. Similarly, An Apology 
for Poetry might best be approached bearing in mind Margaret W. Ferguson’s comment 
that ‘Sidney was a master of “deep dissimulation”’, together with her suggestion that if we 
view Sidney as ‘a counterfeiter … his case for poetry becomes at once more cogent as a 
theoretical statement and more interesting as a literary performance’.15 I make use of 
Sidney’s condemnation of the theatre then not to invent a false opposition between poetical 
practices which share much common ground but rather to illustrate a contemporary 
conception of drama’s mimetic incapacity that must be thought of as reflecting, and in turn 
influencing, a view that that held sway in early modern antitheatricalist circles and beyond.  
A few words must also be said as to the version of mimesis that Sidney’s Apology 
argues. Unsurprisingly, Sidney’s poetics takes ut pictura poesis, and the ancillary dictum 
of Simonides, ‘painting is mute poetry, poetry a talking picture’, as its presiding doctrine. 
The latter formulation finds place in Sidney’s celebrated definition of poetry: ‘Poesy 
therefore is an art of imitation. For so Aristotle termeth it in the word mimesis, that is to 
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say, a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth – to speak metaphorically, a speaking 
picture’.16 Sidney’s preference for the Aristotelian rather than Neoplatonic framework 
allows him to move his model of mimesis further away from understanding poetical 
representation as obliged to reproduce the objects of the world, and instead to press 
‘imitation’ into greater dimensions of ideality. While in Sidney’s system each other art and 
science is constrained to and dependent upon the ‘proposed matter’ nature has assigned to 
it ‘without which they could not consist, and on which they so depend, as they become 
Actors & Plaiers, as it were of what nature will have set forth’ (Sidney exemplifies this 
through the astronomer, who is committed to treat of the stars), the poet is free to range 
‘within the zodiac of his own wit’. ‘[L]ifted up with the vigor of his own invention’, the 
poet ‘doth grow, in effect, into another nature, in making things either better than nature 
brings forth, or quite anew, forms such as never were in nature’. Where nature’s ‘world is 
brazen, the poets only deliver a golden’.17 It is a poetics that lends itself to conceive of the 
artwork in terms which are formal, ideal and autonomous. This has led Paul H. Fry to argue 
for An Apology for Poetry as anticipating Kant’s work on aesthetics,18 and prompted 
Barkan to characterize Sidney’s system as a ‘utopian poetics, a dream that poetry can do 
just about anything’.19  
Such a rarefied poetics is beyond the reach of contemporary public theatre. 
Elizabethan drama is, for Sidney, an essentially vulgar and adulterated medium, mingling 
‘kings and clowns’,20 as well as illusion and actuality. And when it comes to the problems 
that dramatic representation poses for the mimetic model – where the theatre, in some of 
its aspects, would appear to offer representation the dream of actualisation, yet in others, 
seem to surrender to the stage reality and give up on any attempt at creating convincing 
illusions – Sidney’s Apology sees these discrepancies as argument for dismissal of the 
contemporary realisation of drama. Sidney characterizes theatrical representation as 
‘inartificially imagined’, meaning that stage depictions cannot help but betray both the 
conventional and actual means through which they have been brought about.21 Theatre's 
attempts to realize the illusions of place and time – constrained as they are by the limited 
area of the stage and the window of time allocated for the experience of the performance – 
are, as Sidney’s notorious denunciation of contemporary drama would show, bound to be 
absurd:  
you shall have Asia of the one side [of the stage], and Afric of the other, and so 
many under-kingdoms, that the player, when he cometh in, must ever begin with 
telling where he is, or else the tale will not be conceived … Now of time they are 
much more liberal, for ordinary it is that two young princes fall in love. After many 
                                                          
16 An Apology for Poetry, p. 9. 
17 An Apology for Poetry, pp. 7-8. 
18 Theory of Literature (Yale University Press, 2012), pp. 59-60. 
19 “Making Pictures Speak; Renaissance Art, Elizabethan Literature, Modern Scholarship” (Renaissance Quarterly, 
vol. 48, no. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 326-351), pp. 326-327. 
20 An Apology for Poetry, p. 36. 




traverses, she is got with child, delivered of a fair boy; he is lost, groweth a man, 
falls in love, and is ready yet to get another child; and all this in two hours’ space.22 
These violations of the classical unities also serve to undo the sense of the stage-
part’s presence; for even though the actor lends the persona a realization in the actual, 
subjecting this persona to such impossibilities makes the persona too impossible. A second 
objection to the representation formed by the dramatic embodiment of persona might be 
inferred from Sidney’s argument for the unique nature of poetry. For, as we have seen, 
when Sidney asserts that the poetic art of ‘imitation’ is distinguished from all other areas 
of human activity, he somewhat tellingly characterizes the latter pursuits as performed by 
‘Actors and Plaiers’. The metaphor suggests that dramatic performance, in that it is realized 
through real-life ‘Actors and Plaiers’, lacks the aesthetic independence which for Sidney 
characterizes art. The acted character is not ‘[L]ifted up with the vigor of his own 
invention’; the vigor of invention is the playwright’s, and in that this invention can only be 
given form in its reproduction in the actual (that is in the physical performance of the actor) 
it would appear to forfeit the unique position that Sidney’s poetics argues pertains to 
‘imitation’.  
For Sidney the poetics of enargeia must remain distinct from the embodiment that 
theatre is constrained to give them. Imagination can find no true purchase on the stage since 
drama is condemned to a form of representation in which the actual remains always an 
element of the illusory: ‘What child is there that, coming to a play, and seeing Thebes 
written in great letters upon an old door, doth believe that it is Thebes?’23 As Barkan writes, 
‘Sidney wants his poetry to speak pictures, but he does not want the pictures to be real. A 
picture that really talks is for him something of a freak show’.24 We might diagnose then 
from the objections that An Apology for Poetry levels at the theatre that an essential quality 
of mimesis is that its illusions remain imaginary. Despite tradition measuring mimetic 
success according to how closely artistic depiction approaches the actual, it is vital that this 
re-presentation is never actualized; the exchange of aspects that ut pictura poesis proposes 
is to remain, in Sidney’s terms, wholly metaphorical.  
 
 
4.2 Representation’s rhetoricality: the poetics of mimesis and estrangement  
This last point asks that we qualify the position that renaissance theories of mimesis 
themselves most often outline. Despite tradition measuring mimetic success according to 
how closely artistic depiction approaches the actual, it is vital that this re-presentation is 
never really actualized. The translation of representation into reality is to remain, as Sidney 
underlines, wholly metaphorical. Were the impossible desire of a transfiguration into the 
                                                          
22 An Apology for Poetry, p. 48. 
23 An Apology for Poetry, p. 36. 
24 Mute Poetry, Speaking Pictures, p. 108. 
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real ever accomplished, the artwork that achieved this would cease to exist as an artwork. 
Once Pygmalion’s statue becomes Galatea, Galatea ceases to be a statue. Correspondingly, 
this would indicate that the sublation of the medium that the mimetic model infers is too 
merely a ‘metaphorical’ position, something never to be wholly realized. And rather than 
describing the qualification that frames these aspirations as ‘metaphorical’ it would seem 
more precise to term it ‘rhetorical’. The rhetorical question seeks no answer, and the same 
adjective can characterize the apparent ambitions of mimesis: for although the impetus of 
enargiea affirms an affective investment in the urgency of its own claims, it remains 
however essential that the claims themselves go unrealized.25  
These observations prompt us to return to the phrase we earlier borrowed from 
Danto’s The Transfiguration of the Commonplace and ask, if the objectives of mimesis are 
merely rhetorical then what of the ‘aspiration … of redeeming art for reality’? And – a 
question that we will come to subsequently – what might the early modern theatre, a form 
which distinguishes itself from its contemporary arts in configuring a wholly different 
relationship to reality, make of a mimesis understood as merely rhetorical? And it seems 
somewhat appropriate that we should pursue this inquiry according to the preferred method 
of the renaissance theory itself: via analogy with a work of visual art.  
While Danto’s study of the ‘aspiration … of redeeming art for reality’ takes in, as 
we might expect, the theories and practices that inform classical iterations of mimesis, its 
principal energies are devoted to the analysis of an artwork that would appear to challenge 
not only the poetics of mimesis, but also the very categories of representation and reality: 
Andy Warhol’s Brillo Boxes (1964). This is an artwork whose description risks tautology; 
Brillo Boxes is, according to the evidence of our eyes, a pile of Brillo boxes. In visual 
terms, the only thing that distinguishes Warhol’s boxes from their real-world counterparts 
is their location in the gallery space. As deliberately banal as the work is its aesthetic 
complexity should not be underestimated, and it is not being in the least fanciful to see the 
piece as parodying the ideal ambitions of mimesis. I have already elucidated how the 
formulas of mimesis ask for a representation that overwhelms the spectator’s sense of the 
medium itself, and turning to Brillo Boxes we can see that the medium and its associated 
processes have been wholly, almost absurdly, subsumed. Similarly, Brillo Boxes can be 
conceived as offering to the dreams of aesthetic actualization actual actualization – yet as 
realizing this desire through the most quotidian of forms. In blandly effectuating the 
                                                          
25 In my discussion of ‘rhetoricality’ in the article, “Dissimulation and the Dover Cliff: Metatheatrical Representation 
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transposition which mimesis posits as the ambition of all artistic representation, Brillo 
Boxes underlines that mimesis really seeks nothing of the sort. When manifested in the 
real, the artwork forfeits all wonder and ideality. If the mimetic artwork is to retain these 
qualities then it must stop short (and in the ideal dimensions of the classical model, just 
short) of the aspirations that its poetics claim for it. It is not, however, simply the 
rhetoricality of mimetic practice that Brillo Boxes marks up. The work indicates the 
essentially rhetorical nature of all artistic representation; the only thing which prevents 
Warhol’s ‘sculpture’ from being swallowed up, unremarked, by the extra-artistic world is 
its nomination as art. Brillo Boxes are separated from Brillo boxes by an italicization. And 
for Danto, the realization of such a position signals the end of art.26  
Yet it is not only the poetics of mimesis that Warhol’s work can be seen as 
commenting on. The piece can too be read as remarking the function and limitations that 
the aesthetics of estrangement would realize, and demonstrating that its poetics are also 
rhetorically formulated. At first glance, one might be forgiven for taking Brillo Boxes as a 
rather neat reification of estrangement aesthetics. The piece subjects it representational 
processes to a self-reflexive scrutiny, and, probably as thoroughly as any artwork is capable 
of doing, it underlines its real-world presence and status. Characterizing the work as ‘anti-
illusionist’ – the term Gurr used to describe what he imagined was the alienated early 
modern theatre – would be rather precise, and I think we are obliged to recognize in the 
piece the kind of distancing effect that the estrangement model of theatre would have its 
artworks realize. Placed in a gallery space, Warhol’s Brillo Boxes operate, to return to 
Dollimore’s formulation, to ‘defamiliarize the obvious’, and so effect a certain 
‘demystification’ concerning the art object itself. In evacuating aesthetic considerations 
from the work, Brillo Boxes places into question the ontological categories which work to 
separate the artwork from the extra-artistic world. The piece enacts – or it may be more 
accurate to write, advertises – its own commodification, at the same time as it points away 
from itself to place under scrutiny the nature of art and aesthetics, and the status and value 
that our society confers on these objects.  
But this would be to take the estrangement model at its word, as well as to make 
Warhol’s piece into something more simplex than it is. A fuller appreciation of both the 
estrangement model of art and Brillo Boxes would act to demonstrate a differently 
coordinated significance. We have in Chapter 3 already remarked how the estrangement 
model is configured in less absolute terms than it would give out. It is adulterated, and 
dependent for its effects on the spectator’s engagement with an imaginary dimension of 
representation that the model would itself either deny or radically delimit. And we know 
from the discussion of the Brillo Boxes’ apparent ‘mimesis’ that Warhol’s piece has to it a 
strong strain of the burlesque – that at the same time as it portrays itself as enacting an 
artistic position the piece too presents its parody. This aspect of Brillo Boxes can be thought 
                                                          
26 And so as not to misrepresent Danto for readers unfamiliar with his rather fine work, we should add that it is Danto’s 
writings which have most thoroughly elucidated the seminal nature of Brillo Boxes, and that the ‘end of art’ which 
Danto proposes is at the same time framed – and only somewhat perversely – as offering to artistic practice 
invigoration; a position Danto outlines in After the End of Art (Princeton University Press, 1998). 
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to bring us full circle. For Warhol’s work underlines how estrangement aesthetics too seeks 
redemption for art in reality. As we have seen, a prominent strand of early modern drama 
criticism insists that illusion is made impossible by the actual conditions of the plays’ 
staging, and that it is to the latter that the audience’s attention is deliberately directed. 
Another variation makes use of stage illusion only so that it might be repeatedly punctured 
– a process of defamiliarization that brings about the critical awareness of the immediate 
ideological structures in effect. Yet the redemption that Brillo Boxes offers is the most 
banal of realities. It would seem to indicate that the critical consciousness which the work 
encourages its spectators to is destined to remain embroiled in the most mundane and, in 
fact, conditioned of (commercialized) realities.  
Even new historicism’s theatricality, which might seem to accommodate the kind 
of contradictions that a work like Brillo Boxes advances, must still be thought as an attempt 
to transpose art into reality. Theatricality will either – when operating in subversion mode 
– have drama discover the actual performance of power, or – when operating in 
containment mode – see drama as the unvarnished spectacle itself, an auxiliary to ideology 
that enacts real power. And as Brillo Boxes makes clear this transposition into the real 
brings with it problems. For perhaps the most urgent issue that Brillo Boxes would seem to 
raise for the estrangement model concerns how the actual art object might maintain itself 
once it has been redeemed for reality. As Danto has remarked, Brillo Boxes can be thought 
to mark the end of art, and the estrangement that the piece offers suggests a final position 
which would (and this should not be considered as offered without parody either) claim 
that nothing more needs to – or even can be – said. In this case, the object that would most 
perfectly realize estrangement would, at the same time, most perfectly manifest the 
obsolescence of artistic representation. If the spectator is estranged, and so thrust towards 
a critical perspective, this goal being realized, this perfectly estranged individual need no 
longer return to the art object and, in the case of more traditional works, to the 
representation(s) that the art object affords. And not dissimilarly, if the art object is taken 
as another manifestation of ideological power – in a system where power is already seen 
as totalizing – then the object’s unique representational function is ignored, and art 
becomes simply another discourse among discourses. 
Of course, representational obsolescence suits well Brillo Boxes. The work does not 
need a second look – may not, in fact, even require a first look; its description alone may 
be sufficient. But the form of Shakespeare’s theatre cannot subscribe to such an exclusive 
position of conceptual immaculacy; the form of drama is processual, unfolding in the 
shifting terrains of time and space, and each performance is shaped by the particular 
conditions which particularly inform it. The estrangement that early modern drama realizes 
is tied to and must time and again relocate itself within these ongoing processes of 
theatrical unfolding – and as such it is incapable of attaining an exclusive position beyond 
them. At the same time, in that this process of theatrical unfolding is tied to the 
incongruities and mutabilities that self-reflexivity affords, this drama cannot realize itself 
as a consummate manifestation of power – as it will never be only power that is told. The 
analogy offered by Warhol’s Brillo Boxes then brings us back to a point made first in the 
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reading of Troilus and Cressida: that the effect of estrangement is experienced merely as 
an ‘effect of estrangement’ – the audience members are not immediately and forever after 
demystified by metatheatre’s self-reflexive marking, instead they remain engaged within a 
broader and ongoing experience of representation, part of which is an ongoing imaginative 
investment in the play-world as play-world, and part of which is its self- reflexive critique. 
A comment from Roland Barthes is pertinent here. For at the same time as Barthes 
puts forward his idea of the ‘pure text’ – that is, the wholly writerly text – he recognizes 
that such an idea is merely notional, a utopian impossibility.27 In The Pleasure of the Text 
he remarks how even the most radical text still needs ‘its shadow: this shadow is a bit of 
ideology, a bit of representation, a bit of subject’.28 We might extrapolate from this and 
suggest that no aesthetic approach that seeks to redeem the art object is capable of an 
absolute realization in the real, or, for that matter, a consummate and unequivocal spectacle 
of power. The essential duality of artistic representation makes no final and unadulterated 
position available. ‘Estrangement’ never abandons the art object for good, it must, 
inevitably, come back to it; and mimetic representation, for all its apparent dreams of 
actualization, is only itself preserved by the actual presence of the artwork’s medium.  
 
 
4.3  Mimesis and estrangement redeployed 
Of all the arts of the early modern period, it seems it is drama which is most compelled to 
some kind of account of representation’s rhetoricality. As Brillo Boxes’ caricature makes 
explicit, when representation is provided actual rather than imagistic status, art’s relation 
to reality becomes foregrounded in rather urgent fashion. The philosopher of language, 
John Searle elucidates the particular condition which distinguishes the representations of 
the theatre: where the other arts offer ‘a presented representation of a state of affairs … a 
play, that is, a play as performed, is not a pretended representation of a state of affairs but 
the pretended state of affairs itself, the actors pretend to be the characters’.29 While it is 
possible to object that a pretended (and presented) state of affairs still deserves the status 
of ‘representation’, Searle’s comment usefully highlights the extent that dramatic depiction 
is characterized by both actuality and pretence. This pretence makes for a dramatically 
realized presentation which is both closer and further away from the ‘thing itself’ – and in 
the theatre of Shakespeare’s era (Searle’s statement pertains to theatre in general) both this 
proximity and distance would have been accentuated. The early modern theatre would 
seem to offer realization to, on the one hand, the full and real presence dreamt of by 
mimesis, and indicated in Erasmus’ remarking of theatre’s innate enargeia, and on the 
                                                          
27 As Graham Allen points out in Intertextuality (Routledge, 2011). Allen is referring to Barthes’ Roland Barthes by 
Roland Barthes, translated by Richard Howard (Hill and Wang, 1977), pp. 76-77.  
28 Translated by Richard Miller (Hill and Wang, 1975), p. 32. 
29 “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse” (New Literary History, vol. 6, no. 2, 1975, pp 319-332), p. 328. In the 
passage Searle is contrasting fictional stories with the theatre, but his argument holds when making a comparison 
between the arts of the early modern period and the form taken by the drama of the era. 
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other, to the disillusionment enacted by the aesthetics of estrangement, through the fact 
that this same real presence means that theatre’s representations cannot help but 
demonstrate that they are, in Sidney’s phrase, ‘inartificially imagined’, and so point back 
to their actual – rather than imagistic – nature. Clearly, each impetus contradicts the 
representational modality that the other would realize.  
If then the form of early modern theatre compels it to take up a relationship to 
contemporary representational poetics that is both contradictory and urgent, we can remark 
that this is something that the dramatic works of the period exhibit an awareness of. As the 
articles of this dissertation repeatedly point up, the orthodoxies of contemporary poetics 
often find their way, in one form or another, into Shakespeare’s plays, and antitheatricalist 
criticisms like Sidney’s are played out through the business of stage representation itself. 
The plays demonstrate – one is tempted to add, brazenly – their incompatibility with the 
golden poetics that Sidney would have his art deliver, often electing to do so through an 
ironic superimposition of the practices of mimesis on a medium which cannot help but 
assert a recalcitrant actuality. In a sense, the arrangement works to illustrate Sidney’s sense 
that theatrical representation is condemned to an absurd ‘freakshow’ unfolding, and so 
incapable of proper mimetic effect.  
And we should add here that the estrangement model frames itself according to the 
same foundational principle implied in Sidney’s discussion of theatrical representation. 
The experience of artistic representation is confined to one of two modalities: either illusion 
is so powerfully realized that the audience forgoes the sense of its unreality, or, the means 
by which that depiction is brought about are so prominent that the audience forgoes their 
engagement with illusion. Neither model gives space to the sense that a depiction, 
recognized and marked as unreal, still makes claims on us. The models of estrangement 
and mimesis differ from each other only in what this representational impasse is thought 
as affording. Yet as we have seen, Shakespeare’s theatre reveals an ability to realize the 
most powerful representational effects in the teeth of the directives of mimetic poetics. For 
the plays make no attempt to downplay the constructedness of their illusions, the opposite 
in fact: metatheatre constantly draws the audience’s attention to the artifice of the plays’ 
representational modality. The sense of the falsity of the presented illusion is insistent, yet 
this recognition does not prevent the plays’ fictions from realizing a vivid and immediate 
effect. We have seen in the reading of Troilus and Cressida how at each turn the play marks 
up the dissimulation that inheres to its structures of representation, yet at the same time, 
the figure of Cressida is capable of beguiling not just her play-world lover but (and we 
have seen this holds too for Henry Jackson’s Desdemona) the real-world audience as well.  
We might conclude this chapter by summarizing what we have so far determined 
about the relationship Shakespeare’s art bears to the contemporary poetical model of 
mimesis and the latter-day critical model of estrangement. Where both the poetics of 
mimesis and estrangement would, in their own ways, redeem art for reality, Shakespeare’s 
plays mark up the essential dissimulation and pretence that is art’s innate condition. 
Certainly, the plays are happy to frame the poetics of mimesis as well as the techniques 
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and strategies that, centuries later, would become equated with the model of estrangement, 
and to make use of their different representational energies. But the deployment of these 
representational complexes remains throughout marked as occurring within art’s broader 
dissimulation. For representation can never exceed its form, can never transpose itself into 
reality, and the apparent efforts to do so, whether advanced through a poetics of mimesis 
or estrangement, would only succeed at the cost of their own dissolution. The impetus that 
each aesthetic system presents as its goal can be characterized as rhetorical, that is, as a 
pretence, but, of course, not a pretence that can ever be admitted – for pretence is a quality 
that inheres only to the art object’s representation; its real-world counter demands to be 
thought of as the unfeigned thing itself.  
Shakespeare’s art distinguishes itself from both of these aesthetic models. In 
contrast to the poetics of mimesis it foregrounds the falsity of its artistic representation, 
and in this way marks its separation from unfeigned reality. This is plainly something that 
most versions of the estrangement model would also have their artworks do, understanding 
the arrangement as facilitating the audience’s alienation. Only Shakespeare’s theatre does 
not conceptualize art’s essential falsity as something to be escaped. As has been 
demonstrated, in Shakespeare’s drama whether the audience experiences the effect of 
something like a vividly realized mimesis at the play-world level, or the effect of a 
powerfully disrupting estrangement from that play-world, these effects are underlined as 
occurring within the larger pretence that the artwork itself proposes, and as such are never 
fully realized. The audience completes this pretence: they register the effect of mimesis’ 
full presence without ever taking it as ‘real’; they recognize the effect of estrangement 
without ever abandoning their imaginative investment in the performance. Having 
established the relationship that Shakespeare’s art takes to the poetical systems of mimesis 
and estrangement we can now proceed to a closer exploration of the form and function of 




5. Towards an outline of Shakespeare’s metatheatrical representation 
 
5.1 ‘A willing suspension of disbelief’ reexamined and reapplied 
To provide the operation of Shakespeare’s metatheatrical representation elucidation we can 
turn back to Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s famous definition of what constituted the act of 
poetic faith: ‘a willing suspension of disbelief for the moment’.1 It is also relevant to remark 
here that Coleridge’s aesthetic research can be seen as emerging in large part as a response 
to Shakespeare’s dramas. Moreover, in his consideration of these works Coleridge was, 
somewhat uncommonly for the time, acutely aware of the plays as early modern 
performances, and his notion of ‘a willing suspension of disbelief’ was shaped by his sense 
of how the plays’ representations would be subject to the staging conditions then in effect.2 
This last point alone is enough to suggest that while in subsequent criticism the ‘willing 
suspension of disbelief’ has often been seen as a byword for the spectator’s romantic 
surrender to the artwork’s mimetic illusions, Coleridge’s original notion must be 
approached as formulated with far more subtlety. We are best placed if we understand that 
the notion recognizes, in Frederick Burwick’s words, ‘that volitional acquiescence [keeps] 
the mediating referentiality intact even while shifting our attention from signifier to 
signified’.3 Illusion cannot be thought as overwhelming the spectator in the way mimesis 
pretends it does, instead it is dependent on a deliberated and ongoing process by which the 
audience elects to be deceived.  
Coleridge states the essence of artistic representation in the following terms: ‘It is 
not a Copy of Nature but it is an Imitation’.4 Here the sense given to ‘Imitation’ echoes that 
which we earlier encountered in Sidney’s Apology. As Coleridge explains, ‘the word 
imitation itself means always a combination of a certain degree of dissimilitude with a 
certain degree of similitude’. The arts for Coleridge are ideal, they offer ‘not the mere copy 
of things, but the contemplation of mind upon things’.5 A ‘copy’ merely reproduces the 
arbitrary arrangements of the instant whereas the ‘imitation’ is an arrangement illuminated 
by the poetic imagination. However, where a similar attitude led Sidney to dismiss the 
efforts of early modern stage representation as an absurd and unconvincing coupling of the 
figurative and the literal, Coleridge sees stage illusion as sustained by the audience’s 
                                                          
1 Biographia Literaria II (Oxford University Press, 1907), p. 6. 
2 It is perhaps also relevant to point out that when Coleridge himself turns to drama his work makes use of what we 
would now call metatheatre. See for example, Remorse in The Complete Poetical Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 
edited by Ernest Hartley Coleridge (Clarendon Press, 1957). Frederick Burwick’s discussion of the play in Illusion 
and the Drama: Critical Theory of the Enlightenment and Romantic Era (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010) 
highlights well the play’s ironic deployment of metatheatre, especially p. 268. 
3 Illusion and the Drama: Critical Theory of the Enlightenment and Romantic Era, p. 12.  
4 From Coleridge’s fourth lecture on Shakespeare. Quoted in Sanja Sostaric’s Coleridge and Emerson: A Complex 
Affinity (Universal Publishers, 2003), p. 172. 
5 From Coleridge’s third lecture on Shakespeare. Coleridge: Lectures on Shakespeare (1811-1819), edited by Adam 




‘willing suspension of disbelief’. Even the ‘scanty scenery’ of Shakespeare’s stage elicits 
the latter’s praise, forcing as it does, playwright and audience to draw on what Coleridge 
terms ‘the Strength of inward Illusion’.6 This is an arrangement which produces  
a sort of temporary half-faith, by which the spectator encourages in himself and 
supports by a voluntary contribution on his own part, because he knows that it is at 
all times in his power to see the thing as it really is …The true stage-illusion in this 
and in all other things consists – not in the mind’s judging it to be a forest, but, in 
its remission of the judgement that it is not a forest.7 
Where Sidney’s critique of early modern drama sees theatrical representation as 
condemned to an unsuccessful negotiation between the actual and the imagined, the 
structure of Coleridge’s argument means that theatrical representation produces no 
confusion with reality. Rather, the audience’s sense of the essential pretence of the drama 
operates to distinguish it from the extra-artistic world. In fact, it is this very understanding 




5.2 A representational register 
The last quotation occurs in a passage in which Coleridge compares the painted forest 
scenery to a landscape painting by Claude Lorrain, and the discussion serves to reveal 
something more about how the ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ operates to configure 
dramatic representation: 
Thus, Claude imitates a landscape at sunset, but only as a picture; while a forest-
scene is not presented to the spectators as a picture, but as a forest; and though, in 
the full sense of the word, we are no more deceived by the one than by the other, 
yet are our feelings very differently affected; and the pleasure derived from the one 
is not composed of the same elements as that afforded by the other, even on the 
supposition that the quantum of both were equal.8  
We can note that Coleridge distinguishes the different representational modalities, as well 
as the different investments that the audience makes in each of these modalities. Yet by 
presaging these remarks with ‘though, in the full sense of the word, we are no more 
deceived by the one than by the other’, he underlines that at the same time as the audience’s 
imagination perceives these differences, this perception remains encompassed within a 
broader recognition of art’s pretence. The arrangement demonstrates that there exists 
within this overall pretence differentiated layers of pretence: the spectators agree to see the 
                                                          
6 From Coleridge’s lecture on The Tempest. Lectures on Literature, 1808-19: Vol. 5 (Collected Works of Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge), edited by R. A. Foakes (Routledge, 1987), pp. 539-543. 
7 From the essay “The Progress of the Drama” in Lectures Upon Shakespeare (Classic Books, 2001), p. 37. 
8 “The Progress of the Drama”, p. 37. 
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painting as a picture, and the scenery as forest. Further, we should underline that not only 
does the spectators’ approach to the play ensure that they experience these representations 
in the manner that each representation demands, but, despite the fact that in one sense the 
spectators ‘are no more deceived by one than the other’, these different representative 
modalities nonetheless allow different affects: ‘the pleasure derived from the one is not 
composed of the same elements as that afforded by the other, even on the supposition that 
the quantum of both were equal’. 
Elsewhere, Coleridge suggests that these different representational modalities, 
together with the particular affects and signification they afford, can be imagined as 
occurring on a scale, with the location given to each mode being dependent on what we 
have seen Coleridge refer to as degrees of dissimilitude and similitude, that is, the extent 
to which the representation reproduces reality or differentiates itself from it: 
This difference between a sense of reality and falsehood admits of various degrees, 
from the domestic tragedy, which is too real to be compatible with pleasure … and 
down to the mere dance at an Opera, which is yet capable of giving us the highest 
pleasure, and which, with music and harmonious motions of the body, can, by thus 
explaining some tale, deeply affect and delight an audience.9  
We might extrapolate these points in the following way. While art can provide ‘a 
sense of reality or falsehood’, these different representational values remain marked as 
pretence. As such, it is not reality or falsehood that is realized, rather the audience 
experiences the representation as offering ‘a sense of reality or falsehood’. Though 
Coleridge might range the different representational modalities according to how closely 
they reproduce reality, it is not this factor that dictates the power of the audience’s aesthetic 
experience (opera’s ‘unrealistic’ tale-telling being in Coleridge’s view more capable of 
deeply affecting and delighting an audience than the ‘realism’ of domestic tragedy). Instead 
the extent a representational mode does or does not reproduce reality functions to structure 
the manner (which is to say the particular form of pretence) by which the audience (their 
belief willingly and accommodatingly suspended) engages with the representation, and the 
affects and signification which this particular engagement might be taken as affording. In 
such a schema, even when representation occurs according to a vividly realized imitation, 
this does not produce in the audience the kind of confusion between representation and 
reality that enargeia strives to achieve. Rather the effect the representation produces – and 
we must not think of its being any less powerful for this – is recognized, perhaps only half-
consciously, as derived from, and itself epitomizing, a particular modality. 
Of course, there is no need to take as Coleridge does the extremes of this scale as 
fulfilled by domestic drama and by opera. We can maintain Coleridge’s concept of a 
representational scale at the same time as we offer it an extension that enables us to 
accommodate the representations of metatheatre. As was shown earlier, even though 
metatheatre’s drawing attention to the processual construction of the drama is often framed 
                                                          
9 Coleridge: Lectures on Shakespeare (1811-1819), p. 30. 
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as being a powerfully disruptive force, it never absolutely undermines the audience’s sense 
of drama’s duality. The spectator, her belief willingly suspended, is never wholly divorced 
from play-world illusion. Yet at the same time, she is not stunned by the drama pointing 
up its own fictionality – this last fact being a point which, her belief willingly suspended, 
she has never ceased to recognize. As Burwick observes, metatheatre ‘involves not a 
disruption of illusion, but a shift to another dimension of illusion’10 – or, as we could term 
it, making use of Coleridge’s concept, a shift to another representational register.  
This means that despite the fact that the aesthetics of estrangement frame 
metatheatre as effecting the audience’s escape from the art object’s essential pretence, 
metatheatre actually remains confined to this pretence. This is a point that Theodor Adorno 
makes in his discussion of Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt. Adorno argues that Brecht’s 
approach, for all its attempts to dispel stage illusion, is itself recognized as illusory. While 
it claims to free the audience from their aesthetic and ideological stupor, these self-
reflexive efforts merely provide a further iteration of art’s essential duality. And this duality 
is the representational structure in which the Verfremdungseffekt is compelled to operate 
and in which it remains lodged. For Adorno, no approach exists which is capable of 
transposing art’s duality and pretence to something which is simplex and objective; illusion 
is not merely a representational characteristic of art, illusion is what art is.11 Accordingly, 
metatheatrical ‘estrangement’ is no more than another representational resource, another 
aspect of form – a sense that Adorno captures precisely when he comments, ‘Brecht's 
efforts to destroy subjective nuances and halftones with a blunt objectivity, and to do this 
conceptually as well, are artistic means; in the best of his work they become a principle of 
stylization’ (emphasis added).12  
The aesthetics of mimesis and estrangement, then, despite their claims to redeem art 
for the real, never succeed in leaving behind the art object; their depictions are a species of 
representation, not representation’s overcoming. They remain configured according to art’s 
essential duality, and their affects never succeed in escaping art’s essential pretence. A few 
words from Burwick offer succinct summary: ‘The illusion is always accompanied by the 
evidence that the illusion is only an illusion. Thus the triumph of illusion is never more 
than a convenient capitulation. By the same token, however, the pretense of annihilating 
illusion … only thematizes the inherent dialectics of art’.13  
However, if my approach to metatheatrical representation asks that we expand 
Coleridge’s scale of representational register so as to take in the extremes of estrangement, 
it also asks that we reconsider the location on that register which Coleridge supplies to 
                                                          
10 Illusion and the Drama: Critical Theory of the Enlightenment and Romantic Era, pp. 4-5. Burwick is here discussing 
the actor stepping in and out of character in the theatre of Aristophanes. 
11 Aesthetic Theory, edited by Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor (University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 79, 123. See Thomas Huhn’s “Adorno’s Aesthetics of Illusion” in Journal for Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism, vol. 44, no. 2, December 1986, for an extended discussion of this aspect of Adorno’s aesthetics. 
12 Aesthetic Theory, p. 32. 




Shakespeare’s plays. On Coleridge’s scale of reality and difference, which to recap goes 
from domestic tragedy’s representations – ‘too real to be compatible with pleasure’ – at 
one end, to ‘the mere dance at an Opera’ – whose unreality may still ‘deeply affect and 
delight’ – at the other, Shakespeare’s drama is assigned midpoint position. The 
measurement reflects, as Coleridge reckons it, Shakespeare’s balanced perfection: the 
playwright ‘seems to have taken the due medium, & to gratify our senses from the imitation 
of reality’.14 This is an assessment from which the current discussion must sharply depart. 
Coleridge’s words indicate that the plays take a representational register that is singular 
and constant, something refuted by my reading of the passage from Troilus and Cressida. 
As brief as the scene is, no stable representational mode is in evidence. Representation is 
instead a mobile thing. The illusion of Cressida makes for a convincing and vivid presence, 
yet the artifice of the performance is also powerfully marked. And the scene does not unfold 
as a ricochet between these two extreme representational positions but makes use of a range 
of different representational registers in between depending on the particular inflection the 
playwright and the performers chose to give them. Neither do these different 
representational registers occur singly and separately, rather they are simultaneous. 
Shakespearean representation is something shifting and multiple. It follows that 
Coleridge’s theatrical register might then be redeployed; no longer a general tool by which 
to measure the effects allowed by different forms and genre, but a concept by which we 
might better map Shakespeare’s representational permutations. 
 
 
5.3 An outline of Shakespeare’s metatheatrical representation 
Let us briefly summarize where we have come to. Where both the poetics of mimesis and 
estrangement claim that they would redeem art for reality, Shakespeare’s plays mark up 
the essential dissimulation and pretence that is the condition of dramatic art. The plays are 
happy to stage representations realised according to the prescriptions associated with the 
models of mimesis and estrangement, and to make use of the representational energies such 
a staging makes available, but these representations are framed in such a way that they 
remain throughout marked as occurring within art’s broader dissimulation. For 
representation can never exceed its form, can never transpose itself into reality, and the 
apparent efforts to do so, whether taking shape through a poetics of mimesis or 
estrangement, would only succeed at the cost of their own dissolution. The impetus that 
each of these aesthetic systems claims as its goal is a pretence, but, needless to say, not a 
pretence that can ever be admitted – for according to these systems, pretence is a quality 
that inheres only to the art object’s representation, its real-world counter being the 
unequivoval and actual thing itself – whether imagined as mimetically embodied, as 
ideology demystified, or as the performance of real power. 
                                                          
14 Coleridge: Lectures on Shakespeare (1811-1819), p. 30. 
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Shakespeare’s art distinguishes itself from both of these aesthetic models. In 
contrast to the impulse which apparently propels the poetics of mimesis, whereby artistic 
representation aims at becoming another aspect of the real, Shakespeare’s metatheatrical 
art highlights its own falsity, and the result is to mark drama’s separation from reality. This 
is, plainly, the very aesthetic procedure that some versions of the estrangement model 
would prescribe. Only in contrast to these versions of the estrangement model, in 
Shakespeare’s theatre the recognition of the essential falsity of art does not prompt its 
abandonment – nor is metatheatre’s remarking of this falsity sufficient to sever the 
audience’s connection to the play-world. As has been demonstrated, in Shakespeare’s 
drama whether the audience experiences the effect of something like a vividly realized 
mimesis at the play-world level, or the effect of a powerfully disrupting estrangement from 
that play-world, these effects are underlined as occurring within the larger pretence that the 
artwork itself proposes. And the audience completes this pretence: they register the effect 
of mimesis’ full presence without ever taking it as ‘real’; they recognize the effect of 
estrangement without ever abandoning their imaginative investment in the performance. 
This arrangement makes available an array of representational effects, only the meaning 
that we associate with these effects is in Shakespeare’s theatre no longer framed in the 
absolute terms of their original formulation. The essential meaning which these systems of 
representation offer is made over into a presentation of a position, and this ‘meaning’ 
remains, at all times, circumscribed by art’s innate artifice.  
When Shakespeare’s drama is conceived in such terms, metatheatre need no longer 
be formulated in the categorical manner that the estrangement model supplies it. It is not 
an overwhelming presence, but a facilitating one; the play’s access to a shifting and 
multiple representational register is afforded through metatheatre’s highlighting of art’s 
essential pretence. While the audience never loses the sense that the representation is a 
construction (a sense, let us remark it again, that no audience engaged in the act of artistic 
appreciation ever wholly forfeits) metatheatre determines the extent this aspect is 
emphasized or downplayed, and directs where and when this self-reflexive attention is 
concentrated. We might conceive of this representational register as a gradated scale, either 
end occupied by the ideals of mimesis and estrangement – at one extreme you have the 
fictional play-world conceived of as absolutely real, and at the other, an understanding of 
everything on the stage as actual, and never as other. As our discussion of Brillo Boxes 
made apparent, art – as long as it is to remain art – does not of course have access to either 
of these extremes of aesthetic idealism. The usual example by which the absurdity of the 
first position is illustrated is surely familiar to the reader: no audience member, we are 
reminded, is ever so overwhelmed by a sense of the play-world reality that she leaps on 
stage to attend to a wounded Hamlet. At the same time – though this is far less often 
remarked – no-one is ever made so estranged from the art-audience relationship that on 
recognizing Duchamp’s exhibited shovel as a mere shovel she decides to make use of the 
object for a spot of gardening. But these two extreme positions aside, all other 
representational registers – from vividly mimetic illusions to powerfully alienating 
techniques of estrangement, as well as everything in between – having already been marked 
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as occurring within art’s pretence – and their effects recognized as ‘effects’ – are made 
available. 
Rather than being then confined exclusively to any single modality, representation 
in the plays realizes itself as varied, mobile and multiple. The diversity that the register 
enables can be illustrated by, and acts to explain, the ‘dynamic compendium of modes of 
playing’ that Robert Weimann understands as set in motion in King Lear: 
These modes range from Lear’s madness, Edgar’s excessive role-playing, Kent’s 
threadbare disguise, and the “all licensed Fool” to the lower, more earthy “new 
pranks” (Goneril’s phrases [King Lear, 1.4.201, 238]) that recur so frequently in the 
tragedy. To an unsurpassed, even staggering extent, a thick performative mingles, 
but only partially coalesces, with a representation of Albion’s division. Between 
them, and over a residual gap, the play is saturated with insights as unsanctioned as 
its wild assemblage of performance tricks and practices. The rendering of characters 
alone includes a full, bewildering assortment of acting styles and affects of the 
personal, from allegorical figuration and iconographic portraiture to the improvised 
personation and “deep” characterization we have examined in the preceding 
chapters. Far from narrowing the cultural scope that certain historicist readings have 
discerned in it, King Lear’s astonishing array of dramaturgies enhances that scope.15  
To illustrate the shifting variety of representational registers through which 
Shakespeare’s dramatic art unfolds, and the manner in which it is made to, in Weimann’s 
terms, mingle and partially coalesce we can turn to the figure of Hamlet. Where early on 
in our Introduction we made use of the example of Cressida, exploring Shakespeare’s play 
of aesthetic dissimulation and representational multiplicity through a ‘character’ that was 
itself composed through deception and a ceaseless exchange of invalid evaluations, we 
might conclude this discussion by demonstrating how these same aesthetic strategies 
inform the realization given to a figure which remains the paradigmatic example for the 
various schools of critical thought that would understand stage personas as representing 
actual humanity.16 And, certainly,  it would be churlish to argue that the extended speeches 
supplied to the Danish prince do not realize the kind of representation that an audience 
would associate with something very close to authentic human agency. The following 
celebrated lines, for example, are certainly realized in a heightened mimetic key, and the 
sense of a fraught interiority is vividly conveyed:17 
                                                          
15 Shakespeare and the Power of Performance (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 199. 
16 And as the enormous success of Harold Bloom’s Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human (Riverhead, 1998) 
indicates, it is still a perspective that continues to determine responses to the work. 
17 The reader no doubt remarks the convolutions and hedging that must go into these lines: ‘associate with something 
very close to’, ‘realized in a … key’, ‘the sense of a …’. These roundabout expressions are not fortunate, but they are 
necessary if I am to avoid repeating the mimetic idealization of representation that Hamlet so often provokes (and it 
is for the same reason that I made use of quote marks earlier in the sentence when referring to Cressida’s ‘character’). 




What a piece of work is a man – how noble in reason, how infinite in faculty! In 
form and moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel, in 
apprehension how like a god, the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals – and 
yet, to me what is this quintessence of dust? Man delights not me – nor woman 
neither (2.2 264-270)18 
A final clause, addressed to Rosencrantz, attaches itself to these words, ‘though by 
your smiling you seem to say so’ (2.2.270), and testifies to Shakespeare’s dramatic 
dexterity. The speech’s high colouring is what lends its representation the power to 
convince, yet this quality also seems to risk theatricalizing the representation.19 But this is 
plainly the playwright’s strategy, and rather than this self-reflexivity pointing back to the 
literal performance of the stage figures, it is redeployed: Hamlet’s words to Rosencrantz 
ensure that this theatricality is understood as pertaining to a character trait, and, in a further 
elaboration of interiority, a trait that Hamlet (and surely Rosencrantz too) is ceded a 
conscious recognition of. At the same time, another representational redeployment occurs. 
Copia’s iteration pervades the play, and its effects come to the fore in moments such as 
these. Hamlet is a revenge tragedy in which the protagonist repeatedly refuses to assume 
the part of revenger – a playing off of genre which would be all the more marked through 
the relation this play took to the Ur-Hamlet. Hamlet’s monologues, which would 
conventionally project outward, functioning as a stop-start device that would illuminate 
play-world action and drive the revenge plot along, turn inwards, and work to stall it. 
And if this last point indicates that these different representational registers can be 
simultaneously realized and played off each other we can powerfully extend this 
understanding by recalling the lines that precede the speech: 
I have of late, but wherefore I know not, lost all my mirth, forgone all custom of 
exercises, and indeed it goes so heavily with my disposition that this goodly frame, 
the earth, seems to me a sterile promontory; this most excellent canopy, the air, look 
you, this brave o'erhanging firmament, this majestical roof fretted with golden fire 
– why, it appeareth nothing to me but a foul and pestilent congregation of vapors. 
(2.2 257-264) 
At one level these lines can be taken as representing the initial stages of Hamlet’s 
contemplation, as indicating a line of thought that will lead to the more wrought portrait of 
‘self’ that follows. At the same time the speech serves as an ekphrastic attempt to make its 
hearers see (underlined by the speech’s ‘look you’), for the audience to locate Hamlet’s 
                                                          
18 The version of the play used here is that of the Second Quarto with additions from the Folio. 
19 Even when approached in purely mimetic terms, when understood as authentic and possessed of a profound interior 
life, Hamlet must still be thought of as given to fits of theatricality. There is, as A. L. French writes, ‘a certain unreality 
in his grief, a certain kind of histrionic self-regard … whatever the ‘that within’ may be, it is, even in Hamlet’s own 
sensibility, deeply involved with the outward show’ (Shakespeare and the Critics (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
p. 45). Similarly, Alison Thorne contrasts Hamlet’s denunciation of artificial modes of expression with the role’s 
‘studied theatricality’, drawing attention to ‘the pointed ostentation of his own “inky garb” and his punning and 




powerfully realised presence in a vividly conjured space. Yet what would have been 
immediately clear to the original audience is the way in which Hamlet’s words – and surely 
too, the figure’s gestures – indicate the actuality of the performance space itself. As Gurr 
notes, ‘This goodly frame’ would, in the parlance of the day, make for a description of the 
theatre’s walls.20 It seems to me possible, however, that here the phrase might refer to the 
structure of the promontory stage itself. Hamlet’s next descriptor, ‘the earth’ was a term 
that, as Tiffany Stern remarks, denoted the playing boards21 – and this means that the 
comparing of this ‘earth’ to a ‘promontory’ can then be understood, comically and 
absurdly, as making for a simile that undermines its own apparatus of similitude: the figure 
understood as consisting of no vehicle but only a circuit of tenors.22 Hamlet goes on to 
indicate the sky above the stage and audience and to underline their shared space. He then 
points up the overhanging stage roof, painted as it was with the zodiac’s ‘golden fire’.23 
The extract ends by echoing a complaint that was often levelled at theatres – the stink of 
their audience. And it is this (half) recognition of the watching public that prompts Hamlet, 
gazing out at the spectators, to a contemplation of just what a piece of work a man is.  
It certainly does not follow from this that we must revise our opinion of the powerful 
mimetic effect of the passage which follows this. As these pages have demonstrated, there 
is no reason that the recognition of such a context would make Hamlet’s ‘What a piece of 
work is a man’ speech any less charged, or that it would mean the audience would 
experience the representation of ‘authenticity’ as any less powerful. What it does though is 
add to the stage action another, simultaneous dimension of representation. For as charged 
and ‘authentic’ a moment of self-reflection as the speech is, the stage arrangement asks 
that the actor playing Hamlet lets his gaze rove over the audience as he delivers the lines, 
acting as if it is the sight of these particular spectators which prompts him to each new 
plaudit. This making over of the performance’s spectators into the objects of Hamlet’s 
interiority is wonderfully ironic, and the fact of Hamlet’s seeming to single out different 
spectators would mean that the episode also took a comic dimension for its original public. 
The dramatic arrangement too gives the actor the chance to make the most of the sequence. 
Rather than immediately turning to Rosencrantz with ‘though by your smiling you seem to 
say so’, the actor can deliver the line in a way that momentarily exploits the ambiguity of 
its addressee. Audience members might assume, initially, that it is their smiling that Hamlet 
is remarking, and this would create the effect, both ironic and illusory, that as Hamlet’s 
attention is turned back to Rosencrantz and the play-world he inhabits, so too is the 
audience’s.  
                                                          
20 Staging in Shakespeare’s Theatres (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 134. 
21 “‘This Wide and Universal Theatre’: The Theatre as Prop in Shakespeare’s Metadrama”, p. 17. 
22 Understanding is facilitated if we borrow for the simile the terms by which I A Richards distinguishes the object 
and image in metaphor. I have made use of this reutilization elsewhere as the use of tenor and vehicle seems less 
distracting than primum comparandum and secundum comparatum. 
23 That the Hamlet figure gestures toward the roof while speaking ‘this majestical roof fretted with golden fire’ is a 
rather traditional supposition – a point made by, for example, A. R. Braunmuller in the Pelican Shakespeare’s 2001 




These pages offer then a revised approach to Shakespeare’s metatheatre that separates itself 
from present-day instantiations of the estrangement model and which marks up how the 
plays frame their own representational energies in relation to renaissance theories of 
mimesis. The revision takes in not only metatheatre, but also challenges how 
representation, the audience, and the artwork itself are conceived in both the poetics of 
estrangement and mimesis.  
In the model that I argue for here, the dramatic artwork can never overcome its 
inherent duality so as to realize itself in single and unadulterated terms. It can never 
manifest itself in the ideal terms of absolute illusion or those of absolute actuality; its 
representation does not establish full presence, and neither, on the other hand, does it work 
to expose to the audience the conditions of an unvarnished actuality. Which is to say, truth 
– whether of the metaphysical or ideological variety – is not pursued. For while 
Shakespeare’s plays make use of the powerful effects that illusion can conjure these effects 
remain subject to the overarching fact of the artwork’s dissimulation. The spectators 
themselves play a doubled game of dissimulation; while at all times aware of the artwork’s 
essential falsity, they remain ready to collude in the affects this falsity derives. For though 
the sense of the work’s dissimulation is, as I wrote, ‘overarching’, it is only dominant when 
the playwright elects to make it so. And, in such a context, metatheatre, rather than being 
an external force that wholly dismantles representation’s illusion, operates as another 
variety of illusion. And the effect is invigorating. Rather than being confined to the singular 
and absolute terms of truth, representation can be mobile and multiple. Audiences, having 
signed up to this pretence, recognize the artwork as a dissimulation that is not constrained 
by binary opposites, but which offers a more complex, subtle and richer interaction 
between the literal and figurative, and which can play across a range of representational 
registers. And metatheatre, though confined to illusion, becomes the means by which the 








Introduction to the articles 
 
The article-based dissertation brings with it its own challenges. For purposes of publication 
each article is required to function as a self-contained entity. At the same time, each text 
has to form part of the dissertation’s broader thesis. One result of this is that points that 
might serve to elucidate the aims of the dissertation as a whole, when viewed according to 
the discrete concentration that an individual article demands, may be seen as without urgent 
or immediate application to the matter at hand, and peer reviewers are likely to suggest 
their redaction. A second aspect to consider is the fact that insofar as these individual 
articles are to function as a group, and, as a group, elucidate the dissertation’s argument, a 
degree of repetition and overlap must be accepted as a necessary evil – for each article is 
obliged, to a certain extent, to introduce ideas and discussions which are also dealt with 
elsewhere. As such I approached the dissertation in the manner I thought would best enable 
me to produce articles that acted to fully explore my thesis, yet which attempted to avoid, 
as far as is possible, reiteration. The first two articles I completed (and these make up the 
first and second pieces here) were soon after accepted by academic journals, and their focus 
reflects the demands of publication. These pieces make use of the same concepts and 
approach as the other articles, but these aspects are not provided a full and explicit marking. 
The remaining four articles I have refrained from publishing, desiring as I did for them a 
format where space could be given over to elucidating and developing the dissertation’s 
argument in terms more forthright and thorough. And where it has proved necessary to 
revisit something already covered elsewhere, most often I have tried to approach this as an 
opportunity to illuminate a different facet of this aspect. These preliminary comments 
made, let us move on to introduce the articles themselves. 
These articles hold in common a certain methodological structure. They focus on 
either a single episode or on a small group of brief passages. This concentrated focus, 
though, remains inflected by, and itself inflects, the immediate context of the scene in 
which the passage occurs as well as the broader context established by the work as a whole. 
Through analyzing the relationship metatheatre takes to representation I am able to advance 
an original interpretation of each episode. These interpretations either radically extend the 
findings of earlier research – as in, for example, my discussion of religious reference in A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream, or of the part played by metatheatre in the final act of The 
Winter’s Tale – or argue for an understanding of the discussed passage which stands in 
almost direct opposition to received scholarly opinion – as, for example, in the readings of 
the fairy blessing in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Edgar’s ‘Dover cliff’ speech in King 
Lear, and the opening scene of The Winter’s Tale. Often such a critical shift necessarily 
implies a broader reassessment, and the articles explore how these local readings impact 
the overall signification that the work takes.  
Three plays are discussed across six articles. Three of the pieces look at A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream, two The Winter’s Tale, and one King Lear. The prominence 
86 
 
given to A Midsummer Night’s Dream reflects an assessment of the play that I share with 
Hugh Grady. When Grady argues that the year 1595 should be considered the most 
significant turning point in Shakespeare’s career, a year in which Shakespeare realizes a 
‘break-through [that] was multi-dimensional’ it is to A Midsummer Night’s Dream that 
Grady immediately turns, and specifically to a discussion of ‘the central role of a 
sophisticated concept of the aesthetic’ in the work.1 The Winter’s Tale occurs at the other 
end of the canon; the penultimate of the late romances, it was written around 15 years after 
the Dream. It can rightly be considered the most daring of all of Shakespeare’s 
metatheatrical experiments, and placing the discussions of The Winter’s Tale and the 
Dream side-by-side serves to illustrate the manner of the playwright’s technical 
development. King Lear represents a mid-point between these two works (a precise mid-
point were we to accept the earliest date attributed to King Lear – that of 1603), and so 
facilitates our sense of Shakespeare’s maturation. The choice of plays also means that our 
discussion occurs across dramatic genres, taking in works labelled comedy, tragedy and 
tragicomedy.  
The first article, “Holy Words and Low Folly in A Midsummer Night’s Dream”2 
offers a re-interpretation of the Dream’s central religious allusion: the echo in Bottom’s 
account of his ‘vision’ of 1 Corinthians 2.9-10. I argue that the speech’s signification must 
be understood as contextualized by the utilization made of holy reference throughout the 
play. The approach makes use of the second notion of copia that I outlined above. In that 
the references undergo an iteration that unfolds in the context of a self-aware performance 
the signification they would assert, and the structures of patriarchy, order and sanctity that 
they would underwrite, are subject to a certain revision. Bottom’s speech itself is 
approached via Stuart Sillars’ suggestion that the lines’ allusion to 1 Corinthians also 
indicates a reference to Erasmus’ use of the same passage in his Praise of Folly. I show 
how a more expanded understanding of this intertextual weaving would further explore the 
play’s elevation of the lowly and the foolish and also underline the reversals of authority 
that this transposition stages. More significantly, I suggest that these allusions act as a self-
reflexive marking of the play’s artistic strategies, arguing that the effects generated by the 
traditions of spiritual revelation are appropriated and made over into the aesthetic and 
secular effects of Shakespeare’s drama itself. The garbled iterations of Bottom’s speech 
emphasize the folly-like nature of dramatic performance while at the same time linking this 
vulgar art form with the epiphanic. More radically perhaps, it highlights that meaning in 
the Dream – religious or otherwise – is inevitably circumscribed by its occurrence within 
the dissimulating illusions of theatrical performance. 
The second article, “Political Shakespeare and the Blessing of Art”,3 also concerns 
A Midsummer Night’s Dream, exploring the use the play makes of copia in what is a more 
familiar understanding in Renaissance studies: the elaborated imitation of classical models. 
This piece develops a strand of the discussion from the previous article, the relationship 
                                                          
1 Shakespeare and Impure Aesthetics (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 53. 
2 Published in Archiv, vol. 254, no. 1, 2017, pp. 48-66. 
3 Published in EMCO, vol. 4, no.1, 2018, pp. 1-6. 
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that the play’s art takes to power, and it contests Leonard Tennenhouse’s view that these 
elements act to underwrite each other. I argue that metatheatre operates to mark up the 
inevitability of the play’s generic resolution, as well as the pretence and power of its 
illusions. The analysis gives attention to the fairy blessing of the nuptial beds, and I show 
how rather than acting as consummation to the drama’s concluding celebration, the charm’s 
ambiguities operate to disfigure the comedic restitution in marital and civic order by 
underlining the equivocal nature of the mythic couple at the heart of the marriage comedy: 
Theseus and Hippolyta. I argue that by metatheatrically marking the play’s essential 
dissimulation, yet at the same time demanding that the audience engage imaginatively with 
these dissimulations and the multifarious and contradictory signifying practices they make 
available, the Dream realizes for itself an experiential space whose operation is distinct 
from that in effect in the extra-artistic world. This wins for Shakespeare’s art an autonomy 
of sorts – yet the article concludes by considering whether such an arrangement undoes the 
ideological interpretation and appropriation of Shakespeare’s work or if, somewhat 
perversely, it works to facilitate it. 
The third article on the Dream, “Green Plots, Hawthorn Brakes and an Ass’s Nole: 
Imaginative Translation in A Midsummer Night’s Dream”, further examines the notion of 
a reproduction that is capable of radically transforming the signification associated with its 
original, together with an exploration of the complex effects that can be had through the 
ambivalent relationship that spoken description takes to stage depiction. Where the 
subsequent articles consider ekphrastic accounts that are dramatically poised and which 
would seem to invoke sublimity and wonder, this piece focuses on a pair of pat and 
comically self-reflexive instances. Nonetheless, each episode affords a vigorous 
metatheatrical complexity that explores the workings of the poetics of early modern 
performance. Both occur in 3.1: Quince’s initial setting of scene, and the marvelous 
translation that Bottom soon after undergoes. These passages comically highlight how the 
business of stage representation is predicated on the audience’s act of what I have elected 
to call imaginative translation. The term refers to the ability to see the stage action at one 
and the same time as both illusory and real – ‘seeing’ simultaneously an Athenian forest 
and an Elizabethan stage – and at the same time retaining an awareness of this perceptual 
negotiation. The analysis encourages me to an original conceptualization of how the 
episode of Bottom’s transformation was originally realized. I argue that the theatrical 
management given to Bottom’s marvelous metamorphosis, a self-reflexive transposition 
by which the quotidian is re-rendered as the magical, operates to self-reflectively explore 
the nature of the audience’s imaginative engagement. The arrangement at once comical 
and ironic and acts to underline the absurdity of artistic pretence, yet at the same time it 
demonstrates that such a perspective is itself dependent on, and commingled with – via an 
ongoing process – the claims of illusion.  
The relationship between described, actual and imagined representations is pursued 
in the next article. “Dissimulation and the Dover Cliff: Metatheatrical Representation in 
King Lear” examines the fabricated description of the vertiginous drop by which Edgar 
deceives the blinded Gloucester into believing he stands on the verge of the Dover cliff. I 
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argue that the play marks up how the processes by which Edgar creates this false picture 
correspond to how play-world illusion is itself constructed, and in this way the passage 
foregrounds the dissimulation of dramatic representation itself. Central to this analysis is 
the fact that Edgar’s description operates in the mode of classical ekphrasis. The 
ambiguities that inhere to the figure of ekphrasis allows us to address, on the one hand, 
critical perspectives that see the passage as mimetic exemplar, or which claim the play is 
unstageable and only to be grasped by imagination’s inward eye, and on the other hand, 
the view that sees Shakespeare’s self-reflexivity as condemned to effect only estrangement. 
I demonstrate that while Edgar’s speech locates itself within the mimetic tradition and 
makes use of its exemplary contemporary realization, painterly perspective, the description 
undoes at each turn the representational forces that these aesthetic models would institute. 
The account deliberately mis-realizes these techniques of verisimilitude, and instead serves 
to remark how the illusions of dialogue and stage are predicated on dissimulation. Yet this 
act of metatheatre is not limited to instancing disillusion or distance, in fact it acts so as to 
conscript and redeploy the effects that illusion would otherwise generate. This arrangement 
is reliant on the audience’s ability to access the transforming vision of an imaginative 
inward eye while never actually forfeiting the sense of the play’s artifice. In the article’s 
conclusion I return to Coleridge’s concept of ‘a willing suspension of disbelief’ to more 
precisely outline how Shakespeare’s metatheatrical representation unfolds as a negotiation 
between the forces of imagination and disenchantment. 
The manner in which Shakespeare’s art makes simultaneous use of illusion and 
illusion’s undoing is explored in “‘Mocked with art’: Contradiction and Affect in The 
Winter’s Tale’s ‘Statue’ Scene’”. Like the previous article, it too examines the use made 
of the device of ekphrasis – though here ekphrasis is understood in the narrower sense of 
the representation of an artwork, in this case, the staging of Hermione’s statue. My reading 
makes clear that at the same time as the ‘statue’ scene makes for one of drama’s most 
profoundly moving spectacles, it too, in an arrangement that would seem paradoxical, 
redirects attention to the high artifice of its own construction. Yet this movement, rather 
than working against the dramatic impetus of the scene, intensifies it. The contestation 
between a belief in play-world illusion and its repudiation engenders in the play’s 
spectators precisely the kind of tension between faith and doubt that the scene’s approach 
to the miraculous requires. And the dramatist is prepared to press this tension to outrageous 
extremes. Firstly, the play asks that the actor realizes the performance of Hermione’s 
‘statue’ with unblinking eyes, and then draws attention to the inevitable failure of the 
impersonation, a move that threatens the coherence of both play-world and performance. 
Secondly, the queens’ reanimation is framed in such a way that for the original audience it 
would evoke witchcraft and the blasphemous hoaxes of catholic miracle, together with the 
empty dissimulation of street magic. And I argue that it is these rather fraught aesthetic 
gambits which function to structure the scene, and which determine its dramatic success. 
The final article is entitled “‘Exit [Chuckling]’: Exposition, Role and Dissimulation 
in The Winter’s Tale” and extends the exploration of how The Winter’s Tale plays off the 
audience’s imaginative investment in its representations through analyzing the discrepant 
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mappings that dialogical assertion takes to the visual action of stage performance. 
Significantly, the piece shows how the critical approach that the articles have taken up until 
this point, which has tended to focus on a single passage and to concentrate on the 
metatheatrical deployment of either copia or ekphrasis, can be applied more holistically. 
Here, while the centre of analytical attention remains a short section, the 40 lines of the 
play’s opening scene, my focus shifts in and out so as to demonstrate how these first 
moments fold back onto the play as a whole. Metatheatre is likewise given a broader 
configuration, and, correspondingly, the article concentrates on the aspects of iteration, 
discrepancy and dissimulation developed out of the earlier focus on copia and ekphrasis. 
The key to this investigation is the original interpretation given to what is the play’s often 
overlooked opening, an effusive exchange of cordialities between a pair of courtiers that 
seems to make little practical contribution to the narrative’s unfolding. The episode, I 
argue, was not written to be played straight. Properly realized, the scene creates in the 
audience a set of expectations which it subsequently upends, and what results from this is 
a rather remarkable coup de théâtre. I demonstrate how this opening feat of artistic 
misdirection operates to determine the relationship that the audience is to take towards the 
play’s extended use of exposition and report as well as towards the drama’s dynamic 
economy of actor and role. The latter aspect is developed in the second half of the article, 
where it is demonstrated that a comprehensive experience of the reunions and revivals of 
the play’s last act can only be had by a reading that properly accounts for the aesthetic 
strategies of the play’s opening exchange. Yet whereas the previous article approached the 
play’s final act through a focus on Hermione’s revival, and demonstrated the way in which 
metatheatre coordinated the tension between the fictional and constructed aspects of the 
play so as to lend the queen’s reanimation intensification, this article’s discussion of the 
last scene looks at the metatheatrical return that part-doubling supplies to two other figures, 
and shows how the play’s daring self-reflexivity sustains this restitution while at the same 





Holy Words and Low Folly in A Midsummer Night’s Dream 
 
The eye of man hath not seene, and eare hathe not heard, neither have entered into the 
heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him. 
1 Corinthians 2.9-10 (Bishops’ Bible)1 
 
The mangled reference to 1 Corinthians 2.9-10 provided in Bottom’s confused account of 
his ‘dream’ forms the central – and most celebrated – biblical allusion in A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream. St. Paul’s passage asserts the elevation of the low, and its appropriation 
has often been understood as forming the key contribution to the Dream’s complex 
statement on the exchange between the ‘vulgar and celestial’.2 If, however, we understand 
the reference as indicating another allusion still, to Erasmus’ use of the same passage in 
The praise of Folie, we will see that the relationship between these two elements is given 
significant reformulation. The allusion would work to restrain the more elevated 
connotations that the appropriation conjures, while reframing and extending the meaning 
accorded to the low. What emerges is a serioludic syncretic parody, wherein the vulgar and 
celestial borrow freely the effects of the other. The utilisation given to religious reference 
throughout the play appears to establish the context for such a reading, and before Bottom’s 
account of his vision is discussed, the first section of the article surveys the play’s various 
allusions to the sacred.  
 
1 
Bottom’s role may make allusion to the writings of St Paul at its very first appearance. 
Towards the close of 1.2, after the artisans have met and distributed their parts, Bottom 
offers his fellow performers an elevated farewell: ‘Take pains, be perfect: adieu’ (1.2.101-
102).3 These words of counsel may derive from 2 Corinthians 13.11. The Geneva Bible of 
15604 has ‘Finally brethren, fare ye well, be perfect, be of good comfort, be of one mind, 
live in peace; and the God of love and peace shall be with you’ (Emphasis added). The 
gloss provided indicates the importance the fifteen-hundreds ascribed to the short phrase: 
‘be perfect: A brief exhortation, but yet such a one as comprehendeth all the parts of a 
Christian man’s life’. The significance the reference suggests would seem to be underlined 
by Bottom’s final ‘adieu’ – what may have been otherwise understood simply as an 
                                                          
1 London: Christopher Barker, 1568. 
2 Frank Kermode, Shakespeare, Spenser, Donne: Renaissance Essays (Routledge, 2005), p. 210. 
3 William Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, The Arden Shakespeare, edited by Harold Brooks (Methuen, 
1979). All Quotations are from this edition. 
4 Geneva: Rowland Hall.  
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affectation would now operate in its proper sense of a commendation to God. Yet the 
elevation that this reference indicates is not quite allowed to manifest itself.  
As we will see happen throughout, the holy allusion is given to operate in a context 
which would seem to limit and redirect its implications. For the low farce of the artisans’ 
performance preparations – wherein Bottom attempts to grab all available parts – allows 
the professional actors of Shakespeare’s stage to play out their own comic parody. And the 
ironic allusion to the performative structures by which the Dream is itself realised is 
extended through the rapid succession of incongruous personations that Bottom’s role 
provides. The Elizabethan actor playing the weaver-come-actor gives a turn as a tyrant; 
attempts to claim Lion’s part along with his own, and enacts a dialogue wherein he 
personates both Pyramus and Thisbe. This last effort seems to me to offer particular 
metatheatrical commentary. I would argue that the lines given to Bottom suggest that in 
performing this pair of lovers, he swaps their sex.5 It is an arrangement that would underline 
the absurdity inherent in the whole business of contemporary stage personation where 
female roles were fulfilled by male actors – and in this way the scene’s preposterousness 
would reflect ironically back on the ‘straight’ performance of the main narrative’s tangled 
lovers. 
Quince eventually manages to put a stop to these personations, cajoling Bottom into 
limiting his performance to the lead-role: ‘You can play no part but Pyramus: for Pyramus 
is a sweet-faced man; a proper man as one shall see in a summer’s day; a most lovely 
gentleman-like man’ (1.2.79-82). But these lines only work to further highlight the 
mechanics of the Dream’s dramatic illusions. They make comic reference to the ‘ill face’ 
of the actor who took Bottom’s role, Will Kemp6 – and surely offer an ideal opportunity 
for him to summon one of his famous gurns. Paul’s words then come at the end of a scene 
already filled with reversals of both sense and dramatic category. The coherent and certain 
meaning that the phrase would indicate is undone through its occurrence in a scene that 
repeatedly references itself as a performed illusion, and in this way, the significance that 
the phrase volunteers must be understood as checked.   
Where the broader context of the scene qualifies and circumscribes the biblical 
reference within the theatrical, at a more local, syntactical level, the line’s spiritual 
momentum is disrupted by its rubbing shoulders with the bawdy. Bottom’s brief 
valediction tails the final instructions Quince delivers to his troupe. The playwright’s 
instructions to the actors to ‘con’ their ‘parts’ would have already pricked the ears of the 
Elizabethan audience, ever it would seem alert for innuendo.7 Bottom’s response makes 
recourse to malapropism so that this vein might be pursued: ‘We will meet, and there we 
may rehearse most obscenely and courageously’ (1.2.100-101). The effect of these coarse 
                                                          
5 See my “Transgendering Thisne” in American Notes and Queries, vol. 29, no. 3, 2016. 
6 ‘Ill face’ is Kemp’s self-description, found in the dedication to Kemps nine dais wonder (London: Ling, 1600). 
7 ‘Con’ references the French for pudenda, while ‘parts’ could indicate the genitals of either sex – as in Hamlet’s 
‘secret parts of fortune’ (2.2.223). 
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punctuations is to mark up the potential double entendre in the next line’s ‘take pains’ – 
the very words that precede those of Paul. The lewd sense of the phrase has already been 
used by Shakespeare in King John: ‘Hath she no husband/ That will take pains to blow a 
horn before her?’ (1.1.218-219). That the pattern of bawdy in the exchange between Quince 
and Bottom would seem to be deliberate is suggested through the pairing of ‘pain’ and 
‘con’ later in Act 5 – ‘Extremely stretch’d and conn’d with cruel pain/ To do you service’ 
(5.1.80-81) – where the smutty allusion is underlined by the further bawdy implication of 
the last three words.8 
While these innocently voiced obscenities serve to locate Quince’s troupe 
comically, the portrayal the artisans are given cannot be considered ungenerous. The 
aspects of farce and bawdy that configure their presentation indicate the native vitality 
inherent in these low performers, and in turn point up the continued presence of these comic 
elements in the art of Shakespeare’s own theatre. The scene’s parody is gentle rather than 
strident, and this temper extends – here at least – to the religious reference. Paul’s phrase 
is allowed an abbreviated resonance, and its significance, rather than being undermined, is 
merely displaced. For despite the intervening catachresis of ‘obscenely’, and the bawdy 
connotations of the words that precede Paul’s phrase, Bottom’s farewell does nonetheless 
echo with a certain grandeur. His line solemnly marks the completion of the scene, and 
asks for a silent group exit – the better that its poetry may linger. The effect, of course, is 
immediately undone. Quince comes in with: ‘At the Duke’s oak we meet’ (1.2.103), a flat 
line that robs the artisans’ enterprise of the romance and profundity Bottom’s words would 
accord it – and at the same time relocates the magical illusions of Shakespeare’s stage 
within the banal practicalities that performance necessitates. We see, though, that Bottom 
is allowed to recover. He gets the last words after all, only now the elevated allusion of the 
holy text is exchanged for the lower – yet not invalid – form of the proverbial: ‘Enough: 
hold, or cut bow-strings’ (1.2.104).  
The scene’s design ensures that Paul’s elevated exhortation is imbricated within the 
vulgar. His words are mouthed by an artisan, and a lewd and comic capering renders their 
context. At the same time, the Dream underlines its recourse to these very crudities, and 
further points to the realisation of its art as managed through the simplest and most absurd 
pretense. This allows the Dream to ironically rehearse contemporary assumptions that the 
theatre represented a low form, while simultaneously highlighting the brilliance of its own 
comic sophistication. By a similar arrangement, the parodic context lent to Paul’s words 
does not wholly rob them of significance, rather it works to elevate the imperfect material 
of the folk performance. The effect is that the two distinct elements meet on a kind of 
syncretic mid-ground. The sacred significance of Paul’s line is made over, and its meaning 
is redirected so as to indicate the art of drama itself – as represented by the artisans, and as 
actuated by the professionals of Shakespeare's stage. 
                                                          
8 For the Elizabethans, ‘do you service’ indicated sexual attentions. See Eric Partridge on the phrase’s use in All’s 





The wedding celebrations with which the Dream concludes work, at one level, to confirm 
the sanctity of union and the stability of an ordered society founded on marriage. 
Interspersed throughout this movement to resolution and restitution are a series of religious 
references that – in their original form – would entreat of the same. But as we will see, the 
manner of their appropriation works at another level to upend such meaning; they provide 
instead a series of counter-instances that operate to call into question the play's resolution 
in orthodoxy. 
The young lovers have their confusions brought to a close towards the end of the 
play’s third act when Puck anoints the eyes of the sleeping Lysander with the love juice 
while speaking a magical incantation that promises a happy outcome for the play’s various 
Jacks and Jills: 
When thou wak’st, 
Thou tak’st 
True delight 
In the sight 
Of thy former lady’s eye; 
And the country proverb known, 
That every man should take his own, 
In your waking shall be shown: 
Jack shall have Jill, 
Nought shall go ill 
The man shall have his mare again, and all shall be well. (3.2.453-463) 
Bearing in mind the similar reference in Love’s Labour’s Lost (thought to have its 
performing less than a year before the Dream): ‘Our wooing doth not end like an old play./ 
Jack hath not Jill. These ladies’ courtesy/ Might well have made our sport a comedy’ 
(5.2.851-853),9 we see how Puck’s proverb serves to signal the play’s dramatic form; after 
the various comic mishaps, events are now on course to end in happy consummation and 
restitution within the prescribed structures of patriarchal order and ceremony. At the same 
time however, the line’s operation as a self-aware theatrical marker, together with the 
reflexive supplying of its own cross-reference, encourages us to view Puck’s speech as 
offering its own burlesque.  
In highlighting the play’s generically ordained resolution in the sacred ceremony of 
marriage the speech must surely prompt the audience to recall the various and radical 
reformulations that the Dream has throughout provided the figure of union. Beginning in 
                                                          
9 The Norton Shakespeare, edited by Stephen Greenblatt, Walter Cohen, Jean E. Howard, Katharine Eisaman Maus 
(W. W. Norton, 1997). 
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the orthodox and state-sponsored love-match of Theseus and Hippolyta, the figure 
continues via a series of increasingly unconventional formulations in a progress through 
the proscribed and ‘unnatural’. The play is not even twenty lines old when the talk of happy 
nuptials is interrupted by the shrill claims of Egeus and Demetrius, who recompose the 
figure of union in terms of a forced marriage. Their suit, though, is not heard finished before 
the union motif is once more comically reconfigured, this time as a homosexual pairing of 
the claimants.10  
The young lovers, having fled to the woods, continue this movement. There they 
reformulate the figure of union in ever more unorthodox couplings, only now the note of 
parody is intensified: the irregular pairings they imagine are realised in the language of 
sacred marital ceremony. In 2.2., having decided to spend the night in the forest, Lysander 
attempts what may be understood as the sexual coercion of Hermia (2.2.46-51). As Patricia 
Parker points out, Lysander’s lines invoke the wedding vows from the Ceremony of 
Matrimony as found in The Book of Common Prayer 1599, configuring his seduction in 
the very sacrosanct terms he would unravel.11 The speech makes use of both ‘knit’ and 
‘troth’ (2.2.46, 49), terms indicating, respectively, the eternal bond that will join man and 
wife, and the holy vow that consummates this joining. This irregular appropriation is 
underlined in the speech’s last words. Lysander’s lines provide the ceremony’s concluding 
‘Amen’ a disorderly repeat – and then continue on, reformulating the service’s central vow 
as a mawkish, feebly rhymed couplet, before tailing off with a banal good night wish:  
Amen, amen, to that fair prayer say I; 
And then end life when I end loyalty! 
Here is my bed; sleep give thee all his rest. (2.2.61-63).   
Later in 3.2, when the confusions in the forest are at their height, the distraught 
Helena, believing herself abused by Demetrius and Lysander, borrows from the same 
ceremony. Somewhat strikingly, the reference is juxtaposed with an arrangement that again 
indicates a male homosexual union; Helena berates the men: ‘you must join in souls to 
mock me too?’ (3.2.150). Shortly after, a further reconfiguration is provided when, in her 
address to Hermia, Helena is given lines that reframe the union motif in terms of an 
exclusively female coupling. Her speech portrays the mutual devotion of their youth as an 
intense fusion that subsumed their separate selves; she recollects a time when their ‘hands, 
[…] sides, voices and minds/ Had been incorporate’ (3.2.207-208). Having provided 
radical transposition to the figure of union, she caps her appeal with the play’s most explicit 
                                                          
10 The theme is first introduced, sotto voce, with Hermia’s wish that her father could experience the attraction she 
feels for Lysander: ‘I would my father look’d but with my eyes’ (1.1.56); it is reprised when Theseus unpacks the 
options available to Hermia – though this time round Egeus is matched with Demetrius – ‘[…] Or else to wed 
Demetrius, as he would’ (1.1.86-89), and Lysander is allowed to pick up on this ambiguity, giving it bald statement 
in his very first lines: ‘You have her father’s love, Demetrius:/ Let me have Hermia’s; do you marry him’ (1.1.93-94). 




recalling of the Ceremony of Marriage: ‘And will you rent our ancient love asunder/ To 
join with men in scorning your poor friend?’ (3.2.215-216).  
The ironic displacement of the comedy’s resolve in the forms of patriarchal 
convention is further underlined through the language which Puck’s charm takes. Stuart 
Sillars observes that the promised restoration of order and accord occurs in a speech beset 
with jumbled reference and dislocations of sequence.12 Moreover, Puck’s speech sidesteps 
the figures of classical rhetoric, and in this way the prescriptions of civil governance which 
such figures underwrite, to instead borrow from the language of folk tradition. The speech’s 
concluding lines highlight the incongruity of this arrangement, where a trite proverb is 
deemed sufficient to indicate the richness of the play’s resolution. This is further 
underlined, as Sillars observes, by the phrase being provided a self-conscious introduction 
as well as a superfluous gloss – and by the fact that the audience, in having been promised 
one proverb, actually gets two. The original audience would also have found comedy in 
Puck’s failure to get his proverbs quite right: Ray’s Collection of English Proverbs offers 
‘All is well and the man has his mare again’, and in Tilley A164 we find ‘All shall be well 
and Jack shall have Jill’, while A165 provides ‘All is well and the man has his mare again’.  
I think we can understand the humour as taking further explication still, for it 
appears that Puck’s explanatory embellishment makes up another of the play’s allusions to 
St Paul. If the high and holy is indeed employed to provide a gloss for the low form of the 
proverbial, it is an arresting utilisation of biblical reference that would seem to anticipate 
the radical inversions suggested later by Bottom’s allusion to 1 Corinthians. 
Unsurprisingly, Puck’s appropriation is similarly scrambled. His ‘Every man should take 
his own’ appears to offer a muddled echo of 1 Corinthians 7.2. Quite appropriately, it is a 
passage in which Paul entreats marriage, and the verses either side of it would seem to have 
particular relevance to the play’s themes: 
Now concerning the things whereof ye wrote unto me, It were good for a man not 
to touch a woman. Nevertheless, to avoid fornication, let every man have his wife, 
and let every woman have her own husband. Let the husband give unto the wife due 
benevolence, and likewise also the wife unto the husband. The wife hath not the 
power of her own body, but the husband; and likewise also the husband hath not the 
power of his own body, but the wife. (7.1-4. Geneva Bible, 1560 (Emphasis added.))  
‘Due benevolence’ could be understood as providing an ironic commentary on the 
behavior of the play’s husbands-to-be as well as on the fairy King, Oberon. And the losses 
of identity and control brought about by the lovers’ forest transformation may also be 
understood as referenced by the wording, if not the sense, of 7.1.4 (‘The wife hath not the 
power of her own body […] also the husband hath not the power of his own body’) again 
                                                          
12 The observations noted in this paragraph come from Stuart Sillars’ “‘Howsoever, strange and admirable:’ A 
Midsummer Night's Dream as via stultitiae” (Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen und Literaturen, vol. 244, 
2007, pp. 27-39), pp. 36-37.   
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working according to the play’s ‘mispris’d mood’ (3.2.74) of appropriation. Any 
recognition of the reference would immediately effect a broad irony. For while the entreaty 
on marriage is embedded in a speech that offers a similar prescription, Paul’s petition is 
hedged by its opening and overriding caveat: ‘it were good for a man not to touch a woman’ 
– an admonition that would certainly displace the speech’s indication of resolution in 
conventional union. 
Despite the anaphoric pattern of Paul’s passage working to suggest balance and 
parity, this introductory frame makes it clear that his text reworks the myth of the female 
as substantiating potential corruption. That the Dream’s reference to these verses could be 
deliberate is suggested by Puck’s speech seeming to operate in a similar manner – only 
here, the denigration of the female is saved until the end so that it might work as something 
like a punchline. After generic Jacks have been paired with generic Jills in an arrangement 
suggestive of equivalence, the next configuration reiterates the relational terms implicit 
within Paul’s words. While still counseling marriage, the phrase portrays the union of the 
sexes as enacting defilement upon the male through its equating of the female with the 
animal: ‘The man shall have his mare’. 
In locating the female in this manner Puck’s line makes recourse to the traditional 
pairing of sexually active women with mares. This represents, of course, a conventional 
and patriarchal trope, and can be understood as underwriting the play’s ostensible 
movement towards order, reason and marriage. However, as has been remarked, a 
discordant note is struck by the fact that this indication occurs in the form of a crude 
proverb. As was exampled in the earlier discussion of the artisans, the low and vulgar seem 
to function throughout the Dream to provide counter-instance to the forces of order and 
elevation and so offer this relationship a renewed and elaborated significance. The alert 
audience member would have recognised the reoccurrence of this arrangement in the 
inversion of Puck’s concluding words, and this would have brought with it the expectation 
that their patriarchal claim will soon meet with a comic reversal. 
The volte-face comes immediately, and, in that it dispenses with subtle indication, 
proves highly amusing. Having informed the audience that ‘The man shall have his mare’, 
Puck exits, but only for Titania and the ass-headed Bottom to enter – the mismatched 
couple providing an emblematic reformulation of Puck’s proverb that jumbles its terms 
and farces its claims. The gender relationship is switched, and the metaphorical beast of 
Puck’s proverb undergoes a comically misprised reification. Moreover, the humour is 
intensified by the performative context: the usurping female is of course performed by a 
male actor, and Bottom’s magical transformation is realised by what was surely a simple 
and unconvincing stage prop, ‘[a]n ass’s nole […] fixed on his head’ (3.2.17). Yet more 
than simply inverting the phrase’s terms, the charmed lovers detail an arrangement that 
unravels the categorical conventions Puck’s words would assert. The claim of male 
authority implicit in the proverb’s glossed ‘every man shall take his own’ is comically 
undone; the scene’s opening lines see Titania invite Bottom to her bed for coys and kisses 
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(4.1.1-4), and remind the audience that when they last saw the weaver he was being 
conveyed to the Fairy Queen’s bower as a gagged sexual hostage.13 These violations of 
order extend into violations of category: queen couples with commoner, wife with lover, 
and – as the proverb’s tired and formulaic translation of women into mares is transposed 
and revivified – human with animal. Bruce Boehrer understands these transgressions as re-
indicating the process by which Oberon reestablishes his power over his wayward Queen: 
revealing authority’s own capacity to maintain order as reliant upon the violation of the 
very kinds of order it itself constructs.14 It is an observation that brings us back to 1 
Corinthians 7.1-4, marking up the disordering of Paul’s precepts that Oberon’s actions 
realise. As noted, rather than the passage presenting marriage as an ideal, and an end in 
itself, Paul’s words entreat of union principally for its capacity to restrain the very 
transgressions Oberon engineers: the marriage concept is introduced with ‘It were good for 
a man not to touch a woman. Nevertheless, to avoid fornication […]’. Oberon’s actions 
reverse this ordering; for the Fairy King fornication – in its most illicit forms – becomes a 
device by which order might be reasserted. 
Bottom’s confused account of his vison, with its central echo of 1 Corinthians, will 
close out this scene. The signification that the biblical reference can take must, it seems to 
me, be understood as qualified by the complex of tensions that precede it. The series of 
inversions work to reposition sacred allusion in a context that is self-reflexive, 
dissimulating and intensely ironic, and which appears to offer disruption not only to order 
and reason, but to the possibility for sanctity. Most immediately, the arrangement 
underlines for the audience that Bottom’s holy allusion is prompted by what must be in 
part understood as a profane descent into illicit sensuality. More radically perhaps, it 
highlights that meaning in the Dream – religious or otherwise – is inevitably circumscribed 
by its occurrence within the dissimulating illusions of theatrical performance. Yet the 
dissimulating illusions of theatrical practice may just be, as we will see, the means by which 
these apparently antagonistic impulses are drawn together and extended.  
-- 
The final act gathers the aristocrats, the artisans and the fairies for the nuptial celebrations 
in the palace, overtly marking the narrative’s resolution in orthodoxy, order and peace. Yet 
the artisans’ performance reintroduces the contrary forces that have, throughout the play, 
shadowed this progression. Most overtly, the interlude provides a parodic re-rendering of 
the main action; less conspicuously, it offers further development to the Dream’s 
disjunctive appropriation and redirection of religious reference. This continuation is first 
marked by a gentle yet precise echo of the mangled appropriation of 1 Corinthians by which 
Bottom described his ‘vision’. Where in the previous act Bottom gave us, ‘The eye of man 
                                                          
13 The last line of 3.1 has Titania command her fairies ‘Tie up my love’s tongue, bring him silently’ (3.1.194). 
14 Bruce Thomas Boehrer, “Bestial Buggery in A Midsummer Night’s Dream” (The Production of English Renaissance 




hath not heard, the ear of man hath not seen’ (4.1.209-10), as the interlude’s Pyramus, he 
offers ‘I see a voice […] I can hear my Thisbe’s face’ (5.1.190-191). A far more 
sacrilegious note will be struck a few lines later. It will operate to re-indicate the bizarre 
paths of desire that the main narrative suggested and which the ostensible conclusion would 
suppress, and, at the same time, underline these presentations as realised through and 
within illusion. 
In “(Peter) Quince: Love Potions, Carpenter’s Coigns and Athenian Weddings” 
Patricia Parker argues that the name given to the interlude’s playwright offers a set of 
biblical references that develops further the relationship that the play’s framework of 
Christian allusion forms with the low.15 She points to the association that ‘Quince’ bears 
to the ‘quoin’ or ‘coign’, the term used to indicate the carpenter’s ‘cornerstone’ (from the 
many biblical references made to cornerstones, the most prominent for the Elizabethans 
would probably have been Psalm 118:22: ‘The stone, which the builders refused, is the 
head of the corner’ (Wycliffe’s Bible, 1395)16). She goes on to argue that the role’s 
forename further extends this allusion: 
[i]n Shakespeare’s marriage play, ‘Peter Quince’ already recalls not just the one 
married apostle but the network of biblical ‘stones’ that includes the ‘Peter’ or ‘rock’ 
on which a different kind of structure is founded, the rejected ‘cornerstone’ and the 
‘living stones’ all gathered together in the second Epistle to ‘Peter’.  (p. 52) 
The key reference would actually appear to be 1 Peter 2:5, which gives us: ‘Ye also as 
lively stones, be made a spiritual house, an holy Priesthood to offer up spiritual sacrifices 
acceptable to God by Jesus Christ’ (Geneva Bible 1560).That Parker’s observation is not 
simply a critical over-determining of associative significance is indicated by what I suggest 
is the final act’s appropriating of the ‘living stones’ of Peter’s text according to the same 
serioludic strategy that we have seen configure the play’s other uses of holy reference. 
The allusion is located within a piece of low – and, it appears to me, bawdy – 
slapstick. Pyramus peers through the chink offered by Snout’s Wall in order to espy his 
Thisbe – she, though, is nowhere to be seen. Pyramus vents his frustration, and the 
watching Theseus remarks on the performance’s silliness: 
BOTTOM [as Pyramus]: Curs’d be thy stones for deceiving me! 
THESEUS: The wall, methinks, being sensible, should curse again. (5.1.179-181)  
                                                          
15 Shakespeare Survey, vol. 57, 2003, pp. 39-54. 





The lines surely play on the indecorous connotations of ‘stones’, and so indicate that 
Pyramus, in his striking Wall, hits Snout in his testicles.17 This gross farce establishes the 
context by which the sacred allusion will unfold. Once again, the low entertainment of the 
theatre is provided disingenuous indicating while at the same time pointing up the complex 
art of the play’s presentational arrangement. The stones of the interlude belong to Wall, 
and double as the ‘lively stones’ of Snout’s testicles. To give our attention first to Wall’s 
stones, we see that their configuration too functions according to the twin-perspective that 
Shakespeare’s self-reflexive stage effects. At the level of the interlude, ‘stones’ indicates 
the artisans’ attempt at producing the illusion of an on-stage wall. At the same time, of 
course, these stones also make up the literal pebbles that were perhaps mixed in Wall’s 
roughcast decking. Snout’s stones are similarly configured – for testicles are shared by 
stage persona and actor alike. Pyramus’s striking of the stones that frustrate his vision of 
Thisbe would act as an assault not only on the literal-yet-illusory ‘stones’ of Wall, but also 
on the stage ‘stones’ of Snout, and, in this way, the actual ‘stones’ of the actor performing 
both roles.  
Ironically, it is in fact the figure of order and orthodoxy, Theseus, who extends and 
converts the scene’s low comedy into something like sacrilegious allusion. The words 
which reformulate Wall’s stones as the ‘lively stones’ of Peter are his: ‘The wall, methinks, 
being sensible, should curse again’ [Emphasis added]. Once more, the elevation that the 
holy announces is transposed into theatre’s low and dissimulating forms. Biblical reference 
is made to rub up against the vulgar and comic, and its original and absolute signification 
is recast through its manifest embedding in the incongruous illusions of the theatre. 
A few lines later Peter’s ‘stones’ are given reprise. Theatrical dissimulation once 
more combines with a lewdly configured dislocation, only now the latter is radically 
intensified. The figuration in which the reference occurs surely represents the most 
stunningly obscene image of sex that the Dream offers: Thisbe’s words to Wall: ‘My cherry 
lips have often kiss’d thy stones,/ Thy stones with lime and hair knit up in thee’ (5.1.188-
189). Jonathan Bate and Héloïse Sénéchal indicate that ‘lime’ would be pronounced as a 
homophone for ‘limb’, and so suggest penis.18 My own imaginings may be more lurid; for 
me it seems just as probable that ‘lime’ (where the word connotes the substance of lime 
plaster itself) could indicate ejaculate. My understanding of the scene’s dramatic realisation 
would further suggest that the allusion to fellatio enjoys a ribald visual accompaniment. 
The two references to Wall’s ‘stones’ indicate their proximity to the ‘cranny’ the actor 
forms with his fingers, and this leads one to picture the actor performing Snout’s portrayal 
of Wall as standing with legs akimbo and his parted fingers just below his groin. Such a 
pose would mean that the lovers kneel into the wall, an arrangement that would best locate 
                                                          
17 For the various examples in Shakespeare’s work of ‘stones’ being used to denote testicles see Shakespeare’s Bawdy, 
p. 250. 
 18 Jonathan Bate and Héloïse Sénéchal, “Hark the Bard in all his bawdy beauty” (Times Higher Educational 
Supplement, 13 April 2007). 
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Pyramus if the slapstick of his striking of Wall in his ‘stones’ is to appear natural and 
unintentional.  
Allowing Thisbe and Wall to assume such a graphic and absurd configuration draws 
attention back to the fact that Thisbe is performed by the male artisan, Flute, and this would 
operate in turn to remind at least some of the spectators of how the play-world lovers they 
have been watching are too all male performers. The scene’s effects – at once both 
metatheatrical and improper – act to further stress the absurd and unorthodox 
dissimulations by which the marriage comedy is itself realised. While the Dream has its 
ostensible resolution in a patriarchal and cosmic order, it otherwise seems at pains to 
impress upon the audience its forays into the low, the unconventional, the irreligious, and 
– probably most pointedly – the illusory.   
It is the play of this theatrical dissimulation that the Dream’s spectators are 
throughout being directed to – and by which, if they are capable of appreciating its 
sophisticated brilliance, they are given opportunity to distinguish themselves from the their 
on-stage doubles, the court audience. Spurred on by the behavior of Theseus, and braced 
by his recent dismissal of imagination and illusion (the celebrated ‘I never may believe/ 
These antique fables’ speech of 5.2- 22), the members of the court audience ridicule the 
interlude, complacent in their assurance that their perspective represents the final level of 
experience. The alert member of the theatre audience would however have recognised the 
Duke’s response to Pyramus’s striking of Wall as another undermining of this position; the 
line’s indication of the various yet distinct levels of illusion that the interlude’s 
performance realises works to metatheatrically point up the limitations of its speaker as 
well as his acolytes. In a similar vein, where the aristocrats themselves are allowed to 
assume their misadventures have taken only placid and unambiguous resolution, the line’s 
sacrilegious allusion points the theatre audience back to the drama’s multiple notes of 
dislocation, and the manner in which the performance plays off them. 
It appears that wherever the Dream frames high meaning, it underlines this 
presentation as occurring within the play’s own fictive structures. Holy elevation is 
presented rather than realised; the more profound dimensions that the reference would 
assert being qualified through the self-reflexive conditions of the stage. This arrangement 
suggests that the Dream’s religious appropriations work to point us back to the aesthetic 
operations of the performance – or to put it more precisely, the significance indicated by 
holy allusion is reformulated and transposed over into the secular art of the stage. And this, 








The eye of man hath not heard, the ear of man hath not seen, man’s hand is not able to 
taste, his tongue conceive, nor his heart report, what my dream was. (4.1.209-212) 
 
Stuart Sillars points out how Bottom’s muddling of 1 Corinthians 2.9-10 may also be 
thought to make reference to the use of the same quotation in Thomas Chaloner’s 
translation of the Moriæ Encomium of Erasmus, The praise of Folie.19 The passage comes 
on the books penultimate page, providing a concluding illustration that explicitly links the 
visionary wisdom of folly to the purity and simplicity of Christian faith, and in this way it 
parallels Bottom’s account of his ‘dream’ :   
So muche (loe) are spirituall thynges to be preferred before flesshely thinges, and 
the inuisible before the other visible. For this vndoubtedly is euin the very gwerdone 
that the Prophete promyseth, Saiying, was never mans eie sawe, nor eare heard, nor 
thought of hert yet compassed, what, and how great felicitee god hath prepared vnto 
suche as dooe loue him.20 
Erasmus’ use of the same quotation implies that we should understand the episode 
of Bottom’s dream as operating within a much larger discussion of the sacred nature of 
foolishness and of the holy position that the low are given to occupy. At the same time, if 
we are to understand the reference to Erasmus as deliberate, then the process of 
appropriation could be thought to make the religious significance of the biblical allusion 
less immediate. Reference to another literary work would indicate a meta-aesthetic 
arrangement; rather than simply denoting holy folly, the concerns of the Dream would 
extend to the artistic representation of the discourse of folly and to how the aesthetic 
structures of the theatre might mediate such a re-presentation. 
I suggest that the continuation of the passage originally quoted by Sillars lends 
support to seeing the reference as perhaps a direct one, and in this way allows us a more 
expanded understanding of the relationship that the Dream takes to Folie. It runs:  
Who so ever therefore have suche grace (Which sure is genuine to few) by theyr life 
tyme to tast of this said felicitee, they are subjecte to a certaine passion much lyke 
vnto madnesse or witrauyng whan ravisshed so in the sprite, or beyng in a traunce, 
thei dooe speake certaine thyngis not hangyng one with an other, nor after any 
earthly facion, but rather dooe put foorth a voice they wote never what, muche lesse 
to be vnderstode of others […] In sort that whan a little after thei come againe to 
their former wittes, thei denie plainly thei wote where thei became, or whether thei 
                                                          
19 “‘Howsoever, strange and admirable:’ A Midsummer Night's Dream as via stultitiae”, pp. 36-37.  
20 The praise of Folie, Moriae Encomium, a booke made in latine by that greet clerke Erasmus Roterodame. Translated 
by Sir Thomas Chaloner (London: Thomas Berthelet 1549), T3r. Emphasis in the original. 
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were than in theyr bodies, or out of theyr bodies, waking or slepyng: remembring 
also as little, either what they heard, saw saied, or did than, savying as it were 
through a cloude, or by a dreame: but this thei know certainely, that whiles their 
mindes so roued and wandred , thei were most happie and blisfull.21 
The description corresponds rather precisely to Bottom’s befuddled attempt to 
formulate his experience. The ‘blissfull’ ‘felicitee’ of Bottom’s ‘dreame’ is evidenced in 
the amazed tones through which the figure introduces his attempted explication: ‘I have 
had a most rare vision. I have had a dream, past the wit of man to say what dream it was’ 
(4.1.203-205), and the confusions that Folie notes are provided close illustration in 
‘Methought I was – there is no man can tell what. Methought I was – and methought I had 
– but man is but a patched fool if he will offer to say what methought I had’ (4.1.206-209). 
Folie’s use of ‘witrauing’ seems particularly significant. For the Elizabethans, ‘wit’ 
denoted not just ‘sense’, but was also used to refer to each of the senses. That the sentence 
in which the term appears in Folie combines it with: ‘thei dooe speake certaine thyngis not 
hangyng one with an other’ would seem to provide a noteworthy anticipation of Bottom’s 
synesthetic confusion. 
It is not only the concluding passage of Folie that seems to point to the events of the 
Dream though, for the introduction also reveals another set of resemblances. Where the 
penultimate page of Folie offers a parallel to Bottom’s vision, by a happy symmetry the 
book’s second page also links itself to Bottom’s transformation: 
I am come foorthe among you: upon condicion ye will not thinke muche to bestowe 
on me your eares a while. I meane not those ears that ye carie with you to sermons, 
but those ye geve to plaiers, to jesters, and to fooles. Yea those (hardly) wherewith 
my friende Midas whilom herkened to the rurall god Pan, in preferring his rusticall 
songe, before Apollos farre fyner melodie.22 
If the reference to Erasmus is deliberate then the above passage echoes significantly. 
The lines make reference to the tale of the punishment that Apollo handed Midas. The myth 
can be found in Golding’s translation of Metamorphoses. After having realised the 
calamitous effects of his wish to have everything he touch turn to gold, Midas prays to 
Dionysus and the power is rescinded. Thereafter ‘Midas hating riches haunts the 
pasturegrounds and groves, And up and down with Pan among the Lawnds and mountaines 
roves […] But still a head more fat than wyse, and doltish wit he hath’23. He is present for 
Pan’s audacious challenge of Apollo to a trial of musical skill, and there his ‘doltish wit’ 
causes him to engender Apollo’s displeasure: Apollo is named victor, and all those in 
attendance second the judgment, bar Midas – who questions the justice of the award. His 
                                                          
21 The praise of Folie, T3r-T3v. 
22 The praise of Folie, A1v. 
23 Shakespeare’s Ovid: Being Arthur Golding’s Translation of the Metamorphoses. Translated by Arthur Golding, 




preferment of the rustic melody of Pan enrages Apollo and the god transforms Midas’s 
ears: ‘And so a slowe paste Asses eares his heade did after beare’.24 As well as marking 
the prefiguration of Bottom’s transformation, the reference in the passage from Folie would 
also underline the ‘doltish’ nature of that figure. Yet in that Erasmus addresses the 
reception of his text to these very ears, the passage once more points to the understanding 
of which ignorance is capable. Moreover, the passage repeats the Dream’s serioludic 
relationship to the inversionary. That Midas gave preference to Pan’s melodies over the 
god of music’s efforts makes play with the hierarchy realised by a Platonic ideal of forms, 
and points to a reversal whereby the low and rustic are elevated at the expense of the 
privileged and established. 
Rather intrestingly, in tying the conveyance of Folie’s message to the activities of 
‘plaiers […] jesters, and […] fooles’, this introduction can also be seen to take in the form 
and metatheatrical configuration by which the Dream is realised (it being apparent that in 
this instance ‘fooles’ refers not to the ignorant, but to stage clowns). The passage 
emphasises the folly-like nature of theatrical performance while at the same time linking 
its low aesthetic representation with revelation. It also nominates the attentive audience 
member as the ass-eared fool, yet as the development of Folie makes clear – and the Dream 
will do the same – this is not a wholly unflattering comparison.  
Once more, a parallel presents itself in Bottom’s speech: he states: ‘man is but a 
patched fool, if he will offer to say what methought I had’ (4.1.208-209). On one level this 
represents the figure’s attempt to express the incomprehensibility of his experience, yet the 
line also works ironically to assert another audacious claim for the power of art, suggesting 
as it does that the ‘patched fools’ of the stage may be capable of giving presentation to this 
experience of vision. The fact that Bottom chooses to repeat ‘what methought I had’, rather 
than ‘what methought I was’, offers further indication that his transformation is first and 
foremost a transformation of the stage – emphasising as it does that the transformation is 
brought about by a stage prop, by the figure of Bottom having a ‘nole […] fixed on his 
head’ (3.2.17).25 The irony is enlarged by the fact that while Bottom’s words would – at 
the narrative level – point away from himself to reference a generic ‘man’, it is Bottom 
who is at every turn – and at both the narrative and metatheatrical level – indicated by the 
term ‘patched fool’. ‘Fool’ obviously indicates his standing in relation to the intellectual 
tradition that Theseus’s speech on the imagination (5.1.2-22) will soon invoke. ‘Patched’ 
takes in his low social position, and the word has been used in this sense in Puck’s 
description of the artisans: ‘a crew of patches’ (3.2.9) (before, incidentally, Puck calls them 
by what often seems to be preferred term among critics, ‘rude mechanicals’ (3.2.9)). Yet 
in that for the Elizabethans ‘patch’ and ‘fool’ both denoted ‘plaiers’, Bottom and his vision 
are at their climatic moment embedded back into the fictions of performance. Nor is the 
play satisfied with only these indicators; before asserting that only a fool would try to 
                                                          
24 Shakespeare’s Ovid, p. 222. 
25 The uncomplicated means by which Bottom’s transformation is brought about on the stage is made evident later 
when Oberon instructs Puck to return the weaver to human form: his command is simply ‘take off this head’ (4.1.79). 
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explain his experience, Bottom makes three attempts: ‘Methought I was – there is no man 
can tell what. Methought I was – and methought I had –’ (4.1.206-208). Bottom, of course, 
is not obliged to continue the struggle to represent his experience; the men who will finally 
attempt to ‘offer to say’ what Bottom ‘had’ are in actuality the fools of the stage. 
Yet while Bottom’s ‘man is but a patched fool’ at first appears only to refer to 
mankind in general so as to make its specific pointing back to the figure of Bottom itself 
all the more comic, the perceptive members of the audience would have caught the words’ 
echo of Puck’s disdainful generalisation on the condition of man in the previous act. There, 
Oberon and Puck’s observing the ‘sport’ (3.2.353) of the lovers initially suggested that the 
audience shared their ironic vantage point, and in this manner the lovers’ tangles were 
positioned as something to be understood as distanced and, thereby, absurdly comic. Yet 
this arrangement is confounded when Puck is prompted to extend his derisory assessment 
of the lovers to take in all mankind: ‘Lord, what fools these mortals be!’ (3.2.115). His 
words operate to undo the privileged and detached position that the audience has assumed 
it enjoyed, and instead relocates it in the double position of laughing at the lovers while 
admitting its own susceptibility to such folly. 
While Bottom’s echo of Puck’s line would then initially seem to assert a derogatory 
status for the audience, as is the case with Folie’s introductory configuration, Bottom’s 
passage actually engenders a set of shifts and switches that serve as a compliment to the 
audience members who recognise them. In reformulating Puck’s contemptuous estimate 
and pointing it back to himself, Bottom’s words remove the perceptive audience members 
from their conceptual doubling of the lovers, and ask them to locate themselves instead as 
the double of the fool, Bottom. The initial indignity such an arrangement configures is 
immediately transposed by the reference to 1 Corinthians, and points to the elevation of 
the audience members who are sufficiently imaginative to play the complex game that the 
Dream asks of them. Like Bottom, they exceed the regular limitations that the ‘better’ 
judgement of Theseus’s avouched ‘cool reason’ (5.1.6) would impose on their senses and 
sensibility.  For Theseus sees illusion, regardless of whether it derives from lunatic, lover 
or poet, as merely a misconception, and one for which he finds a rather banal equivalence: 
‘in the night, imagining some fear,/ How easy is a bush supposed a bear!’ (5.1.21-22). 
Shakespeare’s audience, by contrast, is asked to comprehend art’s illusions in the fullest 
sense. The play demands a doubled-perspective; only by their maintaining a critical 
awareness of the Dream’s high artifice is the audience able to indulge the ‘tricks’ of ‘strong 
imagination’ (5.1.18). This last quality is, as Theseus reminds us, the province of ‘The 
lunatic, the lover, and the poet’ (5.1.7) – a tripartite description provided a rather neat 
syncretic realisation in the figure of the visionary fool, Bottom. 
The self-conscious transposing of the traditions of spiritual revelation over into 
those of secular aesthetic experience takes one more arrangement, and it is one that would 
seem to point the audience directly to the powers of the dramatist himself. Bottom 
contemplates getting Quince to write a ballad of his dream and states ‘it shall be called 
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‘Bottom’s Dream’, because it hath no bottom’ (4.1.214-215). These words develop, the 
mangled repeat of 1 Corinthians 2.9, pointing as they do to the next verse as it is found in 
both Tyndedale’s Bible 1526 and the Geneva New Testament 1557: ‘For the spirit 
searcheth all things, yea the bottom of goddes secrets’.26 This does much more than merely 
extend the reference, for it stresses the startling – and slightly blasphemous – locating of 
the fictional Bottom within the holy text. It also serves to develop, and one might even say, 
exceed, the apophatic dimensions of Paul’s writing which understands God as being 
without parts and beyond comparison. Where 1 Corinthians 2.9 attempts to express the 
incomprehensibility of God, ‘The eye hath not seen, and the ear hath not heard, neither 
have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love 
him’, one might suggest that Bottom’s serioludic transmogrification provides a more 
profound representation of the theological concept of the via negativa. In Bottom’s 
synesthetic confusions, ‘The eye of man hath not heard, the ear of man hath not seen, man’s 
hand is not able to taste, his tongue conceive, nor his heart report, what my dream was’, 
the inadequacy of the attempt to define the boundless and incomprehensible nature of God 
within the limitations of sensory experience is, one could argue, given more emphatic 
marking. The speech’s reference to the succeeding Biblical verse works similarly to outdo 
the terms of its source. In contrast to a mystical experience that penetrates to ‘the bottom 
of goddes secrets’, Bottom’s vision is determined by the fact that ‘it hath no Bottom’, and 
so better operates according to the removal of boundaries and negating of limits which 
apophatic theology understands as engendering the experience of God. Implicit within this 
is the suggestion that the aesthetic powers that the dramatist enjoys are capable of 
engineering a parody that both undoes and outdoes Paul’s holy words. 
-- 
One last point must be briefly added. That the final revelation that the play offers 
occurs in the aesthetic form of the theatrical rather than according to the holy tradition is 
given indication throughout by the treatment provided to the Corinthians allusion. Its 
utilisation is consistently configured through the serioludic, and while the reference is 
employed to indicate the visionary, the specifically sacramental terms of that vision are 
either elided or undergo compromise. Instead, the impetus to revelation that the reference 
effects is conscripted by the aesthetic, and vision is given its final presentation within the 
profane and equivocal structures of theatrical presentation – with these structuring 
principles being, in turn, subject to the aesthetic conceptualisation that the audience is 
capable of conceiving. This arrangement would seem underlined by the excision of ‘God’ 
from Bottom’s appropriations of 1 Corinthians 9 and 10 – where the word occurs in each 
line. The only use Bottom makes of the term comes before his attempt at expounding his 
experience, and figures as an expletive: ‘God’s my life!’ (4.1.202).  
                                                          
26 This has been variously pointed out; see, for example, The RSC Shakespeare: William Shakespeare Complete Works, 




Were we to accept Jan Kott’s suggestion that Bottom’s transformation also operates 
to indicate the Asinine Mass27 – a vulgar and extravagantly blasphemous parody of the 
liturgy –  the elements of religious burlesque and inversion would be further underlined by 
the figure’s exclamation a few lines previous to the Corinthians allusion. The homophonic 
echo of the ass’s ‘hee-haw’ in Bottom’s ‘Heigh-ho!’ (4.1.200) would then not only point 
the audience back to the role’s transformation but, in what the reader will by now recognise 
as a familiar strategy, would qualify the play’s presentation of vision by juxtaposing the 
sacred with the profane. 
The Asinine Mass was a by-product of the Feast of Fools, a festive celebration of 
the donkey-related stories in the Bible, wherein prominence was given to the tale of words 
of wisdom spoken by Balaam’s ass. While its popularity declined after the Council of Basle 
forbade the Feast in 1435, the yearly revels did nonetheless continue, with records showing 
that the Feast of Fools was celebrated in Amiens, France, as late as 1721.28 While the Feast 
of Fools had a degree of popularity in England, my research has not uncovered any 
evidence of the Asinine Mass being celebrated outside of France. This is not of course to 
say that the tradition would have been unfamiliar in England, and Kott’s comment can be 
entertained as an interesting possibility, and a possibility that the representations found in 
folk pageants and mummers’ plays would seem to lend some support.  
The mass featured as the main event on festive days such as Twelfth Night, Plough 
Monday, and the Feast of the Ass, wherein a man disguised as an ass would be one of the 
main actors in the day’s processions, comic rituals and holiday revels.29 It took 1 
Corinthians 4.10 as its text, urging the congregants to become a ‘fool for Christ’, and the 
holiday operated a carnival inversion of the roles of church hierarchies. T. J. Crowley 
translates the Latin from an extant manuscript to illustrate the valediction: ‘At the end of 
Mass, the priest, having turned to the people, in lieu of saying the “Ite, Missa est”, will 
bray thrice; the people instead of replying “Deo Gratias” say, “Hinham, hinham, 
hinham”’.30 The possible reference to the Asinine Mass made by Bottom’s brief ‘Heigh-
ho!’ would then seem to supplement and continue the Dream’s particular exchange 
between the ‘vulgar and celestial’, pointing to an inversion of the conventional strictures 
that would determine revelatory experience. At the same time, the allusion would underline 
the parodic and profane dimensions within Bottom’s vision, and in this way, it would seem, 
argue for the transposition of the low forms of illicit representation. 
The Dream’s revelation, then, belongs, in the main, to the aesthetic and secular. The 
hierarchical inversion found in 1 Corinthians is further extended, and the experience of the 
visionary conscripted by the presentational processes of the theatre. The epiphany that the 
                                                          
27 The Bottom Translation (Northwestern University Press, 1987), p. 43. 
28 “Feast of Fools”, in Tanya Gulevich’s Encyclopedia of Christmas and New Year Celebrations (Omnigraphics, 2nd 
edition, 2003). 
29 The Bottom Translation, p. 43. 




play asserts is the ‘dream’ of art itself, realised by the literal illusions of the stage and the 
fools that pace it, and configured according to the poet’s frenzied heaven-rolling eye. It is 
a dream that is the audience’s to share if they are capable of the imaginative investment of 




















Note on the text: Since the publication of this article I have become acquainted with Peter 
Holland’s excellent Introduction to The Oxford Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream (Oxford University Press, 2008), a piece which also contains a discussion of the 
play in light of Chaloner’s translation of Erasmus’ praise of Folie (p. 74-77, 83), but which 
does not pursue the line of serioludic religious parody that my own article suggests. Had I 
been familiar with this piece before the publication of this article the overlap in material 
would have compelled me to provide an account of Holland’s research. Holland observes 
that ‘Erasmus’ virtuoso mental paradoxes, his Folly’s [sic] twistings and turnings are as 
subtle as the paradoxes that surround Bottom and frequently seem, at least, analogous or 
parallel’ (76). And as does my article, he notes the possible application that Erasmus’ reuse 
of the story of Midas has to the Dream – rather neatly relating Midas’ display of poor 
musical taste to Bottom’s inclination for ‘the tongs and bones’ (4.1.29) (p. 77). Holland 
also makes use of the ‘whan a little after thei come againe to their former wittes’ passage 
(The praise of Folie, T3r-T3v), and sees it as having pertinence not just to Bottom but also 
to the lovers – a rather neat comparison made more effective by his top-and-tailing the 
quotation so as to remove the references to grace. This redaction reflects Holland’s belief 
that the critical ‘invocation of grace to describe Bottom’s experience is excessive and 
misguided’ (p. 84), a position which acts to differentiate our analysis of the relationship 








Political Shakespeare and the Blessing of Art: A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream 
 
It may seem inappropriate that in order to contribute to a discussion on the ideological 
position that Shakespeare's plays occupy in our culture that the present text gives its central 
focus to what in many ways is a close reading – and a close reading that will often appear 
to sidestep this very discussion. It is hoped, however, that through this tangential approach 
I am able to demonstrate how the plays themselves attempt to frame the relationship their 
art takes towards culture and society. To this end the text will examine how the plays make 
use of a particular set of strategies – those of disfiguration and distinction. 
The relationship between ideology and the plays has of course been a subject for a 
great deal of contemporary criticism, one which most often grounds itself in material 
history. It is a critical approach that – broadly speaking – divides itself into two camps. 
One perspective that searches for subversion but finds only the illusions and strategies of 
containment of a dominant ideology, and the other, which sees the operations of power and 
ideology as more disjunctive, and understands this mass of competing forces as offering 
the possibility for genuine subversion. Each wing, however, appears fairly consistent in 
understanding, in the words of Leonard Tennenhouse, ‘the opposition between a literary 
use of language and a political use of the same linguistic materials as being largely a 
modern invention’.1 Art is taken to be confined within and seen as working according to 
larger frames of ideological discourse.2  
I would like to explore this relationship by going back to Tennenhouse and looking 
at his discussion of A Midsummer Night’s Dream from the 1994 collection, Political 
Shakespeare. For Tennenhouse the Dream operates conservatively; he argues that 
Shakespeare uses his drama to authorise political authority, and political authority, as 
                                                          
1 Leonard Tennenhouse, “Strategies of State and Political Plays” (Political Shakespeare: New essays in Cultural 
Materialism, edited by Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield, Manchester University Press, 1985, pp. 109-128), p. 
110. 
2This sketches out the broader impulses of the movement. There are, admittedly, a number of critical voices that would 
be categorised as cultural materialists, or new historicists, whose analysis is not confined by the description offered 
above. Happily, two of these provide readings of the Dream. While Louis Montrose in The Purpose of Playing 
(University of Chicago Press, 1996) pursues a ‘poststructuralist historical and cultural criticism’ (92), he nonetheless 
provides an interpretation of the Dream that works to explore the ‘reciprocal relationship between formal innovation 
and changes in conscious’ (92), and which prefers a set of ‘inconclusive conclusions’ over the ‘bold assertions that 
have become commonplace in the critical literature on the Elizabethan theatre’ (104). Similarly, Patricia Parker’s work 
on the Dream reveals the play’s complex interrelations with a dizzyingly broad field of contemporary discourse, yet 
still foregrounds the multiple possibilities that the play’s poetics uniquely make available (see for example, “(Peter) 
Quince: Love Potions, Carpenter’s Coigns and Athenian Weddings” (Shakespeare and Comedy, special issue of 
Shakespeare Survey, 5, 2003, edited by Peter Holland, pp. 39-54), and “‘Rude Mechanicals’: A Midsummer Night’s 





Shakespeare represents it, in turn authorises art.3 While Tennenhouse remarks the play’s 
multiple violations of the categories that organise Elizabethan reality, he understands these 
disruptions as occurring within the framework of festival. He argues that the disorder they 
voice is in this way displaced onto art – finding example of this in the transposition of the 
lovers’ misadventures into the ‘story of the night told over’, and in the Pauline inversions 
of Bottom’s vision taking reformulation as dream. Tennenhouse draws his central example 
from the scene where Theseus and his party come upon the sleeping couples lying 
intermingled on the ground. Theseus’s line, ‘No doubt they rose up early to observe/ The 
rite of May’ (4.1.32-33) is understood as acting to identify the lovers as ‘revelers’, and 
Tennenhouse argues that in this way Theseus not only decriminalises the lovers’ 
transgression of the law, but identifies their state of disarray with the order of art. When 
the revelers in turn fall on their knees before Theseus, this is seen as completing the 
reinstitution of political authority. Tennenhouse goes on to give particular attention to the 
last act, seeing it as theorising the process of inversion whereby art and politics end up in 
this mutually authorising relationship.4 
I agree that the last act foregrounds concerns of art and power, yet would like to 
argue that the authority that the Dream attempts to establish is the sovereign authority of 
art. And I hope to demonstrate that rather than taking a mutual relationship to the dominant 
ideology, the play (as I would suggest a great part, if not all, of the canon does) proceeds 
through disruption to instead claim for its operations a differentiated and distinct space. I 
will end by briefly discussing if such an arrangement undoes the ideological interpretation 
and appropriation of Shakespeare’s work – or if, somewhat perversely, it works to facilitate 
it. 
The Dream operates throughout in markedly self-aware terms. It underlines again 
and again the artifice of its own aesthetic construction, by which I refer to its configuration 
in the processes of illusion and dissimulation. And I would argue that it is this arrangement 
– rather than carnival inversions of category as Tennenhouse has it – that determines the 
play’s subversive energies. Political claims are given presentation – and exploration – but 
these presentations are revealed as realised through and bound up in the fictions and 
deceptions of the theatre. This has the effect of undoing – or to put it perhaps more precisely 
– of disfiguring any final and unequivocal ideological assertion. At the same time, in 
stressing the unreal conditions of its own realisation, the Dream marks its distinction from 
the world beyond the stage. Tracing these features of disfiguration and distinction through 
the last act will hopefully provide a fuller picture of how I see the Dream as working to 
position itself. 
The last act sees the coming of the artisans to Theseus’ palace to perform at the 
royal nuptials. Their homage would seem to underline the comedy’s conservative 
resolution, reaffirming the centrality of marriage and the authority of state. As C. L. Barber 
                                                          
3 “Strategies of State and Political Plays”, p. 111. 
4 “Strategies of State and Political Plays”, pp. 111-112. 
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has observed, the artisans’ visit bears kinship to the mumming May-King and Queen’s 
good luck visit to the great house of their neighbourhood. Barber notes that their arrival 
also follows the pattern of the May-Games in marking the movement from the town to the 
woods and back again, ‘bringing in summer to the bridal’. 5 This sense of blessing that the 
artisans’ presence conjures is further extended through the associations evoked by the 
surname of their leader, Peter Quince. As Patricia Parker has noted, the quince not only 
played an important role in solemnising Athenian nuptials, but also right through to the 
Elizabethan period the fruit brought to newlyweds the promise of fortunate issue.6 
The endorsement that these various associations imply though is of course 
undermined at the first opportunity. Quince’s presentation of his prologue immediately 
introduces the note of disfiguration – its punctuation is disordered, and this transforms what 
was intended as a civil address into a volley of comic insults. This opening points to how 
in the last act genre itself undergoes a subtle but certain distortion. It shifts from comedy 
to something more like, to borrow Quince’s mis-formulated term, ‘tragical mirth’, and the 
sophisticated members of the original audience would have understood this as challenging 
the structure of signification that the inevitable momentum of the marriage comedy would 
otherwise appear to enable. 
The most overt manifestation of this shift is the interlude itself. Even though the 
artisans provide the story of ‘Pyramus and Thisbe’ an absurd realisation, the narrative 
nonetheless serves to remind the audience that lovers’ confusions may not always end 
happily – they can, especially when the lovers are Athenians, also be the stuff of tragedy. 
This does more than simply provide parody of the main action; in highlighting the Dream’s 
explication and apparent ideological resolution as generically determined, the play’s 
abstract and artificial construction is emphasised. This has the effect of underlining the 
distinction between the conditions by which the play’s comedy operates and those 
conditions which are in effect in the world beyond the stage. For even though the artisans’ 
‘tragic’ performance also unfolds according to the conventional generic prescriptions, in 
its presentation of death, and a despair that goes unalleviated, the interlude can be said to 
make reference to some of the grimmer circumstances that enfold human experience 
beyond the stage, and which the form of comedy necessarily ignores. 
This marking of the Dream’s form as artificial and distinct – and in this way limited 
– is reiterated in Puck’s first epilogue. Initially, the comedy appears to mark its closure in 
formulaic terms: Theseus, as is appropriate to his rank, is awarded the lines that precede 
the Athenian aristocrats' exit, and his words promise these lovers 'nightly revels and new 
jollity' (5.1.356). But rather than the play ending there, Puck returns to the stage and 
provides an epilogue that underlines the palace's peace yet, simultaneously, places it at a 
distinct remove. The play’s happy resolution is marked as abbreviated, being presented as 
having application only to the fictional figures of the stage. As Puck's cataloguing of the 
                                                          
5 Shakespeare's Festive Comedy (Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 137. 
6 “(Peter) Quince: Love Potions, Carpenter’s Coigns and Athenian Weddings,” pp. 39-49. 
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night terrors that lie beyond the palace walls and beyond the peace of comedy makes clear, 
the play’s movement to conclusion indicates the resumption of a set of harsher conditions 
for the theatre audience: the world to which they must return is pictured as one in which 
‘the hungry lion roars,/ And the wolf behowls the moon’ (5.1.357-358).  
Later, Puck’s final epilogue repeats and develops this marking off of the play-world 
further still. Here he asks the audience to consider the performance ‘but a dream’ (5.1.406) 
– relegating the play’s art to that of the peripheral, supplementary, and insubstantial. But, 
clearly, Puck’s formulation is disingenuous; it does not suggest to the audience the poverty 
of art’s illusion, nor even for that matter illusion’s forfeiture. Rather the epilogue once 
more outlines the theatrical space as distinct from and operating outside the conditions that 
determine the world of its audience. For at the same time that Puck asks the spectators to 
consider the play an airy nothing, the speech itself works to extend and complicate the 
play’s structures of performance. While the direct address of the audience points to the 
renouncing of theatrical illusion, the figure delivering the speech still continues to assert 
his stage identity. Furthermore, it is an identity which maintains the dissimulations of 
persona that characterise the role (‘as I am an honest Puck’ (5.1.417), ‘Else the Puck a liar 
call’ (5.1.421)), and which, as we see in the final line's switching from 'Puck' to 'Robin' 
(5.1.424), continues to play on the ambiguities which that identity has accumulated. Puck's 
final epilogue then not only points us to the separation of the play world from that of the 
world of the audience but reveals this distinction as brought about by an investment in the 
paradoxes that art’s elements of dissimulation and illusion allow.  
Another ironically reflexive announcement of the play’s aesthetic workings has 
occurred earlier – spoken by the playwright, Quince. Where Puck’s lines pass off the 
experience of Shakespeare’s play as but a dream, Quince’s pair of prologues have claimed 
the interlude as the aesthetic realisation of a profound insight into the true conditions of 
existence. The first provides: ‘The actors are at hand; and by their show/ You shall know 
all that you are like to know’ (5.1.116-117), and the second has: ‘But wonder on, till truth 
make all things plain’ (5.1.127). The aesthetic announcements voiced by Puck and Quince 
are ironically overemphatic and contrasting statements of art’s meaning. Yet at the same 
time, they work together to underline the play’s aesthetic explication. They point to the 
conditions by which the Dream works – and serve to announce its achievement; the play’s 
signification is compassed within the illusory dream terms of its theatrical realisation, yet 
within the limits that this form prescribes the play enjoys a sovereign freedom of revelation.  
-- 
If we understand the artisans’ visit to the palace as indicating a form of marital benediction, 
then the fairy blessing itself would operate as another of the play’s iterated and 
transmogrified doubles. This would be further underlined if – as is at least a possibility – 
the actors who performed the artisans doubled as fairies. And this role doubling would 
further contextualise the significance the audience might give the fairy charm – for it would 
relate its magic and blessing to the fundamental fact of theatrical illusion. Even without the 
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role doubling, the effect of the two groups’ conceptual doubling would mean that the fairy 
blessing would be immediately understood as coloured by the elements of disfiguration 
that the audience has just remarked in the interlude. 
This is picked up on immediately. Oberon begins his speech with a remark that 
reminds the audience that these fairies are night-bound creatures: ‘Now, until the break of 
day,/ Through this house each fairy stray’ (5.1.387-388). That this constraint is not 
unimportant is made clear when the Fairy King again references this supernatural 
restriction in the injunction with which he concludes his words of benediction: ‘Trip away; 
make no stay;/ Meet me all by break of day’ (5.1.408-409). These lines point the spectators 
back to Puck’s earlier underlining of this fairy constraint and to his seemingly inadvertent 
association of the fairies with a set of sinister creatures subject to the same limitation:  
My fairy lord, this must be done with haste, 
For night's swift dragons cut the clouds full fast, 
And yonder shines Aurora's harbinger; 
At whose approach, ghosts wandering here and there 
Troop home to churchyards. Damned spirits all, 
That in crossways and floods have burial, 
Already to their wormy beds are gone, 
For fear lest day should look their shames upon; 
They willfully themselves exil’d from light 
And must for aye consort with black-brow'd night. (3.2.377-387) 
In contemporary folklore fairies were portrayed as equivocal and occasionally even malefic 
creatures, and this means that the Elizabethan audience could not have ignored the 
implication that Puck’s lines suggest. That Oberon’s words work to recall such an 
association at the point of benediction serves to undermine both the integrity of the fairies 
and the salutary complexion of the blessing to be rendered. 
Another echo marks the Fairy King’s speech of magical dedication, one more 
precise and far more urgent. Oberon’s words point back to another charm heard earlier in 
the play (and the beneficiary in this case is similarly a-bed), First Fairy’s lullaby to Titania. 
The song is formulated according to the peculiar and ambiguous schema preferred by the 
fairies, configuring itself as it does through the invocation of the very terrors it would 
exclude: 
You spotted snakes with double tongue, 
 Thorny hedgehogs, be not seen; 
 Newts and blind-worms, do no wrong... 
 Weaving spiders, come not here; 
 Hence, you long-legg'd spinners, hence! 
 Beetles black, approach not near; 
Worm nor snail, do no offence. (2.2.9 – 22) 
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It is an arrangement that Oberon’s blessing of nuptial issue also observes: 
And the blots of Nature’s hand 
Shall not in their issue stand; 
Never mole, hare lip, nor scar,  
Nor mark prodigious, such as are 
Despised in nativity, 
Shall upon their children be. (5.1.395-400) 
In the instance of the First Fairy’s lullaby, of course, events unfold in such a way that the 
magical protection offered is radically contravened. The moment the song is done Oberon 
enters and avenges himself by bewitching the sleeping queen, and the consequences of his 
action extend far beyond the mild terrors the fairy charm conjured, concluding instead in 
the monstrous and unnatural. Recalling the egregiously subverted charm at the point of 
Oberon’s blessing of the bridal beds would surely have suggested that the Fairy King’s 
magic may be subject to a similar unravelling. 
These various ambiguities serve to engender the audience’s sceptical attention and 
direct it to the figures of the blessing’s recipients. The lines which detail Theseus and 
Hippolyta’s future fortune appear, however, in themselves, unclouded by the polysemy that 
marks the rest of the speech:  
And the issue there create 
Ever shall be fortunate. 
So shall all the couples three 
Ever in true loving be. (5.1.391-394) 
These promises, though, come at the end of a play already filled with infidelities and broken 
oaths, and they will be followed by an ambiguously ringing reference that develops the 
connection to First Fairy’s lullaby. The ‘field-dew consecrate’ with which the fairies will 
bless each chamber (5.1.401-403) links itself back to Puck’s description of the monster in 
Titania’s ‘consecrated bower’ (3.2.5-6), referencing again her magically engineered 
humiliation. In such a context – of deception, humiliation, and unnatural desire – the 
promises of fortunate issue and lasting love that configure the blessing would have surely 
prompted the audience to recall the alternative and darker history that classical myth 
provides to the blessing’s recipients.  
According to myth, the amorous pursuits of Theseus do not find their conclusion in 
his marriage to Hippolyta – rather, the episode of their matrimony ends in a bloody and 
tragic debauch. According to most re-tellings, while their union is still intact, Theseus and 
Hippolyta are blessed with an issue that does for some time indeed appear fortunate, the 
handsome and chaste Hippolytus. Yet, Theseus becomes enamored of Phaedra, and he kills 
Hippolyta. Theseus goes on to marry Phaedra, but she in turn falls wildly in love with her 
step-son. Hippolytus rejects Phaedra’s advances, and in revenge she tells Theseus that 
Hippolytus raped her. An enraged Theseus takes his son’s life.  
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Recalling the tragic outcome myth gives to the story of Theseus and Hippolyta 
greatly complicates the relationship between the Dream’s Duke and Duchess and the play-
world they inhabit. It also complicates the play-world’s relationship to the myths and genre 
it makes use of – while at the same time extending the claims that the play seems to make 
for the operation of its art. We have already seen that Puck’s epilogues indicate the distinct 
set of conditions that determine the world beyond the theatre and underline the resumption 
of their terms once the ‘dream’ of the play is concluded. This arrangement points up the 
illusory nature of the play and indicates that its narrative and the figures it has presented 
are confined to and given no extension beyond their dramatic performance. Yet, as we can 
see here, the fairy blessing appears to operate at the play-world level to suggest the tragic 
fate that consumes the mythological figures which these stage presences are configured 
according to. This arrangement would seem to point – paradoxically – to a continuation of 
the existence of these stage presences, and – ironically – locate this continuation in the 
tragic dimensions of what Theseus has dismissed as ‘antique fables’. The irony would be 
given full explication in that the Dream, after making great comic play with the equivocal 
relationship between the play’s Theseus and Hippolyta and their mythological counters 
eventually suggests for the play-figures an independent existence that not only escapes the 
confines of their current fictional realisation but reconfigures them according to their tragic 
mythological fate. 
Understanding the conclusion in this way would mean seeing the art of the Dream 
as having it both ways at once. And rather than this contradicting Puck’s remarking of the 
play-world as artificial and finite, it actually points to how the Dream plays out the same 
gambit with artistic illusion that it has Puck frame when he performs his epilogues. For as 
we noted earlier, Puck’s speeches operate to foreground the play’s own structures of 
illusion, yet – at the same time – they refuse to forfeit the effects that these structures might 
derive. And this is precisely the arrangement that the interpretation above cedes to the 
Dream: the play claims for itself an independent, yet wholly contrived, world. And it does 
not follow that tragedy has no part in such an arrangement. For the reading would seem to 
suggest that the fairy blessing is no more capable of preventing the explication of death 
and disaster for its mythological play figures than the ‘dream’ of art (as in Puck’s 
formulation) is able to alter the conditions of existence that determine the lives of its 
spectators, and to which – as we recall Puck first epilogue indicates – they must return.  
However, in light of the approach that I have proposed throughout this article, there 
is a diametrically opposed way of understanding the consequences we might attach to the 
fairy blessing. This reading would also work according to a self-reflexive comic irony and 
too suggest the limitations that the work is subject to, only it would instead place its 
emphasis on the absolute and transformative power that its art is capable of realising within 
the limits of this form. Rather than the sceptical formulation given to Puck, this reading 
would understand the blessing of art more in line with Quince’s claims – as absolute and 
overwhelming. While the final act’s invocations of the tragic fate that myth accords to the 
play’s principal pair is asserted, the audience might instead understand this as another 
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instance of the Dream’s comical mythological revisions. Taken in this way, the drama 
suggests that contrary to the narrative of the myths that it has made such play with 
throughout, and in contrast to the darker elements and scepticism that it has entertained, 
the Dream’s Theseus and Hippolyta will indeed be blessed: their issue shall be fortunate, 
and that they shall ‘Ever true in loving be’ (5.1.394). It would complete a final refutation 
of the identities of these roles (a dis-figuring, if you will), and a final renunciation of the 
tragic conditions of myth – vouching the play’s most absolute assertion of its comedic 
structures of design over the material of its realisation. Like the first reading, it points to 
the formal limitations of its art, yet while doing so asserts the profound, transformative 
powers that this aesthetic strategy allows within these limits. And I would suggest that it 
would completely miss the mood and structure of this constantly shifting and myriad drama 
if we felt compelled to choose one reading over the other.  
-- 
This approach then understands the self-aware art object as flaunting the paradoxes of its 
own nature. The Dream’s realisation is emphatically marked as being managed through 
illusion and unreality. And it is these false terms that serve to distinguish the artwork from 
the world beyond the stage, and to underline the play-world’s freedom from the conditions 
that determine the reality of its audience. When the ‘true’ things of the world are translated 
into Shakespeare’s theatrical space, they are reconstructed in terms that are immediately 
dissimulating. The relationship that such an artwork takes to the world then is one of 
displacement; it makes no truth claims about the world, but simply references the things of 
the world to effect a series of explorations which – as penetrating and profound as they 
may be – will invariably be both disruptive and polysemic. 
One might imagine that, formulated in this way, the play (and we could, I would 
argue, say ‘plays’ – as the aesthetic strategies that I have highlighted in this text are present 
across the canon, irrespective of genre, irrespective of early- or late-) can be understood as 
an autonomous art object, and that as a consequence of this autonomy, it is capable of 
refuting the type of ideological appropriation that the historical-materialist critics which I 
mentioned in the introduction see art as determined by. And perhaps in the formalist, 
limited and discrete space that I have attempted to demonstrate the play as operating in 
(that is to say, taking the play almost completely on its own terms), it may manage this 
aesthetic chastity. Obviously however, as these historical-materialist critics would assert, 
outside of this aesthetic self-circuit, neither a sovereign nor even a discrete relationship to 
ideology is possible. Moreover, it could be the case that an art such as Shakespeare’s – an 
art that realises itself through a complex and ambiguous multiplicity – may all the better 
facilitate its own ideological conscription.  
-- 
Political Shakespeare and the critical movement that it went a long way to developing can 
be understood as in great part enacting Raymond Williams’ concept of dialectical 
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materialism, a specifically Marxist mode of engagement with literature and culture. As 
Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield set out in the preface to Political Shakespeare, the 
collection 'registers its commitment to the transformation of a social order that exploits 
people on grounds of race, gender and class'.7 The book was published in 1994, and it is 
worth pointing out that in the same year Michael Portillo, the Chief secretary of the 
Treasury, and then-darling of the political right, quoted a redacted version of Ulysses’ 
speech on degree and reason from Troilus and Cresside at the Conservative party 
conference, passing it off as a high cultural alibi for what were some of the most extreme 
social policies modern Britain had seen.8 A few years earlier, Nigel Lawson, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, used the same speech to defend the economic policy of the Thatcher 
government.9 I am of course not alone in thinking that this represents an absurd 
understanding of Ulysses’ lines, one that appears – willfully, or otherwise – ignorant of the 
context that the play offers them. For Troillus and Cresside is surely a play of high camp 
and arch nihilism; a work in which no position is held with conviction, but where instead 
we are presented with a static moral debate which seems to call into question not only the 
presumptions of the debaters but the whole means of rational discourse itself. This is an 
interpretation, of course, that derives from my own critical partialities, reflecting the same 
kind of approach and engagement by which I just explored the Dream. Cultural materialists 
would no doubt analyze the play in another mode altogether – yet, one imagines, its 
explication would still offer a challenge to the play's conscription by the radical right. Yet 
the mere fact of this huge disparity in more or less contemporaneous readings of 
Shakespeare – readings that find in the plays ample confirmation of their own critical, 
cultural and ideological prejudices – would seem to force a rather banal conclusion. It may 
be the case that an art of prodigious breadth, complexity and multiplicity may – through its 
sheer aesthetic sophistication – reveal itself as compatible and complicit with any surgent 
of power. 
                                                          
7 Preface to Politic Political Shakespeare: New essays in Cultural Materialism, pp. vii-viii, p. viii. 
8 Portillo utilised the speech to argue that ‘order in society depends upon a series of relationships of respect and duty 
from top to bottom’, and to condemn a ‘New British Disease: the self-destructive sickness of national cynicism’ (“The 
Right hails Portillo as next Prime Minister.” Independent, 16 January 1994). 




Green Plots, Hawthorn Brakes and an Ass’s Nole: Imaginative 
Translation in A Midsummer Night’s Dream 
 
‘Bless thee, Bottom, bless thee. Thou art translated’ (3.1.103)1 
 
The third act of A Midsummer Night’s Dream opens with the reappearance of the artisans. 
This group of workers have gathered in the forest outside Athens to rehearse the play they 
hope to perform at the wedding celebration of Theseus and Hippolyta. We might imagine 
that these would-be-actors, led by Peter Quince, the group’s playwright and – to give him 
an anachronistic but not unsuitable title – director, enter bearing some bundled theatrical 
props, and perhaps, in readiness for their rehearsal, are already when they come in kitted 
out with one or two items. At their first appearance in 1.2 these artisans almost certainly 
carried the tools of their respective trades (something that has been pointed out by Helen 
Cooper – ‘How else’ she asks, ‘would the audience know Quince is a carpenter?’2), and a 
nice parallel would be had if in their return to the stage, these artisans-turned-actors had 
swapped their tradesman’s tools for theatrical props.3 The arrangement would accord well 
with the game of ironic transformation that the play works throughout and would make 
immediately apparent the self-reflexive potential offered by the rehearsal. For the group’s 
inept attempts at drama will inevitably point back to the skillful performance of the 
professional actors that play these artisans, and, correspondingly, the somewhat farcically 
sketched Peter Quince would be recognised as a parodic counter of the Dream’s own 
playwright.4  
Such metatheatrical intent is given exuberant and emphatic announcement in the 
scene’s first few seconds. Quince, gesturing before and behind him, declares, ‘This green 
plot shall be our stage, this hawthorn brake our tiring house’ (3.1.3-4). It is a deliberately 
conspicuous piece of scene-setting that makes ironic play with the relationship that existed 
between actor’s exposition and fictional locale in the early modern theatre. Present-day 
audiences are more familiar with a stage in which setting is realised through scenography, 
and where fictional locale is independent of, and precedes, the entering actor(s). In early 
modern theatre, however, actor precedes fictional locale, with the latter actually deriving 
                                                          
1 All quotations from the plays come from The Norton Shakespeare, 3rd edition, edited by Stephen Greenblatt, Walter 
Cohen, Suzanne Gossett, Katharine Eisaman Maus, Gordon McMullan (W. W. Norton, 2016). 
2 Shakespeare and the Medieval World (The Arden Shakespeare, 2010), p. 214. 
3 These artisans do, in their fictional world, have ready access to theatrical props. Their Interlude makes use of a range 
of such items, all of which they managed to collect in haste between acts 4 and 5. 
4 That Shakespeare, an active actor at the Globe, fulfilled the part of Quince is an intriguing thought. It is given 
discussion in A. B. Taylor’s “Peter Quince, the other Playwright in A Midsummer Night's Dream” Shakespeare Survey 




from the former.5 Locale is established by the actor (when, that is, it needs to be 
established) by means of an exposition – usually within a few lines of entering. Before this 
happens the stage remains – not wholly to be sure, but more or less – untransformed; that 
is to say, the actual conditions of the stage are at this point most prominent. Once the actor 
has detailed his fictional surroundings these actual features recede somewhat and the 
audience commits to a certain re-imagining of the space. 
Quince’s line exploits the audience’s process of re-imagining rather neatly. The 
‘green plot’ that he asks his group of aspiring actors to reconceive as a stage is of course 
the actual wooden stage on which the Dream itself is being performed. Similarly, when 
Quince’s re-designates the ‘hawthorn brake’ as the actors’ tiring house (that is the house 
for attiring – what we would refer to as the dressing room), he indicates one of the doors 
at the stage rear which leads to the theatre’s actual tiring house. But Quince’s line is more 
than simply a witty reversal. It indicates how the business of stage representation is 
predicated on the audience’s act of, what I have elected to call, imaginative translation. The 
term refers to the ability to perceive the stage action at one and the same time as both 
illusory and real – ‘seeing’ simultaneously an Athenian forest and an Elizabethan stage. 
Imagination translates the actuality of the stage into something other, but, and this is vital, 
translation remains an active process, a negotiation between different yet simultaneous 
planes which the spectator throughout maintains an awareness of. The skilful playwright 
may of course, and depending on the extent of his skill, influence the degree to which the 
spectator ignores or remarks this awareness, but this awareness, throughout, remains in 
place. The joke produced by Quince’s announcement is dependent on the existence of such 
a simultaneity of perception; without it there either would be no joke (as with a wholly 
credulous audience which would attend only to a fictional forest), or the joke would be 
rather lifeless (as with an entirely alienated audience which would attend only to the actual 
stage conditions). 
The term ‘imaginative translation’, as most readers will no doubt have noted, takes 
its cue from the forest action itself; the scene’s extended and self-aware exploration of the 
nature of theatrical representation climaxes with Bottom being magically ‘translated’. My 
reading of the scene will demonstrate how metatheatrical strategies operate to continually 
shift representational value, and the analysis encourages me to an original 
conceptualisation of how the episode of the weaver’s transformation was originally 
realised. By giving close attention to the shifting representational registers that 
characterises the episode Shakespeare’s strategies of metatheatrical representation will be 
elucidated, and their success demonstrated as dependent on an audience whose perception 
is sufficiently supple as to presume, in the same instance, a green plot a stage, and a stage 
a green plot. Such a view of metatheatrical representation, one that understands it as a 
processual working with and against stage illusion, is quite far from being a critical given, 
and some of the most influential voices in Shakespeare criticism conceive of the 
representations of metatheatre as operating in distinctly different fashion. By providing 
                                                          
5 Shakespeare and the Medieval World, pp. 96-97. 
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these contrasting positions discussion, my own perspective on metatheatrical 
representation will be clarified and the validity of my argument better demonstrated. We 
must then pause in our analysis of the forest rehearsal and turn to a consideration of these 
views. 
--- 
In the essay, “Metatheatre and the Fear of Playing” which appears in his 2017 collection, 
Shakespeare’s Workplace, Andrew Gurr makes a claim for how representation unfolded in 
the plays of Shakespeare as well as in other early modern works of drama. He sets out his 
stall in the opening paragraph: 
Acting at the new Globe in broad daylight shows what an anachronism the modern 
tradition of stage realism is on such a stage … The original staging at the Globe was 
more openly unrealistic than modern conditioning can admit … One of the fitter 
words for the early concept of acting might be anti-realism … We talk now about 
the danger on stage of breaking the illusion. Setting up any kind of illusion was a 
concept the Elizabethans were extremely wary of.6  
The last point is extended a few pages later when it is suggested that the early modern 
theatre audience was alienated from the emotions of the actors in a way that Gurr sees as 
bearing similarity to Bertolt Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt, whereby ‘the obviousness of the 
pretence could save the participants from the fear of being really deceived’.7 For Gurr, this 
anti-illusionistic staging is determined by the performance conditions and dramatic 
conventions of early modern theatre. He argues that the daylight and the almost bare stage, 
together with soliloquys, asides, and the speaking of verse are features that inevitably work 
against the production of artistic illusion, and so produce an ‘anti-realist’ art. As 
schematised in Gurr’s essay, illusion is no more than a peripheral effect, its impact limited 
by an overarching sense of estrangement – this being early modern theatre’s common and 
proper mode.8  
                                                          
6 Cambridge University Press, p. 145. 
7 “Metatheatre and the Fear of Playing”, p. 158. 
8 Gurr’s position on this matter is not always staked out in such unilateral terms. In other works he seems to find 
accommodation for the claims that illusion makes on the early modern stage, and the manner in which he describes 
the operations of theatrical representation in the period are not so completely removed from the conception for which 
I argue here (and readers who are familiar with Gurr’s work – as anyone who is interested in early modern theatre 
should be – will have remarked the extent to which my own perspective, which though in this instance contests some 
aspects of Gurr’s thinking, is nonetheless very much influenced by this scholar’s ground-breaking research). And even 
in “Metatheatre and the Fear of Playing” there are moments when Gurr seems to display a more flexible attitude 
towards illusion than his opening salvo might indicate. On page 158, for example, he writes, ‘Much of the drama of 
this period can be seen as fluctuating nervously between the extremes of realism and estrangement’ – although, it must 
be said, this is quickly recontextualised by the sentence that follows (of which I have already quoted in part): ‘Like 
the alienation of audience from the emotions of the actors in Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt, the obviousness of the 




Brecht himself saw Elizabethan drama, and the drama of Shakespeare in particular, 
as anticipating his Verfremdungseffekt. As Margot Heineman writes in “How Brecht read 
Shakespeare”, some of the most brilliant pages of Brecht’s Messingkauf Dialogues are 
devoted to how Shakespeare realises ‘a theatre full of alienation effects’.9 “How Brecht 
read Shakespeare” was the concluding number in Political Shakespeare, the 1985 Jonathan 
Dollimore and Alan Sinfield edited collection that introduced cultural materialism to the 
works of Shakespeare, and Heinemann’s essay served to underline the extent that the 
approaches taken by these scholars to Jacobethan drama was indebted to Brecht’s thought. 
Heinemann’s understanding of the position and value given to illusion in Shakespeare’s 
theatre is very similar to that of Gurr’s. She remarks that the conditions by which 
Shakespeare’s plays were realised, ‘with daylight performances, boys playing girls and so 
on’, meant that ‘illusion was impossible’.10 Whether Brecht himself maintained such an 
unequivocal understanding of the plays’ relationship to illusion is debatable, but certainly 
he saw Shakespeare’s metatheatre as offering a representational structure that avoided what 
he considered to be the failings that the naturalistically-realised dramatic productions of 
his own time were subject to.  
Though Gurr and Brecht understand the estrangement effected by (what we can 
term) techniques of metatheatre as unfolding in a similar manner, they diverge in their 
assessment of what follows from this. As we have seen, Gurr takes metatheatre’s most 
urgent application as indicating the duplicity inherent in artistic representation, and – in 
remarking illusion’s unreality – defusing its allurements. Brecht, however, sees the 
device’s dismissal of verisimilitude as working to force the spectators into a confrontation 
with the ‘real’ conditions of their ideological conscription. One of the first theorists of 
cultural materialism, Jonathan Dollimore, in his adoption of ‘critical perspective deriving 
from Brecht’,11 makes clear the effects that a self-reflexive theatre (what Brecht termed 
‘epic theatre’) could be expected to produce: 
One effect of this is that epic theatre ‘incessantly derives a lively and productive 
consciousness from the fact that it is theatre’. Another effect is what Brecht called 
estrangement (Verfremdungseffeckt) whereby the ‘obvious’ is made in a certain 
sense incomprehensible but only in order that it be made the easier to comprehend 
– that is, it is properly understood for the first time. To defamiliarize the ‘obvious’ 
… is a crucial step towards ideological demystification.12 
                                                          
9 The quotation occurs in “How Brecht Read Shakespeare” in Political Shakespeare: New Essays in Cultural 
Materialism, edited by Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield (Manchester University Press, 1985, pp. 202-230), p. 
208, and is derived from the discussion in Bertolt Brecht’s Messingkauf Dialogues found on pp. 57-64 in Brecht on 
Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic. Edited and translated by John Willett, Hill and Wang, 1966.  
10 “How Brecht Read Shakespeare”, p. 208. 
11 Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (University 
of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 63. 
12 Radical Tragedy, p. 64; the quotation that begins ‘incessantly derives …’ comes from Walter Benjamin’s 
Understanding Brecht (Verso, 2003).  
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We can see that regardless of whether Gurr and Brecht, together with the cultural 
materialists that make use of the German playwright’s approach, see the effects of 
estrangement as pointing back to a disenchanted stage or out onto an ideological uncovered 
reality, each perspective nonetheless understands metatheatre as serving to negate the 
audience’s engagement with drama’s representations. In order to properly contest this 
dismissal of the audience’s imaginative involvement in illusion, it is useful to get a fuller 
sense of the relationship these thinkers take to theatrical illusion, and their understanding 
of how the conditions of the early modern theatre might constrain its effects. 
We might begin by remarking that it is crucial for both Gurr and Brecht that 
representation in Shakespeare’s theatre is thought of as contrasting with ‘the modern 
tradition of stage realism’ and, particularly, the fiction of verisimilitude that it figures.13 
Gurr, as we have seen, characterises the representational mode of early modern drama as 
‘anti-realism’, while Brecht prefers to term it ‘naïve surrealism’.14 But both descriptions 
are of course anachronistic; unlike Gurr and Brecht, Shakespeare and his contemporaries 
had no ‘modern tradition of stage realism’ either to react against or attempt to over go. 
Similarly, Gurr’s argument (and as we have seen, Heinemann makes the same argument 
on behalf of Brecht) that the theatrical conventions that were in place in the early modern 
period entail that its drama must necessarily forgo illusion is not in itself convincing. Most 
art forms, when broken down in the manner Gurr breaks down early modern theatre, exhibit 
practices that would seem to preclude any imaginative engagement with their fictions. The 
form of film, which more than any other medium appears devoted to an incarnational 
realism, is ensconced in conventions that would, when looked at in terms of their 
immediate effects, seem to suggest the impossibility of the medium doing other than 
highlighting the unreality of its representations: action unfolds before an observing but 
unobserved eye; cuts and edits cause viewpoint to jump about and these same devices 
facilitate instantaneous leaps across broad swathes of space and time. On a cinema screen 
a human face might measure forty feet. Yet imagination seems prepared to collude with 
the illusions arranged by any set of formal conventions from the moment it has learned 
their pattern. No more so than with any other form or medium should the conventions of 
early modern theatre be thought of as predisposing it to an aesthetic estrangement. 
‘Estrangement’ is simply an effect these conventions make available. The quotation marks 
here are important, for the spectators are never fully estranged – even if they are not 
seduced by the drama’s illusions, they remain engaged in the broader play-experience. 
Which is to say that the Brechtian ‘estrangement-effect’ is confined to its own rhetoricality. 
The theatre-goers register their ‘estrangement’ and – somewhat ironically – this forms part 
                                                          
13 In the context of this discussion of ‘realism’ and ‘realistic’ it needs remarking that Brecht used these terms in rather 
idiosyncratic fashion. By supplying them with a conceptualisation contrary to their common use, he claimed the terms 
as descriptors for his own work, as well as Shakespeare’s (see “How Brecht Read Shakespeare”, p. 228 n 8). The 
understanding of realism as verisimilitude, as the dramatic corollary of the rational and sensual experience of the 
world’s appearances and life’s unfolding, was dismissed by Brecht as an ideological misrepresentation of reality, and 
hence, unrealistic. ‘Realistic theatre’ as Brecht conceives it ‘does not reproduce conditions; rather, it discloses, it 
uncovers them’ (Understanding Brecht, p. 100; also see Brecht on Theatre passim, but especially p. 277). 
14 Quoted in “How Brecht Read Shakespeare”, p. 209. 
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of their experience of the (metatheatrical) play. ‘Estrangement’ is simply a stylistic effect 
early modern theatrical conventions make available, and as such the dexterous Jacobethan 
playwright is free to make the most of the possibilities offered by, on the one hand, the 
remarking of the actual mechanics of artistic representation and, on the other, the appeal 
that artistic illusion makes to the human imagination and which Gurr and Brecht, at their 
most unilateral, refuse to recognise. 
Early modern drama’s representation then occurs as a processual effect which is in 
part dependent on an imaginative engagement with stage illusion – and I would argue that 
even cultural materialist criticism which seeks to demonstrate the distancing effect, would, 
almost in spite of itself, seem to further reveal the nature of this process. For the 
‘estrangement effect, [the] invitation to engage critically’ that it posits is predicated on the 
recognition that the work effects – to borrow a handful of terms familiar to cultural 
materialism – dislocation, discontinuity, demystification, and disengagement. And these 
effects of disjuncture can only be brought about by an initial relationship with the work 
that is, to some extent or other, located, continuous, mystified and engaged – which is to 
say, a relationship that can only be had through an imaginative engagement in illusion. 
Neither should we imagine that the estrangement effect, once experienced, maintains itself. 
Otherwise – and this is patently absurd – a single instance of aesthetic dislocation would 
be sufficient. If we are to accept the kind of critical engagement that Dollimore outlines, 
then it must be thought of as dependent on a process that is ongoing and cumulative, and 
which is charged by a perspective that shifts back and forth between enchantment and 
disenchantment, between illusion and the distancing effect – and that this shifting never 
involves the complete surrender to any single modality. We might return to Dollimore, 
picking up a couple of pages after we last left him, and so to a reading by which he 
illustrates his critical perspective, and which reveals the extent to which the claims of 
illusion inform the effects of metatheatre, even in a Brechtian-derived critical analysis. 
Discussing Bosola’s mistaken killing of Antonio in John Webster’s Duchess of 
Malfi, Dollimore writes:  
… the episode is not intrinsically implausible: the play makes it clear that it is night 
and that Antonio and Bosola are in darkness (the servant exits at line 42 to fetch a 
lanthorn) – and so on … from a Brechtian perspective, what is most relevant is the 
incongruity between Bosola’s measured meditation and the sudden disruption of the 
moment – one sharpened by the actual or implied transition from darkness to light 
(the servant returns with the lanthorn- 5.4.48). One effect of that incongruity is to 
check the expected climax: in fact, the episode is a kind of anti-climax: both revenge 
and poetic justice are anticipated but suddenly denied through the disclosure that it 
is Antonio not Ferdinand who lies dying. Checked expectations, not enthrallment or 
empathy …15 
                                                          
15 Radical Tragedy, p. 66. 
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If as this passage argues the scene provokes an estranged reflection, then at the same time 
it makes apparent the degree to which this perspective (whether we think of it as belonging 
to Dollimore or to the audience that he imagines) is engendered through the preliminary 
operations of illusion; in order that an anti-climax is effected, the movement by which 
‘revenge and poetic justice are anticipated’ must have its own momentum. We see that 
plausibility – rightly a species of illusion-making – plays its part in creating the effect. And, 
of course, the outcome that Bosola’s scheme delivers can only be felt as incongruous when 
a preceding illusion of – or at the least, an expectation of – congruity has been established. 
And it is only an audience that is engaged with the stage fictions whose experience of the 
scene will be ‘sharpened’ by a dramatic change in the lighting effects (– and regardless of 
whether this change is illusory or actual). Dollimore writes that the scene produces 
‘[c]hecked expectations, not enthrallment or empathy’, but, of course, expectations can 
only be checked if the audience is originally engaged (and if instead of ‘engaged’ I had 
written ‘enthralled’ that would, I feel, be a fair description of what some portion of the 
spectators must be feeling, and – I think this is even more precise – a fair description of 
what each spectator must be feeling in some part).16  
Any estrangement that results from a representation that shifts between registers in 
this way can be neither exclusive nor unequivocal. It is relative and momentary; dependent 
on, and commingled with – via an ongoing process – the claims of illusion. And it follows 
that rather than the audience member’s critical attention being directed to the world outside 
of the staged illusions – and so uncovering the ideological dissonance of that reality – the 
claims of dramatic illusion ensure that the audience member’s attention is drawn back to 
the business of theatrical representation.  
Now we might return to the artisans that we left to their forest rehearsal five or so 
theoretical pages back. Selected for discussion due to its acutely metatheatrical character, 
the forest episode offers exemplification of the claims that I have here made and allows 
their exploration to be extended. In so doing, it also serves to remark the inappropriacy of 
an interpretation that would inevitably understand the scene as producing an estranged and 
critically reflected political insight. Granted, it is not outside all possibility that one of 
cultural materialism’s many talented critics might manage to wring from the episode a 
demystified position of ideological elucidation. But then one would be compelled to 
respond that the scene’s metatheatrical strategies are concerned primarily with the nature 
of theatrical representation – and not so as to undermine illusion’s appeal, but, as I will 
demonstrate, to elaborate and intensify it.  
--- 
                                                          
16 Where most cultural materialists usually either overlook or choose to ignore this issue, Dollimore’s analysis might 
be understood as implying that illusion’s claims are indeed part of the Verfremdungseffekt. But even so, it seems he 
understands (at least at this point in his career) these claims as being immediately recognised by the audience as mere 
claims, and producing minimal imaginative engagement.  
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Quince’s scene-setting has provided these conditions flagrant marking, and as the artisans’ 
rehearsal progresses they are provided a further exploration, subtler and more complex. 
Bottom, playing the part of Pyramus, is instructed by Quince that after speaking his 
opening lines, he is to ‘enter into that brake’ (3.1.63) – that is, to enter the tiring house 
(Shakespeare’s lexical choice must be thought deliberate here: refraining from using 
something like ‘go behind’, which would have foregrounded the fictional forest locale, in 
preference for the literally descriptive ‘enter into’) – and await his cue.17 In the decidedly 
self-aware terms of the Elizabethan stage, providing a stage figure a brief and explicit trip 
to the tiring house, especially when so marked up, creates the prospect that the figure is 
likely to re-emerge in altered state – a prospect that is underlined by Bottom’s cue words, 
‘never tire’, teasing such a dressing up. It is an expectation that Shakespeare strings out by 
having the artisans muddle the signal for Bottom’s re-entrance. In the confusion of their 
rehearsal Bottom’s cue words, ‘never tire’, are spoken three times, and this suggests a piece 
of comic stage blocking by which a flummoxed Bottom twice over (in untranslated state) 
emerges from and then retreats back into the ‘brake’ (that is, enters and exits the stage), 
before making his final and fantastically transformed entrance.18  
Bottom’s first return to the stage comes as Flute, in the part of Thisbe, speaks the 
cue but continues on, running the separate sections of Thisbe’s dialogue together and 
delivering them as a single speech (3.1.80-84). Quince’s exasperated response points out 
the mechanics of the confusion: ‘Why, you must not speak that yet; that you answer to 
Pyramus: you speak all your part at once, cues and all’ (3.1.85-87). It is important to briefly 
unpack this moment as it seems to tell us something noteworthy about the Elizabethan 
audience’s relationship to drama: the joke reflects the playwright’s understanding that at 
least a good portion of his audience would have been intimate with the specific ins and outs 
of dramatic practice. Flute’s confusion stems from the fact that actors in the early modern 
theatre were not given the full text of the play in which they were to perform. Providing 
each performer with a hand-written copy of the entire play-text would be unnecessarily 
time-consuming as well as costly – and, of course, the more copies of a play in circulation 
the greater the likelihood that a rival company or printer would come in possession of one. 
Instead, the actors were each supplied with their own ‘part’ – the term (as well as indicating 
the character in the play) referred to the written paper, usually made into a roll, on which 
                                                          
17 Later, when Puck recounts the events of the forest rehearsal to Oberon, he is given a description that revisits the 
earlier mingling of conceptual and physical locales: he tells the fairy king how Bottom ‘Forsook his scene and enter’d 
in a brake’ (3.2.15). The line plays on the multiple indications that ‘scene’ can take in the immediate context. Beyond 
signifying the area and act of the play-world rehearsal, for early modern auditors ‘scene’ would also refer to ‘the front 
or forepart of a Theatre or Stage, or the partition between the Players Vestry, and the Stage’ (Thomas Boult 
Glossographia, or, a Dictionary (1656), sig. 2M5r-v). Puck’s words then underline Bottom’s departure from the area 
of the ‘frons scenae’, as well as the fact that the weaver has exited through the ‘scene’ – the wall formed at the back 
of the stage through which players entered and exited. See Tiffany Stern’s “‘This Wide and Universal Theatre’: The 
Theatre as Prop in Shakespeare’s Metadrama” in Shakespeare’s Theatres and the Effects of Performance, edited by 
Farah Karim-Cooper and Tiffany Stern (The Arden Shakespeare, 2014), pp. 11-32, pp. 23-24. 
18 Paul Menzer imagines the business of Bottom’s reentry as unfolding in a very similar way in “The Weaver’s Dream- 
Mnemonic Scripts and Memorial Texts” (A Midsummer Night’s Dream: A Critical Guide, edited by  Regina Buccola 




the lines for the part were transcribed. It is these rolls that Quince distributes in the first act 
when he says, ‘here are your parts’ (1.2.81-82). Beyond the lines the actor was to deliver, 
the roll provided no information about the role; neither was any of the surrounding dialogue 
given aside from a one- to three-word cue which preceded each speech. The actor 
memorised his part, cues and all – only unlike the confused Flute, he waited for another 
actor to speak the cue before he came in with his own lines.19 The joke of Flute’s amateurish 
mistake – speaking his part all ‘at once, cues and all’ – can only be shared by an audience 
that has a rather specialised knowledge of the processes of dramatic production, familiar 
with how the part was written up, and how it incorporated its cues. And, we should note, it 
would follow that for an audience so acquainted the shifting representational value the play 
gives to the aspects of illusion and actuality would be all the more conspicuous. 
Quince then goes on to call to Bottom, ‘Pyramus enter: your cue is past; it is, “never 
tire”’ (3.1.87-88), and in this way prompts the weaver’s second entrance. Flute, however, 
responding to Quince’s reprimand, has begun his part over, and Bottom, so that he might 
correctly come in on cue, again exits. His next entrance comes quickly on the heels of the 
last, and the brief time the role is off-stage intensifies the effect created by the comic rule 
of three. When the punchline does finally arrive it is as absurd as it is unexpected: Bottom 
reappears wearing an ass-head. In terror, the artisans flee into the forest – that is they careen 
in and out of the doors at the stage rear (a comic callback that reproduces, visually, the 
translational seesaw of Quince’s opening declaration).20 
It is important to note that in so far as Bottom’s metamorphosis needs to be effected 
quickly, the transformation that the stage prop presents cannot be anything like a visually 
realistic transformation. And the play text itself announces the manner of the 
transformation’s practical management: when later reporting the event to Oberon, Puck 
explains, ‘An ass’s nole I fixed on his head’ (3.2.17). Similarly, the prosaic manner by 
which the play physically renders Bottom’s eventual return to human form is indicated by 
the Fairy King’s unvarnished instruction to Puck: ‘take off this head’ (4.1.78).  
It is not without pertinence to here repeat the interesting surmise that Cooper makes 
as to the artistic genesis of Bottom’s transformation.21 She draws attention to the one other 
early modern performance that we are aware of in which an actor disguised himself with 
an ass-nole: Balaam and the Ass, from the Chester cycle. The ass is a speaking part, and – 
                                                          
19 See the discussion of parts and cues in Simon Palfrey and Tiffany Stern’s Shakespeare in Parts (Oxford University 
Press, 2007), especially the Introduction. 
20 The stage directions in the Arden third series of A Midsummer Night’s Dream (edited by Sukanta Chaudhuri (The 
Arden, Shakespeare, 2017)) helpfully make this stage action explicit. In fact, throughout this edition stage directions 
are excellently realised (something I discuss in my review of the edition in Archiv vol. 255, no. 1, 2018), combining 
a reading that remains alert to textual cues with a genuine imaginative investment in original performance possibilities. 
It is the approach I attempt to realise in the current text, and it is encouraging to see such a critical methodology finding 
its way into play editions. 





in an intriguing foreshadowing of Bottom’s exclusive experience of the fairies – it is the 
only stage figure that is able to see the drama’s angel. The late 16th century suppression of 
the cycle plays would have rendered the property of the ass-head superfluous, and we might 
imagine that the cash-strapped Capper’s guild who had performed the pageant (their 
financial difficulties are attested to by the need for the government to provide the trade 
financial support around this time) would be looking to sell the rather elaborate property. 
Cooper introduces the possibility that the Queen’s Men, in one of their visits to Chester 
(we know, thanks to Andrew Gurr’s research, that the company were there in October-
November 1589, 1580, and 159122) purchased the property from the guild. Soon after, the 
Queen’s Men were to run into difficulties of their own: the closure of the London theatres 
in 1592-3 impacted them significantly, and by the mid-nineties the company was no more. 
Shakespeare’s troupe, the Chamberlain’s Men, took over some of their playbooks, and this 
prompts Cooper to ask, ‘might they have taken over the ass-head too, giving the cue to 
Shakespeare to work it into a play?’23 The supposition is intriguing for all sorts of reasons, 
most of which are beyond the scope of this text, but it does encourage me to an observation 
that I will advance once I have finished discussing the business of Bottom’s transformation. 
Stuart Sillars has also given attention to the nature of this stage property, and his 
comments can be thought of as complementing Cooper’s conjecture. Sillars remarks that 
it is likely that the ass-head used in the original performances is of similar type to that 
which would have been worn by the ‘hobby horse’ figure that featured in the mummers’ 
plays and pageants (and though the popularity of these guild performances had declined, 
even in Shakespeare’s time they remained a familiar tradition). That the artisans, ‘played 
in Shakespeare’s theatre to represent figures of exactly the kind who would perform in the 
mummers’ plays’, flee when confronted with a figure whose appearance would have been 
absolutely familiar to them only adds further to the metatheatric and comic absurdity of the 
passage.24  
Reconceiving the stage action in light of Sillars’ observation intensifies the 
complexity and comedy of the scene’s representational strategies. It also encourages me 
towards a certain speculation as to how the business of Bottom’s reappearance might have 
functioned. So that the reader is best placed to entertain what I propose I would ask her to 
bear in mind a circumstance which distinguishes the original audience’s particular 
experience of the Dream from our own. Where present-day readers or audience members 
will almost invariably come to the Dream with some foreknowledge of Bottom’s magical 
transformation, this is not something that would have been shared by the first audiences, 
or even, one must think, by large portions of the audiences that came to the ‘sundry’ 
performances of the play that were given in the years that followed.25 And before beginning 
                                                          
22 The Shakespearian Playing Companies (Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 214-215; see also p. 279. 
23 Shakespeare and the Medieval World, pp. 219-220. 
24 Shakespeare and the Visual Imagination (Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp.184-185. 
25 The title-page of the 1600 quarto announces that the play ‘hath beene sundry times publickely acted, by the Right 
honourable, the Lord Chamberlaine his seruants’. 
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to outline my imaginative reconstruction of the scene I would also like to remind the reader 
that I have earlier supplied the artisans of my speculation with an array of props, and to 
state that in keeping with the characterisation lent to these figures, it would be only natural 
that these props be thought of as those that the Elizabethan audience associated with the 
mummers’ pageants. 
With these points in place, let us now turn back to the emergence of the transformed 
Bottom. It seems to me we must imagine that the original audience is permitted a few 
moments of theatrical grace in which to enjoy the outrageous spectacle of the 
metamorphosised Bottom before his fellow artisans are allowed to notice him and offer 
their terrified reaction. And this would mean that rather than the audience immediately 
understanding the weaver’s transformation as being brought about by Puck’s magic it is 
just as likely that in these first moments the spectators would have assumed they were 
watching a piece of guild rehearsal drollery: assumed, that is, that Bottom had thought to 
give his fellows a laugh by reentering with one of the group’s stock props on his head. This 
may not immediately strike the reader as a point of great importance, but I ask her to bear 
with me, as I will shortly demonstrate that it would prove highly significant in regard to 
the scene’s already complex exploration of artistic self-reflexivity. 
The line that cues Pyramus’ entrance also hints at such an arrangement. It is Thisbe’s 
description of Pyramus, and given in full it is ‘As true as truest horse, that yet would never 
tire’. Though Quince’s ‘Pyramus and Thisbe’ draws – often rather closely – on Ovid’s 
retelling of the story, there is no similar line in the original. The content of the simile that 
Shakespeare has allowed his carpenter-playwright to come up with must then be thought 
deliberate, and we see that it ironically anticipates the equine nature of Bottom’s 
metamorphosis, while the homophone that the line ends with works, as already suggested, 
to point up that this ‘translation’ is effected by a simple piece of tiring house business. For 
the Elizabethan auditors these two aspects would have folded back on each other, since, as 
well as denoting the actor’s change of costume, another sense of ‘tire’ was ‘headdress’ or 
‘raiment’. We might turn, for example, to Cleopatra’s description of her frolics with 
Antony (where the term is also used to reference a play of transformation that crosses 
categories): ‘and next morn,/ Ere the ninth hour, I drunk him to his bed,/ Then put my tires 
and mantles on him, whilst/ I wore his sword Philippan’.26 The audience could be forgiven 
for imagining that were there an ass-nole prop to hand in the Dream’s fictional forest, the 
ambiguities in the cue line, ‘As true as truest horse, that yet would never tire’, might be 
thought sufficient to inspire a character like Bottom to improvise a visual pun for his 
fellows’ amusement: re-emerging from the brake to figure a comic reversal of Thisbe’s 
words: Pyramus is not a true horse, but a tired (that is ‘an attired’) one.  
Understanding the audience as guided towards an interpretation which initially 
conceives of the spectacle of the ass-headed Bottom as representing the weaver’s 
tomfoolery with a prop that he had to hand rather than evincing his supernatural translation 
                                                          
26 Antony and Cleopatra, 2.5.20-23. 
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extends and intensifies the various metatheatric complexities that the scene has so far 
instituted. And just as importantly, the arrangement is perfectly feasible. In that the prop 
of the ass-head is a familiar mummers’ item it fits right alongside the other props that I 
suggest the artisans have brought to the stage. In such a context, it is likely that when the 
audience first see the translated Bottom emerge they would have originally understood the 
ass-head as enjoying the same representational value as the artisans’ other items: which, to 
reiterate my point, is to say that in the Dream’s fictional world this ass-head would have 
been perceived as just another of the artisans’ props. That no audience member saw the 
ass-head being carried on stage with the other props would not detract from this 
understanding: the alacrity and unexpectedness of Bottom’s transformation does not really 
allow the spectator time to reflect on this; the audience only needs to entertain the idea of 
the ass-head-as-artisan-prop for a few moments. And there is after all no reason for the 
original audience to automatically see the ass-headed Bottom as indicating that the weaver 
has been magically transformed. The play itself does nothing to so direct such expectations: 
the marvelous translation that Puck works on Bottom is not in any way foreshadowed in 
the words that the sprite speaks when he comes across the artisans.27  
If the Elizabethan audience’s experience of this scene unfolded in the manner in 
which I have outlined, the effects it arranges would be quite striking. At the same time, 
these effects would serve to climax the scene’s self-reflexive commentary: the audience 
members, having initially taken the explicitly quotidian ass-head for what it is – a familiar 
prop, and one incapable of producing a ‘realistic’ illusion – are then directed to reconceive 
of it as instantiating a marvelous transmutation. In this way, the comic framework instituted 
by Quince’s opening declaration is again revisited, making explicit the audience’s 
imaginative translation of the actual performance conditions into the illusions of the play’s 
fictions. And it is again in lines given to Quince that Bottom’s altered state is registered as 
an effect that is supernatural rather than mundane: ‘O monstrous! O strange! We are 
haunted!’ (3.1.93). And a few lines after this, Quince will re-render Snout’s equivocal ‘thou 
art changed! What do I see on thee?’ (3.1.103) (equivocal, since the second sentence still 
carries the suggestion that the head is no more than a hastily assumed prop) as ‘Thou art 
translated’ (3.1.105), and so indicate a more marvellous transformation. This arrangement 
points back once more to Quince’s earlier scene-setting declaration, and to its 
foregrounding of the dramatic technique whereby dialogue determines play-world reality. 
And as occurred then, the dramatic technique is sent up at the same time it is successfully 
executed: the spectators, having had the banal actuality of the ass-head-as-prop made 
apparent to them, are persuaded to re-register it as evincing a fantastical metamorphosis. 
This seems to me a quite brilliant move – for Quince’s permutation of Snout’s line not only 
remarks the fantastic nature of Bottom’s reappearance but ties together the magical 
transformation worked by fairy magic with that of the transformation worked by the 
audience’s imagination. And the fact that Snout’s description was supplied with the 
playwright’s (let us make the most of the ambiguity of the referent) correction underlines 
                                                          
27 Puck’s words merely indicate the possibility that he might engage in some kind of mischief: ‘I'll be an auditor – / 
An actor too perhaps, if I see cause’ (3.1.67-68). 
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that at the same time the audience members surrender to their investment in the illusion of 
Bottom’s metamorphosis they are too made aware of the imaginative act of translation by 
which this is accomplished. 
If we return to Cooper’s conjecture that the ass-head used was a prop inherited from 
the Cycle plays, then we are encouraged to see an analogous relationship between the play-
world action – whereby, to repeat myself, what might initially be assumed as a banal guild 
property is reregistered as instancing magical metamorphosis – and the playwright’s 
creative appropriation and redeployment of a prop from an older and, in terms of 
sophistication, rather remote dramatic tradition. As a Cycle play property, the ass-head 
would have previously facilitated a rather antiquated dramatic representation that was 
stylised and particularised, more emblematic than it was illusory, and while Shakespeare 
offers an episode that initially locates the prop in just such a dated representational context, 
he transforms the ass-head into an elaborate device whose representational status is realised 
through a complex exchange between enchantment and estrangement that is only made 
possible by cutting edge experiments in the metatheatre of the 1590s. 
The episode’s comic and complex metatheatrical unfolding is given one final twist. 
The circumstances of the Elizabethan stage would dictate that the scene arrange itself so 
that any ‘props’ that the artisans brought onto the stage also left the stage with them. This 
would mean that when the group flee the transformed Bottom they do so bearing – and 
also, most probably, still wearing – these ‘props’. It is not unlikely in fact that the scene 
presents two further masks alongside the one given to Bottom: at their first meet Quince 
has told Flute that he shall play Thisbe in a mask (1.2.41), and Snug may already be 
sporting the Lion’s mask (Bottom’s comment regarding the matter earlier in the scene, that 
‘half his face must be seen through the lion’s neck’ (3.1.31-32) need not necessarily 
indicate a future arrangement, it could represent the weaver making a readjustment to the 
mask at the same time as speaking the line). This spectacle offers a further parodic 
reflection on the processes of imaginative translation by which the audience negotiate the 
levels of representative theatricality: Bottom’s magical metamorphosis is realised by a 
crude guildsman’s prop, while the artisans that flee from this spectacle, as we have said, in 
and out of the doors at the stage rear, though kitted out from the same group of props, take 
on no new fictional identity, remaining instead dramatically untransformed. 
--- 
Even if the reader is reluctant to wholly accept my argument as to the audience’s experience 
of Bottom’s transformation, the analysis of the scene as a whole nonetheless demonstrates 
that, in contrast to the theories of metatheatre proposed by Gurr and Brecht, together with 
the cultural materialist thinkers the latter influenced, Shakespeare’s metatheatre does not 
operate through a dismissal of illusion, nor does it facilitate a unilateral estrangement. As 
we have seen, the audience’s attention can be directed to the absolute artifice of the form’s 
construction, and at the same time still be seduced by its illusions. This simply depends on 
the extent that these conventions are either marked up or ignored, as well as on which 
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aspects of the performance such metatheatric attention is directed to. There exists, if you 
like, a gradated register of representation. At one extreme you have the fictional play-world 
conceived of as absolutely real, and at the other, an understanding of everything on the 
stage as actual, and never as other. Art – as long as it is art – does not have access to either 
of these extremes of course, but as the scene in the Dream demonstrates, between these 
ends, there remains an enormous ranging representational register which the skilful artist 
can play on, and to which the alert and imaginative audience attends. 
The Dream’s representations then must be thought of as rendered through the 
tension of economies that metatheatre affords: the synchronic and overlapping claims of 
the visual and verbal, of the actual and imagined. As well as functioning as a reflection on 
the processes of dramatic representation, the rehearsal scene also acts to point up the 
processes by which the spectators themselves negotiate the stage’s representations. And 
we see that despite self-reflexively directing the audience members’ attention to the 
intricate layering by which these representations are realised, the play still demands that, 
simultaneous with an appreciation of this, these audience members never forfeit their 
imaginative engagement in the stage fictions presented. For underlying the scene’s brilliant 
unpacking of the business of theatrical representation is the fact of an involvement in the 
illusion of the forest rehearsal. Real comedy is only realised when both of these elements 
are present, and their contrasts exploited. If the audience does not admit an imaginative 
engagement in the illusory – if it does not recognise the fumblings of Flute and Bottom, or 
the limitations of Quince – then the humour is attenuated and loses a dimension of its 
humanity. What I have argued as being the scene’s most brilliantly realised piece of meta-
commentary – the comparison of Bottom’s fantastical metamorphosis with the imaginative 
translation that Shakespeare’s audience makes – is only made available if, consciously or 
not, the tiring room is presumed a brake, if Bottom is ceded the illusion of agency, and if 
a transformation that is impossible and absurd is conceived. 
Rather then than seeing metatheatre as engendering an estrangement that either 
abandons the play-structures for a remote position of ideological insight, as it does in the 
formulations of Brecht and the cultural materialists that follow him, or which would 
evacuate illusion from the stage, as Gurr would have it, it seems more profitable to think 
of metatheatre as facilitating a withdrawal into form – a withdrawal through which it might 
best exploit the duality of the structures that early modern theatre makes available, and the 
multifarious effects these structures afford. It is an arrangement that’s predicated on the 
audience’s engagement in a continual process of imaginative translation – a ceaseless 
movement through modalities of illusion and disillusion. And one which, in this ceaseless 
movement, remains always encompassed within the sense of art’s duality. As such, the 
representation the plays offer never rests in a position that is final, exclusive or unilateral, 






Dissimulation and the Dover Cliff: Metatheatrical Representation in 
King Lear 
 
Deception and the early modern theatre 
It is difficult to exaggerate the extent that the manifold and manifest hazards of deception 
impressed themselves on the early modern mind. Puritan sermonisers ensured that their 
flock never forgot how demons might reshape themselves in seductive counterfeit, that the 
chimeras of witch-craft were a constant peril, and that mankind itself was in the midst of 
‘such delusions in which men’s senses are and may be corrupted by satanical operation’.1 
Alongside these supernatural dissimulations existed more quotidian deceits, and these were 
provided extensive illustration in the publications of the day, energetically devoted as they 
were to detailing a variety of sharp practices and recapitulating the seemingly perennial 
entrapment of the gullible. These imprints ranged from the enormously popular cony-
catching pamphlets to longer accounts of more spectacular deception, such as Reginald 
Scot’s sceptical enquiry, Discoverie of Witchcraft 2 or, in a slightly different vein, John 
Gee’s highly popular anti-Jesuit tract, The Foot out of the Snare.3 Scot’s book, for example, 
contains, together with its investigation into the root causes behind what were portrayed as 
supernatural manifestations, a section which details the ruses of legerdemain and reveals 
how certain magical tricks were accomplished – thought to be the first material of this kind 
published.4 The Foot out of the Snare offers a more animated, though somewhat less 
reliable exposé that recounts various elaborate deceptions devised by Catholic priests to 
convert unsuspecting Protestants. A particularly colourful example finds its way into the 
appendix that Gee later attached, New Shreds of the Old snare, including the apparitions 
of two new female ghosts.5 It describes a hallucinatory show that the priests devised 
whereby, thanks to some theatrical lighting and women dressed as ghosts, their gulls were 
deceived into believing that they were in the presence of souls returned from Purgatory. 
                                                          
1 William Perkins, A Discourse on the Damned Art of Witchcraft (Puritan Publications, 2012 [1608]), p. 45. 
2 London: William Brome, 1584. 
3 London: Robert Mylbourne, 1624. The book ran through four editions in the year of its publication. 
4 And if as it continues to explore the age’s fascination with deception Discoverie of Witchcraft also serves to indicate 
a burgeoning investigative rationalism, the reactions that the publication produced demonstrate that Scot’s sceptical 
position was not widely held. The book was immediately controversial and was condemned by no less an authority 
than James VI of Scotland as ‘damnable’, and tradition has it that all copies were burned at his 1603 ascension. 
Whether that ‘tradition’ is wholly trustworthy or not (see, for example, Philip C. Almond’s “King James I and the 
burning of Reginald Scot’s The discoverie of witchcraft: The invention of a tradition” (Notes and Queries, vol. 56, no. 
2, November 2009, pp. 209-213), we do know that refutations of Scot’s position continued to be published for almost 
a century afterwards. 
5 The original title in full is: Nevv shreds of the old snare. Containing the apparitions of two new female ghosts. The 
copies of diuers letters of late intercourse concerning Romish affaires. Speciall indulgences purchased at Rome, 
granted to diuers English gentle-beleeuing Catholiques for their ready money. A catalogue of English nunnes of the 




That the elements of drama might lend themselves to diabolical application would 
not be something most Jacobeans needed convincing of. In the ceaseless war that the 
Puritans waged on lies and illusion the epitome of dissimulation and deceit was, 
unquestionably, the theatre. Stephen Gosson’s Playes Confuted in Five Actions makes the 
position clear: ‘In Stage Playes for a boy to put one the attire, the gesture, the passions of 
a woman; for a meane person to take upon him the title of a Prince with counterfeit porte, 
and traine, is by outwarde signes to shewe them selves otherwise then they are, and so 
within the compasse of a lye’.6 
Such is the climate of deception Andrew Gurr sketches out in his essay, 
“Metatheatre and the Fear of Playing”,7 and which, as the title indicates, he sees as 
operating to determine the representational mode of early modern theatrical performance. 
He takes diatribes like Gosson’s as evincing ‘a real fear of illusion, and a revulsion against 
the deliberate dishonesty it was based on’,8 and he sees the dissimulation of theatrical 
representation as something that ‘angered and terrified many Elizabethans’.9 According to 
Gurr, such levels of Tudor anxiety required that the early modern theatre police the effects 
of deception that its illusions might produce. He asserts that the performance conditions 
and dramatic conventions that operated in the theatre of Shakespeare and his 
contemporaries – he lists the daylight, the almost bare stage, together with soliloquys, 
asides, and the speaking of verse – lend themselves to an ’openly unrealistic’ staging.10 By 
metatheatrically highlighting the means by which theatrical representation was realised this 
‘fear of playing’ was displaced: ‘Like the alienation of audience from the emotions of the 
actors in Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt, the obviousness of the pretense could save the 
participants from the fear of being really deceived’.11 
There is much to recommend Gurr’s argument, yet I would like to offer a reading 
of the beginning of King Lear 4.6, what critics almost invariably refer to as ‘the Dover cliff 
scene’, so as to counter some points of his thesis and to extend others. The false description 
by which Edgar deceives his father into thinking he is standing at the edge of a precipitous 
drop represents an arrangement that would seem at first glance to confirm Gurr’s sense that 
Shakespeare’s audience viewed theatrical illusion with an anxious scepticism and 
appreciated a metatheatric arrangement that revealed such rhetorical gambits as Edgar’s 
for the fictions they were. However, I have chosen the scene in part because it has instigated 
a series of competing critical perspectives by which we might explore and expand upon 
Gurr’s conceptualisation of metatheatre. In fact, for one of these critical perspectives, the 
question of metatheatre in Lear is moot. Critics taking this line see Lear as something that 
is to be read rather than performed, as a work that makes an appeal to an inward eye of the 
                                                          
6 London: Thomas Gosson, 1582, sig, E5r. 
7 From Neo-Historicism, edited by Robin Headlam Wells, Glenn Burgess and Rowland Wymer (Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, pp 91-110). It is reprinted in Gurr’s 2017 essay collection, Shakespeare’s Workplace: Essays on 
Shakespearean Theatre (Cambridge University Press), pp. 145-166. 
8 “Metatheatre and the Fear of Playing”, p. 91.  
9 “Metatheatre and the Fear of Playing”, p.92. 
10 “Metatheatre and the Fear of Playing”, p. 91. 
11 “Metatheatre and the Fear of Playing”, p. 103. 
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imagination rather than Gurr’s outward eye of disenchantment. A third critical grouping 
that we will consider responds directly to the cliff-top description and, despite the 
deception that its speaker is at the narrative level playing out, sees it as a brilliantly realised 
exemplar of language’s power to re-realise the world. This is a view that is further 
encouraged by the account’s marking itself up as an ekphrasis, as well as the by fact that 
the speech’s representational technique is borrowed from the technology of pictorial 
perspective – a combination of classical and contemporary devices that would seem to 
make for an emphatically realised mimesis. By contrasting these positions with my own 
reading of the scene something like a critical triangulation may be effected, and the insights 
offered by these earlier efforts redeployed. My analysis will demonstrate that the scene’s 
effects are reliant on their being given stage realisation, and that the dissimulation of 
metatheatre is intrinsic to the episode’s success. It will be shown that Edgar’s speech 
operates as a parody of mimetic illusion, and that the scene serves to call into question the 
processes of artistic representation themselves. Yet metatheatre in Lear is not confined as 
it is in Gurr’s formulation, to effects of estrangement; even while its operational mode 
remains that of dissimulation it shows itself as nonetheless capable of stirring the 
audience’s imagination and realising powerful effects.  
Returning for the moment to Gurr’s text, we can observe that even the supporting 
historical material that he assembles would itself seem to point up that the dissimulations 
of theatrical representation were not confined to effects that oscillated between the 
production of anxiety and alienation. At one point in his essay, Gurr observes how William 
Perkins, in a sermon in which the Puritan theologian denounced illusion, ‘actually used the 
standard term of praise for good acting as lifelike when he spoke of the Devil impersonating 
Samuel to deceive Saul. He “did it so lively and cunningly, as well in forme of bodie, as in 
attire and voice, that Saul thought verily it was the prophet”’.12 Perkins remarks this so as 
to underline the association of acting with deceit, and the quotation is redeployed by Gurr 
to point back to his assertion that theatrical deceit necessarily triggers a metatheatrically 
engineered estrangement. Yet Perkins’ statement must surely also be thought of as attesting 
to the effect of an emerging acting style, termed ‘personation’, that was capable of seducing 
its audience with powerfully convincing imitations of something like the actual behavior 
of real people.13 If this would seem to demonstrate that the theatre’s attitude to illusion was 
                                                          
12 “Metatheatre and the Fear of Playing”, p. 92. The quotation comes from William Perkins, The Works of that famous 
and worthie minister of Christ, in the universitie of Cambridge, M. W. Perkins (Cambridge: John Legatt, 1603), p. 
120. 
13 A performance development that Gurr elsewhere acknowledges and which he discusses insightfully. For example, 
in The Shakespearean Stage, 1574-1642 (Cambridge University Press, 1992) he writes, ‘In the sixteenth century the 
term “acting” was originally used to describe the “action” of the orator, his art of gesture. What the common stages 
offered was “playing” … what the players were presenting on stage by the beginning of the [seventeenth] century was 
distinctive enough to require a whole new term to describe it. This term, the noun “personation,” is suggestive of a 
relatively new art of individual characterisation, an art distinct from the orator’s display of passions or the academic 
actor’s portrayal of the character-types … The first use of the term “presentation” is recorded … in 1599-1600, at the 
end of the great decade in which Alleyn and Burbage made their reputations. it is probably not stretching plausibility 
too far to suggest that the term was called into being by the same developments – in the kinds of parts given the actors 




not exclusively one of estrangement, it also points to an audience whose relationship to 
dissimulation cannot be wholly configured in terms of anxiety. In the same way, it seems 
sensible to see the enormous appetite for accounts of trickery and deceit of all kinds in less 
unilateral terms than Gurr does; not as indicating a preoccupation which reveals only an 
apprehension of the power of deception, but as also pointing to the compelling fascination 
that the processes and effects of dissimulation had for the age. 
Early on in his argument, Gurr makes space for a rather different voice, one that is 
rather useful for this article’s current purposes in the contrast that it takes, in terms of both 
viewpoint and expression, to the previously quoted early modern commentators. The voice 
belongs to John Harington, courtier and ‘saucy godson’ to Elizabeth I,14 writing in his 
Treatise on Playe. The 1597 work places deceit in the broader context of Tudor recreation 
and remarks the degree to which the everyday Elizabethan life was itself embedded in 
dissimulation. The following passage provides this extended illustration:  
Wee goe brave in apparel that wee may be taken for better men then wee bee; we 
use much bumbastings and quiltings to seeme better formed, better showlderd, 
smaller wasted, and fuller thyght, then wee are; wee barbe and shave ofte, to seem 
yownger than wee are; we use perfumes both inward and outward to seeme sweter 
then wee be; corkt shooes to seeme taller then wee bee; wee use cowrtuows 
salutations to seem kinder then wee be; lowly obaysances to seeme humbler then 
we bee; and somtyme grave and godly communication to seem wiser or devowter 
then wee bee.  
The paragraph concludes by advising: ‘Labour to bee as you would bee thought’,15 a 
distinctive sentiment which while on the one hand serves, as Gurr notes, as ‘an 
immaculately puritan-like precept which neatly defused the charge that any such pretence 
was inherently devilish’,16 could also be thought as underlining the extent to which pretence 
conditions the relationship between representation and identity. Extrapolating, we might 
imagine another attitude as present in the period; one which is both circumspect of illusion 
and fascinated by it, compelled by illusion and compelled to act through it. And we would 
be remiss should we fail to remark that Harington’s text demonstrates that ironic self-
reflection is a mode that appears particularly suited to an exploration of such an attitude. 
                                                          
pinnacle of theatrical fame. By 1600 characterisation was the chief requisite of the successful player’ (pp. 99-100). 
And even in the essay here under discussion Gurr says, ‘Much of the drama of this period can be seen as fluctuating 
nervously between the extremes of realism and estrangement’ – although this is immediately followed up by the 
already quoted comparison to Brecht’s ‘defamiliarisation effect’: ‘Like the alienation of audience from the emotions 
of the actors in Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt, the obviousness of the pretence could save the participants from the fear 
of being really deceived’ (p. 103). 
14 Harington signs himself as such in at the end of a poem he wrote for the queen, and which – in a gesture that attests 
to wholly theatrical nature of Elizabethan court – he reports he deposited ‘behinde her cushion at [his] departing from 
her presence’ (Quoted in Tom Standage, Writing on the Wall: Social Media – The first 2,000 years (Bloomsbury 
Publishing USA, 2013), p. 79). 
15 See The Letters and Epigrams of Sir John Harington, edited by Norman Egbert McClure (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1930), pp. 41-42. 
16 “Metatheatre and the Fear of Playing”, p.93. 
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The Lear scene, as we will see, reveals a similar inclination and sensibility. Unfolding in 
serioludic fashion, the episode works to demonstrate how metatheatre works to frame stage 
illusion through the coordination of explicit dissimulation on the one hand and the 
audience’s imaginative investment on the other.  
 
Dissimulations of role, stage and exposition 
Scene 4.6 of King Lear offers an acute and markedly self-reflexive exploration of theatrical 
representation. We need to reiterate, however, that for some scholars the business of stage 
representation in Lear is a concern that never arises. There is a critical tradition which 
argues that Lear is better read than staged, with a number of prominent commentators even 
going so far as to claim that the play is essentially unperformable. The view was first 
advanced by Charles Lamb in 1811 and persists to this day.17 Perhaps though it is A. C. 
Bradley in his 1904 Shakespearean Tragedy18 who has made the case most forcefully, and 
whose views are most pertinent for the current discussion. Bradley insists that the play 
must be experienced by a solitary reader who enters fully into the fiction’s illusions. Only 
in this way can Lear be experienced in ‘its proper world of imagination’,19 conveying to 
the reader ‘in the manner proper to poetry, the wider or universal significance of the 
spectacle presented to the inward eye’.20 When the play is staged, the fact that performance 
operates ‘in obedience to the tyranny of the eye’ means ‘the poetic atmosphere is 
dissipated’. Similarly, the theatre’s inability to realistically reproduce the world in which 
the play’s action takes place engenders a ‘conflict between imagination and sense’.21 
Yet confining Lear to the inward eye in the manner Bradley recommends has the 
effect of flattening the play’s concern with the nature of representation – and, specifically, 
with a form of representation that unfolds itself through the dissimulations that early 
modern theatrical performance makes available. Beginning in the feigned performances of 
the opening act by which the sisters Goneril and Regan, and then immediately after, 
Edmund, deceive their respective fathers, dissimulation drives the action of Lear. And 
throughout the play, from the commentary that Cordelia supplies to her sisters’ 
                                                          
17 In his 1811 essay “On the tragedies of Shakespeare, considered to their fitness for stage representation” Lamb argued 
that when presented on stage, the figure of Lear was inevitably diminished, and only the solitary experience of reading 
fostered an empathic identification with the King. For Lamb, ‘Lear is essentially impossible to be represented on a 
stage’ (the essay is excerpted in Jonathan Bate, The Romantics on Shakespeare (Penguin, 1992), pp. 111-127; the 
quotation is from p. 123). One of the most popular works on Shakespeare of the past two decades, Harold Bloom’s 
Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human (Riverhead Books, 1999), also concludes that stagings of Lear are best 
avoided (p. 476). 
18 1904, reprint Penguin, 1991. 
19 Shakespearean Tragedy, p. 232. 
20 Shakespearean Tragedy, p. 247. 




performances in the drama’s very first moments, the dissembling of these play-world 
villains is tied to the dissimulations of theatrical representation.22  
Nowhere in the play is this correlation more accented than in the absurd fabrications 
of 4.6, what we might perhaps best call the pseudo-Dover cliff scene. The passage involves 
the blinded Gloucester and his loyal son, Edgar, with the latter playing the part of mad 
Tom, a disguise that has taken in his father. The suicidal Gloucester has asked ‘Tom’ to 
take him to Dover cliff so that he might throw himself off, an intention that Edgar aims to 
overturn in, it must be said, unusual fashion. After having his father imagine they are 
making a steep climb, Edgar comes to a stop before what he leads his father to believe is 
the cliff edge, at which point Edgar provides an animated description of the vertiginous 
drop he would have his father think is before him. Yet – as the audience understand – this 
is all a deception; Edgar has in fact deposited his father on what in the play-world must be 
a plain. 
Even such a cursory recounting cannot help but point to how the fictional constructs 
of Edgar’s invention – the fashioning of the illusions of role and location – parallel the 
fictional constructs by which Shakespeare’s play too realises itself. The ‘conflict between 
imagination and sense’ which Bradley took as dissipating the play’s power is in fact what 
here drives the scene. And this is an aspect that would have been emphasised by the 
performance of the episode on a stage wholly (or almost wholly) devoid of scenery, and 
further underlined by the extent to which Edgar’s performance is suffused with a sense of 
its own theatrical constitution. 
That the scene plays on the theatricality and the dislocation of representation is 
apparent from the first.23 For as soon as Edgar enters the stage the audience cannot help 
but be struck by the alteration in his appearance. When last seen he was – and we must 
imagine that the effect was somewhat striking – presented as filthy and half-naked, with 
                                                          
22 Asides given to Cordelia throughout her sisters’ declarations serve to point up their falsity, and at 1.1.222-223 she 
makes her criticism explicit in a statement that remarks the performances of the sisters at the same time as it takes in 
the actors that perform these parts: ‘If for I want that glib and oily art/ To speak and purpose not’. The use of ‘oily’ is 
particularly suggestive, for it would also reference the ‘paint’ by which the male actors affected their transformation 
into stage females – and as Andrea Stevens reminds us, ‘early modern defenders and detractors of the stage alike 
imagined paint as embodying the essence of theatricality’ (“Cosmetic Transformations” (Shakespeare’s Theatres and 
the Effects of Performance, edited by Farah Karim-Cooper and Tiffany Stern (Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 94-117), p. 95). 
It is also pertinent here to reiterate Meg Twycross and Sarah Carpenter’s point that it is unlikely that stage make-up 
of the period would produce – or was, for that matter, intended to produce – a naturalistic effect (Masks and Masking 
in Medieval and Early Tudor England (Routledge, 2016), p. 317). It is quite in keeping with the strategies of the play 
– which themselves might be characterised as duplicitous – that as the roles are allowed to indicate one level of 
theatrical dissimulation, the play itself remarks a further level: for at the same time as Cordelia’s words point to the 
boy-actors who perform the parts of her sisters, the lines cannot help but demonstrate that Cordelia’s role is of course 
too realised in precisely the same terms. 
23 This paragraph and the next two make use of my article “Terrible Steep Hills and Flat Stages: Dissimulation, Illusion 




nothing more than a holey blanket tied about his loins,24 but now, though he remains in the 
impersonation of Tom, he is cut in the figure of a stage-gentleman. He is decked out in the 
Old Man’s ‘best ’parel’ (4.1.50), and carries, though we know not where he obtained it, a 
staff.25 Correspondingly, his speech has abandoned the crazed locutions that previously 
defined his incarnation of Tom, and, appropriate to what is his new apparent status, he is 
given blank verse to speak. For the original audience the last switch would have been 
particularly dislocative, for it would mean that the instantiation given to Tom is now 
realised according to a different rhetorical register: it is performed through a contrasting 
vocal delivery and an altered lexis of gestures – and, it follows, it must also be thought of 
as accessing a different modality of signification.26 The shift is underlined by Gloucester: 
‘Methinks thy voice is altered, and thou speak'st/ In better phrase and matter than thou 
didst’, to which Edgar is given a reply heavy with dramatic and metatheatric ironies: 
‘You’re much deceived. In nothing am I changed/ But in my garments’ (4.6.7-10).27 The 
assertion is not one that would have struck the early modern spectators as wholly 
convincing; role-doubling was common in the theatre of the day, and the audience would 
have been habituated to the semiotic convention whereby the off-stage assumption of a 
new stage costume corresponded to the taking up of a different part. While then the opening 
exchange points to the local artifice of Edgar’s dissimulation it cannot help but at the same 
time point back to the larger artifice of theatrical representation itself. 
The dissimulations that mark role also mark stage, as the scene’s opening exchange 
immediately makes clear: 
GLOUCESTER When shall I come to th’ top of that same hill? 
EDGAR  You do climb up it now. Look how we labor. 
GLOUCESTER Methinks the ground is even. 
EDGAR  Horrible steep. (4.6.1-3) 
Contrary to the arguments of some commentators that would imagine the play-world 
terrain otherwise,28 let us underline here that the stage action guarantees that ‘the ground 
                                                          
24 When first adopting the Tom guise, Edgar provides the following account: ‘My face I'll grime with filth,/ Blanket 
my loins, elf all my hair in knots,/ And with presented nakedness outface/ The winds and persecutions of the sky’ 
(2.3.9-12). Later the Fool’s comment confirms his state of dishabille: Lear, wondering if Edgar’s apparent 
impoverished condition is also due to the rapacious attentions of a set of daughters, asks him ‘– Couldst thou save 
nothing? Wouldst thou give ‘em all?’, and the Fool interjects ‘Nay, he reserved a blanket, else we had been all shamed’ 
(3.4.60-62). Further to this, I think it makes sense to assume that the henydias which Lear earlier applied to the 
homeless wretches out in the storm, ‘Your looped and windowed raggedness’ (3.4.32) (coming as it does directly 
before ‘Tom’s’ first entrance) operates as a proleptic description of the state of Tom’s blanket. 
25 A staff is required for Edgar’s later fight with Oswald. 
26 See John Meaghre’s discussion on the performance of blank verse on the early modern stage in Shakespeare’s 
Shakespeare: How the Plays Were Made (Continuum, 1997), pp. 171-172. 
27 All quotations from the works of Shakespeare are taken from The Norton Shakespeare, 3rd edition, edited by Stephen 
Greenblatt, Walter Cohen, Suzanne Gossett, Katharine Eisaman Maus and Gordon McMullan (W. W. Norton, 2016), 
this version being the Folio with Additions from the Quarto. 
28 See for example, Jenn Stephenson’s “Spatial Ambiguity and the Early Modern/Postmodern in King Lear” (Drama 




is even’. Since taking on the part of Tom, Edgar has invested a peculiar amount of energy 
in a theatrical and convoluted deception of his father, and this means that the audience is 
hesitant in understanding any of Edgar’s propositions as indicating a play-world truth. So 
even if Edgar enters feigning ascent, it is Gloucester’s walking upright across the flat stage 
that confirms for the audience the topos of the scene’s setting.29  
As a piece of stage business, the contrasting of Edgar’s ‘Horrible steep’ with the 
roles’ progress over a flat stage is a simple maneuver of theatrical juxtaposition. Yet it 
illustrates the complex manner by which Shakespeare makes use of the discrepancy 
between drama’s conjured illusions and the physical qualities of the performance space to 
in fact seduce the audience into a further engagement with these illusions. We might 
describe the type of metatheatrical re-description here enacted as confined to the adjectival; 
which is to say that highlighting the flatness of the Globe stage in the manner that the scene 
does does not undo the play-world in which Edgar and his father move, but instead works 
to determine the imaginary landscape’s character. Even Jacobean theatre-goers as 
estranged from the concept of illusion as Gurr would have them could not help but project 
this feature back onto a fictional play-world setting – any more than they could, in the 
previous act, have avoided picturing Lear pelted by a ‘pitiless storm’ (3.4.30).  
This arrangement plays on the theatrical convention demanded by the almost bare 
Jacobean stage, whereby in a scene’s opening moments a narrated description works to 
establish a particular locale. Here, the conventional representational priorities are reversed; 
the expository account is marked as false while the actual stage conditions guarantee the 
nature of the play-world. Such a metatheatric juxtaposition undoubtedly influences the 
manner by which the audience approaches Edgar’s later pseudo-cliff-top description – an 
expository apostrophe that is addressed to the empty air. And this demonstration of the 
falsity of the narrative account is immediately repeated, when in his next line Edgar asks 
Gloucester, ‘Hark, do you hear the sea?’. The absence of the cued theatrical effect would 
surely be given underlining by the actor who performed Gloucester modelling the 
particular and pathetic intensity that would characterise the gesture of a blind man straining 
after a sound that does not arrive. The more perceptive among the Globe’s attendees would 
have noted that the scene itself plays out a similar deception on its spectators. In fact, the 
deceit performed on the audience has the greater temerity; not reliant on devices of the 
visual and verbal, its effect is conjured by vacancy. Where Edgar persuades (or perhaps 
half-persuades) Gloucester into thinking they are close to the sea by telling his father he 
fails to hear the surf due to his imperfect senses, the audience, encouraged to laugh at 
Gloucester’s nescience, is convinced that Edgar has led his father elsewhere through the 
absence of a below-stage sound effect.  
 
                                                          
29 The previously noted article “Terrible Steep Hills and Flat Stages: Dissimulation, Illusion and Metatheatre in King 
Lear” goes into greater detail in challenging the opinion of scholars who argue that the play-world location remains 




‘Dover is to be realized, not simply to be imagined’ 
Having established the mood of dissimulation which marks out the scene, we can now turn 
to the pseudo-cliff-top description itself. Edgar provides his father the following picture of 
the ‘scene’: 
Come on, sir. 
Here's the place. Stand still. How fearful 
And dizzy 'tis, to cast one's eyes so low! 
The crows and choughs that wing the midway air 
Show scarce so gross as beetles. Halfway down 
Hangs one that gathers samphire, dreadful trade! 
Methinks he seems no bigger than his head. 
The fishermen, that walk upon the beach 
Appear like mice, and yond tall anchoring bark 
Diminished to her cock; her cock a buoy 
Almost too small for sight. The murmuring surge, 
That on the unnumbered idle pebbles chafes, 
Cannot be heard so high. I'll look no more, 
Let my brain turn, and the deficient sight 
Topple down headlong. (4.6.11-25) 
In the play-world of Lear, Edgar intends this to be a convincing word-painting of 
the prospect presented at the verge of Dover cliff, and the speech has too sufficed to 
convince a number of critics. Roland Mushat Frye understands it as a pioneering verbal 
incarnation of the scientific principles of painterly perspective: ‘Prior to Shakespeare, we 
cannot find a written description of such precise linear perspective as Edgar evokes … In 
those lines, Shakespeare systematically designed the illusion of receding space, carefully 
selecting words to express a consistent geometrical reduction in the size of objects seen at 
a distance’.30 Jonathan Goldberg’s deconstructionist account of the speech, though it is not 
unaware of the ambiguities of illusion-making in Edgar’s words, understands the series of 
images as ‘dividing the space into mathematical segments’ and realising an ‘exactitude of 
visual placement [that] is remarkable’. He finds in the description ‘the power of images … 
pushed to its limits. Dover is to be realized, not simply to be imagined’.31 Jan Kott, while 
also alert to the play of paradox in the scene, nonetheless approaches the speech with a 
similar enthusiasm, making the claim that ‘no other Shakespearian landscape is so exact, 
                                                          
30 “Ways of Seeing in Shakespearean Drama and Elizabethan Painting” (Shakespeare Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 3, 
Autumn 1980, pp. 323-342), p. 341. 
31 “Dover Cliff and the Conditions of Representation: King Lear 4:6 in Perspective” (Shakespeare’s Hand (University 




precise and clear as this one’.32 While one might wonder if any of these assessments would 
be capable of sustaining itself in the context of a close reading (something that will be 
returned to later) this trio of comments point to a more fundamental problem in critical 
response to this speech. As William H. Matchett observes, the scene is routinely referred 
to as the Dover cliff scene, even though this is ‘precisely where Edgar has not taken his 
father’.33 This critical solecism underlines the fact that while the description is highlighted 
as being – even at the play-world level – a rhetorical fabrication it still has the power to 
convince the imaginations of its auditors. And as the scene underlines, the ‘false’ landscape 
of Edgar’s account is realised in exactly the same way as are any of the ‘true’ play-world 
landscapes. This cultivated duality is something that Joel Altman remarks, when he 
characterises Edgar’s pseudo description as ‘a tour de force of Shakespearean theatricality 
… [that calls] attention to itself as a linguistic feat while at the same time seducing the 
listener from admirer to rapt believer’.34 
Before proceeding to offer the speech analysis, two last points must be made so as 
to properly introduce it. The first concerns the staging. That the audience understand 
Edgar’s deception as maintained, and so that the play’s gambits of representation are not 
dispersed in a banal effect of contradiction, it is important that Edgar’s pseudo-cliff-top 
description is, as Stanley Wells’ gloss underlines, ‘not spoken close to the edge of the 
stage’.35 The second point concerns a particular aspect of the Jacobean theatrical 
experience and so – and this is so obvious that it is sometimes overlooked – represented 
the structures of reception according to which Shakespeare designed his drama. Writing 
about the audience reaction to one of his plays, the Elizabethan poet and author, Michael 
Drayton notes the frequent interruptions for applause: ‘Showts and Claps at ev’ry little 
pawse, / When the proud Round on ev’ry side hath rung’.36 Theatre-goers would, it seems, 
clap something as brief even as an individual joke: William Fennor writes that ‘The 
stinkards oft will hisse without a cause / And for a baudy jeast will give applause’.37 Where, 
for the most part, present-day theatre-goers, whose relationship to the play is still very 
much framed according the conventions of a Stanislavskian-derived realism (and this frame 
remains in place, referentially, even when these conventions are ‘renounced’), imagine a 
play-world-narrative which is smoothly consistent, coherent and all of a piece, the early 
modern audience it seems would have understood the play’s unfolding as conducted 
through a series of stage presentations that were (to a degree) separate and self-contained. 
And the point would seem especially pertinent in the current instance where a speech has 
gone to some effort to mark out its own theatricality. Whether or not we imagine the 
                                                          
32 Shakespeare, Our Contemporary (Methuen, 1967), p. 113. Kott describes the scene as a ‘pantomime’ (p. 114) and 
goes on to remark that it ‘shows the paradox of pure theatre’ (p. 146).  
33 “Some Dramatic Techniques in King Lear” (Shakespeare: The Theatrical Dimension, edited by Philip C. McGuire 
and David A. Samuelson (AMS Press, 1979), pp. 185-208), p. 206 n 6. 
34 “Ekphrasis” (Early Modern Theatricality, edited by Harry S. Truman (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 270-
290), p. 287. 
35 The History of King Lear (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 231. 
36 Idea, Sonnet 47 (The Works of Michael Drayton, edited by J. William Hebel (Blackwell, 1961)), 2.334. 
37 Cited in Andrew Gurr’s Playgoing in Shakespeare’s London (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 275. 
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performance of Edgar’s speech as likely to receive applause, the convention nonetheless 
underlines the inclination of Shakespeare’s audience to view such passages as something 
of a set-piece, marked off to an extent from the narrative’s progressive unfolding, and in 
this way signifying in a somewhat independent fashion. 
Highlighted in this way the speech would have self-reflexively signaled itself as a 
rhetorical performance, and one which the educated humanists in the audience would have 
recognised as an exercise in ekphrasis. As the various instructional treatises on rhetoric of 
Shakespeare’s day make clear, ekphrasis refers to a rhetorical description, written or 
performed, that is infused with what the Greeks term enargeia, and thereby forms in the 
imagination of its readers or listeners pictures of sufficient verisimilitude and vividness as 
to rival actuality itself. Edgar’s speech, however, must have struck the Globe audience as 
a peculiar instance of the form – for the description seems, in fact, to be constructed in 
opposition to the precepts that classical training laid down for the successful realisation of 
ekphrastic enargeia. Contrasting the passage with Quintilian’s battle-scene description, the 
canonical exemplar of enargeia, is revealing: 
… flames pouring from house and temple, and hear the crash of falling roofs and 
one confused clamour blent of many cries: we shall behold some in doubt whither 
to fly, others clinging to their nearest and dearest in one last embrace, while the 
wailing of women and children and the laments of old men that the cruelty of fate 
should have spared them to see that day will strike upon our ears. Then will come 
the pillage of treasure sacred and profane, the hurrying to and fro of the plunderers 
as they carry off their booty or return to seek for more, the prisoners driven each 
before his own inhuman captor, the mother struggling to keep her child, and the 
victors fighting over the richest of the spoil.38 
According to Quintilian, in order for enargeia to be realised, it must be ‘presented in the 
most realistic manner’39 and, as his battle-scene ekphrasis demonstrates, this quality of 
verisimilitude needs be based on precision of detail, or, rhetorically speaking, 
circumstantiae. Enargeia’s power, as Dionysius of Halicarnassus observes, ‘arises out of 
[this] grasp of circumstantial detail’.40 Writing in the century after Quintilian, the sophist 
Lucian of Samosata underlines the part that a dedication to factual reporting plays in the 
successfully produced enargeia. The rhetor must ‘give a fine arrangement to events and 
illuminate them as vividly as possible’ so that (and here he repeats antiquity’s favourite 
formulation for enargeia’s efficacy) ‘a man who has heard him thinks hereafter that he is 
actually seeing what is being described’.41  
Invariably it seems, critics who remark the ekphrastic mode of Edgar’s cliff-top 
description understand its success according to these classical prescriptions. Jenn 
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Stephenson’s response to the speech remarks by implication its ekphrastic nature, as well 
as the realisation of its enargeia: ‘a powerful expository word picture … vividly 
described’.42 Similarly, Kott and Frye’s understanding of Edgar’s ekphrasis as an account 
that is ‘exact, precise and clear’ as well as ‘systematically designed’ would seem to suggest 
that the speech conforms rather scrupulously with these classical prescriptions of 
circumstantiae, while Goldberg’s comment that ‘Dover is to be realized, not simply to be 
imagined’ understands the speech as realising the transfiguration suggested by enargeia’s 
perennial formulation. A more thorough analysis, however, might argue that these are the 
very features that the description turns upside-down. It might also be claimed that an 
audience more familiar with the specific demands of ekphrastic procedure, as a number of 
the Globe’s attendees undoubtedly would have been, might have better remarked this, and 
in so doing recognised this reversal as a deliberate parodic game playing.  
Dissimulation of word and image  
Let us then examine Edgar’s ekphrasis. The description begins by plunging immediately 
down to the ‘midway’ air, where crows and choughs ‘Show scarce so gross as beetles’. It 
is the scaling down that this suggests, going from bird to beetle, which prompts Frye and 
Goldberg to see the description as exemplifying Albertian perspective whereby diminution 
determines distance. But Edgar’s comparison is formulated in a way that invites confusion; 
Richard Meek writes ‘Presumably we are being asked to imagine birds that are as small as 
beetles, but do we not also imagine beetles themselves? In other words, are we being asked 
to imagine not being able to see the birds Edgar describes?’43 The same representational 
inversion holds for Edgar’s description of the fishermen walking on the beech which are 
no sooner pictured than the auditor is asked to re-imagine them ‘like mice’.  
Far from being ‘exact, precise and clear’ these descriptions appear deliberately 
confounding, with the manner of expression seeming to get in its own way. The account’s 
figurative language eludes a mental picturing, producing only an imagistic disorientation. 
Where the auditor expects the simile’s anticipated vehicle to deliver illumination, it offers 
instead an aberrant juxtaposition. The vehicle, in terms of its form, offers no visual 
continuity with the tenor;44 the shapes of birds seen at a distance offer no correspondence 
to the shape of beetles, any more than men seen from a height take a similar visual form to 
that of mice. More radically, the value-relationship that simile observes between described 
object and its figural representation would itself seem dislocated. Tenor and vehicle appear 
to be invested with a similar category of presence, and each vies with the other. In this 
verbal and imaginative confusion no particular feature of Edgar’s pseudo description is 
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capable of maintaining its form or identity but is instead subject to a deviant re-mapping 
by which its representation is obscured or even absented.  
In this way the speech structures an ironic game-play of representation, one that 
echoes the scene’s previous metatheatric realisation of locale through the artistic gambit of 
an absence that marks itself up. As Richard Fly comments, it is impossible to ‘forget that 
the entirety of Edgar’s speech is finally an artful structuring of nothing because a felt 
absence permeates the whole elaborate deception’.45 Even when in the speech’s concluding 
lines the description shifts from the visual to the aural this impulse to erasure is continued: 
‘The murmuring surge/ That on the unnumbered idle pebbles chafes/ Cannot be heard, it’s 
so high’. A grammatically self-cancelling joke, as the extended noun phrase that makes up 
the subject is annulled by a flat predicate.  
Yet the ironic play of the speech takes in more than simply the language of 
ekphrastic description. It offers, I would argue, a parody of perspectival representation 
itself, and this seems most clearly marked up in the crude and confusing description of the 
samphire gatherer who ‘seems no bigger than his head’. The introduction of linear 
perspective in the painting of the Renaissance supplied to pictorial descriptions of space a 
mimetic fidelity previously unimaginable, and other early modern media were compelled 
to recognise and react to the enormous impact of this breakthrough technology. Earlier in 
his career, in the poem, Rape of Lucrece, Shakespeare had made reference to pictorial 
devices of spatial depiction and located these so as to explore the relationship they took to 
literary representation. It is instructive to return to this previous example, for although the 
painting that the poem describes is not realised according to single point perspective, the 
account foreshadows an approach to aspects of perspectival description that the later 
pseudo-cliff-top scene picks up, most prominently the overlapping of forms crudely 
remarked in the description of the samphire gatherer. Rather fittingly, the inter-medial 
appropriation occurs in an episode that concerns the play of truth and falsehood in painterly 
and poetic representation: Lucrece’s contemplation of the ‘skilful painting made for 
Priam’s Troy’ (1367): 
For much imaginary work was there: 
Conceit deceitful, so compact, so kind, 
That for Achilles' image stood his spear, 
Gripped in an armèd hand; himself behind 
Was left unseen, save to the eye of mind: 
A hand, a foot, a face, a leg, a head, 
Stood for the whole to be imaginèd. (1422-1428) 
Stuart Sillars notes the striking way in which the stanza converts ‘the painter’s skill 
in perspective to the poet’s skill in rhetoric’, pointing out that ‘Shakespeare’s contemporary 
readers trained in the arts of rhetoric would have recognised the use of Achilles’ spear as 
                                                          




representative of his whole body as a metonymic substitution, and the list of body parts in 
the penultimate line as a synecdochic catalogue’46 This transmediation is self-reflexive and 
not wholly unironic, and in framing the conceptual encounter the stanza points to the 
paragonal rivalry between the different media, at the same time as it registers the distinct 
set of operations by which painterly and rhetorical representation unfold. More acutely, 
Shakespeare marks his own particular expression as differentiated from the mimetic 
fidelity that perspectival representation promises. Rather than an exclusive concentration 
on a convincing imitation, Shakespeare’s depictions provide a self-reflexive interrogation 
of artistic depiction itself.  
The descriptive method by which the representation of Achilles is realized is, 
ostensibly, repeated in Edgar’s account of the samphire gatherer. Yet by placing the 
perspectival depiction found in Lucrece next to that found in Lear’s pseudo-cliff-top scene 
the precise and graceful handling of the former underlines the parodic tone of rhetorical 
and representational mismanagement that distinguishes the latter. The poem’s language 
evinces precision and subtle complexity, the phrasing is measured and balanced, and the 
account unfolds via a graceful and intelligent aural progression. The devices of rhetoric 
mimic the techniques of perspectival representation, yet, quite brilliantly, the imitation 
serves to demonstrate the power and unique expression that can be won through language. 
By comparison, Edgar’s depiction of the samphire collector, ‘Methinks he seems no bigger 
than his head’, cannot help but strike us as laughably unpolished figuring of perspectival 
overlapping. Here, not only is there is no attempt by the language of description to match 
the sophistication of the painter’s technique but the rhetoric fails to realize even a coherent 
description. The ostensibly naïve fumbling of descriptors, the mis-mapping of relational 
elements, bears some commonality with the exasperated attempt of Robin Starveling when 
in the role of Moonshine to capture the distinctions that abide between ‘reality’ and 
representation: ‘All that I have to say is to tell you that the lanthorn is the moon; I, the man 
I’ th’ moon; this thorn-bush, my thorn-bush, and this dog, my dog’ (A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream, 5.1.247-9). And of course, there is a nice irony in that having conscripted the 
devices of painterly perspective so as to realize a description of a profound drop, Edgar 
remarks an effect that does not serve to create a sense of distance but merely determines 
the angle that the viewer takes to the object. 
The mawkish rhetorical mismanagement of Edgar’s description then hardly seems 
to equate with a reading like Goldberg’s which sees this series of images as a creating a 
precise and lucid word painting that appears to have ‘realized’ the dream of ekphrastic 
presence. Better, surely, to take Edgar’s bizarre descriptions as evincing a deliberately 
deployed rhetorical inadequacy, and to see that an arrangement which in Lucrece framed 
the paragonal rivalry between the visual and rhetorical arts according to an ironic 
sophistication has in Edgar’s speech been swapped out for a crassly formulated (though, of 
course, not unsophisticated) parody of perspectival representation itself.  
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With this understanding in place we can return to Frye’s reading of the speech, 
‘Shakespeare systematically designed the illusion of receding space, carefully selecting 
words to express a consistent geometrical reduction in the size of objects seen at a distance’, 
and contrast it with the image which concludes the description: ‘yond tall anchoring bark,/ 
Diminished to her cock, her cock, a buoy/ Almost too small for sight’.47 Once again, the 
phrasing of Edgar’s pseudo description seems clumsy rather than ‘careful’, and meaning is 
once more entangled. Moreover, any attention to the lines which extends beyond the 
cursory cannot fail to note that the apparent dwindling progression of scale that is presented 
as characterising the image sequence is a mere semblance. Rather than a perspectival 
reduction, the description registers a procession of absurd transmogrification. Unpacked, 
Edgar’s confusing formulation suggests that the experience of seeing the anchored bark, 
its cockboat and buoy from such a height would re-render the three vessels, absurdly, as 
cockboat and buoy. It is a transformation that undoes the spectacle of immense perspectival 
distance that the speech would ostensibly conjure. For it not only begs the question of how 
Edgar would be capable of interpreting the cockboat he perceives as a bark, but, most 
ironically of all, the re-description also implies that any (imaginary) body standing on the 
(imagined) precipice would only register the (imagined) sight as a cockboat and buoy, and 
such a mistaken identification would mean that this observer would understand – according 
to the laws of perspective – the distance to the vessel as being less than it was. 
We can see then that while the bark description represents the speech’s most 
concentrated and dramatic sequence of diminution, in no way does the image undergo, to 
return to Frye’s quotation, ‘a consistent … reduction in the size of objects seen at a 
distance’. Neither is this a ‘systematically designed […] illusion of receding space’. In 
spatial terms, the effect is not recessive but successive – each mentioned object sits on the 
same visual plane (the sea’s surface), and the series of images moves across this plane – 
one mapped onto the next. Moreover, the fact that each image undergoes a reduction in 
scale is far less striking than the peculiar transformation that the description enacts. Where 
in the earlier accounts of crows, choughs and fishermen tenor and vehicle were arranged 
in a discrepant juxtaposition, the description of the bark can be said to work in the opposite 
manner. It follows the model of the samphire gatherer with the reported object being 
transformed, rather awkwardly, into something with which it has a close relational 
familiarity (the bark becomes a synecdochal cock, and the samphire collector, 
metonymically,  his own head). The effect remains similarly discordant, however: both 
strategies work against the imaginative reproduction of the scene. That Shakespeare is 
capable of subverting the mimetic prescriptions of both rhetorical and perspectival 
description through two wholly contrasting means seems a deliberate demonstration of the 
breadth of his parodic virtuosity. 
Where the speech’s ekphrastic frame promises a clear and vivid description, it 
delivers instead an account that is incoherent. Rather than the imagined precipice being 
‘painted with all the colours of rhetoric’ the objects of its account are either obscured or 
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erased entirely, or else subject to aberrant transformations – figurative and literal mis-
mappings that subvert any attempt at their imaginative reproduction. The word picture 
offered, though it marks up its borrowing of painting’s perspectival representation, misuses 
the devices and techniques of its adopted method, and undoes any visualisation of the 
terrible drop it ostensibly sets out to describe. The deliberate ineffectiveness of the speech’s 
description is marked up self-reflexively by the final reference to the imagined spectacle: 
Edgar terms it a ‘deficient sight’. While in the play-world in which Edgar is attempting to 
convince his father of the drop before him ‘deficient’ would take the meaning of ‘sufficient 
to derange he mind’, it would be the more common sense of the word as indicating a lack 
that would have reverberated around the theatre. In this way the phrase works a three-fold 
irony; it is directed at Gloucester, as well as the audience, neither of which see the sight, 
but it also points back to the description itself, which has signally failed to render the 
representation it promised.  
Signally failed to render the representation it promised, yes – but this is of course 
intended, and it is very far from saying that the speech is without power. For Edgar’s 
description is, as commentators time and again attest, compellingly effective. And it may 
be an attempt to account for the power of the speech which has persuaded critics such as 
Stephenson, Frye and Goldberg to take it, as it were, at its word. To see the speech’s 
ekphrastic form and its apparent appropriation of the method of painterly perspective as 
supplying both ancient and modern authentication of the description’s representational 
agenda – and from here, to make the mistake of crediting to it a mimetic fidelity and 
realisation that it in no way possesses. For as has been made clear, the utilisation of 
ekphrasis and perspectival representation is parodic, and, as will be demonstrated, the 
powerful effect that the speech generates occurs not through mimesis, but rather in its teeth. 
In its application of parody the speech still makes happy use of the conceptual space 
which its references to mimetic tradition afford. Edgar’s lines exploit the fact that together 
with the call to imaginative engagement that any early modern scenic description enacts, 
the exercise of ekphrasis brings with it as standard an appeal to wonder.48 At the same time, 
the speech makes the most of the fascination that the new perspectival technology 
undoubtedly commanded. As such, the speech asks for a performance that must, at one and 
the same time, be powerful and subtle – and this once more points back to the virtuosity of 
the actor for whom the part was written. He must balance the tasks of captivating the 
audience while still remarking the speech’s parodic unfolding. An arrangement of this kind 
calls for a similarly sophisticated spectator. One that shares with the theatregoer that Gurr 
posits an acute sensitivity to the deceptive nature of illusion, but, who, rather than anxiously 
seeking to constrain the effects of this deception, is happy to submit to its seductions. As 
Catherine Belsey has noted, a comprehensive sense of the appeal of early modern ekphrasis 
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is only possible if we acknowledge ‘the element of wonder implied by such terms as 
deceive and counterfeit’, and the degree to which the audience’s ‘eagerness to be beguiled 
anticipates Coleridge’s “willing suspension of disbelief”’’.49 
With such an audience and performer, instead of metatheatre being limited to a 
policing of the disquieting implications of Edgar’s deception it may here function to effect 
the illusion of the prospect’s dizzying vacuity. It is a rather daring arrangement; that the 
same device which serves to send up mimetic strategies of representation can at the same 
time lend Edgar’s invented scene a convincing immediacy. We might return to Richard 
Fly’s comment which appears, whether intentionally or not, to remark this point: ‘We never 
forget that the entirety of Edgar’s speech is finally an artful structuring of nothing because 
a felt absence permeates the whole elaborate deception’. Despite announcing its artifice, 
the speech nonetheless creates a ‘felt absence’ that folds back and lends to the imagined 
cliff-top prospect an appropriate emptiness.  
This ‘felt absence’ is underlined by the use the episode makes of the bare stage. As 
noted earlier, Edgar’s speech makes play with the theatrical convention whereby a 
speaker’s scenic description secured a play-world location. This means that the effect of 
Edgar’s deception is not so much to undermine the specific illusion of the prospect’s drop 
but rather to point to the illusory nature of theatrical representation itself – to point 
physically and directly to the actual emptiness of the stage. Yet even as the audience 
members recognise the falsity of the play-world description and the broader dissimulation 
of the conventions of theatrical representation they cannot help but conceptualise the 
description in the same manner as they would any ‘genuine’ play-world scene. Only here, 
this imagined picture is not taken as constituting the play-world, but as merely having 
existence in the consciousness of Gloucester. But ‘the consciousness of Gloucester’ is of 
course, in the context of the early modern, a rather fraught phrase. The first performance 
of Lear would have been given a good half century before we get anything like an 
articulated and accepted concept of selfhood. And while the audiences of the early 17th 
century would have encountered a theatre that was happy to make sometime use of these 
burgeoning impulses, early modern drama showed little inclination to give them a 
presentation that was consistent and unequivocal. The two roles in our scene have been 
provided a highly theatrical realisation and there is little to suggest that they are to be 
imagined as possessed of a psychologically coherent interiority, of a ‘within which passeth 
show’ (Hamlet 1.2.85).50 The precipitous drop that the audience is enjoined to conceive 
finds no sticking place in the drama; it cannot be located on the stage proper, nor in the 
play-world, nor in the non-existent consciousness of the make-believe Gloucester. 
Ironically, the non-existent prospect only has existence in the minds of the audience, the 
same audience who find humour in a fictional character apparently being taken in by such 
a description. Conceptualised, but never located, the audience’s image of the prospect must 
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be thought of as somewhat ontologically restless, as flickering between presence and void; 
a rather contradictory representation that also has about it something like a ‘felt absence’. 
It is a conceptual arrangement that is intended to confuse the mind, and it is not 
incidental that Edgar’s descriptive set piece is bookended on either side by an underlining 
of the description’s dizzying effect. The speech is introduced with ‘How fearful/ And dizzy 
'tis to cast one's eyes so low!’ and Edgar breaks off his account by declaring, ‘I'll look no 
more,/ Let my brain turn, and the deficient sight/ Topple down headlong’.51 And re-
encountering ‘deficient sight’ reminds us how the speech works contrary to attempts to 
visualise it, and creates instead a sense of disorientation. Once more, this would seem to 
suggest a deliberate display of ironic virtuosity. Demonstrating that while the speech 
forgoes a visual mimesis, it might nonetheless reproduce the discombobulating effects that 
often accompany the contemplation of a terrible drop. As already pointed out, Edgar’s 
account has a giddy relationship to its own interpretation, inviting misreading and 
misunderstanding. Images are not quite able to contain the language of their own 
formulation, and the description threatens, as Meek notes, ‘to expose the workings of its 
own similes and metaphors’.52 Represented objects undo themselves via discrepant 
transformations, or through taking a description that collapses in on itself. In our mind’s 
eye the objects of the account can only be realised with a fleeting focus. This semantic and 
imagistic muddling produces something rather like a vertiginous reflex – and it is not 
without a certain ironic pertinence that when the most mimetic of all media, film, attempts 
to replicate just such a sensation, it employs a technique that is somewhat akin: the distantly 




Let us now return to the points by which this reading has contested the critical positions of 
Bradley, Gurr, and what we might call the mimetic interpreters, and see if something like 
a triangulation of their ideas might yield a fuller understanding of how metatheatric 
representation works on Shakespeare’s stage. And ‘on Shakespeare’s stage’ is, as I have 
demonstrated, an element that cannot be ignored if we are to fully appreciate the scene’s 
effects. Experiencing Lear in the manner Bradley recommends, that is, as unfolding within 
the solitary reader’s imagination, is to re-realise the action in a world that is conceived as 
autonomous and whose objects are unequivocal. This approach fails to accommodate the 
representational axis on which the pseudo-Dover-cliff scene depends: the fact that what 
Gloucester assumes is a verge and what the play action presents as a plain is simultaneously 
the stage. It is only by experiencing the play in its performative dimension, what Bradley 
denigrates as in ‘obedience to the tyranny of the eye’, that the effects which the scene’s 
multiple and layered deceptions play out can be properly remarked. In fact, it is not unfair 
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to argue that the exclusive experience of the ‘inward eye’ is the very thing the scene is 
sending up; it is the blinded Gloucester who is presented as experiencing the cliff top 
according to Bradley’s prescription, and it is Gloucester, after all, who is completely 
deceived. But to parody is not to dismiss, and if the scene appears to revel in remarking its 
own deceptions, we must remember too that deception is predicated on an original 
enchantment. The effects of the scene – those belonging to its fictions, as well those 
belonging to the undoing of its fictions – are dependent on the illusions that the inward eye 
projects onto the bare stage and onto the costumed actors. Rather then than determining 
the play’s representations absolutely and unconditionally the audience’s imaginative effort 
to illusion operates as an element in a representational dialectic, and it is due to this 
arrangement that the audience is able to negotiate the vying claims of the fictional and 
actual. Where Bradley advocates for the reading of Lear so as to elide the ‘conflict between 
imagination and sense’, it seems that it is precisely this conflict that the play’s strategies of 
representation are most intent on exploiting. 
Bradley’s ‘inward eye’ can be considered a species of mimesis, and as with all 
mimesis it seeks a representational realisation that would subsume the artistic medium 
itself. We see the same impulse clearly in ekphrasis, the rhetorical genre most explicitly 
concerned to enact the mimetic dream,53 and Goldberg’s assessment of Edgar’s speech – 
in so far as it misreads form for content – reiterates enargiea’s desire for a transfiguration 
into the actual: ‘the power of images … pushed to its limits … Dover is to be realized, not 
simply to be imagined’. And while a number of artistic media are so disposed that in 
approaching the impossible dream of mimesis they seem to realise the greatest possibilities 
of their particular form, the early modern theatre cannot be numbered among them. The 
nature of this theatre does not allow the medium to retreat in the manner that traditionally 
realised mimesis demands; the actuality of the performance space and the apparatus by 
which it constructs its representations remain an insistent presence. This representational 
contradictoriness is something that the pseudo-Dover-cliff scene exploits repeatedly, 
generating its metatheatric effects through ironically superimposing the practices of 
mimesis on a medium that cannot help but assert a recalcitrant actuality.  
As such, it is not incidental that Edgar’s false description appropriates the lexis of 
pictorial perspective. The imitation theory has always found in painting its paradigmatic 
avatars, and perspectival representation seemed to have brought the dream of mimetic 
presence closer than ever before. Leonardo da Vinci provided the new technology its ideal 
formulation: ‘Perspective is nothing else than the seeing of an object behind a sheet of 
glass’.54 As simple a statement as this is, it marks something like an artistic consummation, 
pointing to a profound correlation between the art work and the world: the medium is made 
transparent, and the viewer experiences a direct and unfiltered representation of the real. It 
is a realisation of mimesis which claims to have wholly dispensed with what post-
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structuralists would call rhetoricality.55 But such a formulation is, as any good post-
structuralist will tell you, untenable; perspectival representation has, just like every other 
form of expression, its own rhetoricality. It is not a limpid and immediate re-realisation of 
the real, but an accumulation of effectually realised techniques. Perspectival representation 
is a particular interpretation wholly dependent on the means that the medium makes 
available, the techniques in place at that time, as well as on a way of thinking about the 
world, art and representation that reflects the particular historical-cultural juncture. And, 
of course, even the asserted agenda of mimesis is itself something like a posturing. Artistic 
representation never really seeks to sacrifice itself into the actual; what the representations 
of mimesis unfold is not a genuine attempt at a re-realisation of the real, but the rhetoric of 
‘an attempt at the re-realisation of the real’. That this is not an understanding owing wholly 
to the recent investigations of the post structuralists is something that Shakespeare’s 
parodic ut pictura poesis makes apparent. There, language undoes itself and the business 
of representation gets in the way of its own realisation. Rather than the medium 
disappearing, it is foregrounded and its deceptions highlighted. Classical and modern 
prescriptions of mimesis are provided modelling, but only so that their claims might be 
parodied and unraveled. Yet though these metatheatric features work to undermine the 
visual reimagining of Edgar’s description – and just as is the case with the use made of the 
illusion-making ‘inward eye’ – the scene still manages to access the dizzying sense of 
vacuity that a successful mimetic representation would convey. 
These observations require that we expand upon Gurr’s formulation of metatheatre. 
As has been noted, while the analysis of the scene has demonstrated that, as Gurr argued, 
dissimulation and the associated practice of metatheatre play an integral role in the 
representations of the early modern theatre, the idea that the dissimulation of theatrical 
illusion produces such anxiety that the strategies of metatheatre must devote themselves to 
its government does not, as has been seen, hold up. Deception is in fact reveled in, and it 
must be thought as triggering the scene’s artistic energies. And rather than being limited to 
instancing disenchant or distance, metatheatre is allowed to extend itself so as to conscript 
and redeploy the effects that illusion would otherwise generate. This is an effect that is 
reliant on the audience’s access to the transforming vision of an imaginative inner eye, and 
the particular relationship that the early modern theatre was compelled to take up towards 
the mimetic tradition. We might note that in arguing for a fuller conceptualisation of 
metatheatre we have been pushed towards a discussion of the nature of artistic 
representation, and it seems in the space remaining to us we are obliged to sketch – but 
only ever so briefly – a theory of metatheatric representation on the early modern stage. To 
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introduce the term: he tells us that we call ‘a style “rhetorical” when we observe a conscious application of artistic 
means of speaking’ (Friedrich Nietzsche, “Nietzsche's ‘Lecture Notes on Rhetoric’: A Translation”. Translated by 
Carole Blair, Philosophy & Rhetoric, vol. 16, no. 2, 1983, pp. 94-129, p. 107). And the term can be seen as offering a 
broad application when we recognise that all artistic practice occurs as the result of a conscious decision, and that it 
takes place through the particular language that each specific medium makes available. 
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do this we might turn to a theory of audience engagement that few writers on metatheatre 
appear prepared to make use of – though, as we saw a few pages back, Belsey made astute 
use of it.  
Many of those thinkers that have employed Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s notion of ‘a 
willing suspension of disbelief’ have often done so without affording the concept anything 
like the subtlety with which it was originally framed. Though it is often taken as 
championing a form of romantic-mimetic surrender, it in fact theorises a far more self-
reflexive and cooler relationship to illusion.56 Happily for our purposes, the concept is 
encapsulated in a discussion of stage illusion: treating of a painted forest scenery, Coleridge 
remarks that  
Stage presentations are to produce a sort of temporary half-faith, by which the 
spectator encourages in himself and supports by a voluntary contribution on his own 
part, because he knows that it is at all times in his power to see the thing as it really 
is …The true stage-illusion in this and in all other things consists – not in the mind’s 
judging it to be a forest, but, in its remission of the judgement that it is not a forest.57 
This formulation adds a new dimension to our discussion of deception: illusion is 
experienced via a deliberate and ongoing process by which the audience elects to be 
deceived. From this it follows that illusion does not take us in in the way mimesis pretends 
that it does. And this is something that Coleridge implies when he contrasts the experience 
of the painted forest scenery to a landscape painting by Claude, observing that when it 
comes to the picture ‘it is a condition of all genuine delight that we should not be deceived’. 
Yet these contrasting effects of artistic deception themselves occur within a broader 
understanding of the nature of artistic deception: when introducing these paired examples, 
Coleridge comments, ‘though, in the full sense of the word, we are no more deceived by 
the one than by the other’.58 The remark suggests that even when the spectator has entered 
into the illusion (which she does deliberately and consciously), she does not give herself 
up to it but retains a simultaneous sense of the degree to which the illusion might be 
                                                          
56 A rather striking example of how far discussions of the concept tend to overlook the terms of Coleridge’s initial 
formulation can be found in the aesthetic philosopher Kendall Walton’s article “Fearing Fictions” (The Journal of 
Philosophy, vol. 75, no. 1, January 1978, pp. 5-27). There, Walton confronts the ‘traditional ideas that the normal or 
desired attitude toward fiction involves a “suspension of disbelief”’ (and though, as we see, Walton supplies the term 
with quotation marks, his discussion, rather peculiarly one feels, makes no reference to Coleridge). Walton asserts 
that it makes for an unfortunate phrase and says that it suggests people see fictions as fact. Having so interpreted the 
concept he goes on to offer it what he presumes is correction: ‘Our disbelief is “suspended” only in the sense that it 
is, in some way set aside or ignored’. Itself something of an unfortunate phrase, marrying condescension to what 
anyone who was familiar with Coleridge’s formulation would have recognised as redundancy. Had Walton made 
himself familiar with the term’s original outlines he would have saved himself the bother of going on to model the 
alternate theory of artistic reception that he presents in counter (p. 7-8). The model is in itself a rather neat little thing, 
only it suffers from the fact that it has already been elucidated, and with far greater subtlety and extent, in - with an 
irony that the reader of the current text has undoubtedly anticipated – the paragraphs by which Coleridge originally 
introduced into aesthetic philosophy the notion of ‘a willing suspension of disbelief’. 
57 Coleridge’s Essays and Lectures on Shakespeare and Some Other Old Poets and Dramatists (J. M. Dent and Sons, 
E. P. Dutton, 1914), p. 28. 
58 Coleridge’s Essays and Lectures on Shakespeare and Some Other Old Poets and Dramatists, p. 28. 
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considered convincing as an illusion. And we might extrapolate from this a similar 
framework operating in the reception of metatheatrical effects; that in encountering 
metatheatre’s apparent breaking of illusion, it is not so much that illusion is broken, rather 
it is that the spectator is directed to an appreciation of the technique of metatheatre’s 
‘breaking’ of illusion.  
Following from these remarks we might suggest that the modes of artistic 
representation, ranging from the most ‘convincing’ illusions, born of mimesis and the 
audience’s inward projection at one extreme, to the ‘alienation’ and ‘distancing’ of Gurr’s 
conception of metatheatre at the other, are encompassed within the deception that the 
audience consciously and voluntarily enters into when it engages with art’s fictions. 
According to such a conceptualisation, their effects take, as marked up in the previous 
sentences, quotation marks. Each representational register is understood rhetorically. The 
audience is not convinced by the plain that Edgar leads his father across and which the 
inward eye cannot help but project on the stage, any more than it is convinced by the sense 
of dizzying vacuity that the mimetic imagination conjures. But also, the audience is not 
either, ‘in the full sense of the word’, convinced by metatheatre’s disenchantment. Gurr, it 
seems, is wrong to imagine that metatheatre completely undermines stage representation 
through marking up illusion’s deceptions. It is less unilateral an effect; the audience 
member’s attention is brought back to her remission of the judgement that she is engaged 
in imaginative illusions, but she does not go on to cease her engagement with these 
illusions. The assumption that she would simply indicates another version of the dream that 
art might sublate into the actual; where mimesis would vaporise the artwork through 
realising the actuality of the representation, metatheatre would perform the same trick 
through realising the actuality of the medium. The absolute claims that metatheatre 
advances, like all absolute claims of representation, are only meant to be advanced, never 
realised. Rather than enacting a disenchantment, the ‘deception’ of metatheatre unfolds 
according to the larger and less equivocal deception by which art itself is realised and by 
which it is experienced. And no matter how much this art may remark its own counterfeit 









‘Mocked with art’: Contradiction and Affect in The Winter’s Tale’s 
‘Statue’ Scene  
 
The manner in which Shakespeare’s drama unfolds compels us to posit an early modern 
audience which possessed, as Stuart Sillars wrote in 2013, the ability ‘both to be moved by 
the fiction of representation and to be fully aware of its falsity’.1 It is a perspective that 
William E. Gruber, expressed in even more emphatic terms back in 1985. Gruber writes 
that in contrast to their present-day equivalents, Tudor and Stuart theatregoers would ‘not 
only tolerate visible contradictions’ between the actual conditions of the theatre and the 
fictions there being played out, but that they clearly ‘consider[ed] them to be the affective 
basis of spectating’.2 This, though, is not an uncontentious critical notion. More commonly, 
the contradictions that abide between the literal and figurative, and which of course enjoy 
a rather pronounced presence in the early modern theatre, are taken as having the potential 
to disrupt, fatally even, the audience’s engagement with the drama’s fictional world. It is 
an understanding that informs both the poetics of mimesis (and the play-world focused 
approaches that derive from it) – which in its most absolute realisation assumes that the 
successful representation can only be brought off by an illusion of such verisimilitude that 
the spectator loses all sense of the depiction’s means and manner – as well as traditional 
conceptualisations of metatheatre – wherein any self-reflexive marking of drama’s artifice 
is taken as sabotaging the audience’s imaginative investment in play-world fictions.3 
                                                          
1 “‘You lie, you are not he’: Identity, Rhetoric and Convention in Shakespeare’s Art of Lying” (Shakespeare and the 
Art of Lying, edited by Shormishtha Panja (Orient BlackSwan, 2013), pp. 14-36), p. 25. 
2 “The Actor in the Script: Affective Strategies in Shakespeare's Antony and Cleopatra” (Comparative Drama, vol. 
19, 1985, pp. 30-48), p. 34. Gruber is discussing specifically the contradictions between actor and role, but his 
observation must be thought to take in the broader terms of the literal and figurative. 
3 The idea that Shakespeare’s metatheatre is for the most part constrained to alienate the audience from the play-
world’s illusory appeal can be thought of as first properly theorised by Bertolt Brecht. The German playwright saw 
Shakespeare’s drama as anticipating his own model of ‘a theatre of estrangement’ (see Margot Heinemann’s useful 
summary “How Brecht read Shakespeare” in Political Shakespeare: New Essays in Cultural Materialism, edited by 
Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield, (Manchester University Press, 1985), pp. 202-230). It is a view that has had, 
and continues to have, an enormous influence on some of the most important theorisations of Shakespearean 
metatheatre. Its impact is already marked in Maynard Mack’s work from the 60s (see, for example, “Engagement and 
Detachment in Shakespeare’s Plays” (Essays on Shakespeare and Elizabethan Drama in Honour of Hardin Craig, 
edited by Richard Hosley (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 275-296)); it informs the work of James L. 
Calderwood in the 70s and 80s (Shakespearean Metadrama (University of Minnesota Press, 1971), Metadrama in 
Shakespeare’s Henriad (University of California Press, 1979), To Be and Not to Be: Negation and Metadrama in 
Hamlet (Columbia University Press, 1983)); it has had a decisive impact on the investigations into theatricality 
undertaken by new historicists and cultural materialists, as well as on the work of researchers investigating the plays’ 
original performance conditions; and the estrangement model remains prevalent in many present-day discussions of 
metatheatre. For example, one of our best readers of early modern drama, Andrew Gurr, argued in his 2017 collection, 
Shakespeare’s Workplace: Essays on Shakespearean Theatre (Cambridge University Press), that Shakespeare’s self-
reflexive representations operate to divorce the audience from an investment in the play-world illusion so that ‘[l]ike 
the alienation of audience from the emotions of the actors in Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt, the obviousness of the 




So that the perspective modelled by the words of Gruber and Sillars might be 
explored, and, hopefully, elucidated and extended, this article presents a reading of one of 
the most affective scenes in all of drama: the reanimation of Hermione’s statue in the final 
scene of Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale. Following on from the statements by Sillars and 
Gruber, I argue that the episode’s profound impact is realised in great part through the 
scene’s representational tension, and that the most affecting moments are derived from the 
playwright’s pressing the form’s contradictions to their most acute point. The second half 
of the article pursues this further, allowing me to underline the audacity of such a strategy. 
I demonstrate how Shakespeare marks up for the audience the parts played by the 
duplicitous and banal in the statue’s performance, an arrangement that risks at the same 
time as it engenders the scene’s sublime effects. 
The episode is familiar to us: Paulina presents to the royal court of Leontes a ‘statue’ 
of Hermione, the Queen that the drama has led both play-world figures and the audience 
in Shakespeare’s theatre to believe had died 16 fictional years previous. The action reaches 
its climax when the ‘statue’ finally moves, and it is revealed that, contrary both to reason 
and to narrative cohesion, the Queen has escaped death, and opted to stage her resurrection 
through an impersonation of her own sculpted likeness. Despite the outrageous 
arrangement by which Hermione is restored, the sequence is – as productions time and 
again attest (and we are obliged to imagine the original performances as similarly brought 
off) – one of the most startling and intensely moving episodes in all of drama.4 Oftentimes 
theatregoers invoke the miraculous in their attempt to describe its effect, and it is not 
unusual for their responses to suggest that what has been witnessed is art’s transposition 
into the actual. This sense is vividly conveyed in a review of Helen Faucit’s 1848 
performance of Hermione’s revival taken from The Glasgow Herald: 
The graceful figure … rivetted every eye when the curtain was withdrawn. So 
complete was the illusion, so still the figure, so sightless the eyeballs, that you 
seemed insensibly to forget it was a living being who stood before you; and when 
amidst the melody of music, she turned her head towards the king, the whole house 
started as if struck by an electric shock, or as if they had seen the dead rise.5 
While this account captures well the scene’s affective power it seems to suggest that 
the ‘visible contradictions’ that Gruber remarked have been wholly subjugated. Those 
watching ‘insensibly … forget’ the work’s literal dimension, and illusion realises 
something like a mimetic apotheosis. And this is an interpretation of the scene that a 
                                                          
4 G. Wilson Knight in The Sovereign Flower (Methuen, 1958) writes: ‘Eventually the resurrection of Hermione must 
be considered the most strikingly conceived and profoundly penetrating moment in English literature’ (p. 240).   
5 14 March 1848. The theatre critic for The Glasgow Citizen recounts a remarkably similar effect: ‘We really do not 
know what to say in order to speak worthily of the statue scene … It was the most entrancing thing we ever remember 
to have seen, – actually suspending the blood, and taking the breath away. It was something supernatural almost’ 
(April 1948) Both reviews are quoted in A New Variorum Edition of Shakespeare: The Winter’s Tale. 6th Ed. 1898, 





number of the play’s most astute readers have adopted. These critics, taking up the 
dichotomy that the play introduces in the debate between Perdita and Polixenes in 4.3, see 
the transposition of the ‘statue’ into the living Hermione as enacting the familiar 
Renaissance counterpoising of art and nature, and take it as ceding victory to the latter. 
Jean Hagstrum’s remarks serve to outline this perspective: ‘Shakespeare has reversed the 
situation that usually prevails in the art epigram. Art has not defeated nature; nature has 
defeated art’.6 This ‘nature’, however, has nothing of the prosaic about it, as Howard 
Felperin makes apparent in a commentary even more forthright than Hagstrum’s. For 
Felperin, Hermione’s transformation ‘is all the more miraculous in its effect than anything 
art in the usual sense could produce for being life itself … Art is repudiated even as life is 
asserted’, and he concludes that ‘[f]or a few rarefied moments the creative and recreative 
power of the imagination is literally made flesh … and the impossible comes true’.7 Even 
Leonard Barkan, a critic exceptionally alert to the shifting valences that characterise 
Shakespeare’s exploration of the relationship between art and actuality, follows suit, 
describing Hermione’s initial movements as the moment ‘that the central dream of all 
ekphrasis can finally be realized, that is, that the work of art is so real it could almost come 
to life. Theatre removes the almost’.8 
Unquestionably, the recognition of the scene’s captivating effects is crucial to any 
full assessment of the play – yet the perspective reflected in the comments above fails to 
properly account for the fabricated nature of drama, and in doing so neglects a dimension 
of self-reflexivity that the dramatist took great care to cultivate. Our experience of the play 
is attenuated if, enthralled as we are by the stage action, we do not simultaneously attend 
to the fact that the reanimated Hermione is not ‘life itself’, that the figure whose first 
movements in that final scene creates such an awesome effect is not, in actuality, the 
wronged Queen of Sicilia, but is, in fact, an aesthetic construction. As Philip Edwards 
points out, the scene is, at the levels of both play-world and actuality, a ‘brilliant double-
cross’. Contesting the critical notion that ‘it is not a triumph of art that Leontes is beholding, 
but Hermione herself’ Edwards responds that ‘[i]t is in that “Hermione herself” that the 
mockery lies, for Hermione is a boy-actor pretending to be Hermione pretending to be a 
statue’.9 The transformation of art into life that the action stages remains, inevitably, a 
                                                          
6 The Sister Arts (Chicago University Press, 1958), pp. 87-88. 
7 “Our Carver’s Excellence: The Winter’s Tale” (The Winter’s Tale: Critical Essays, edited by Maurice Hunt 
(Routledge, 1995), pp. 220-242), pp. 238, 242. 
8 “Making Pictures Speak: Renaissance Art, Elizabethan Literature, Modern Scholarship” (RenQ, vol. 48, no. 2, 
Summer 1995, pp. 326-351), p. 343. This section of my article is indebted to Richard Meek’s survey of the critical 
responses that the scene has generated in Narrating the Visual in Shakespeare (Routledge, 2016), pp. 172-180. 
9 “‘Seeing is believing’: Action and Narration in The Old Wives Tale and The Winter’s Tale” (Shakespeare and His 
Contemporaries: Essays in Comparison, edited by E. A. J. Honigmann (Manchester University Press, 1986), pp. 79-
93), pp. 92-93 n 12. I would prefer if Edwards’ formulation used ‘male actor’ rather than ‘boy actor’ – recent research 
suggests that female parts were not exclusively fulfilled by boy actors (see for example, Brett Gamboa’s Shakespeare’s 
Double Plays: Dramatic Economy on the Early Modern Stage (Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 12-13, 75, 
177). The demands of the Hermione part may be thought to exceed the capabilities of a boy actor, and this could mean 




staging, an episode that is itself framed within theatrical art’s doubled and paradoxical 
form.  
The scene’s concerns with art, representation, actuality, and wonder bring us, as 
anticipated in Barkan’s remark, to the figure of ekphrasis. The term warrants a brief 
unpacking, its denotation ‘surrounded by a haze, as much present [in antiquity] as 
generated by subsequent discussion’.10 Today ekphrasis is most commonly thought of as a 
poetical description of a visual artwork. Classicism defined it differently however, and the 
early modern humanist would have understood ekphrasis as a description applicable to an 
extremely broad range of subject material (the list of topics the various manuals of 
rhetorical instruction recommend is catholic, and artworks obtain no special status – in fact, 
more often than not they are absent), the salient feature of which was its enargeia, that is, 
the wondrous quality of bringing ‘the subject matter vividly before the eyes’.11 The practice 
of ekphrasis, however, would have ensured that the early modern scholar also thought of 
the term in the modern sense. In both early- and late-Renaissance, the most exalted 
exemplifications of the genre were both classical descriptions of artistic representations 
(respectively, Homer’s account of the elaborate imagery of the shield of Achilles, and 
Virgil’s description of the depictions on the shield of Aeneas), and when Catherine Belsey 
describes ekphrasis as ‘a favourite device of the period’ she is using the term in its modern 
denotation.12 Even in antiquity, the self-reflexive potential of applying ekphrasis to art 
objects was recognised and repeatedly seized on by a number of sophists.13 
As Richard Meek observes, The Winter’s Tale represents ‘arguably Shakespeare’s 
most provocative treatment of the figure of ekphrasis’ – a statement which takes in both 
the classical and modern senses of the term.14 A remarkably large number of the play’s key 
events are never staged, but only represented in the form of vivid description, while the 
‘statue’ of Hermione is first introduced with an ekphrastic description that underlines its 
incredible lifelikeness. But of course, when Meek writes ‘provocative’ he is thinking 
mainly of the ekphrasis of the ‘statue’ scene itself; of the staged presentation of what is 
                                                          
10 Stuart Sillars, Shakespeare and the Visual Imagination (Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 28. The ‘subsequent 
discussion’ is reflected in in a number of fascinating texts, see for example, Murray Krieger’s Ekphrasis: The Illusion 
of the Natural Sign (The John Hopkins University Press, 1992), James A. W. Heffernan’s Museum of Words: The 
Poetics of Ekphrasis from Homer to Ashbery (University of Chicago Press, 1993), W. J. T. Mitchell’s Picture Theory: 
Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation (University of Chicago Press, 1994), John Hollander’s “The Poetics of 
Ekphrasis” (Word and Image, vol. 4, 1988, pp. 209-219). 
11 A phrase, that as Ruth Webb remarks the various versions of the Progymnasmata – despite their being separated by 
up to almost four centuries – repeat over, with almost no variation (“Ekphrasis ancient and modern: The invention of 
a genre”, Word and Image, vol. 15, 1999, pp. 7-18, p. 11). 
12 “The Rape of Lucrece” (Cambridge Companion to Shakespeare’s Poetry, edited by Patrick Cheney (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), pp. 90-107), p. 100. 
13 For example, Philostratus’ Imagines (third century CE), which gives itself out as providing description of over 60 
works in a Neapolitan picture-gallery, and which was explicitly defined as ‘certain ekphrasis of works of painting’ by 
his purported grandson, Philostratus the Younger, in the proem to the second book. In the same or next century, 
Callistratus produced an imitation of the Imagines entitled Ekphraseis, which consisted of 14 essays describing stone 
and bronze statues. 




initially introduced as a sculpture realised by ‘Julio Romano’, an artist whose work offers 
such a degree of verisimilitude that it ‘would beguile nature of her custom’ (5.2.97).15 It is 
a tag in which we hear again the dream of actualisation that informs all mimetic 
representation, and which, as Barkan’s earlier comment indicates, ekphrasis makes 
explicit.  
Yet there is another side to ekphrasis; for however insistently this apparent impulse 
to the actual is advanced, ekphrasis can too be thought of as something of a deliberate 
misdirection. It is a set-piece, and as such marks itself up as an artistic representation that 
is, at essence, confined to the rhetorical. Discussing the figure’s nature, Meek has written 
of how ekphrasis ‘crystallises something of the paradoxical nature, even duplicity’ of 
artistic representation, and elsewhere he goes as far as to describe it as ‘a sophisticated con 
trick’.16 Ekphrasis then seems to pull in two ways at once, and the title of Murray Krieger’s 
excellent study of the figure captures precisely this inherent contrariety: Ekphrasis: The 
Illusion of the Natural Sign.17 
Understood in this way, it becomes clear that the possibilities generated by 
ekphrasis fit well with an art like Shakespeare’s, intimately concerned as it is with the 
representational possibilities afforded by the exchange between illusion and artifice. This 
exchange is of course foregrounded and intensified, provocatively so, in Hermione’s 
‘statue’. For rather than being confined to rhetorical illusion, as in the traditional ekphrastic 
mode, here ekphrasis is figured forth. The dream of actual presence is, it seems, realised – 
yet simultaneous with this, the arrangement cannot help but point up that this ‘actual 
presence’ is, at bottom, simply another layer of artistic dissimulation – an actor performing 
a part composed by a playwright.  
This points us towards something which the reading of the ‘statue’ scene will 
explore: that the strategies by which Shakespeare makes use of the dissimulations and 
contradictory unfolding of early modern theatrical representation bear a certain 
commonality with – to return to Meek’s words – the con trick. And this is a correspondence 
which the play seems to self-reflexively highlight through the figure of the scam-artist, 
Autolycus, with a number of critics happy to identify the play’s fraudster with Shakespeare 
himself.18 Autolycus is, like his creator, a virtuoso in the creation of fantastical deceptions, 
                                                          
15 Giulio Romano was, of course, one of most famous artists of the Renaissance; he helped to define the mannerist 
style and was seen by his contemporaries as the principal heir to Raphael. The spelling of his first name as ‘Julio’ 
reflects that found in the folio, a form which most subsequent editors have stuck to. The different spellings prove 
rather convenient for the critic who needs to distinguish between the actual artist and his fictional counterpart. All 
references to The Winter’s Tale are taken from The Norton Shakespeare, 3rd edition, edited by Stephen Greenblatt, 
Walter Cohen, Suzanne Gossett, Katharine Eisaman Maus, Gordon McMullan (W. W. Norton, 2016). 
16 Narrating the Visual, pp. 6, 178. In the first quotation Meek is referring to literary description specifically rather 
than artistic representation in general. However, as the discussion throughout his book makes apparent, Meek 
understands the arrangement he remarks as also taking in representation on stage and in the visual arts.  
17 The John Hopkins University Press, 1992. 
18 For example, Mary L. Livingstone’s “The Natural Art of The Winter’s Tale” (Modern Language Quarterly, vol. 30, 
1969, pp. 340-355), especially p. 346; Philip Edwards’ “‘Seeing is believing’: Action and Narration in The Old Wives 
Tale and The Winter’s Tale”, especially p. 92; Stephen Orgel’s introduction to the 1996 Oxford Shakespeare edition 
of the play, especially p. 52. 
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and in the manipulation of his audience’s credence. Moreover, playwright and play-world 
part both share a brazen yet gamesome confidence in the powers of their artistry, both being 
willing to risk the success of their dissimulations by pressing them to ever more outlandish 
extremes – as well as through foregrounding the very means by which these deceptions are 
brought off. Yet as will be demonstrated, it is this sophist-like gambit which makes possible 
the scene’s revelatory power. 
 
 
The ‘statue’ scene 
We should here at the outset underline an aspect of Shakespeare’s stagecraft which, being 
as it is so often taken for granted, is not always made explicit. Shakespeare’s plays, as Jean 
E. Howard observes, 
give every evidence that he thought a great deal about audiences: their potential 
recalcitrance and suggestibility, the techniques by which the dramatist wins or 
forfeits control over them, the potential abuses and benefits of such control … he 
also created scripts that reveal his constant concern with guiding the perceptions and 
responses of those who watched his dramas.19 
In the current instance where I imply that the closing scene of The Winter’s Tale 
deploys the contrary aspects of early modern drama’s form to facilitate something along 
the lines of a confidence scam the manner in which Shakespeare guides audience 
perceptions and responses must be thought of as of particular interest. And to get some 
sense of how this is engineered we should remark at the outset that Shakespeare’ spectators 
go into the scene somewhat wrong-footed. For the apparent narrative climax which the 
audience members were anticipating, the spectacle of royal reunion between King Leontes, 
his thought-to-be-lost daughter, Perdita, and his estranged friend, King Polixenes, has been 
denied them and they have had to make do instead with a second-hand and somewhat 
farcical report of the scene.20 And the play would have only further compounded the 
audience’s sense of consternation, by having, at this point when the climax of the 
narrative’s main action, however unsatisfying a form it may have taken, seems done, one 
of the gentlemen introduce into proceedings some peculiar business about a statue of the 
Queen, a part which the audience had assumed the play had long since disposed of. 
The unveiling of Hermione’s ‘statue’ would have only underlined the singularity of 
the scene’s action. As the dialogue makes apparent Paulina reveals the ‘statue’ by drawing 
                                                          
19 Jean E. Howard, Shakespeare's Art of Orchestration: Stage Technique and Audience Response (University of 
Illinois Press, 1984), p. 8. 
20 A point made by various critical voices, but perhaps Arthur Thomas Quiller-Couch captures the mood most 
colourfully: ‘Are we not baulked? In proportion as we have paid tribute to the art of the story by letting our interest 
be intrigued, our emotion excited, are we not cheated when Shakespeare lets us down with this reported tale?’ (Notes 




a curtain (a stage direction that modern editions supply, and which lines 5.3.18-20 make 
explicit), and this would seem to indicate that Hermione has been concealed in the stage’s 
discovery space. Such a blocking arrangement is highly unusual (it seems that only once 
before had a play in the commercial English theatre made such a use of the discovery 
space21), and we must imagine, histrionically realised as Paulina’s uncurtaining surely was, 
its effect would have been notable. 
Almost immediately, however, in a dramatic strategy that, as I will show runs through 
the scene, this powerful effect is undercut, or at the least, reconfigured. Here, the moment 
of spectacle is juxtaposed incongruously with what could be understood as the crude 
connotations implicit in Leontes’ initial exclamation: ‘Her natural posture!’ (5.3.23). 
Certainly, the utterance serves to capture Leontes’ startled wonder, and the line can too be 
thought of as picking out the contrapuntal theme of representation’s ekphrastic impulse to 
the actual through what has been presented as a work of Julio Romano. Moreover, 
Romano’s reputation for an art that rivals the actual is something with which any Jacobean 
readers of the first edition of Georgio Vasari’s Lives of the Artists (1550) would have been 
familiar, and the eulogistic introduction that the Third Gentleman provides to the statue of 
Hermione with its claim that its creator ‘could put breath into his work’ seems to 
deliberately reference it. As Vasari records, the second epitaph inscribed on Romano’s 
tomb read: ‘Jupiter saw sculpted and painted bodies breathe and the homes of mortals made 
equal to those in heaven through the skill of Giulio Romano. Thus angered he summoned 
a council of all the gods, and he removed that man from the earth, lest he be exposed, 
conquered, or equalled by an earth-born man’.22 Yet Gurr remarks another connotation, 
pointing out that the expression probably makes reference to an actual work that for a 
number of Jacobeans the name ‘Julio Romano’ would have immediately conjured: the 
illustrations made by the play’s real-world counterpart in the most notorious erotic book of 
the sixteenth century, Arentino’s Postures.23 The innuendo – and the stage blocking may 
                                                          
21 Bart van Es points out that the unconventional arrangement is almost certainly borrowed from John Fletcher’s 
tragicomedy, The Faithful Shepherdess, first performed – we think – in 1608 by the Children of the Blackfriars (that 
is, probably two or three years before The Winter’s Tale), but later added to the Kingsmen’s repertoire. In the final act 
of Fletcher’s play, a curtain is drawn to reveal a carefully orchestrated spectacle which restores two figures that the 
stage characters and audience had presumed to be dead. The arrangement undoubtedly impressed Shakespeare, for he 
makes use of it not only here in The Winter’s Tale, but again soon after in The Tempest, when ‘Prospero discovers 
Ferdinand and Miranda playing at chess’ (5.1.171 sd) (Shakespeare in Company (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 
272-274). 
22 The epitaph was dropped from subsequent editions. The passage can be found in Le Vite de' piu eccellenti pittori 
scultori ed architettori, edited by G. Milanesi (Firenze G. C. Sansoni, 1878-85), p. 557, and the translation provided 
here appears in Leonard Barkan’s “‘Living Sculptures’: Ovid, Michelangelo, and The Winter's Tale” (ELH, vol. 48, 
no. 4, Winter 1981, pp. 639-667), p. 656. 
23 “New Directions: Sources and Creativity in The Tempest” (The Tempest: A Critical Reader, edited by Alden T. 
Vaughn and Virginia Mason Vaughn (Bloomsbury, 2014), pp. 93-114), p. 98. Gurr sees the inclusion of the reference 
as sustaining what he argues is the teasing relationship the play takes up to Ben Jonson. Gurr observes that Jonson 
flaunted his familiarity with the scandalous work, ‘most likely alluding to what Shakespeare, for one, knew was his 
personal copy. References to it appear in both Volpone and The Alchemist, two of the plays he wrote for Shakespeare’s 




have chosen to play it up – is that the pose the ‘statue’ models is compatible, hypothetically 
at least, with the King and Queen’s preferred coital arrangement.  
But of course, what would have been immediately obvious, and perhaps most 
discomposing of all, was that what the unveiling revealed as stood on a platform was not, 
in actual terms, a statue, but a male actor. What would not have been clear though is 
whether the male actor is impersonating a statue of Hermione – that is assuming the role 
of a theatrical prop – or if he is impersonating the Hermione role impersonating the statue. 
This latter possibility is especially bewildering – for the narrative has indicated to the 
audience, quite unambiguously, that Hermione has died. The audience has watched as 
Leontes was led out to see her corpse, and, in what would seem unassailable dramatic 
proof, Antigonus has been granted a vision of the ‘dead’ Queen. As Ernest Schanzer notes, 
‘[t]here is no precedent in Elizabethan drama for the spirit of a living person appearing to 
others either in dream or waking’.24 And while an audience familiar with Shakespeare’s 
artistic strategies may have noted that the playwright’s recent romances were not at all 
times as forthright as his earlier work, they would still have expected the play to unfold 
according to what Schanzer calls Shakespeare’s ‘habitual practice’, which ‘in contrast to 
that of many other playwrights … had been to put the audience in full possession of all 
relevant knowledge, so that, even on a first viewing, the dramatic irony that derives from 
the characters’ lack of this knowledge is immediately felt’.25  
Playing against this sense of the improbability of Hermione’s resurrection though, 
and doing so powerfully, is the patent fact that this ‘statue’ is performed by the Hermione 
actor. And this arrangement would only encourage the expectation fostered by Renaissance 
tradition that any statue presented in literature or performance might very well come to 
life.26 Yet at the same time, any restoration that would reverse Hermione’s fate means that 
the audience has been lied to – and, correspondingly,  this means that any promise of 
restoration which is held out cannot itself be trusted.27 The matter is finely poised; one 
strand of the play’s illusion – stage representation – seems to validate the ‘statue’ as being 
the resurrected Hermione, while another strand – the narrative representation – tells the 
audience that this cannot be. And inevitably, the contradictions that this juxtaposition 
effects will point the audience back to an awareness of the fictitious nature of both 
representations. Yet the playwright has deliberately cultivated these vying impulses, and, 
masterfully, he directs them. The intense spectacle of the scene’s fiction demands focus, 
                                                          
24 Introduction, The Winter’s Tale (The New Penguin Shakespeare) (Penguin, 1973), p. 15. 
25 The Winter’s Tale, p.15.  
26 As Wilson F. Engel III notes, ‘[t]he statue that comes to life to take part in dramatic action was a stock, sensational 
device in Renaissance English drama with roots in classical, non-dramatic sources’. Alongside the statue of Hermione, 
he lists a number of other examples: ‘the Brazen Head in Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay, by Robert Greene, the statue 
of Pompey and the dreamed statue of Caesar in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, the statue of Fortune in Jonson’s Sejanus, 
His Fall’ (“Sculpture and the Art of Memory in Elizabethan and Jacobean Drama” (Modern language Studies, vol. 
10, no. 2, Spring 1980, pp. 3-9), p. 3). The trope was also popular in masques: in Thomas Campion’s The Lord’s 
Masque (1613) eight women, turned into statues by Jove, are reanimated, and the first antimasque in Francis 
Beaumont’s Masque of the Inner Temple and Gray’s Inn (also 1613) has four statues come to life and dance.  
27 As Stephen Orgel puts it in his introduction to the Oxford edition: ‘if Leontes is being deceived by Paulina about 
the reality of death, so we are being deceived by Shakespeare’ (p. 36). 
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and this means that the audience members are not permitted the opportunity to properly 
reflect on this contestation between a belief in play-world illusion and its repudiation, but 
can only map the experience of this tension back onto the narrative. And, it follows, that it 
is there, within the narrative, that the audience seeks its satisfaction. Here it seems, 
Brechtian notions of metatheatre are anticipated and superseded. Estrangement is only the 
initial stage in this metatheatrical strategy; for this estrangement is realised in tandem with, 
and countered by, the compelling power of the play’s illusion. Moreover, the tension of 
this arrangement is projected back onto the play-world, re-investing its fictions with greater 
dramatic immediacy. 
This tension must not be allowed to resolve itself either one way or the other, else it 
disappears. So when the play highlights that the Hermione figure seems to show the signs 
of aging that one would expect to find if this was indeed the living Queen, this revelational 
momentum must be offered some kind of inhibition. Once more, and again rather 
audaciously, it takes the form of an inappropriate comic check. For once the effect of the 
double entendre of Leontes’ initial expression has been dispersed by the king’s subsequent 
expressions of an overwhelming wonder, the passage tacks back again, and Leontes 
remarks, ‘But yet, Paulina,/ Hermione was not so much wrinkled, nothing/ so agèd as this 
seems’ (5.3.27-29). These words contrast sharply with the idealised hyperbole of the king’s 
memorialisation of his Queen at the start of the act – and depending on how Polixenes – 
the man Leontes had previously thought his love-rival – delivers his next line, ‘O, not by 
much’, the sexist humour of Hermione’s literal objectification might be repeated and 
extended. 
Despite this comic interjection, these wrinkles would nonetheless seem to provide a 
natural sign confirming that this truly is the Queen – that, somehow, at the narrative level, 
Hermione avoided the death we were told befell her 16 stage-years previous. But of course, 
this confirmation provided by the visual evidence of her aging – in a play, which as has 
been noted, constantly raises doubts about the nature of visual evidence – is born of, and 
only leads the audience back to, the illusions of the stage. For – returning to the ekphrastic 
paradigm remarked in Krieger’s study – this natural sign is clearly an artificial illusion. It 
is what the Jacobeans would have called ‘paint’, that is, stage make up. And for this stage 
paint to be effective (that it conveys the impression of the part having aged, and that this 
apparent aging is visible to even the most distant spectators), it would need to be 
exaggerated, and, one imagines, more stylised than realistic. As Meg Twycross and Sarah 
Carpenter note, it is unlikely that stage cosmetics of the period would produce – or were 
even intended to produce – a naturalistic effect.28 
Additionally, being that as ‘early modern defenders and detractors of the stage alike 
imagined paint as embodying the essence of theatricality’29 it would seem that at the same 
time the stage make up realises the representational indication of Hermione having aged 
                                                          
28 Masks and Masking in Medieval and Early Tudor England (Routledge, 2016), p. 317.  
29 Andrea Stevens “Cosmetic Transformations” (Shakespeare’s Theatres and the Effects of Performance, edited by 
Farah Karim-Cooper and Tiffany Stern (The Arden Shakespeare, 2014), pp. 94-117), p. 95. 
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16 years, it must simultaneously signal a metatheatrical remarking of the play-as-aesthetic-
construction, underlining that ‘the aged Hermione’ exists only as a dissimulation rendered 
by a made-up actor. Paulina’s lines twice draw metatheatrical attention to the figure’s 
painted aspect, as she dissuades first Perdita and then Leontes from attempting to kiss the 
‘statue’:  
Oh, patience! 
The statue is but newly fixed, the colour's 
Not dry. (5.3.46-48) 
 
Good my lord, forbear. 
The ruddiness upon her lip is wet; 
You'll mar it if you kiss it, stain your own 
With oily painting. (5.3.80-83) 
At the same time, the painted nature of the wrinkles would also signal the larger aesthetic 
construction of the play itself, pointing the audience back to the (let us underline it – 
probably not wholly convincing) cosmetic transformation by which all the stage presences 
from the play’s first half have been made to look older, including, of course, the two Kings 
that give Hermione appraisal. 
But as we have noted, this pointing up its own artifice does not undermine the 
scene’s emotional hold. It seems, in fact, that in so far as these movements model a struggle, 
the audience is encouraged to strive with ever more urgency after belief, to invest all the 
more in the possibility of a living Hermione. This impetus to faith is pursued throughout 
the language of the final act, and at the brink of Hermione’s restoration, this impulse is 
made most explicit: Paulina announces, ‘It is required/ You do awake your faith’ (5.3.94-
5). Though, ostensibly, directed at Leontes and the court audience, it is the theatre audience 
who Paulina charges, and whose belief is being spurred on.30 Paulina goes on to provide 
the – one imagines, occasionally unruly – Jacobean spectators further instruction: ‘Then 
all stand still’, and King Leontes speaks a royal injunction that commands their attention 
at the same time as it promises their compliance: ‘No foot shall stir’ (5.3.98).  
Coming at this point of pitched suspense, these imperatives work to reposition the 
audience; they open up the stage and assign the spectators a play-world role. They are 
changed from theatre audience to royal subjects; no longer spectators, but witnesses.31 It is 
                                                          
30 As Patricia Southard Gourlay observes ‘Paulina herself is both magician and stage-manager, an arranger of dramatic 
effect, totally in control of her spectacle’ (“‘O my most sacred lady’ – Female Metaphor in The Winter’s Tale” (The 
Winter’s Tale: Critical Essays, pp. 258-279), p. 275). 
31 A reading of the audience reaction that would chime with the theatre experience of yet another Scottish reviewer 
fortunate enough to witness Faucit’s Hermione: ‘The spectator became an actor in the scene, and all “Held their breath 
for a time” (The Scotchman (Edinburgh, 3 March 1847)). In his discussion of the scene, Michael O'Connell argues 
that the viewers ‘become complicit in the worship of the statue and thus agents in whatever it is that brings about the 




as though in ceding this particularly realised role to the audience, the thin but sophisticated 
divide that separates Jacobean stage and audience is momentarily withdrawn. Having 
dallied with older literary forms throughout, it seems as if The Winter’s Tale, for these few 
vital and hypnotic moments, shirks off a century’s worth of dramatic tradition and, for the 
space of three or four breaths, relocates its action and its audience within the atmosphere 
of the spiritually loaded dramas of the recent medieval past.32 I am referring of course to 
the mystery plays, dramas which, rather than taking a knowing attitude to the dissimulation 
of dramatic performance as the Jacobethan theatre was, at one level, almost compelled to 
do, unfolded through a modality that was more akin to that of religious reenactment. This 
was drama in which, as Anne Righter puts it, ‘illusion had power over reality’, and in 
which, ‘[w]hile the performance lasted, audience and actors shared the same ritual world’.33 
Or, perhaps rather than my claiming that the play has relocated its action within this 
tradition it might be more precise to say it makes a deliberate facsimile of it; that is, to 
remark the sequence as an appropriation of the arrangement of the earlier form – as the 
borrowing of an effect. 
Still Hermione does not move just yet. For – quite strikingly – the apparent miracle 
of her return to life is not cued by this call for faith, but by a reformulation of Paulina’s 
sacred imprecation that stresses once more the context of theatrical performance. The 
earlier, ‘It is required you do awake your faith’ is transposed into ‘Music, awake her; 
strike!’ (5.3.98). And this moment of aural surprise would have paired itself with an 
intellectual jolt. For in whatever way it was realised, this music could not help but have 
marked itself out as bringing to a climax what a number of the audience would have viewed 
uneasily as a series of recognisably Catholic gestures enacting a repeated challenge of 
Protestant proscription. To begin with, as Julia Reinhard Lupton has pointed out, the 
scene’s occurrence in a ‘chapel’ allows it to reproduce Catholicism’s iconography of 
idolatry.34 Walter Lim offers further examples: ‘there is the reference to Julio Romano, 
whose name cannot be extricated from the contaminating context of papal politics; and 
then, of course, there are the pervasive images evocative of Marian iconography’.35 One of 
                                                          
Shakespeare does not counter, but embraces the charge’ (The Idolatrous Eye: Iconoclasm and Theatre in Early-
Modern England (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 141). 
32 Though he uses different examples and remarks different effects, Daryll Grantley also sees The Winter’s Tale as 
making use of the mystery play tradition. In “The Winter’s Tale and Early Religious Drama” (Comparative Drama 
vol. 20, no. 1, Spring 1986, pp. 17-37) he argues that ‘Leontes in his rage recalls one of the most dramatically striking 
of the characters in scriptural drama: Herod’, and goes on to compare Hermione’s trial scene to the representation of 
the trial of Christ in the Cycle plays (pp. 29, 31). Other critics have noted that Shakespeare’s latter plays can be seen 
as making use of this older and distinctly religious form. We see it, for example, in Colin Still’s study of The Tempest, 
to which he gives the title, Shakespeare’s Mystery Play (Folcroft Library Editions, 1921), and in the introduction to 
the 1963 Arden edition of Pericles F. D. Hoeniger argues for the play’s structural features as being derived from the 
Saint’s Play.  
33 Shakespeare and the Idea of the Play (Penguin Shakespeare Library, 1967), pp. 15, 21. 
34 Afterlives of the Saints: Hagiography, Typology, and Renaissance Literature (Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 
175-218, especially p. 217. 
35 “Knowledge and Belief in The Winter's Tale” (Tudor and Stuart Drama, special issue of Studies in English 




the most resonant of these images being when Perdita kneels before the ‘statue’ of her 
mother, only, as Lim observes, ‘to find herself beset by the Protestant awareness that such 
an act of adulation is akin to superstition’36: ‘And give me leave,/ And do not say 'tis 
superstition, that/ I kneel, and then implore her blessing’ (5.3.42-44).  
A word, however, needs to be said about the scene’s setting.37 Following the stage 
directions supplied in modern editions of The Winter’s Tale (no such indications found 
their way into the folios) most commentators have been content to understand the play’s 
final scene as, from the first, occurring in ‘a chapel’. However, Shakespeare’s original 
audience would have experienced the scene very differently. The failure to recognise this 
represents an oversight, and it has meant that one of the scene’s most startling and original 
theatrical shifts has escaped critical attention. Let us remind the reader that the almost 
complete lack of scenery on the early modern stage meant that when a scene required a 
specific location, dialogue was constrained to indicate it. Naturally, it was expedient that 
this was done early on in the scene. Turning to the opening exchanges of The Winter’s 
Tale’s final scene we see that while in the sixth line Paulina remarks the action as occurring 
in her ‘poor house’ there is nothing that might indicate to a Jacobean audience that the 
events are taking place in a chapel. In fact, 10 lines in, Leontes makes a comment to Paulina 
which might suggest a rather different setting:  
Your gallery 
Have we passed through, not without much content 
In many singularities, but we saw not 
That which my daughter came to look upon, 
The statue of her mother. (5.3.10-14).  
Granted, the present perfect construction of ‘Have we pass’d through’ could be understood 
by some audience members to indicate that the King and his entourage have left the gallery 
and entered a new room. But other audience members would surely be likely to take 
Leontes words as indicating that the stage figures are still in Paulina’s gallery. A sense that 
would be reinforced by there being no alternate setting remarked in the scene’s early 
exchanges, and also by the fact that a ‘gallery’ is precisely the location one would expect 
to encounter a statue.  
The ambiguity is deliberately and rather cunningly cultivated, and even for audience 
members who understood Leontes’ lines as remarking that the figures had subsequently 
entered a separate space, the sense that the action occurs in a ‘chapel’ would still be wholly 
absent. Shakespeare allows these conceptualisations of the setting to persist right up until 
line 86, at which point the play-world locale is made explicit. Leaving the marking of 
setting so extraordinarily late and fashioning the scene in such a way that some members 
                                                          
Romano, as the already quoted epitaph that Vasari assigns to Romano demonstrates the notion that a work of art was 
capable of offending divinity was not exclusive to Protestant thought. 
36 “Knowledge and Belief in The Winter's Tale”, p. 320. 
37 The remarks on the scene’s ‘chapel’ setting are derived from my article, “‘Quit presently the chapel’; A note on 
setting in the final scene of The Winter’s Tale” (Notes and Queries, vol 67, no. 2, June 2020). 
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of the audience (those who had imagined the play events as occurring in a gallery) would 
be forced into an abrupt reconceptualisation of the setting makes for a rather arresting 
arrangement. The timing too is striking – with the disclosure being embedded in the 
passage in which Paulina offers a miraculous reanimation:  
Either forbear, 
Quit presently the chapel, or resolve you 
For more amazement. If you can behold it, 
I'll make the statue move indeed, descend, 
And take you by the hand (5.3.85-89). 
The newly remarked setting underwrites the divine dimensions of Paulina’s 
promise, and in this way accumulates to itself an acute significance.38 That the existence 
of the chapel is relayed to the audience members almost as if in passing, in the manner of 
a piece of background information, would have made the information all the more startling. 
In contrast to readings which take the presence of the chapel as apparent throughout and 
so picture the audience experiencing the scene’s implications of Catholic idolatry unfolding 
as a series of separate instances, it seems that these affronts to Protestant interdict only 
become fully apparent retrospectively, at the point when Paulina’s speaks the word, 
‘chapel’ – and I would add, that in so far as they become apparent all at once, their impact 
is all the more intense.39 
The revelation that the statue has been all along in a chapel is an arrangement that 
would have been particularly invidious to Protestant sensibility. It would have meant that 
the audience, without fully grasping it at the time, had been offered a representation that 
flouted the contemporary proscription on imagery in places of worship, whereby church 
statues – at least those which had escaped the zeal of Reformist destruction – were covered 
over. It would also mean that Paulina’s melodramatic revelation of the statue, occurring as 
it did through a curtained unveiling, would have served as a rather shocking up-ending of 
contemporary interdict. Yet, of greater significance would be the sudden realisation that 
the audience members had witnessed a stage re-enactment of Catholic image worship, and 
a re-enactment which, in the powerful emotional appeal it realised, they had unknowingly 
urged on. Perhaps most troubling of all, this worshiped statue seems to be on the verge of 
the kind of miraculous transformation to which the Catholic church’s statues, at least in the 
previous generation, were notoriously prone40 – and which Protestants took great pains to 
                                                          
38 The imaginative transposing of gallery to chapel, that is, the reconceptualisation of a secular space as a holy one, 
might encourage the critics who see Hermione’s recovery as a miraculous realisation that repudiates the claims of art. 
But this would be to ignore the explicit dissimulation by which this transformation of setting has been brought about, 
and which itself points back to the play as being realised through an art that is intensely focused on its own artifice. 
39 As my “‘Quit presently the chapel’; A note on setting in the final scene of The Winter’s Tale” demonstrates, the 
impact derived from the locale being realised in this way is something the playwright deliberately cultivated. In the 
previous scene, when the statue is first introduced, Shakespeare goes to some dialogical lengths so as to avoid giving 
out its specific location. 
40 The exposé of the false miracles devised by Catholic priests was a favourite topic in Protestant discussion – and 
oftentimes this concerned itself with moving church statues. See, for example, the various discourses of the period 
devoted to denouncing the Rood of Grace in Boxley Abbey as a mechanised hoax. 
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demonstrate were – and this is not without significance when it comes to Hermione’s return 
to life – elaborate and sinful hoaxes. And nor is the play satisfied to leave it there. 
With Paulina’s holy exhortation having already provided the mandate for 
Hermione’s reanimation, the subsequent demand for music – an arrangement that is, which 
effectively frames ‘music’ as constituting the final and crucial element in Hermione’s 
enlivening – would seem a rather brazen inversion of the Protestant prohibition of 
instrumentation in places of worship. And of course, the music that inspired Hermione’s 
resuscitation would be far removed from the sacred sound typical of churches prior to the 
reformation. It would be realised instead through a distinctly secular aural pattern – ‘that 
lascivious, amorous, effeminate, voluptuous music’ which William Prynne encountered 
only at the theatre.41 Some commentators, encouraged by a conventional reading of the 
‘statue’ scene which sees the movement to revelation as a swelling concord, will find it 
natural to imagine this music as taking the form of a restrained and harmonic theme, most 
likely realised through the theatre’s string and wind instruments. This is certainly feasible, 
but we should not dismiss the possibility that a more galvanising sound accompanies 
Hermione’s first movements, something which might more closely echo the cadences of 
Paulina’s commentary, marked as it is by ‘brisk stirring trumpet sentences’42 and frequent 
and abrupt breaks (this later sense is underlined by the punctuation in the first folio: 
Paulina’s command is printed as ‘Musick; awake her: Strike:/ 'Tis time: descend: be Stone 
no more: approach:’ (3.306-307)). A strident sound would create disjuncture, but at the 
same time the effect would innervate, as well as serving to underline the epochal fracture 
that this reanimation instantiates. And having made the most of this momentary discord, 
once again, the scene zags back the other way, as Paulina delivers a speech of such poetic 
and evocative power that – for a few instants at least – any impulses to discord must be 
overwhelmed; contrariety, having brought the scene to is pitch, is, momentarily, 
suspended: 
'Tis time. Descend. Be stone no more. Approach, 
Strike all that look upon with marvel. Come, 
I'll fill your grave up. Stir. Nay, come away. 
Bequeath to death your numbness, for from him 
Dear life redeems you. (5.3.99-103) 
And, incredibly and outrageously, Hermione steps down onto the stage. 
 
 
                                                          
41Histriomastix (London: Michael Sparke, 1632), p. 274. 
42 Harley Granville Barker, “Preface to The Winter’s Tale” (The Winter’s Tale: Critical Essays, pp. 76-81), p. 79. 
Earlier, when she decides to take on the part of the scolding voice of moral consciousness, Paulina makes explicit the 
trumpeting tones that she has adopted: ‘I'll take 't upon me:/ If I prove honey-mouth'd, let my tongue blister,/ And 
never to my red-look'd anger be/ The trumpet anymore’ (2.2.32-35).   
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Motion and magic 
At the same time then that the play’s spectators experience the wonder of miraculous 
resurrection and the dream of ekphrasis’ representational ideality, a parallel metatheatrical 
movement marks up the artifice of artistic illusion. As has been demonstrated, the 
playwright skillfully exploits this representational duality, and this means that while the 
sequence’s representational claims are ironised and even sometimes temporarily 
undermined, the play’s climactic effects are nonetheless lent intensification. While the 
scene can, on the one hand be thought of as an extended exploration of artistic 
representation’s inherent dissimulation, it can simultaneously be considered an exemplar 
of the overwhelming effects that illusion is capable of. Key to the success of this operation 
is the sense of ‘the paradoxical nature, even duplicity’ of Shakespeare’s dramatic 
representation. In the context of this discussion there are two further effects generated in 
the scene which deserve remarking. Their analysis will underline the extent to which the 
play presses its original audience to associate its most profoundly moving illusions with 
the aspects of banal simulation and empty trickery. 
The first of these aspects concerns the acted impersonation of the unmoving statue. 
Whenever an actor is forced to represent immobility on the stage, and its most common 
application is, of course, not to statues, but to corpses, some part of the audience’s attention 
is invariably drawn to how successful the impersonation is. As the actor Peter Ustinov 
notes, ‘When presented with a corpse, we check for breathing’, an observation which Jenn 
Stephenson expounds as ‘[d]eath is always meta-theatrical’.43 Stephenson goes on to state 
that this attention ‘unbalance[s] the typical duality of aesthetic experience’ forming a 
‘second-order metatheatre which comments on theatrical perception by showing 
breakdowns of that perception’.44 It is an effect that we see Shakespeare frequently play 
off in his treatment of stage corpses,45 and it is a strategy he makes use of in his handling 
of the statue impersonation in The Winter’s Tale.  
Here, the audience’s focus on the rather exacting task given to the Hermione-actor is 
echoed and intensified by the inspection that the onstage-audience gives to what it 
presumes is a statue. And this is accentuated by a further demand that Shakespeare places 
on the impersonation – for as the text makes apparent, the actor must conduct his imitation 
                                                          
43 Taken from Jenn Stephenson’s “Singular impressions: Meta-theatre on Renaissance celebrities and corpses” 
(Studies in Theatre and Performance, vol. 27, no. 2, 2007, pp. 137-153), p. 147. 
44 “Singular impressions: Meta-theatre on Renaissance celebrities and corpses”, p. 138. 
45 Gamboa provides an excellent example of the intricacies of Shakespeare’s metatheatric strategies in his extended 
analysis of Othello’s suffocation of Desdemona, which begins by remarking that the initial attack ‘will always leave 
the actor breathing – and the spectators watching her breathe – while giving us cause to believe that the character has 
died. Spectators fluently harmonise the actor’s life and the character’s death. But when Othello finds her living, we 
learn that the reality we perceived (of a living actor) was, in fact, a component of the fiction. So, in the moment at 
which Othello finds life – ‘Not dead? Not yet quite dead?’ – we learn that we have more misjudged the state of the 
drama than he, while mistaking our own capacity to keep fiction separate from truth. Shakespeare anticipates how 
spectators will perceive and process stage deaths, then uses our understanding against us. We trust convention by 
setting truth aside for a fictional reality, only to learn that truth was necessary for correctly interpreting fictional 
events.’ This analysis is followed by an equally perceptive reading of the acute presence of the live actor in Cordelia’s 
death scene in King Lear. Shakespeare’s Double Plays, pp. 36-38.   
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with eyes open (5.3.67). Deliberately, the playwright has tasked his actor – at the same 
time as he has marked up that his performance of immobility warrants scrutiny – with an 
impossible demand; it being inconceivable that any actor would be capable of holding an 
unblinking, motionless gaze for over a hundred lines.  
The actor has already maintained the pose for a couple of minutes – meaning that 
some audience members would almost certainly have remarked some involuntary 
movements of his eyes – when Leontes and Polixenes close in on the ‘statue’ so as to give 
it closer survey: 
LEONTES:  See, my lord, 
Would you not deem it breathed, and that those veins 
Did verily bear blood? 
POLIXENES: Masterly done: 
The very life seems warm upon her lip. (5.3.63-66) 
The Kings’ appraisal of the verisimilitude of the ‘statue’ cannot help but indicate the actual 
manner of its realisation. But this ‘actual’ brings us back to the claims of the critics who 
see in the sequence life’s victory over art, and reminds us also of the limitations of this 
view. Leontes’ words, like so many things in this scene, make use of ekphrastic convention 
to ironically foreground the inherent contrarieties of artistic representation. They point 
beneath the impersonation of marble to remark the flesh-and-blood Hermione within – yet 
this is to remark, at one and the same time, the flesh-and blood Jacobean actor on whose 
skills the successful impression of marble-like immobility is predicated. It is a design 
which serves to redouble the scene’s tension, as each representational mode is dependent 
on the success of the imitation. For at the play-world level, if, as the audience cannot help 
but suspect, this is the recovered Hermione, then it seems vital that the Queen should 
maintain the illusion that she is a statue, so that Paulina might direct the action to its 
orchestrated conclusion. Parallel to this, and unfolding according to Stephenson’s concept 
of ‘second-order metatheatre’, it is too vital that the actor should not fail in his impression 
of immobility, and that he maintains the illusion that Hermione maintains the illusion that 
she is a statue, so that Shakespeare might direct the action to its orchestrated conclusion. 
Shakespeare, one cannot help but note, has placed a great deal of weight on, and directed 
a great part of the audience’s attention to, what is not only an impossible performance, but 
one, in that a great part of the audience’s focus is directed to the business of an actor’s 
ability to forgo blinking, risks transposing sublime illusion into a trifling and banal 
actuality.  
And, in line with the Autolycus-like sensibility that pervades the play – which is 
prepared to gamble that the con-trick of its fictions can sustain themselves even as it 
outrageously advertises the constructed nature of their deceptions – The Winter’s Tale ups 
the tension one notch further. Continuing his inspection, Leontes is given an observation 
that teases the failure of the impression: ‘The fixure of her eye has motion in’t/ As we are 
mocked with art’ (5.3.67-68). This line could of course be understood simply as a 
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continuance of the Kings’ preceding comments, with the stock formula by which ekphrasis 
complements the art-work – that its illusions could be taken for reality itself – and so 
working to underline once more the structural irony built into the scene. But the remark 
certainly also carries with it the suggestion that Leontes feels he has glimpsed just the sort 
of involuntary movement which the audience members have themselves been monitoring 
the ‘statue’ for (and the folio’s ‘fixure’, meaning ‘fixed position’ – which editors usually 
emend to ‘fixture’ – would further underline this), the very movement that would seem to 
threaten the schemes of Hermione and Paulina as well as those of the playwright.  
Leontes’ line implies that he subjects the eyes of the ‘statue’ to a close inspection. It 
is a deeply ironic moment, and one that places representation under an intense strain. 
Originally given out as a wondrous artwork exemplifying ekphrasis’ empirical idealism – 
of manifesting a rhetorical presence that rivals the real – the ‘statue’ has been reconfigured 
according to a different mimetic arrangement. It now presents itself, most prominently in 
the audience’s mind, as the acted impersonation of a sculpture. And rather than enacting 
the mimetic ideal and so securing the link between representation and reality, this acted 
impersonation instead becomes the lynchpin by which the impossible ending of this already 
incredible romance will be effected. Moreover, though the tension of the scene means that 
the scrutiny that Leontes gives to the gaze of the ‘statue’ must be thought a dramatically 
fraught moment, surely the King’s inspection is also somewhat ludicrous. And made 
perhaps more so by the fact that the actor playing Hermione must at this particular point 
expend an extra effort so as not to blink or to allow his gaze to shift – so that when the 
spectators examine him for the signs of movement that Leontes seemed to have remarked 
they, along with the King, find none. A charged moment certainly, but one which cannot 
help but point up the essentially mundane and unsuccessful instantiation of mimesis that 
this ‘statue’ manifests – merely the actor’s unrealisable imitation of absolute immobility. 
Yet it is a dissimulation which the audience itself must not only go along with but is one 
in which they are forced to partake. For, in their engagement with the sequence, the play’s 
spectators must be thought of as urging on the success of a mimetic impersonation which 
has underlined itself as a deception at both fictional and metafictional levels, and one which 
they are acutely aware offers an imitation that cannot do other than fail. 
--- 
 
The inevitability of the actor’s failure to pass himself off as a statue, or even to pass off 
Hermione’s impersonation of a statue as convincing provides perhaps the scene’s most 
intense marking of the banality and counterfeit nature of its construction – yet I would 
argue that for the Jacobean audience these effects would have made themselves apparent 
not just in relation to the performance of immobility, but also in the broader presentation 
which configures the sequence. Let us return to the moment when Paulina draws back the 
curtain to reveal the ‘statue’, a gesture that asks for melodramatic realisation. As already 
noted, such a curtained unveiling would have been a rare sight on the early modern stage. 
However, most Jacobeans, especially those that had wandered through the Liberties to 
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watch the play in the Globe, would have been familiar with such a device, making up as it 
did a part of the performative repertoire of contemporary ‘jugglers’ – that is, early modern 
street magicians. As their continued use in present-day performances of magic attests, 
curtains represent for the illusionist a rather effective contrivance. They temporarily 
conceal the acts of trickery by which the apparently extramundane is brought about, and 
the promise of their unveiling infuses the performance with a more urgent suspense and 
drama. For the early modern juggler performing in a public space, curtains would also 
ensure that the initial setting up of the trick went unobserved (something that the particular 
jugglers’ trick that I will shortly discuss must make recourse to).  
We should not, however, think of the designation ‘jugglers’ as being restricted to 
magical entertainers; as J. A. Shea writes, the term took in ‘what were considered their 
cultural and professional forerunners—gypsies, witches, minstrels and joculators’. As 
such, ‘juggling’  
came to indicate a diverse set of social and religious practices, many of which were 
branded morally dubious or unlawful. The activities most frequently compared to 
juggling were Catholic miracles and language, confederate trickery, spiritual magic 
and witchcraft, illicit sexual behaviour, and, finally, stage-playing.46  
And since these activities are, as has been seen, the very themes that the ‘statue’ sequence 
plays off, we might imagine that the Jacobean spectator would need little encouragement 
in associating Paulina’s presentation with the practices of street illusion. Nor would this 
move have been unnatural; as Philip Butterworth documents, renowned companies like 
Admiral’s and Lord Strange’s Men gave space to jugglers’ performances of legerdemain 
and tumbling as late as 1588 and 1589.47 That Shakespeare was at this mature point in his 
art prepared to make use of the means as well as the effects realised by contemporary magic 
performances would seem borne out by the enigmatic stage direction from The Tempest: 
‘Thunder and lightning. Enter Ariel, like a harpy, claps his wings upon the table, and with 
a quaint device the banquet vanishes’ (3.3.52 sd).48 
Together with the curtain, the small platform-type construction on which the ‘statue’ 
stands may also have served to recall jugglers’ practice (it is more likely that the ‘statue’ 
stands on a platform than a pedestal since, as indicated in Paulina’s commanding the 
revived Queen to ‘descend’ (5.3.99), the stage action requires this stand to have a set of 
steps), and this again would recall the temporary platforms on which jugglers would 
perform. This allowed the juggler to be viewed by a larger audience, and the platform could 
also serve to facilitate the staged illusions. Joseph Strutt notes that a number of early 
modern authors ‘speak of “juggling upon the boards” which clearly indicates the use of a 
                                                          
46 The Juggler in Shakespeare: Con-Artistry, Illusionism, and Popular Magic in Three Plays (PhD thesis (University 
of Montreal, 2010)), p. i. 
47 Magic on the Early English Stage (Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 33 (and further evidence is offered on p. 
216, n 48). 




stage or temporary platform’,49 and he points back to a couplet from Geoffrey Chaucer’s 
The House of Fame to show that this had long been common practice for jugglers in 
England: ‘Ther saugh I Colle tregetour/ Upon a table of sicamour’ (II, 1277-1278).50 
Insight into these performances of illusion can be provided by Reginald Scot’s 
Discoverie of Witchcraft of 1584,51 a sceptical text which argues that belief in witchcraft 
and magic is rejected by both reason and religion. The book contains a section bringing to 
light the workings of magic tricks, thought to be the first published material of this type.52 
One of the famous illusions that Scot exposes was the ‘Decollation of John the Baptist’ 
(see figure 1).53 Looking at the trick we can see that certain parallels to the business of 
Hermione’s ‘statue’ present themselves. The most manifest is that the ‘Decollation’ also 
utilises the human body as the site for magic, and that it too subjects it to a miraculous 
resurrection. In material terms, the ‘Decollation’ also makes use of a platform, as well as a 
curtained unveiling (we know this since the performers must be concealed when taking up 
their positions), and we can add that tricks like these would certainly have benefitted from 
taking place in an alcove-type area similar to the discovery space in which Hermione’s 
‘statue’ is located (a semi-enclosed space has a number of advantages: it would be much 
less complicated to keep the initial setting up of the trick under wraps; in terms of its 
performance, it is a much simpler business to make an illusion appear credible when it can 
only be viewed from one side, and the arrangement would too make it easier to direct 
spectators’ attention as well as managing the onlookers in such a way that the overly-
curious are prevented from getting too close). This ‘Decollation’ too makes apparent that, 
as with the ‘statue’ scene, early modern street magic was likely to make use of religious 
contexts for subject matter and theme.  
If we turn back to Paulina’s presentation of the sequence, a performance that serves 
to build an immense sense of occasion, and which skilfully choregraphs audience interest 
and attention, we can observe that its rhetorical strategies are remarkably similar to those 
we find used in illusionists’ performances today. It does not seem outlandish to presume 
their Jacobean forerunners worked a similar line, and that, for Shakespeare’s original 
audiences, Paulina’s presentation would have brought to mind her counterparts on the 
Liberties. Her repeated – and disingenuous – offers to draw the curtain so as to remove the 
spectacle from view conform to the magician’s teasing out their audience’s suspense: we 
see that Leontes stops her from drawing the curtain at 5.3.59, only for Paulina to threaten 
to do so again nine lines later: ‘I’ll draw the curtain’. Fourteen lines after that she will again 
feign that she is ready to end the display, ‘Shall I draw the curtain?’. And like the practised 
                                                          
49 The Sports and Pastimes of the People of England (Methuen, 1801), p. 170. 
50 The Complete Works of Geoffrey Chaucer, vol. 3, edited by Walter W. Skeat (Oxford University Press, 1899), p. 
38. ‘Tregetour’ is a Middle English term for ‘juggler’. 
51 London: William Brome. 
52 Other works followed suit, however, attesting to the age’s interest in magical illusion and the means of its 
dissimulation. For example, Samuel Rid’s The Art of Iugling or Legerdemaine (London: T Bushell and Samuel Rand, 
1612), which covers much the same area as Scot’s supplement, was printed right around the time of the first 
performances of The Winter’s Tale. 
53 Discoverie of Witchcraft, p. 293. 
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illusionist, Paulina stirs audience anticipation with the promise of wonders to come: ‘I am 
sorry, sir, I have thus far stirred you, but I could afflict you farther’ (5.3.74-75). Finally, as 
the climax is approached, being the masterful entertainer she is, she makes out that this 
outcome is predicated on the audience’s faith, as well as its silence (‘It is required’ she tells 
her onlookers, ‘You do awake your faith. Then all stand still’).  
 
 
Figure 1: The decollation of John the Baptist from Reginald Scott’s The Discoverie of 
Witchcraft. 
 
While, as we have noted, the religious connotations of Paulina’s vocabulary would 
underwrite the sequence’s impulse to the epiphanic, the stagey and histrionic aspects of her 
performance would also serve to bring out the fact that Paulina’s presentational pitch shares 
commonalities with that of the juggler’s. The juggler’s language was similarly inflated and 
similarly derived, with these performers couching their dissimulated miracles in a lexis 
which borrowed from Catholic ritual. Conjurors in Scot’s book employ an aggrandised 
speech that apes religious discourse,54 and so as to create a sense of the arcane, jugglers 
would pepper their speech with corruptions of Latin terms that were often borrowed from 
the Catholic mass. For example, in his Discourse Against Transubstantiation from 1685, 
the Archbishop of Canterbury, John Tillotson, remarked that the conjuror’s staple, ‘hocus 
pocus’, probably represented a corruption of hoc est corpus, and while the idea is contested, 
it nonetheless demonstrates a sense of how the juggler’s language formed itself and was 
                                                          




understood as operating.55 Finally, we might note that the era’s debate on lawful and 
unlawful magic56 – a discussion that the contemporary jugglers’ oral presentation would 
inevitably have had to take account of – also finds its way into Perdita’s speeches: directly 
following her call to faith, Paulina includes it as part of another typical juggler’s gambit: 
‘On! Those that think it is unlawful business/ I am about, let them depart’ (5.3.96-97). 
Deliberately then it seems that Shakespeare links the miraculous restoration of the 
narrative and the wondrous effects of the play’s dramatic illusions with the patter and 
performances of his neighbours on the Liberties – the more or less debunked conjurers, 
whose tricks most of the public understood as dealing not in miracles but in deception. That 
the playwright also draws attention to the Hermione-actor’s dissimulation of immobility 
intensifies this sense, as the arrangement compels the spectators – much as it would do if 
they were watching a magic trick – to scrutinise the verisimilitude of the performer’s 
illusion. And in that the magic trick has almost no content beyond its double-dealing, it 
could be understood as the ultimate marker for the dissimulation of representation. 
Northrop Frye seems to imply something of this sort in a passage linking the stagecraft by 
which the Queen is revived to the manner in which Autolycus earlier fleeced his marks:  
All the attention is absorbed in Hermione as she begins to move while music plays; 
and we are reminded of Autolycus and of his role as a kind of rascally Orpheus at 
the sheep shearing festival: ‘My clown…would not stir his pettitoes till he had both 
tune and words; which so drew the rest of the herd to me that all their senses stuck 
in their ears…No hearing, no feeling, but my sir’s song, and admiring the nothing 
of it’ [4.4.595-603].57 
The suggestion of course is that just as Autolycus uses this opportunity to cut the purses of 
his stupefied audience, the playwright does something similar to the rapt theatregoers 
witnessing Hermione’s recovery. For while they might react ‘as if they had seen the dead 
rise’, this miracle is clearly a dissimulation – what Shakespeare’s spectators, all their senses 
stuck, admire is only the ‘nothing’ of an artful con. 
However, as this text has repeatedly demonstrated, the play’s pointing up of artistic 
illusion as a dissimulated ‘nothing’ does not function to enact estrangement – it certainly 
does not follow, for example, that since Frye is capable of remarking such a structuring he 
is left unstirred by Hermione’s reanimation. The self-reflexive association of the scene with 
the deceptions of the magic trick and the counterfeiting of acted impersonation can further 
our understanding of how this seemingly contradictory position is maintained. In magic 
performances of the type that Hermione’s restoration references, the spectators must – at 
least if the performance is to be enjoyed – willingly take up a false position. While the 
magician’s spectators understand that the illusions they witness are the result of a shrewd 
deception, it is not the ingenuity of this ruse that is enjoyed as much as it is the apparent, 
                                                          
55 Quoted in John S. Hammett’s Biblical Foundations for Baptist Churches: A Contemporary Ecclesiology (Kregel 
Academic, 2019), p. 320 n 95. 
56 The space given over to this discussion in Scot’s Discoverie offers a good indication of the seriousness of the issue. 
57 “Recognition in The Winter’s Tale” (The Winter’s Tale: Critical Essays, pp. 106-118), p. 116. 
182 
 
though fraudulent, suspension of the laws of reality. The illustration depicting the 
‘Decollation’ allows a reader to admire the inventiveness by which the illusion was brought 
about, but this is a very different experience from what a spectator, even when she knows 
that the ‘magic’ is merely a deception of some kind, would undergo watching the 
performance. In the latter instance, the spectator makes available an imaginative space in 
which this ‘magic’ might be experienced as something awesome, while at the same time 
recognising this ‘magic’ as essentially false. As with the spectator of the magic trick, the 
audience of The Winter’s Tale must be thought complicit in its own emotional arousal. In 
its desire to experience the intensity of Hermione’s restoration the audience must cede a 
miraculous dimension to that which it cannot help but recognise as nothing more than a 
trick. Rather then than conforming to the romantic-mimetic prescriptions of audience 
experience that crystallise in the concept of a ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ (and in this 
crystallisation ignores the rather brilliant subtleties according to which Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge originally framed the notion), the art of The Winter’s Tale points to an audience 
experience that could more accurately be described as a ‘dissimulation of belief’. 
The ‘statue’ scene indicates that the business of representation is an impure process. 
Both the impulse to illusion and the impulse to illusion’s undoing are it seems at all times 
present in the representational process, and the dissimulated terms through which the 
spectators commit to these contradictory modalities means that neither one establishes 
itself according to the absolute terms of its formulation. Just as the audience cannot give 
itself wholly over to the claims of illusion and, in doing, take them for actuality, it is equally 
impossible that metatheatre’s self-reflexivity serves to wholly estrange the audience from 
the effects of these illusions. The actor’s impersonation of the ‘statue’ foregrounds and 
intensifies these tensions. His performance of immobility represents a stage illusion that 
the spectators are compelled to scrutinise for signs of mimetic failure, signs which they 
cannot help but note. Yet even though the illusion cannot succeed in convincing the 
spectators, they must nonetheless urge on its success, must half-pretend that they did not 
remark the actor’s movements nor recognise that the ‘statue’ was already a figure of flesh 
and blood.  
The audience is encouraged, and encourages itself, to see in the episode the awesome 
transformation that ekphrasis proposes: that representation might become real, that art 
might re-realise itself as life. Yet at the same time as the scene invokes the profundities 
that mimetic effect gathers, it offers such a representational poetics burlesque. The 
impossible task of immobility ceded to the Hermione actor is doomed to failure, and a 
failure which reiterates the very transformation that mimesis idealises – the going from 
illusion to the actual – in ridiculous terms. But neither does the episode function as 
metatheatrical estrangement. For if the estrangement model of metatheatre also posits a 
shift from illusion to the real it most often understands this as a rupture that brings about a 
bracing and reinvigorated return to the immediate. But the episode of the blinking 
Hermione actor would seem to reveal little more than the banality of its own arrangement. 
And of course, as the scene itself underlines, both of these apparent representational 
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reversions to the actual are themselves brought about by an act of counterfeiting which 
highlights itself as drawing on the base dissimulations of the jugglers’ trick.  
This last point underlines that Hermione’s reanimation is only the presentation of a 
transformation into the real.  The falsity of art sustains itself in the face of its own promise 
of the actual; the aesthetic construction of Hermione is not transposed into life when the 
figure descends the platform, nor are actor, platform and wooden stage recovered and 
reincorporated into a wholly disabused reality. Neither impulse escapes the confines of its 
artistic realisation; the representation remains an aesthetic event. For while spectators do 
not react to artistic illusion as if it were real neither do they, when that illusion is deflated 
by metatheatrical strategy, assume the artwork forfeit. In the case of the former, as has been 
often remarked, no spectator rushes the stage to attend the wounds of a fallen protagonist. 
And in the case of the latter – though this is far less often acknowledged – when metatheatre 
allows the stage performer to step beyond the play-world and address the audience directly 
– in, for example, an epilogue – no-one takes this as an invitation to strike up a conversation 
with the actor. Illusion, even when it apparently actualises itself, as in the case with 
Hermione’s reanimation, does not make itself over into ‘life itself’, nor does metatheatre, 
even when it remarks the actual configuration of these illusions, step wholly outside them. 
The absolute positions which both mimesis and the estrangement model of metatheatre 
announce can never be realised; the audience supplies to each modality only the 
dissimulation of belief. The apparent impulse to subvert artistic representation, by either 
outgoing or undoing it, is simply a rhetorical strategy; not to be realised, it is framed only 
for the effects it makes available.  
This brings us back once more to a key feature of Shakespearean representation. 
Though it undoes the mimetic claim that illusion might realise the vividness of the actual, 
it does not alienate the audience from the power of these illusions. The ‘statue’ scene is so 
arranged that the audience must recognise the miraculous Hermione as an essentially 
fallacious presence, a construction born of playwright and male actor, and one in which 
aspects of the counterfeit and banal figure prominently. Yet the simultaneity that the 
audience’s ‘dissimulation of belief’ allows for means that the potent effects that the 
mimetic model makes possible are too available. One modality need not, as the poetics of 
estrangement and mimesis like to assert, neutralise the effects of the other. In fact, as we 
have seen, if this arrangement is handled with the flair and virtuosity of an Autolycus, the 
tension of the form’s contradictions serves to make for an art that is all the more urgent, 




‘Exit [Chuckling]’: Exposition, Role and Dissimulation in The Winter’s 
Tale 
 
The opening of Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale has been subject to a certain neglect; 
directors find so little of value in the play’s first scene that it is often cut in production, 
while critics mostly overlook it altogether1 (a prime example of this appears in Louis L. 
Martz’s From Renaissance to Baroque: Essays on literature and Art where his discussion 
of ‘the opening of the play’ refers to act one, scene two2). The exchange between the 
Bohemian courtier, Archidamus and his Sicilian counterpart, Camillo can be read as an 
uneventful and rather conventional exposition. And the fact that the narrative content that 
the exposition rehearses is found repeated later in the play would seem to provide further 
encouragement to those who are disposed to ignore it. But the playwright did, after all, 
include it, and if we are not to assume that the theatrical perspicuity of his interpreters 
wholly outgoes his own, then it is perhaps useful to revise our notions of how the scene is 
realised. 
I will argue that an interpretation which does away with the idea that the courtiers’ 
exchange is meant to be played straight allows the scene to function in a completely 
different manner, one which integrates it into the game of theatrical dissimulation that the 
rest of The Winter’s Tale plays out. Consequently, the focus of this article shifts back and 
forth, moving between a close reading of the opening scene and the broader impulses of 
the play’s narrative. I demonstrate that the scene operates to determine the relationship that 
the audience is to take towards the play’s extended use of exposition and report, and, more 
importantly still, towards the drama’s dynamic economy of actor and role. I explore how 
part-doubling would have extended this arrangement, and conclude by showing that a 
comprehensive understanding of the reunions and revivals of the play’s last act can only 




In the early modern theatre the play’s setting (dramatic, temporal and geographic) has to 
be made clear early on, and most usually occurs through an exposition that takes place in 
the opening scene. And while certain narrative choices that the playwright might indulge 
together with the scenic constraints that the almost bare Jacobean stage imposes mean that 
the play will inevitably make recourse to exposition at various times throughout a given 
                                                          
1 A discussion had in Wilbur Sanders’ The Winter’s Tale (Critical Introduction to Shakespeare) (Prentice Hall/ 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1987), p. 4. 
2 University of Missouri Press, 1991, p. 135. 
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performance, it is in the drama’s opening moments that the use of the device is most urgent. 
Here, the play is obliged to render the action’s broader background, as well as fulfil the 
awkward business of providing the subsequent play-action a certain narrative bedding – 
something which nearly always occurs through a ‘retelling’ of the events that the audience 
is to conceive of as preceding the drama’s opening. But the purpose of the exposition is not 
limited to clarifying setting and narrative circumstance; another effect is to secure the terms 
by which the audience is to imagine the play-world as constituted. That is, the content of 
the exposition, together with the manner of its realisation operate to establish a slightly 
more reflexive mode of representation by which broad markers like genre are instituted, 
and finer modalities such as representational register (by which I mean the manner and 
intensity according to which the illusions of the play-world and its parts are conceptualised) 
are marked up.  
That a play is obliged to juggle these demands in the first few minutes of the drama’s 
action when, for the audience, the sense of the actuality of the theatre is at its most insistent 
and play-world illusion least convincing means that the exposition will almost inevitably 
draw attention to itself. Alongside this we should also remember that the early modern 
theatre audience would have for the most part been made up of savvy and discerning 
spectators, familiar with theatrical convention and alert to the uses to which it might be put 
– and this would mean that the exposition would invariably be recognised for what it was. 
Muriel Bradbrook remarks the difficulties that the exposition poses for the early modern 
playwright, and argues that ‘[e]xpository soliloquy is usually preferable to expository 
dialogue … The use of dialogue implies an attempt to hide the exposition, to make it 
naturalistic, and if the disguise is not efficient there is a definite sense of failure’,3 and for 
Bradbrook the opening scenes of As You Like It, and Hamlet exemplify such failure. 
Whether or not he shared Bradbrook’s assessment of the earlier plays’ first scenes, the 
Shakespeare of the romances seems to have approached the opening scene’s exposition 
with a sense of the difficulties the device presented. Yet having remarked this, we need to 
remember that in the case of this particular playwright the issues of theatrical form seem 
to, time and again, inspire his most ingenious efforts.4 The opening of The Winter’s Tale 
foregrounds the problems of the device by conducting its exposition in what Bradbrook 
sees as its most regrettable format, yet, as I will demonstrate, the exchange still successfully 
establishes a naturalistic register. And this is all the more noteworthy for the scene’s 
unfolding in what is essentially a parodic mode – one which operates to underline the very 
falsity of theatrical representation itself. 
                                                          
3 Themes and Conventions of Elizabethan Tragedy (Cambridge University Press, 1980), p.109. 
4 A note on language: Oftentimes in this article, I refer to the achievements of the playwright in terms that valorise. 
Such formulations are, for most present-day criticism, beyond the pale. And this is undoubtedly, for the most part, a 
positive development – we require no more texts that simply rehearse the great and the good. But such language is 
pertinent to the current article, dealing as it does with a metatheatrical arrangement that is not only masterfully realised, 
but which also, and this is what is crucial, exuberantly points back to the artistic virtuosity of this arrangement. To fail 
to acknowledge this quality would be more than churlish, it would mean producing a critical reading that ignored a 
central aspect of the work’s effect and signification. 
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Preferring to see The Winter’s Tale 1.1 as working in these terms not only means 
that the opening will be understood as foreshadowing as well as generating the strategies 
of representational game-play that occur throughout the play, but it also has the happy 
effect of eradicating a canonical anomaly, as the scene now aligns with the burlesqued 
marking up of the exposition device that we find in the openings of each of the other late 
romances. Pericles begins with a resurrected Gower performing an antiquated chorus; the 
recap that Prospero provides in The Tempest (occurring in 1.2 after a playfully rendered 
take on the stereotypical romance opening of shipwreck), though making use of 
Bradbrook’s preferred solution, the expository soliloquy, is so tedious that Marina nearly 
dozes off listening to it, while the exposition in Cymbeline is facilitated by a Second 
Gentleman whose series of lead-in questions make the scene’s dramatic function comically 
explicit. The catechism is funny enough to warrant revisiting: 
But what's the matter?...  
None but the King?… 
And why so?...  
What's his name and birth?...  
But pray you tell me,  
Is she sole child to th’ King?...  
How long is this ago? (1.1.3-61)5  
The opening of The Winter’s Tale will too present an expository exchange between two 
gentlemen, yet as we will see the realisation given to the device in this instance offers 
something more complex than Cymbeline’s straightforward parodic reversal. So that we 
might best appreciate this it is useful to remind ourselves of the somewhat duplicitous 
relationship that the play as a whole takes to its own representations and to the expectations 
of its audience. 
 
2 
As a great deal of recent criticism has made clear, The Winter’s Tale is a play that gives 
extended exploration to the relationship between different modes of representation and 
carries out this investigation in a manner that is inescapably self-aware and ironic. The 
effect is to call into question the nature and signification of artistic representation. 
According to Walter Lim, play events are marked by an ‘epistemological (un)certainty’,6 
and Peter Platt in his assessment goes even further, stating that ‘epistemological mastery 
can never fully be achieved in this play’.7  This particular relationship to meaning is 
                                                          
5 All references to Shakespeare’s plays are taken from The Norton Shakespeare, 3rd edition, edited by Stephen 
Greenblatt, Walter Cohen, Suzanne Gossett, Katharine Eisaman Maus and Gordon McMullan (W. W. Norton, 2016). 
6 ‘Knowledge and Belief in The Winter’s Tale’ (Tudor and Stuart Drama, special issue of Studies in English 
Literature, 1500-1900, vol. 41, no. 2, Spring 2001, pp. 317-334), p. 323. 




reflected in the particularities of the play’s realisation. Howard Felperin is just one critic 
who has noted the extent to which the play is reliant on ‘the evidence of things not seen’, 
as well as remarking the ambiguous realisation often provided to this evidence.8 Of course, 
an extended exposition is expected in the opening scene, but as the play progresses its 
audience must have been somewhat baffled by just how many of what are the narrative’s 
central events go un-staged and are presented only as verbal description: Cleomenes and 
Dion’s meeting with the oracle; Antigonus’ vision of (the presumed-to-be-dead) Hermione; 
Antigonus’ mauling at the hands of the bear; and, most significantly, what the audience 
had anticipated as providing the play’s climactic spectacle, the reunion of Leontes with his 
(also presumed-dead) daughter, Perdita, and the ‘brother’ king he wronged, Polixenes. And 
throughout, the drama marks up how this manifest use of report undermines itself along 
with the expectations of the play’s audience. Often the expositions point out the inadequacy 
of verbal description (for example, in the Third Gentleman’s attempt to convey the 
ineffable nature of the royal reunion he witnessed: ‘Then have you lost a sight which was 
to be seen, cannot be spoken of … I never heard of such another encounter, which lames 
report to follow it, and undoes description to do it’ (5.2.40-55)), or they mark up the 
improbability of what they report (the Second Gentleman introduces the Third Gentleman’s 
account with: ‘This news which is called true is so like an old tale that the verity of it is in 
strong suspicion’ (5.2.26-27)). At other points the device is itself provided outlandish 
parody, as when the personification of Time takes to the stage to expound the 16 year-gap 
between the play’s tragic and comedic halves.  
The unravelling of the capacity of description to provide a sufficient account is not, 
however, limited to metatheatric effects alone – it drives the dramatic action as well. It is, 
after all, ‘the evidence of things unseen’ working together with the deceptions of the 
imagination that triggers Leontes’ awful outburst of monomaniacal jealously over what he 
apprehends to be an affair between his Queen and Polixenes. Representation confounds in 
both its dramatic and metadramatic incarnations, and in this confusion they overlap, 
something that Richard Meek observes:  
the play … repeatedly confounds our attempts to draw a distinction between dream 
and reality, role and actor, art and theatre. The more we reflect on the play’s status 
as a work of art, and attempt to separate what is real from what is fictional within 
the play, the more entangled we become in its mimetic complexity.9 
Verbal description is, as we have seen, marked up as dubious, yet as the quotation 
from Meek implies, the observable phenomena that are speaker and stage action are not to 
be considered any more trustworthy. This is made manifest in the work’s (wholly 
unanticipated) climax proper, what critics almost invariably refer to as ‘the statue scene’ 
                                                          
8 “‘Tongue-tied, our queen?’: The Deconstruction of Presence in The Winter’s Tale” (Howard Felperin, The Uses of 
the Canon: Elizabethan literature and Contemporary Theory (Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 35-55), p. 38. 
Felperin is here making use of a quotation taken from Hebrews 11:1 (King James Version). 
9 Narrating the Visual in Shakespeare (Routledge, 2016), p. 155. It seems to me that Meek’s uses ‘mimetic’ here as a 
synonym of ‘representational’ in general, and not to suggest the particular representational discourse associated with 
classical mimesis.   
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(and since the scene contains no statue, the nomination realises a mismatch between 
descriptor and object that is for this play rather apt), and which offers what is perhaps the 
most audacious staging in the entire canon. Here Paulina presents the statue of Hermione, 
only for it soon after to be revealed as being the actual living Queen, the self-same 
Hermione who the awe-struck court audience – together with the theatre audience 
(similarly, one imagines, awe-struck) – had been led to believe had perished 16 years 
previous. The play’s spectators cannot help but be confounded by this turn of events. They 
have even heard Antigonus relate his encounter with the Queen’s ghost, and, as Ernest 
Schanzer notes, ‘[t]here is no precedent in Elizabethan drama for the spirit of a living 
person appearing to others either in dream or waking’.10 The arrangement flagrantly 
violates the contract between art and audience that serves to coordinate the relationship 
between representation and reception - and as interested as the play is in the contract 
between audience and stage representation, it shows (probably to a greater extent than any 
other Shakespeare play) little inclination to honour it.11 For even if, as performances of the 
play time and again demonstrate, Hermione’s return is a startling and profoundly moving 
moment, attentive audience members would find it difficult to avoid a sense of what Philip 
Edwards terms, ‘Shakespeare’s keenness to impress [upon his spectators that they] have 
been cheated’.12  
Attending to the play’s acts of rhetorical and representational dissimulation has 
encouraged a number of responses that see the deceptions of the pedlar and con-artist, 
Autolycus, as reflecting the aesthetic strategies of the play, with critics such as Philip 
Edwards, Mary L. Livingstone and Stephen Orgel going so far as to identify Autolycus 
                                                          
10 The Winter’s Tale (Penguin, 1973), p. 15. 
11 The violation would have been even more startling for the more literary members of the audience. The play’s main 
plot is taken from Robert Greene’s Pandosto of 1588, and – up until the last act – Shakespeare has demonstrated a 
remarkable fidelity to his source, diverging from the earlier work only in minor detail. Pandosto was enormously 
popular (it was reprinted four times before Shakespeare wrote The Winter’s Tale – in 1592, 1595, and 1607 – and at 
least fourteen subsequent editions are published before the end of the seventeenth century). We must assume that a 
number of the audience members would have known it, and so would have been all the more caught out by the 
outrageous resurrection that Shakespeare appends to his retelling. And while an audience familiar with Shakespeare’s 
artistic strategies may have noted that the playwright’s recent romances were structured somewhat more equivocally 
than his other work, they would still have expected the play to unfold according to what Schanzer calls Shakespeare’s 
‘habitual practice’, which ‘in contrast to that of many other playwrights … had been to put the audience in full 
possession of all relevant knowledge, so that, even on a first viewing, the dramatic irony that derives from the 
characters’ lack of this knowledge is immediately felt’ (The Winter’s Tale (Penguin, 1973), p. 15). 
12 “‘Seeing is believing’: Action and Narration in The Old Wives Tale and The Winter’s Tale” (Shakespeare and His 
Contemporaries: Essays in Comparison, edited by E. A. J. Honigmann (Manchester University Press, 1986), pp. 79-




with Shakespeare himself.13 This is a formulation that certainly has its uses,14 and we might 
note how at his very first appearance the figure of Autolycus operates to remark the 
representative conditions by which the play is realised, and to align his own duplicities 
with the dissimulations of Shakespeare’s dramatic art. Almost immediately, the pedlar 
picks up on the play’s predilection for rendering unseen events through verbal retelling by 
detailing the story of his own violent assault and robbery. However, this merely gives full 
articulation to what has already been demonstrated as the precarious relationship between 
exposition and event, for his account is of course nothing more than a fabrication, designed 
with the sole intention of duping the guileless Clown. A virtuoso in his field, Autolycus is 
even able to invert the apparent truth of his appearance, managing to pass off his rags 
(which for the theatre audience function as a semiotic convention that confirms him as a 
vagabond) as proof of gentlemanly status. And not wholly unlike the playwright that 
Edwards imagines, Autolycus cannot resist embroidering, quite gratuitously, the deception 
he plays out on his hapless mark – naming himself for his own assailant.15 
We should remember that Autolycus is himself too an artist – he is both a composer 
and performer of ballads, and his artistry must be thought of as extending to take in the 
sales pitch with which he supplies these efforts. Like so much of the play in which he 
operates, the success of his ballads hinges on how the brilliance of his performance might 
inspire his audience’s faith in ‘things unseen’. Also, as we have noted, he shares with his 
creator an absolute yet distinctly playful confidence in the powers of his own artistry. 
Moreover – and this, for any critical line that would propose a correspondence between the 
pedlar and his creator, seems to me key – he will happily risk his success by foregrounding 
the absurdity of his dissimulations. Autolycus is a creator of impossible tales, and these 
                                                          
13 Richard Meek draws attention to these scholars in a brief but useful survey of this critical position in his Narrating 
the Visual (pp. 161-162). Livingstone writes ‘Seeing [Autolycus’] guises deceive simpler folk should make us question 
how art, either his or The Winter’s Tale’s, works on us: perhaps the pockets of both audiences are picked’ (“The 
Natural Art of The Winter’s Tale” (Modern Language Quarterly, vol. 30, 1969, pp. 340-355), p. 346). In ‘“Seeing is 
believing”’, Edwards mentions the ‘self-images of the artist in the last plays’ and remarks that ‘Beside the heroic 
image of the brooding careworn Prospero, we have the anti-heroic image of Autolycus, the man who depends for his 
living on his protean resourcefulness and the gullibility of the public’ (p. 92). Orgel, in his introduction to the 1996 
Oxford Shakespeare edition of the play, says that Autolycus ‘is the figure in this play closest to the playwright’ and 
the critic underlines the pedlar’s penchant for ‘continually reveal[ing] his disguises, tricks and plots to us’ (p. 52).  
14 Identifying Shakespeare with his pedlar strikes me as rather insightful, though I would prefer to understand 
Autolycus as not pointing to the play’s writer as much as pointing to the play’s written and performed structures. 
15 We might assume that in the original performances, the part of Autolycus enjoyed a certain prominence. The one 
contemporary account we have of the play, from the astrologer Simon Forman, gives great attention to his role, and 
the nature of the description suggests it was vividly realised: ‘Remember also the rogue that came in all tattered like 
colt pixie, and how he feigned him sick and to have been robbed of all that he had and how he cozened the poor man 
of all his money, and after came to the sheep-shearer with a pedlar’s pack and there cozened them again of all their 
money. And how he changed apparel with the king of Bohemia his son, and then how he turned courtier, etc. Beware 
of trusting feigned beggars or fawning fellows’ (from Bocke of Plaies and Notes therof per formans for Common 
Pollicie (Bodleian Library, Ashmole MS 208, fol 200-207), 202r. The modernised text is from The Winter’s Tale, 
edited by Stephen Orgel (Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 233). There is not space in this survey of the play’s use 
of exposition, role and dissimulation to remark the particular relationship the figure of Autolycus takes towards these 
features, but I have elsewhere written about the part-doubling that seems to pertain to the role – see “References to 
the doubling of Autolycus and the bear in Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale” (Notes and Queries, vol. 66, no. 3, 
September 2019, pp. 454-457). 
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operate within an aesthetic structure that is itself composed of impossible tales – a 
comparison that the play itself invites in the last act when it describes the Leontes-Perdita-
Polixenes reunion scene as being of ‘Such a deal of wonder … that ballad-makers cannot 
be able to express it’ (5.2.22-23). And as outlandish as Autolycus’ ballads are – such as the 
woman who pays the price for her sexual continence by being transformed into a fish – 
surely they are only slightly more outlandish than an improbable reunion between father, 
thought-perished daughter, and estranged ‘brother’, or – even more fantastically – the 
sudden resurrection of a Queen 16 years dead. So while the audience members are invited 
to laugh at the gulls who fall for Autolycus’ preposterous stories, they are at the same time 
being pointed in the direction of their own susceptibility to artistic deception. And that 




Having perhaps tried the reader’s patience with a necessary yet rather extended 
introduction, I must now risk exacerbating it by saying that, in narrative terms, no case can 
be made that recommends The Winter’s Tale 1.1 as effective exposition. For essentially, 
this gilded and extended exchange serves no genuine expository purpose. As opposed to, 
say, the complex account provided by Cymbeline’s convoluted opening, the initial 
exchange in The Winter’s Tale, though spread over 40 lines, conveys nothing more than 
the fact that Polixenes, King of Bohemia, has enjoyed the hospitality of his boyhood friend 
Leontes, King of Sicilia, and to indicate the existence of the young Sicilian prince, 
Mamillius. Dramatically speaking, almost none of this really requires exposition. And as 
the next scene unfolds it becomes apparent that even the imparting of these crumbs of 
information is superfluous – immediately reiterated as they are in the first exchanges of 
1.2. The opening then seems to enact a turning inside-out of the familiar application given 
to the exposition where, conventionally, its aim is to lay the foundations of the drama’s 
narrative structure while – as in formulations such as Bradbrook’s – minimising the effects 
of artifice that the device advertises. Here, making no proper contribution to the narrative, 
the exposition seems to be included to no other end than to mark up its own contrivance.  
With this in mind we might turn to Wilbur Sanders’ perceptive reading of the play’s 
first scene and pursue the rather interesting interpretive possibilities which it opens up. The 
exchange between the two courtiers, Camillo and Archidamus, concerning the hospitality 
that Polixenes’ court has enjoyed in Sicilia is interpreted as a contestation in courtly 
hyperbole, which having rapidly escalated to impossible heights, dissolves into a shared 
laughter. At the close of the scene, the pair ‘have returned (with some relief) to the real 
world. The easy accord, obstructed throughout their conversation by a contention in 
complimentary exaggeration, arrives effortlessly now as they confess to an artificial 
inflation of sentiment, and agree to abandon it’.16 The ‘relief’ Sanders credits to the 
                                                          
16 The Winter’s Tale (Critical Introduction to Shakespeare), p. 6. 
192 
 
courtiers is underlined by an earlier comment he makes: ‘hyperbole, once you’re entangled 
in it, is a net of fine meshes’.17 While this is a comment that is undoubtedly pertinent to the 
dramatic unfolding of the play as a whole, I think the opening scene is better understood if 
Sanders’ reading is slightly amended so as to forgo the suggestion of an underlying unease. 
The tone of the courtiers’ exchange does not appear to bear out such a sense; far from being 
entangled in their own hyperbolised expression, their back-and-forth can be seen as 
evincing a playful agility, suggesting the speakers are relishing their verbal sparring. 
Further, the kind of mood that Sanders suggests would seem at odds with the manner by 
which, when the discussion turns to the superlative qualities of the young prince, 
Mamillius, Archidamas, preferring to eschew another round of rhetorical one-upmanship, 
supplies the contestation a sceptically humorous deflation: 
CAMILLO They that went on crutches ere he was born desire yet their life 
to see him a man. 
ARCHIDAMUS Would they else be content to die? 
Camillo immediately takes up the new turn, and Archidamus – still half in his assumed 
character – puts the business to bed: 
CAMILLO  Yes – if there were no other excuse why they should desire to 
live. 
ARCHIDAMUS [po-faced, suggests Sanders (6)] If the king had no son, they would 
desire to live on crutches till he had one. (1.1.34-40) 
And in a further rather neat emendation, Saunders has it that they go off chuckling (6). 
The most coherent reading of this ‘contention in complimentary exaggeration’ 
would then be one in which these Castiglione courtiers, having recognised the escalating 
note in the opening stages of their exchange, elected to continue their trading of cordialities 
according to an ironic gameplay of exaggeration. The courtiers’ dialogue then should not 
be thought of, in the manner Saunders sees it, as enacting the entanglements of hyperbole, 
but as acting them. Their interaction foregrounds one of the elements that will drive the 
destructive energies of the narrative, and which threatens in the very next scene to bring 
about a royal tragedy – only here, tellingly, it is realised by the stage-parts as a self-
conscious ironic farce that might be played with impunity.18 
                                                          
17 The Winter’s Tale (Critical Introduction to Shakespeare), p. 5. 
18 Hyperbole runs though the play, of course, informing its brightest as well as its darkest moments – and I think we 
are guilty of a critical oversight if we do not remark the extent to which the figure underwrites the effects of the final 
scene. The important contribution made by hyperbole is noted by John K. Hale in “The Maturing of Romance in The 
Winter's Tale” (Parergon vol. 3, 1985, pp. 147-162), and the article captures well the manner in which the play puts 
the device to use. Rather than an explicit and extended satirising of hyperbole (as elsewhere we see Berowne, Benedick 
and Rosalind engage in), most often in The Winter’s Tale hyperbole is allowed to explode itself (p. 149). Describing 
Florizel’s adoration of Perdita at the sheep-shearing festival Hale writes, ‘It convinces us, not because Shakespeare 




Having the opening scene frame the lure of hyperbole in this way also underlines 
the fact that Leontes’ later accusations of Hermione are figmental; that the King is led 
astray by a sweep of inflated emotions and is intoxicated by the power and dread 
connotations of his own expression (something that Leontes is even represented as 
recognising, as indicated in the knotty self-scrutiny that begins with the lines, ‘Affection, 
thy intention stabs the centre,/ Thou dost make possible things not so held,/ Communicat’st 
with dreams …’ (1.2.138-140)). Closely related to this – and too foreshadowed by the 
ironic feigning of Camillo and Archidamus – is the unavoidable sense that Leontes, even 
in the delirious heights of his rage, is caught up in a role which he has somehow elected to 
play. Again, this is something that the King’s own lines remark. Almost immediately after 
Hermione and Polixenes’ exit he notes: ‘I/ Play too, but so disgraced a part, whose issue/ 
Will hiss me to my grave’ (1.2.186-188). And as the speech continues, this metatheatric 
focus pulls back, and pans out, shifting from the fictional Leontes’ imagined cuckolding to 
take in the members of Shakespeare’s audience and the very real cuckolding that, at 
Leontes’ reckoning, takes in something like a couple hundred spectators: 
And many a man there is, even at this present, 
Now, while I speak this, holds his wife by th’arm, 
That little thinks she has been sluiced in's absence, 
And his pond fish'd by his next neighbour, by 
Sir Smile, his neighbour … 
Should all despair 
That have revolted wives, the tenth of mankind 
Would hang themselves. (1.2.191-198) 
Leontes’ projecting of the fate he has imagined for himself back onto the audience 
is at once a cause for laughter, yet it must also have unsettled the audience as art intrudes 
into life with a troubling immediacy. Joan Hartwig lucidly maps the manner in which the 
positions of knowledge and power which usually mark the audience’s relationship to 
dramatic characters are realigned by Leontes’ poisonous charge: 
Leontes moves from a character in the play, involved in the reality of his own 
situation, to a perspective like the audience's, from which he surveys his role in the 
play, to a point beyond the audience, from which he can show them what they 
themselves are doing. This is an immense leap in points of view, and the dramatic 
effects it produces are complex. As the man in the audience turns to look at the 
woman he holds by the arm, he realizes simultaneously that the situation is 
improbable but that it is altogether possible in human terms. In recognizing how 
possible Leontes' position as cuckold is, the audience forgets for the moment that 
his position as cuckold is the result of his infected fancy. There is just enough truth 
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in his generalization for the audience to see that underneath his variously harsh and 
tyrannical attitudes, there exists (at least at given moments) a cool and rational 
perception of everyday realities.19  
The first scene realises a similar metadramatic reorganisation of the relationship 
between the stage figures, the play-world that these figures are understood as inhabiting, 
and the watching audience. Thanks to the absurd inflation of the courtiers’ civilities, the 
scene quickly marks itself out as comic, yet the spectators’ initial failure to appreciate that 
Archidamus and Camillo are play-acting would have meant that the spectators misconstrue 
the arrangement of the comic scene: until Archidamus’ change of tack, the audience would 
have been laughing at the courtiers rather than with them. For the early modern auditor the 
humorously quaint and overdone decorum of the courtiers’ conversation would have soon 
made itself apparent. And the dialogue in lines 8-10 is clearly intended to highlight this: 
Camillo interrupts Archidamus’ already slightly contrived ‘For indeed-’ with a somewhat 
archaic ‘Beseech you-’, only for the latter to begin over with a spuriously solemn 
‘Verily…’ (1.1.8-10)). For those audience members who had not up until this point grasped 
the comic tone of the exchange, the manner in which Archidamus tops this ricochet of 
rapidly escalating pomposity would it seems have brought the point home. As Anne Barton 
notes, ‘Shakespeare often treats that group of … still uncommon English words derived 
from the Latin veritas – “verily”, “verity”, “verify”, “veritable” – as mildly comic and 
affected’.20  
 Signaling in this way, the dialogue frames audience expectations that for the 
remainder of the scene (to borrow a phrase from Biron in Love’s Labour’s Lost) ‘the style 
shall give us cause to climb in the merriness’ (1.1.195-196). The finely tuned ear of the 
educated early modern auditor, familiar as it was with the concept of ‘plainesse’ as 
championed by arbiters of modern rhetorical taste such as Thomas Wilson and Roger 
Ascham, could not but have registered the comic failure of form in the courtiers’ 
extravagant contrivances, and many among them would have found humour in the 
exchange’s replaying of the kind of euphuistic excesses that marked so many of literary 
efforts of the previous generation. Even modern audiences, denied the rhetorical training 
of their Renaissance predecessors, find comedy in the overblown language of passages 
like: ‘that they have seemed to be together, though absent; shook hands as over a vast; and 
embraced as it were from the ends of opposed winds. The heavens continue their loves!’ 
(1.1.25-27). Remarking the absurdity of this type of language would have confirmed the 
                                                          
19 “The Tragicomic Perspective of The Winter’s Tale” (ELH, vol. 37, no. 1, March 1970, pp. 12-36), p. 15. 
20 Essays, Mainly Shakespearian, (Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 192. That this is the case here is confirmed 
in the next scene. When Polixenes answers Hermione’s request to put off his departure with ‘I may not, verily’, the 
Queen explodes at the absurd term: ‘Verily?/ You put me off with limber vows’ (1.2.45-47) (where ‘limber’ means 
‘weak’), and then launches on a 12 line skit poking fun at the effete Polixenes’ ‘dread “verily”’ (1.2.55). He has no 
answer for her humour, and, despite only a moment before swearing that it was out of the question, he consents to stay 
on. We should also note that this discursive preciousness is also present in Polixenes’ previous speech to Leontes, 




audience’s initial sense of their own sophistication and their distance from the play-world, 
as well as their original assumption that these stage roles conformed to the stock figure of 
the self-regarding courtier. Though such stylised and flat representations would have been 
recognised by 161121 as being somewhat outdated, they would not have been thought 
inappropriate for a play that billed itself as a ‘Tale’, and in this way the audience would 
have been encouraged to locate these figures in a play-world reality configured along 
similarly crude representational lines.  
Yet with the volta performed by Archidamus’ ‘Would they else be content to die?’, 
the rug (which some spectators may already have sensed was, once or twice, being tugged) 
is pulled from under the audience. What were assumed to be stock figures are revealed as 
being the ironically performed constructions of a pair of naturalistically framed courtiers. 
Courtiers that the audience must now conceive of as possessed of a sceptical intelligence 
and a deft wit, as capable of launching on an improvised parody, of negotiating the shifting 
tonalities of such an exchange, and also sufficiently sophisticated to presume their 
interlocutor similarly gifted. Suddenly, the audience members find themselves watching a 
quite different play; not only must they revise their understanding of the exchange they 
have just witnessed, but, correspondingly, they must also reconceive the generic 
parameters of this play-world according to a far more complex theatrical mode than they 
had originally allowed. 
This reassessment enacts what might be termed a shift to the real. In finding humour 
in the overwrought language of the scene, the audience had originally assumed themselves 
in possession of a discernment denied to the speakers. However, in that these courtiers are 
presented as having merely been play-acting all along, the correlation between audience 
and stage representation is reworked. The discriminating perspective that allowed the 
audience to remark some of literature’s clichéd forms, and which the audience assumed 
was exclusively theirs is presented as shared by the courtiers. In fact, having been taken in 
by the personas that they acted out, the play’s spectators are forced to admit that these 
courtiers shared an unspoken understanding which in terms of ironic sophistication initially 
outwent their own. The effect of this is that Archidamus and Camillo are accorded a more 
emphatic presence. They are, in short, made more real. 
Yet in keeping with the perverse sensibility which informs the play’s aesthetic 
construction, having effectively established this naturalism, The Winter’s Tale soon after 
disrupts it. The sophistication that marks Archidamus and Camillo extends only so far as 
to take in the Leontes and Hermione that banter urbanely with Polixenes at the beginning 
of the next act. After that, the outdated and crude representational techniques that the 
courtiers’ exchange parodied become one of the preferred modes by which The Winter’s 
Tale will re-realise its roles and through which it will remark the conditions of its play-
world reality. This rather remarkable shift in tone occurs with the startling explosion of 
                                                          
21 We know the first performances were not later than 1611; in his diary, Simon Foreman records seeing the play at 
the Globe on 15 May that year. 
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Leontes’ jealousy. The ready-made motives that the play’s source, Pandosto, provides for 
its king’s accusations are jettisoned, and rather than representing Leontes’ suspicions as 
being a natural response to experienced events, his jealousy comes from out of the blue, 
from a psychological nowhere. It is, in Howard Felperin’s words, ‘the kind of heaven-sent, 
or rather hell-sent, madness with which Até, Tisiphone, and Envy conventionally afflict 
the protagonists of the dramatic romances of three decades earlier’.22 And similarly, once 
she becomes an Innocent Slandered, the idiosyncratic and lively intelligence Hermione 
demonstrated in her playful exchange with Polixenes recedes, and her figure takes on 
something of the statuesque schematic rendered by personification.23 
The refined naturalism that the play’s opening few minutes so effectively realise 
then is shown to be simply a modality which the play is free to suspend and revisit when 
and how it chooses. And after these first minutes, this naturalism has only occasional 
application, returning to superimpose itself on play’s representational layerings so as to 
lend to certain key moments an emotional heightening. The remainder of the action of the 
drama’s first half becomes, by contrast, progressively more outlandish, culminating in a 
hectic accumulation of the romance’s typically fantastical elements. And when, after a 
narrative interim of 16 years, the second half of the play begins, it does so with an 
exposition scene (a structural arrangement that folds back to reference the courtiers’ 
opening exchange) which remarks how far from the particulars of the first scene’s 
realisation the play has travelled: this exposition is delivered in a to-audience address by 
the ludicrous and archaic personification of Time. 
Related to the use that The Winter’s Tale makes of such rudimentary and old-
fashioned devices is its play with stock characters. Once more, this is given marking up in 
the courtiers’ opening exchange, and, in a similar arrangement to that just discussed, this 
re-utilisation upends the advances of this scene. The kind of conventional dramatic 
characters that the courtiers played as cliché, and which they highlighted as products of 
theatrical dissimulation are exactly the types of role that, as the drama progresses, the 
audience will watch the play’s stage figures time and again assume – only here, the ironic 
distance that indicated a sophisticated agency on the part of the courtiers seems entirely 
absent. Leontes’ role-playing has already been noted, but it extends beyond taking the part 
of the ‘cuckold’ to Hermione’s ‘wronged woman’. As Hartwig points out, Leontes forms 
a dramatically diametric relationship with Paulina, and in the intercourse between the pair, 
they each enact a number of theatrical stereotypes, most prominent among them being (in 
                                                          
22 “Our Carver’s Excellence: The Winter’s Tale” (Howard Felperin, Shakespearean Romance (Princeton University 
Press, 1972), pp. 211-245), p. 223. 
23 While Felperin is prepared to cede to the role of Hermione ‘a psychic life and past’ he insists strongly on the extent 
the figure functions to personify a long line of virtues. And he argues that in her speech of 3.2.26-34 this is ‘something 
to which she actually draws our attention’. To better make his point, when quoting the lines he elects to follow the 
folio and capitalise the Queen’s terms – meaning that 3.2.28-30 reads, ‘I doubt not then but Innocence shall make/ 
False Accusation blush, and Tyranny/ Tremble at Patience’ – but as Felperin notes, ‘a Jacobean audience would have 
recognized them immediately as the personifications of an older dramatic tradition’ (“Our Carver’s Excellence: The 




the first half) Leontes’ ‘tyrant’ to Paulina’s ‘shrew’, and (in the second) Leontes’ humble 
‘penitent’ to Paulina’s ‘confessor’.24 And, as we have earlier noted in the case of Leontes’ 
assumption of the jealous ‘cuckold’, the play repeatedly chooses to highlight this role-
playing as representing a course of action that the character is aware of, or even as 
something knowingly decided upon. Paulina belongs to the latter category; on being 
informed of the premature birth of Hermione’s baby girl Paulina announces her self-
conscious assumption of the role of ‘shrew’, ‘the “scolding tongue” of moral conscience’:25  
I dare be sworn. 
These dangerous, unsafe lunes i' th' King, beshrew them. 
He must be told on't, and he shall. The office  
Becomes a woman best. I'll take’t upon me. 
If I prove honey-mouthed, let my tongue blister,  
And never to my red-looked anger be  
The trumpet any more. (2.2.30-36) 26  
But it is not left entirely to the individual roles themselves to mark up this repeated 
assumption of stock character. The dramatic action too gives it a cartoony highlighting in 
the sheep shearing scene of 4.4. The shift effected by the play’s switch to pastoral – a form 
that by the early 1600s would automatically mark up its artifice and fictionality27 – 
underlines how the scene (the second longest that Shakespeare ever wrote) functions as a 
highly theatricalised set-piece – Righter even goes as far as to describe it as ‘a kind of play 
within the play’.28 As the action unfolds it soon becomes apparent that almost every 
character present is playing at being some other part (and sometimes more than one). For 
example, in the paired interlocutors that conduct the scene’s extended and ironically 
conventional debate on the relative merits of art and nature: Polixenes, already made up to 
appear 16 years older than the Polixenes of the play’s first half, makes himself appear older 
still by adopting a white beard (as made clear at 4.4.395). This so he might, (in a distinct 
reversal of the meek character he demonstrated in the first two acts) play Tyrant King in 
confronting Perdita (a role that was itself of course performed by a boy actor), a queen-to-
                                                          
24 “The Tragicomic Perspective of The Winter’s Tale”, p. 13. 
25 “The Tragicomic Perspective of The Winter’s Tale”, p. 13. The ‘scolding tongue’ is an epitaph twice given to the 
‘shrew’, Katherina, in The Taming of the Shrew (1.2.98, 251). 
26 J. H. P. Pafford’s note to this passage in the 1965 Arden edition demonstrates that even Paulina’s tongue plays a 
role: ‘The “trumpet” was the man who preceded the herald who was usually dressed in red and often bore an angry 
message’ (The Arden Shakespeare, p. 42, n 34-35). 
27 Certainly, the early modern period produces various ‘straight’ pastorals, but oftentimes these become appropriated 
and re-rendered in a multifarious sequence of serioludic imitation. Even poetical brilliance failed to ensure that a work 
would escape such parodying; see for example, the numerous responses written to Christopher Marlowe’s The 
Passionate Shepherd to His Love: Sir Walter Raleigh’s coining of The Nymph’s Reply, John Donne’s The Bait, and 
the distorted iteration that Shakespeare gives to the lines in The Merry Wives of Windsor 3.1. And Marlowe himself, 
provides the poem burlesque in The Jew of Malta 4.3. This pattern suggests that even in the apparently ‘straight’ works 
of the early modern period the relationship that a form takes to its content and signification is neither fixed nor 
absolute. 




be who believes herself to be a farmer’s daughter who is here playing at being a queen – 
arms filled with flowers, and, as Righter notes, most probably wearing a crown in the 
fashion of the Whitsun Queen.29 
But if the sense of ‘real’ conjured by the courtiers’ exchange in 1.1 is soon after cast 
aside, even within the confines of that first scene this ‘real’ must still be understood as 
cutting both ways. For while it essays the substance of the courtiers and the verisimilitude 
of the world they inhabit it also indicates the actuality of the theatre. When Archidamus 
steps out of the character he has up until that point played, the audience must wonder for a 
moment who, exactly, he is. In humorously shucking off a persona and leaving a make-
believe world to collapse, his play-acting cannot help but point back to the courtiers’ own 
fictional and performative realisation; the audience is made aware of the actors behind each 
of the parts. Granted, the play-world is soon after resuscitated, and reconstituted on terms 
that could be said to be more convincing than those by which it was originally conceived 
(even if this is only to last for the space of a few minutes). But once this moment of 
powerful confusion has been had, the ambiguities of performed identity can never wholly 
be put out of the minds of the spectators. And these ambiguities will be given further 




The device of having Archidamus and Camillo act out the parts of stereotypical stage 
courtiers marks up theatrical identity as something that is not only performative but shifting 
and variant. This would have been further underlined by the fact that the actors that 
performed Camillo and Archidamus would almost certainly have doubled other roles.30 In 
the early modern theatre the assumption of role never wholly occluded the performer, and 
when doubling was in effect, the actor himself would remain a prominent presence across 
the different roles he played. This would be particularly so in the case of the actors who 
                                                          
29 Essays Mainly Shakespearian, p. 177. 
30 As pioneering works from the sixties like D. M. Bevington's From ‘Mankind’ to Marlowe (Harvard University 
Press, 1968) and W. A. Ringler's article “The Number of Actors in Shakespeare's Early Plays” (The Seventeenth 
Century Stage, edited by G. E. Bentley (University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 111–133) established, doubling was 
a common recourse in the theatre of the period, and we can be sure that Shakespeare’s plays made use of the device. 
It seems me that we can be equally certain that Shakespeare, intimately concerned as he was with the manner in which 
his chosen art form negotiated the business of its own realisation, would explore the creative possibilities offered by 
such a resource. This is something that a number of recent studies have investigated. Brett Gamboa’s Shakespeare’s 
Double Plays (Cambridge University Press, 2018) combines a careful analysis and re-evaluation of the evidence for 
doubling in Shakespeare’s plays with imaginative yet measured speculation. This work can be supplemented by John 
Palfrey and Tiffany Stern’s excellent survey of acting in the period in Shakespeare in Parts (Oxford University Press, 
2007) (see chapters 1-3) which demonstrates not only the manner in which performances of the period exploited the 
device, but also explores how audiences conceived of the relationship between the separate roles as well as the 




took on Camillo and Archidamus. The opening scene’s game of dissimulation already 
implicates the actors as being impersonators of different dramatic types, and the audience 
– having been taking in by the actors’ performance once already – will give these same 
actors keen attention when they return to the stage in other parts. 
Camillo is a relatively large part, and the actor most probably took on only one other 
role – almost certainly that of Paulina’s ill-fated husband, Antigonus (a claim that I will 
explain shortly). Archidamus, on the other hand, makes no further contribution after the 
opening scene, and this may point to the role being performed by an actor more used to 
taking on bit parts. Brett Gamboa’s speculative casting chart for the play gives the actor 
who plays Archidamus four more roles (Jailer, Mariner, Servant (4.4), Messenger (5.1)),31 
and the audience members may have found humour in a distribution of this kind. Such a 
design would mean that the spectators could not, at each of these subsequent re-
appearances, help but remark the presence of the same actor beneath each of these (briefly 
sketched) play-world figures, an arrangement that would make comic contrast with the 
trick that this actor pulled off in the opening scene, whereby the audience initially failed to 
recognise the sophistication of Archidamus’ feigned construction. 
My own feeling is that there exists a conceptual correspondence between the roles 
of Archidamus and the Third gentleman – the speaker who in 5.2 will complete the account 
of the never-staged reunion scene – and giving both parts to the same actor would highlight 
this nicely. This would mean that having opened the play, in what turned out to be a bit 
part, it now appears that this same actor, in another bit part, is, with his account of the royal 
reconciliation, apparently closing out the narrative. And the emphatic theatricality that 
marked the delivery of the exposition in 1.1, is matched – outdone, even – by the quite 
preposterous stage business of 5.2. In this latter scene the account of the unseen reunion is 
rendered through a sequence of installments that are delivered by a set of serially arriving 
gentlemen. The account unfolds according to the rule of three, one of Shakespeare’s 
favourite comic devices, and the already absurd punchline of having a third speaker arrive 
on stage to complete the exposition is made even more ludicrous if the audience were to 
recognise him as the same actor who, in the very first scene, demonstrated that neither actor 
nor exposition was to be trusted. And while the language of the first two gentlemen is 
somewhat grandiose, the Third Gentleman has a turn of phrase that even more closely 
resembles the tumid contrivances of Archidamus and Camillo’s mock-language: ‘One of 
the prettiest touches of all, and that which angled for mine eyes – caught the water though 
not the fish …’ (5.2.76-76). There would also be a perverse symmetry at work in having 
the same actor top and tail the play action (that is at least, what at this point the audience 
have been led to believe represents the tail-end of the play action) with expositions that 
(deliberately) do not quite work. This actor opened the play with what was essentially a 
pseudo-exposition, and one that in practical terms – since, as has been noted, all the 
pertinent background information that it imparts is repeated almost immediately in the next 
scene – is not needed. Returning to complete the description that replaces the anticipated 
                                                          
31 Shakespeare’s Double Plays, p. 270. 
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spectacle of the narrative climax, he offers an exposition that – in that it replaces the 
spectacle of what has been signalled as the drama’s climax – is not wanted.  
The audience members must be uncertain as to what kind of investment they are 
expected to make in the scene. Not only has the playwright elected, rather peculiarly it 
must seem, to forgo staging the play’s emotional reunion, but here at the (assumed) finale 
he has chosen to underline the ambivalent status accorded throughout the play to ‘the 
evidence of things unseen’ by rendering the account of the reunion according to a risible 
theatricality. The presence of the actor who had fulfilled the role of the mock-expositor 
Archidamus would only make the audience members more sceptical as to the investment 
they can give to such a report, reminding them that the play, in its very first moments, had 
operated to dupe them. Yet the same arrangement might also suggest to them that this 
presentation of the play’s ‘final scene’ may too be some kind of trick, and that the play 
does in have fact more surprises for them – that the play will, like it did in the first scene, 
seem to offer them something poorly realised, only to reverse their assumptions and then 
pull out a coup de théâtre. Which, with the ‘statue’ scene, is precisely what happens. 
-- 
As we can see, doubling picks up on and extends the open deception of ‘role’ that the first 
scene played out, and I would in fact argue that the success of the play’s spectacular 
resolution can be considered as in large part reliant on these features. It is doubling that 
ensures that the emotional fulfillment that the final scene offers is properly replete – and 
is, at the same time, possessed of an audacious comic brilliance. Without it, the fantastic 
resolution of the ‘statue’ scene is clouded, and the manner of its realisation is less artful 
than the rest of the play has led the audience to expect. And, happily for our purposes, it is 
through the discussion of the play’s climax that we will come in round-about way to the 
matter of the doubling of our second courtier from 1.1, Camillo. 
For if the effects that doubling makes possible are not recognised then the narrative 
climax provides only the recovery of Hermione and Perdita, and no matter how miraculous 
this climax might be felt to be, the terrible loss of Leontes’ son, Mamillius, must still be 
thought of as hanging over the scene.32 It could even be said that the awful injustice of 
Mamillius’ death is in fact accentuated by Hermione’s return – something implied in 
Robert Grams Hunter’s remark that Shakespeare could just have easily had ‘the renowned 
Julio Romano create a mother-son group’.33 As Grams Hunter points out, the loss of 
Mamillius is something which most critics fail to properly accommodate into their readings 
of the play’s resolution, choosing either to ignore the young Prince’s death (G. Wilson 
                                                          
32 The discussion of the theatrical correspondence between Mamillius and Perdita that occurs over the next three pages 
is taken in part from the more extended exploration I give to this relationship in my article “‘This seeming lady and 
her brother’: Further remarks on the doubling of Perdita with Mamillius in The Winter’s Tale” (Notes and Queries, 
vol 67, no. 2, June 2020). 
33“Shakespeare and the Comedy of Forgiveness: The Winter’s Tale” (The Winter’s Tale: Critical essays, edited by 




Knight writes of the final act that though ‘Paulina reminds us that her husband is gone; and 
we may remember Mamillius … the subsidiary persons are no longer, as persons, 
important’34), or to dismiss it as lacking importance (‘The loss of [Leontes’] son is more 
than made up for by the recovery of his wife and … daughter,’ as Paul N. Siegel tallies 
it35). Yet if Mamillius is ‘no longer important’ then why does the play remind the audience 
of this loss near the beginning of the final act – seeming, in fact, to go out of its way to do 
so, and to do so forcefully? Paulina reintroduces his figure after hearing of the arrival of 
Polixenes’ son, Florizel: 
Had our prince, 
Jewel of children, seen this hour, he had paired 
Well with this lord; there was not full a month 
Between their births. (5.1.115-118) 
Significantly, it is, as Grams Hunter observes, the only occasion where Leontes calls for a 
halt to Paulina’s purgatorial torments.36 And I would add that in contrast to interpretations 
like Siegel’s, the effect of the loss of Mamillius on the King is presented as being so 
profound that we must think that even with the miraculous restoration of his Queen Leontes 
would still be subject to a grief capable of overwhelming his very sense: 
Prithee, no more; cease. Thou know'st 
He dies to me again when talked of. Sure, 
When I shall see this gentleman, thy speeches 
Will bring me to consider that which may 
Unfurnish me of reason. (5.2.118-122) 
In a passage that remarks the peculiarity of Mamillius’ fate, and the particular 
connection this role has with Perdita, Helen Cooper suggests the role-doubling that a 
number of recent critics37 have felt that the structure of the play asks for: 
That loss of Perdita in the play becomes crucial to the play primarily because of her 
brother’s death. He is unusual in romance, as in a tragicomedy, for being 
irremediably dead – there is no symbolic return for him in the plot, as there is for 
Hermione – but the theatre may have offered a way round that, too. It is possible, 
perhaps likely, that the same boy actor played both siblings. That Mamillius does, 
in the most literal sense, return in the person of his sister.38 
                                                          
34 The Crown of Life (Methuen, 1947), p. 126. 
35 “Leontes, a Jealous Tyrant” (Review of English Studies, 1, n.s., October 1950, pp. 302-307), p. 306. 
36 “Shakespeare and the Comedy of Forgiveness: The Winter’s Tale”, p. 170. 
37 See for example, Lynn Enterline (Shakespeare’s Schoolroom (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), p. 151), 
Richard Proudfoot (“Verbal Reminiscence and the Two-Part Structure of The Winter’s Tale”, (The Winter’s Tale: 
Critical essays, edited by Maurice Hunt (Routledge, 1995), pp. 280-297), p. 288), Margaret Fleming Pearson (All in 
War with Time: Studies in Shakespeare’s Romances (University of California Press, 1994), p. 50). 




Gamboa underlines the appeal of such an arrangement:  
…no alternative can equal the value of doubling Mamillius and Perdita, a choice 
that so well complements the play’s miraculous conclusion that not employing it 
seems actively to thwart the play’s objectives and to deprive the audience of the 
full-throated redemption and reunion that the structure and genre facilitate.39 
Since the first scene, the play has emphasised that its stage figures must be thought 
of as being realised through dissimulation and configured as multiple. As such, the stage 
part, which in the early modern theatre is already equivocal is made even more so, and the 
other aspects that configure role – the actor, and the other play-world parts that are 
performed by that same actor – enjoy a greater presence than they would normally. In this 
way, when Perdita (if we allow the part as played by the same actor that earlier performed 
the young Prince) is reintroduced in the final act, in a scene which reunites the grieving 
parent with the presumed-dead child, and in a context that has foregrounded the memory 
of the lost Prince, the presence of Mamillius is conjured in a manner that is more immediate 
than the rather abstract reference that doubling is usually constrained to make.40 
At the same time then that Paulina’s incessant lamentations serve as shrewish 
castigations to the conscience of the King, they also fulfill a structural purpose. By 
repeatedly underlining the loss of Hermione, the Queen’s spectacular restoration is made 
all the more powerful. Yet as we see, Paulina’s jeremiad is not confined to Hermione – in 
fact her speeches in 5.1. reiterate each of the losses of play’s first half, and in this way 
prepare the ground for the incredible return of each of these figures (whether that revival 
is in dramatic or metadramatic mode). As well then as marking up the theatrically 
recovered presence of Mamillius, Paulina’s litany of loss too takes in Perdita. Since, 
though, the audience is prepared for the Princess’s reunion with Leontes she needs only a 
brief mention. Discussing Leontes’ remarrying and getting an heir, Paulina says: 
For has not the divine Apollo said – 
Is't not the tenor of his oracle? –  
That King Leontes shall not have an heir 
Till his lost child be found? (5.1.37-40) 
But there is – although its occurrence takes place in a wholly different theatrical 
register – one more loss in the play’s first half, and as Paulina’s speech continues, it too is 
indicated: 
Which that it shall, 
Is all as monstrous to our human reason 
As my Antigonus to break his grave 
                                                          
39 Shakespeare’s Double Plays, p. 94. 
40 There are points in the scene at which it may be thought that in this meeting between Leontes and Perdita the latter’s 
doubling of Mamillius is being brought to the audience’s attention. See my previously mentioned “‘This Seeming 




And come again to me, who, on my life, 
Did perish with the infant. (5.1.40-44)41 
The manner in which this is shoe-horned in must draw attention to itself, and the 
awkwardness of the mention is only further underlined by Paulina choosing, peculiarly, to 
attest to her husband’s demise with a perfectly gratuitous oath. Yet as the audience is aware, 
the ‘lost child’ is about to be recovered, and, if the doubling arrangement which has been 
suggested for Mamillius also takes in Paulina’s husband, then the dramatic irony is 
extended further: Antigonus too is allowed to return, as the actor who fulfilled his part is, 
in the role of Camillo, about to present himself at court. 
Antigonus’ death, though, is, in terms of rank and realisation, distinct from the 
play’s other losses. Hermione, Mamillius and Perdita complete Leontes’ royal circle, and 
their losses were configured with a sense of drama and tragedy (or at least potential 
tragedy). Antigonus’ death occurred in an altogether more fantastic key, representing the 
hinge-point by which the play switches from tragedy to comedy. The stage direction is as 
familiar as it is outrageous: ‘Exit, pursued by a bear’ (3.3.57 sd), and the marvellously 
muddled commentary that the Clown provides to Antigonus’ grisly end a few lines later is 
a comic tour de force that can raise gales of dark laughter. 
It might be thought that the profound movement of the play’s last scene, one of art’s 
most striking enactments of the universal human hope that the lost might be recovered, is 
dependent on maintaining an artistic mood that cannot properly accommodate a figure 
dispatched in so colourful and outrageous a manner. And, as the scene unfolds, it does 
indeed appear that the playwright has dispensed with pursuing further any metatheatrical 
arrangement that will reunite Paulina with her Antigonus. Though the actor is present in 
the role of Camillo, all Paulina’s energies are concentrated on the presentation of 
Hermione’s ‘statue’, and nothing passes between Paulina and Camillo that indicates any 
sort of connection. Most of the audience, of course, caught up in the dramatic presentation 
of the ‘statue’ would have quite forgotten that Paulina had rather awkwardly insinuated 
Antigonus into her inventory of loss. And those who remembered would almost certainly 
not have been disappointed with an arrangement that suggested the playwright was content 
to sacrifice this relatively minor business so as to better realise the revelatory mood that 
Hermione’s ‘statue’ undoubtedly conjured.  
The dizzying finale of Hermione’s fantastic return crowns and integrates the play’s 
unexpected royal reunions; the Queen steps down from the pedestal and delivers a blessing 
on her daughter’s head, marking out her own revival as predicated on the mysterious 
recovery of her child. In dramatic terms, the only thing required at this point, as the 
playwright is fully aware, is a rather urgent wrapping up. To finish things, while the play’s 
spectators are still stunned by wonder, and before they recover themselves sufficiently to 
                                                          
41 There is another reminder of Antigonus in the next scene’s description of the royal reunion: ‘But, oh, the noble 
combat that twixt joy and sorrow was fought in Paulina: she had one eye declined for the loss of her husband, another 
elevated that the oracle was fulfilled’ (5.2.69-71). The physically absurd and cartoon-like description being provided 
by the already much-discussed Third Gentleman. 
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recognise the narrative impossibility (or, more precisely perhaps, the narrative fraudulence) 
of what they have just witnessed. A minor but masterful piece of theatrical misdirection 
facilitates this. Hermione, in the one brief speech she is here given, asks a series of 
questions as to how Perdita’s return came about, and this serves to point the audience’s 
attention away from the dubious restoration of the Queen herself, and onto a recovery, 
which though fantastical, has been provided proper explanation. Paulina has throughout 
5.3 played the part of director, guiding the responses of the audiences of both Leontes’ 
court and Shakespeare’s Globe, and now her curt rebuff of Hermione’s inquiries, ‘There’s 
time enough for that’, works to forestall audience queries in both the Sicilian court and the 
London theatre. Then, with the same feel for dramatic effect that she has displayed 
throughout this scene, and so that the sense of revelation that has been realised should not 
be dissipated, she instructs everybody on stage to make a sharp exit: ‘Go together,/ You 
precious winners all. Your exultation/ Partake to every one’ (5.3.130-132). 
Brilliantly realised a piece of stagecraft as this is though, it is insufficiently brilliant 
for Shakespeare. Despite having demonstrated that he is capable of effecting a dramatic 
arrangement that gives his audience no real opportunity to register the outrageous artistic 
deception that has just been practiced on it, and in this way bringing his stage figures to the 
point of their final exit with the scene’s miraculous mood wholly preserved, Shakespeare 
– in the manner of his play-world counter, Autolycus – will push his luck further. And just 
as it was with the pedlar, the test of the playwright’s virtuosity will be that his invention 
sustains itself at the same time as it flaunts the outlandishness of its deceptions. With such 
an arrangement, nothing needs to be sacrificed; the sublime can rub shoulders with the 
comic, and the playwright, like Autolycus, can have things all ways at once: underlining 
the dissimulation of his own art, yet at the same time, still making the most of its effects. 
So rather than simply having Leontes affirm Paulina’s call to exit and leading everyone off 
Shakespeare has the scene go on for another 23 lines, providing an exchange between this 
pair in which the various contrivances of the play are, in somewhat frantic fashion, 
remarked over. And it is worth observing in passing that productions which opt to cut the 
play’s opening scene, often cut out most of this exchange too – demonstrating how often 
the play is given a conceptualisation which means that its ironic attitude towards its own 
construction is neither appreciated nor accommodated. 
Leontes has barely begun in on his response to Paulina, when he interrupts himself 
to remark the artistic double-dealing which has afforded the play its powerful final effects 
(more than remark in fact: he offers a new narrative detail that further strains the 
plausibility of the resolution): ‘Thou hast found mine, / But how is to be questioned, for I 
saw her,/ As I thought, dead’ (5.3.138-141). And a few lines later, after repeating Paulina’s 
instruction to exit (‘Let’s from this place.’(5.3.146)) he checks himself so that he might 
fulfil – in so hurried a manner that it cannot help but mark itself up  – his narrative 
obligations: he makes a final lightning-quick apology that in 14 words takes in the wrongs 
he did to both Hermione and Polixenes, and then in equally rapid terms, so that the Queen 
is updated as to how the plot resolutions have served to take in her daughter, he introduces 
Hermione to her ‘son-in-law’, Florizel. 
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Leontes’ last lines – preceded by yet another call for everyone to get off stage – are 
even more explicit. They highlight the lack of narrative explanation for the resolution, and, 
in the phrase ‘answer his part performed’, underline for the last time how these effects have 
been afforded through the efforts of the playwright and his players: 
Good Paulina, 
Lead us from hence, where we may leisurely 
Each one demand and answer his part 
Performed in this wide gap of time since first 
We were dissevered. (5.3.151-155) 
After which there is only time for Leontes to once more reiterate the dramatic need of a 
sharp exit – making it four mentions in all: ‘Hastily lead away’ – before, he finally has 
everybody go off. 
Leontes’ various unpacking of the play’s theatricality and illusion, though, is too 
stagecraft of the first order, with the dramatist continuing to control and direct his 
audience’s response. For even as the play points back to the artifice and absurdity by which 
it has coordinated its effects, it does not undo their power. Leontes’ scattergun cataloguing 
of the drama’s contrivances (and Leontes’ call that they away ‘Hastily’ so as to ‘leisurely’ 
unpack things elsewhere suggests that the King’s closing speech, while undoubtedly 
characterised by regal flair and fiat, has some pace to it) means that the audience members 
are given no opportunity to dwell on the particularities by which the play has taken them 
in, but merely to register that the playwright has pulled off this trick in virtuoso fashion; it 
is an arrangement that produces delight rather than disillusion. 
There is in these final lines between Paulina and her King one more metatheatrical 
gambit that gets played out, and it is the most outrageous and enjoyable of them all. It 
occurs early on in the exchange and it brings us back to our courtier of the first act, and 
double of Antigonus, Camillo. Any figures that were, in fulfilment of Paulina’s first call to 
exit, set to march off are immediately checked in their movements. Shakespeare has 
Paulina begin over again her lamentations, only now it is the wretched state of her own 
lonely widowhood that she bemoans. It is a switch which however it is performed must, to 
some extent, seem strained – an arrangement that serves to remind the audience that 
Antigonus is, metatheatrically at least, present: 
Go together, 
You precious winners all. Your exultation 
Partake to every one. I, an old turtle, 
Will wing me to some withered bough, and there 
My mate, that's never to be found again, 
Lament till I am lost. (5.3.130-135) 
Leontes amends this in outrageously implausible fashion: there and then he 
contracts a marriage between Paulina and Camillo. And since nothing in the play has 
prepared the audience for such an eventuality, the King supplies the motivation for this 
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peremptory resolution with an absurd and absurdly brief (only seven words) parenthetical 
expository aside: ‘(For him, I partly know his minde)’.42 The whole episode is delightfully 
improbable, a quality that Gamboa suggests explains ‘the laughter and joy it routinely 
sparks in audiences, who experience by it something that seems perfectly in tune with other 
magical transformations that turn the play into a full-blown romance’.43 A full-blown 
romance, whose profundity is edged out with the comic, and in which even Antigonus 
might in metatheatric manner escape the bear’s belly. 
At the same time then that the fantastic conclusion of The Winter’s Tale marks one 
of art’s most moving realisations of the profound human hope that lingers behind every 
loss, it is also a striking demonstration of artistic deception. Remarkably, neither aspect 
overwhelms the other. The rather brilliant metatheatrical reversal which the first scene 
pulled off means that the drama has from its very first instances insisted on the false 
conditions upon which its effects are predicated. The opening exchange empties out the 
elements of exposition and role, and the scene seems to point to nothing beyond the artistry 
of its own contrivance. Yet, with a wonderful irony, it is through the contrivances of 
exposition and of role that the play’s final effects are had. Sicilia’s Prince, Princess and 
Queen each make a return that is miraculous – and which at once marks up the 
dissimulations by which this miraculous effect is brought about. Mamillius returns to the 
stage, conjured through the configured impossibilities of role; Perdita is recovered through 
the self-aware unfolding of romance formula, and the awesome reappearance of a living 
Hermione is accounted for in an explanation that is incomplete and, properly speaking, 
incredible. The coda attached to this fantastical scene of royal restitution pursues this 
strategy. It offers a series of comic expositions that make for a wilfully over-wrought re-
rehearsal of the play’s various improbabilities, and the breakneck pace at which these are 
delivered intensifies the parodic mood. The most charming of these can be thought the 
contracting of the marriage of one of our original courtiers, Camillo, to Paulina, an 
arrangement that highlights the duplicities that role and exposition afford, yet, at the same 
time remarks the delight which these duplicities might derive. 
We might remember how at the end of the first scene, Camillo together with 
Archidamus wandered off (according to Sander’s perceptive emendation) chuckling. But 
we might ask who exactly is chuckling, and at what precisely? The opening scene’s coup 
de théâtre initiated the structures by which the audience would conceive of stage presences. 
They are experienced by the audience as myriad, ambivalent and artificial. Each stage 
                                                          
42 Parenthetical in the folios at least, which prints it in this way: ‘(For him, I partly know his minde)’ (3356). While it 
might be objected that such punctuation is dated, it seems to me rather apt in highlighting what I feel to be the phrase’s 
camp knowingness. The use of a self-aware and ironic exposition is not infrequent in the plays, and I think that making 
use of the folios’ preference for supplying these moments parenthetical punctuation remarks this rather nicely. For 
example, see the parenthetical aside stuck in the middle of Theseus’s solemn declaration of the punishment that awaits 
a recalcitrant Hermia: ‘Or else the Law of Athens yeelds you vp/ (Which by no meanes we may extenuate)/ To death, 
or to a vow of single life’ (128-130), a line that asks for a similarly ironic delivery (the play’s plot, after all, being 
resolved by Theseus offering, in – once again – briskly-realised form, a fourth act mitigation of these unmitigable 
conditions). 
43 Shakespeare’s Double Plays, p. 94. 
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presence indicates beyond its part to the actor that performs it, and, further, to the other 
parts that this same actor fulfils. And each stage presence points back further, indicating 
the enterprise of the performance and the playwright who has fashioned it, and at the same 
time remarking the duplicity inherent throughout such a structure of representation. So 
while at one level the courtiers’ chuckling will be seen as the result of their ironic game of 
rhetorical one-upmanship, the spectators, who had almost certainly been rather ingeniously 
taken in by the courtiers’ impersonations, must wonder if on some other level it is not their 
own earlier obtuseness that motivates the chuckling on the stage – if this mirth does not 
belong also to the actors, and through them, the playwright, and derive from their pleasure 
in the effect that they have so skilfully engineered.  
The arrangement can be thought revisited in the play’s wondrous climax. 
Hermione’s return, if it is not to be a ridiculous misfire, requires an enchanted audience. 
The Queen’s first movements are only experienced as miraculous if the audience 
imaginatively colludes in the sense of their impossibility. The scene could rightly be 
considered the most moving moment in the entire canon. Yet at the same time, it may be 
the most outrageous. No sooner is this awesome recovery effected than the playwright and 
his company – Autolycuses all of them – point back to the incredible means by which this 
artistic con-trick has been accomplished. Of course, this ‘reveal’ is too a virtuoso 
performance, it draws attention to the absurdities of both the fictional and theatrical 
arrangements, yet is performed with such wit, flair and pace, that rather than undermining 
the miraculous mood, it serves instead to round it with humour and delight. It is an 
extremely high-risk strategy, and the arrangement derives much of its brilliance from the 
way that it manages to sustain itself in the face of the imminent collapse that the gambit 
threatens. Even the highly skilled performers of the Kingsmen can only pull it off for the 
briefest interval, and after 24 lines, they exit. They leave behind them an audience that they 
have repeatedly outfoxed, who they have taken in with the most profound of artistic 
illusions and the most mundane of deceptions, an audience to whom they have revealed 
the very mechanics by which their duplicities have been practiced – but only to further 
revel in these dissimulated effects. And it is an audience that we must imagine remains 
subject to these effects, that remains astounded. We could be forgiven were we to imagine 
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